Robert Love

The defendant restaurant brought a motion for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiffs' amended statement of claim advanced a new cause of action barred by the Limitations Act.

The plaintiffs had previously had their claim regarding a slip and fall on the restaurant's stairs struck, but were permitted to amend to plead a failure to advise of a main floor washroom.

The court found that while the amendment did not constitute a new cause of action, there was no genuine issue requiring a trial because the underlying complaint regarding the condition of the stairs had already been dismissed.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the amended claim was dismissed.

The self-represented plaintiffs moved to consolidate a Rule 7.08 settlement approval motion, brought by the Public Guardian and Trustee on behalf of a co-plaintiff under disability, with the upcoming trial.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that Rule 6 only permits consolidation of 'proceedings', and a motion is not a proceeding.

Furthermore, the court noted that consolidation would be inappropriate as it would expose the trial judge to privileged settlement information, prejudicing the plaintiffs.

The court also ordered the sealing of an affidavit containing privileged settlement details.

In a personal injury action arising from a multi‑vehicle rear‑end collision, third parties sought summary judgment dismissing the third‑party claim and cross‑claims against them.

The moving parties argued that the rear‑ending driver’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and relied on the so‑called “clear line” doctrine to argue their conduct could not have contributed to the collision.

The defendants and another third party argued that the driver who stopped in a live lane of traffic may have breached duties under the Highway Traffic Act and that factual disputes existed regarding traffic conditions, visibility of hazard lights, and whether the vehicle was disabled.

Applying the modern summary judgment framework from Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court held that credibility disputes and complex issues of causation and negligence required a trial.

The court further noted that the “clear line” doctrine could not displace the modern “but for” causation analysis.

Following two motions relating to the costs consequences of a discontinued civil action, the court addressed competing costs claims between the parties.

The plaintiff had been successful on both motions, including opposing the defendant’s motion under Rule 23.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking costs following discontinuance and obtaining costs related to an appearance before an assessment officer.

The court considered the discretionary costs framework under s.131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and the factors in Rule 57.01, as well as the principle of proportionality under Rule 1.04.

Although the plaintiff was the largely successful party, the court reduced the amount claimed to reflect partial success and concerns about proportionality.

Costs were fixed at a reduced amount that the court considered fair and reasonable.

The defendant moved for an order requiring the plaintiff to pay costs following a notice of discontinuance, seeking an extension of time under Rule 23.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure after failing to bring the motion within the 30‑day deadline.

The court applied the test requiring absence of prejudice and a reasonable explanation for delay.

While the plaintiff would not be prejudiced, the defendant deliberately chose an incorrect procedure by attempting to have costs assessed by an assessment officer rather than bringing a timely motion.

The court held that a mistaken strategic choice did not constitute a satisfactory explanation for delay.

The motion for an extension and costs was dismissed, and the plaintiff was awarded reduced partial indemnity costs relating to the assessment hearing.