R.E. Charney

The applicant father brought an urgent motion for interim sole custody of the parties' one-year-old son, alleging the respondent mother was abusing drugs and alcohol while breastfeeding.

The respondent mother brought a counter-motion for temporary care and control and permission to relocate to Sioux Lookout, alleging she fled the matrimonial home due to the applicant's escalating anger and domestic violence.

The court found the matter urgent under Rule 14(4.2) of the Family Law Rules.

Relying on corroborating medical and CAS evidence supporting the mother's version of events, the court granted the mother temporary care and control.

The court also permitted the mother to temporarily relocate to Sioux Lookout with the child to secure her safety and family support, while granting the father facilitated access.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking retroactive and ongoing child support under s. 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines in a shared custody arrangement.

The respondent mother argued that the applicant was intentionally underemployed and that income should be imputed to him at a higher level.

Applying the test from AMD v. AJP, the court found the applicant was intentionally underemployed and imputed income of $75,000 to him.

However, given factual disputes regarding standards of living and the imminent trial process, the court declined to make interim or retroactive child support orders.

The issues were held to be more appropriately determined at trial.

The applicant brought an urgent motion under rule 14(4.2) of the Family Law Rules seeking a temporary order permitting relocation with a child to Alberta due to the applicant’s spouse being temporarily transferred for employment.

The motion sought to proceed before a case conference on the basis of urgency tied to an upcoming school start date and planned relocation timeline.

The court held that the circumstances did not constitute urgency or hardship within the meaning of rule 14(4.2), emphasizing that parties cannot manufacture urgency through delay or logistical convenience.

The court found no evidence of harm to the child if the relocation decision were briefly delayed and concluded that the responding parent was entitled to a full opportunity to respond before a potential status quo change.

The request to proceed without a case conference was therefore dismissed and directions were given to schedule a case conference and motion promptly.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking expanded access to his child following several years of interrupted contact arising from allegations of sexual abuse that resulted in criminal charges but ultimately ended in acquittals.

Competing professional evidence addressed the child’s wishes, potential coaching, and the impact of parental conflict on the child’s wellbeing.

Psychological and therapeutic assessments concluded that the child had little or no independent recollection of abuse and that continued reunification with the father was beneficial and safe.

Applying the best interests analysis under s. 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court found the risk of harm to the child from renewed contact to be low and the benefits of rebuilding the parent-child relationship significant.

The court ordered a modified, slower graduated access regime with initial supervision and a future professional review.

The respondent mother brought a contempt motion alleging the applicant father repeatedly breached a consent access order by refusing to deliver the parties’ children for scheduled parenting exchanges.

The father admitted he knew the order but claimed he would not force the child to attend visits because the child expressed reluctance and alleged safety concerns about the mother’s partner.

Child protection authorities had investigated and found no basis for the father’s allegations.

The court found the father intentionally disobeyed a clear order and that any reluctance expressed by the child resulted from the father’s coaching or influence.

Applying the civil contempt test, the court held the breach was wilful and proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and adjourned the matter for a separate penalty hearing.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of driving over 80.

At trial, the accused raised a 'bolus drinking' defence, testifying she rapidly consumed a large beer shortly before driving.

The Crown requested an adjournment to call a toxicologist in reply to calculate the impact of this consumption on her blood alcohol concentration.

The trial judge denied the adjournment, treating the request as an attempt to reopen the Crown's case.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by confusing reply evidence with reopening a case.

The Crown was entitled to call reply evidence to respond to a new matter put in play by the defence.

A new trial was ordered.

The applicant brought a motion seeking a finding of contempt against the respondent for breaching provisions of a prior family court order relating to the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL) referral, reconciliation counselling, and access logistics.

The court applied the three-part test for civil contempt and found that the respondent wilfully refused to comply with the clear requirement to complete and submit an OCL intake form within 14 days of the order.

Alleged breaches relating to reconciliation counselling and provision of access logistics were not proven to meet the contempt standard.

The court emphasized that contempt is a serious remedy requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt and should be used cautiously in family proceedings.

The respondent was found in contempt only with respect to the OCL intake form requirement, and the penalty phase was adjourned.

The plaintiff's employment was terminated, which immediately ended his long-term disability (LTD) coverage under the employer's group policy.

Two months later, he became totally disabled in a motor vehicle accident.

The employer inadvertently continued paying LTD premiums, and the insurer initially denied the claim based on lack of total disability and late filing, while reserving the right to investigate eligibility.

The plaintiff argued the insurer waived the termination date of the policy.

The court dismissed the action, finding no waiver because the insurer lacked full knowledge of the termination and did not unequivocally intend to relinquish its right to rely on the policy's termination clause.

The respondent was successful on a motion preventing the applicant from moving their two children outside of Barrie.

The respondent sought costs of $3,531.25 under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The court fixed costs at $1,000, payable at $100 per month, noting that while the applicant's decision to move for employment and lower rent was reasonable in other circumstances, it was not practicable given the children's best interests.