Sandra Train

The plaintiff's counsel sought court approval of a solicitor and client account based on a 30% contingency fee agreement following a $200,000 settlement with the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The court found the contingency fee agreement was not fair or reasonable, noting the lack of complexity, the limited time docketed compared to the proposed fee, and the absence of evidence that the plaintiff was advised of the limited recovery available from the Fund.

The court deemed the agreement unenforceable and reduced the approved fee to $30,000 plus HST and disbursements.

The plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained during a recreational non-contact hockey game, alleging that an opposing player intentionally or negligently checked him into the boards and that the league operator failed to provide a safe playing environment.

The court considered the negligence standard applicable to sporting events and the doctrine of implied consent to the inherent risks of hockey.

The evidence did not establish that the opposing player acted with intent to injure or in a reckless manner outside the ordinary risks of play.

The court further held that the league had appropriate rules, referees, and disciplinary systems, and that the plaintiff had signed a clear waiver releasing the league from liability for injuries arising from hockey participation.

The action was therefore dismissed.

A statutory third party insurer sought leave to bring a motion after the action had been set down for trial in order to compel the plaintiff to attend a psychiatric defence medical examination.

The insurer argued that it had only recently become aware of the psychiatric component of the claim and that, as a statutory third party with separate interests from the defendant insurer, it was entitled to its own medical examination.

The court held that there had been no unexpected or substantial change in circumstances justifying leave after the matter was set down for trial.

The court also found that the insurer’s interests were effectively the same as the defendant insurer’s and that a psychiatric defence examination had already been obtained.

The motion was therefore dismissed.