Peter Cronyn

The defendants brought a motion for an order that the same judge hear the third party proceeding as the main action, which was dismissed.

The third party sought costs of the motion.

The court found that costs should follow the event but that the $14,000 claimed was disproportionate for a procedural motion that could have been resolved at a case conference.

Costs were fixed at $5,000 on a partial indemnity scale.

The defendants brought motions for leave to appeal an interlocutory decision that dismissed their Rule 21 motions to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim.

The plaintiffs, including a former RCMP member, claimed damages for harassment, assault, and sexual assault.

The defendants argued the claims were barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act because the plaintiff received a pension for PTSD.

The court refused leave to appeal, finding no conflicting case law on the principles for striking pleadings and no good reason to doubt the motion judge's conclusion that it was not plain and obvious the entire claim was barred.

The plaintiffs were wholly successful on a motion brought by the defendants regarding claims of privilege over certain documents and seeking the removal of the plaintiffs' counsel of record.

The plaintiffs sought full indemnity costs of $53,871.81.

The court found that while the plaintiffs were successful, they should have brought the motion to determine privilege themselves rather than forcing the defendants to do so.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the amount claimed disproportionate, and fixed costs at $25,000 plus HST and disbursements.

The defendants brought a motion seeking a declaration that certain inadvertently disclosed documents were subject to solicitor-client or litigation privilege, their return, and the removal of the plaintiffs' counsel of record.

The plaintiffs, former executives of the defendant organization suing for wrongful dismissal, argued that common interest privilege applied to the legal advice they received alongside the board of directors.

The court found that common interest privilege applied to the majority of the disputed communications and that privilege had been waived for others.

The motion to remove the plaintiffs' counsel was dismissed as grossly disproportionate, given that only one minor redaction was required and no prejudice was shown.

Following a 31-day trial where the plaintiff was awarded $11 million in damages, the court determined the quantum of costs payable to the plaintiff.

The parties agreed that partial indemnity was the appropriate scale.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed the plaintiff's partial indemnity fees at $675,000 plus HST and disbursements at $238,000 inclusive of HST.

An investor that had acquired the rights of a bankrupt Indigenous‑owned technology company sued a software corporation for breach of contract arising from a failed strategic partnership.

The plaintiff alleged the defendant committed to invest $1.5 million and provide technological support but later withdrew, causing the company’s collapse.

The court found a binding agreement was formed through oral approval and a confirming letter, and that the defendant’s internal corporate approval issues did not negate the contract.

Alleged misrepresentations regarding finances, market size, and potential investors were rejected.

Applying a modified valuation based on projected business plans and discounting for risk, the court awarded damages for the lost business opportunity.

Following an eight‑day trial in which the plaintiff’s action was dismissed, the successful defendant sought substantial indemnity costs after an earlier settlement offer to dismiss the claim without costs.

The plaintiff argued that costs should remain on a partial indemnity scale and challenged both the proportionality of counsel time and several disbursements.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01, including the magnitude of the claim, the complexity of the litigation, the importance of the issues to other generators, and the relative financial positions of the parties.

The judge concluded that the amounts sought were excessive and that the unsuccessful party should not bear the full scope of the defendant’s litigation resources.

Total costs were fixed at $250,000 inclusive of HST.

A small hydroelectric power producer sought a declaration and damages concerning the interpretation of a long‑term electricity purchase contract.

The plaintiff argued that payments after the tenth year of the agreement were required to escalate annually with inflation, while the defendant maintained that the contract fixed the tenth‑year rate as a floor and permitted annual rate determinations thereafter.

The court held the contract language was clear and contained no entitlement to an automatic inflation escalator.

Claims based on estoppel arising from the treatment of other generators were rejected.

Although the limitation period did not bar claims arising within two years before the action, the plaintiff ultimately failed to establish entitlement under the contract.

The Attorney General of Canada was completely successful on a motion to stay the plaintiffs' claim and sought costs.

The court found the Attorney General's claimed costs excessive as the matter was not complex and the case law was overwhelmingly in its favour.

Costs were fixed at $8,000 on a partial indemnity basis, payable in any event of the cause rather than forthwith, due to the pending decision on whether the action is barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act.

The individual defendants who supported the motion were denied costs as they contributed little to the debate.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend a further independent psychiatric examination.

The plaintiff had previously attended an examination, but due to an administrative error, was examined by the wrong doctor (the intended doctor's brother).

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that a further examination was unnecessary and would cause him prejudice due to a real risk of harm, as he had a history of suicidal ideation and hospitalizations following previous assessments.

The court found that the further examination was necessary and fair, as the defendants had a right to an expert opinion from a specialist of their choice.

The court ordered the examination to proceed in Ottawa, with the condition that the plaintiff's treating psychiatrist be available immediately afterward to mitigate any risk of harm.