Pugsley J.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference following an encounter with his then-boyfriend.

The complainant alleged that the accused engaged in non-consensual sexual acts, while the accused maintained that all activity was consensual.

The court applied the W.D. framework to assess credibility, finding the complainant's evidence inconsistent, exaggerated, and contradicted by external evidence, including a post-incident selfie and testimony from a witness present in the apartment.

The court believed the accused's evidence, found that the complainant consented, and acquitted the accused on both counts.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a sample into an approved screening device under the Criminal Code and careless driving under the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown proved the careless driving charge beyond a reasonable doubt based on evidence of aggressive and erratic driving, including high-speed passing and tailgating.

However, the court dismissed the refusal charge, finding that the accused's refusal was equivocal and that the officer rushed to judgment without affording the accused adequate opportunity to provide a sample, particularly given the accused's medical condition following a serious motor vehicle collision.

The defendant was sentenced following guilty pleas to drug-related and driving offences.

The court imposed a sentence of time served (64 days credited as 96 days on a 1.5:1 basis) plus one day, followed by 24 months probation with conditions including drug treatment, non-association orders, and a one-year driving prohibition.

The sentencing was significantly influenced by the defendant's contraction of COVID-19 while in custody at Maplehurst, which the court found to be a unique mitigating circumstance warranting a departure from the Crown's suggested range.

The defendant pleaded guilty to five Criminal Code offences arising from a series of incidents on September 7-8, 2018.

The defendant stole a relative's pickup truck and engaged in a prolonged dangerous driving incident on Highway 10 in Grey County, repeatedly ramming a vehicle driven by Ms. A. and her two passengers.

After the victims escaped to a gas station, the defendant led police on a high-speed chase across three counties, evading multiple police services, driving at speeds up to 161 km/h in an 80 km/h zone, and deliberately ramming a police cruiser.

The defendant was sentenced to 12 months in custody (after 9 months pre-sentence custody credit), a three-year driving prohibition, three years probation with treatment conditions, and a five-year weapons prohibition.

The accused, charged with driving with an excess blood alcohol level, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the trial date was 17 months and 12 days.

The court attributed 9 months and 8 days to institutional delay, finding the initial 5 months to be neutral delay caused by the defence exploring resolution.

Concluding that the institutional delay was within acceptable guidelines and that the accused suffered minimal specific prejudice, the court dismissed the application.

At the beginning of his trial for impaired driving, the defendant moved for a stay of proceedings under s. 24 of the Charter, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total time from the swearing of the information to the trial date was nearly 14 months.

The court found that a significant portion of the delay was neutral, including time for the parties to be ready for trial and a four-month delay caused by the investigating officer being injured in a serious motor vehicle accident.

The court concluded that the institutional delay was under six months, well within the Morin guidelines, and that the defendant had contributed to the delay through poor trial time estimates and late filing of applications.

The application for a stay was dismissed.