Human Rights - ONSCDC

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) dismissing her discrimination complaint due to delay and denying reconsideration.

The applicant, who was on sick leave for breast cancer, received a notice in 2014 that her position was eliminated and she would be laid off upon her return to work.

She filed her HRTO application in 2018.

The HRTO found the triggering event for the one-year limitation period was the 2014 notice, not her future return to work.

The Divisional Court held that the HRTO's decisions were reasonable and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Human Rights Commission dismissing her human rights complaint without a hearing.

The applicant alleged her former employer failed to accommodate her disability before terminating her employment.

The Divisional Court applied the patent unreasonableness standard of review and found that the Commission acted within its jurisdiction and expertise.

The court concluded that the Commission's decision was supported by the evidentiary record, which indicated the employer had accommodated the applicant and that she was not interested in returning to her previous employment.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ministry of Transportation's decision to deny him a religious exemption from the requirement to have a digital photograph on his driver's licence.

He argued the requirement violated his freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter, citing beliefs based on the Book of Revelations and the Second Commandment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that his objection was based on a sincere religious belief, noting inconsistencies in his practices and evidence that his true concerns were secular privacy issues.

The defendant Ministry of the Environment brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dismissing its Rule 21 motion.

The underlying action involved a corporate plaintiff alleging that the Ministry's investigation, press releases, and threats of core drilling violated its rights under sections 7, 8, and 11 of the Charter, despite no charges being laid.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding that there were conflicting decisions regarding whether a corporation could assert these Charter rights in the absence of penal proceedings, and that the issues raised were of sufficient importance to warrant appellate review.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decision not to refer his discrimination complaint to a Board of Inquiry.

The Commission had declined the referral because the employer had made a reasonable settlement offer that matched what the applicant could expect at a hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Commission was correct to consider the settlement offer in exercising its gatekeeper function under the Human Rights Code.

The tenant brought a motion appealing the decision of Keenan J., which upheld a Tribunal order evicting her for disruptive conduct.

The tenant argued the Tribunal erred in finding her conduct continued after receiving an N5 notice, misapplied section 84(1) of the Tenant Protection Act, and failed to properly assess the landlord's duty to accommodate her disability under the Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding overwhelming evidence that the landlord accommodated the tenant's disability to the point of undue hardship and that the Tribunal made no errors of law.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Human Rights Commission not to refer his discrimination complaint against a university to a board of inquiry.

He also sought $55 million in damages against the university.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission's decision was not patently unreasonable as it had investigated the complaint and based its decision on evidence of the applicant's academic and financial issues.

The court also held it lacks jurisdiction to award damages on an application for judicial review.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration board decision that upheld the constitutionality of s. 58(5)(c) of the Employment Standards Act.

The provision denied severance pay to employees whose contracts were frustrated due to illness or injury.

The Divisional Court found that the provision discriminated against severely disabled employees, violating s. 15(1) of the Charter, and was not saved by s. 1.

The offending words were struck down, and the disabled employee was awarded severance pay.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision upholding the dismissal of an employee with schizophrenia.

The employee had a history of failing to take her medication, leading to disruptive behaviour.

The arbitrator found that the final incident jeopardized workplace safety and that the employer could not accommodate the employee without undue hardship.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's decision was not patently unreasonable and correctly applied the Meiorin test for accommodation.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Human Rights Commission not to deal with his complaint under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no error in the Commissioner's conclusion that the complaint could be more appropriately dealt with under the Labour Relations Act and that the applicant had already engaged in mediation during the arbitration process.

The court held that the Commissioner's decision was not patently unreasonable and awarded costs to the respondents.

The applicant, an African-Canadian male, sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decision not to refer his complaint against the University of Toronto Faculty of Law to a board of inquiry.

The applicant alleged that the law school's reliance on LSAT scores for admission constituted systemic discrimination against African-Canadians.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission's decision was not patently unreasonable, as it had considered extensive evidence showing the law school used a holistic admissions policy rather than strict numerical cut-offs.

The court also dismissed claims of procedural unfairness and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award upholding the discharge of an employee for sleeping on the job.

The employee was subject to a Last Chance Agreement that permitted immediate discharge for sleeping at work.

The union argued the arbitrator unreasonably disregarded medical evidence suggesting the employee suffered from sleep apnea and circadian rhythm disorder.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator carefully considered the evidence and reasonably concluded the sleep apnea only became significant after termination.

The arbitrator's decision was not patently unreasonable.

The moving parties (respondents on the appeal) brought a motion to lift the statutory stay of several orders made by a Board of Inquiry regarding a racially poisoned workplace at a detention centre.

The Board had ordered the Ministry to publicize its decision, implement organizational reforms, and conduct anti-racism training.

The court applied the RJR-Macdonald test and lifted the stay of the order requiring publication of the decision, finding irreparable harm to the complainant if he was kept out of the workplace.

However, the court declined to lift the stays on the orders requiring organizational reforms and training, finding that the balance of convenience favoured leaving them in place until the appeal was decided, given the substantial public funds involved and the Ministry's pending appeal.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision reinstating an employee who was terminated for excessive innocent absenteeism under an attendance management system.

The arbitrator found that the termination violated the Human Rights Code because the absences relied upon included a compensable workplace injury, and the employer failed to show undue hardship in accommodating the employee.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, upholding the arbitrator's decision and finding no error in the arbitrator's application of human rights principles regarding the duty to accommodate.

Following an appeal of a human rights tribunal decision where the appellants achieved divided success by limiting the scope of the tribunal's order, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The respondents, who were represented pro bono, sought costs on a public interest basis, while the appellants sought their costs.

Recognizing the appellants' material success, the court awarded them partial indemnity costs fixed at $25,000, payable by the respondents.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to revoke his appointment to an industry advisory committee.

The Minister revoked the appointment after learning the applicant was a member of the Hell's Angels.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's exercise of discretion was not unreasonable and that the revocation did not violate the applicant's freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

A dissenting judge would have quashed the decision, finding the revocation unreasonable given the applicant's good character, qualifications, and the fixed term of the appointment.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission appealed a Board of Inquiry decision dismissing complaints against Ford Motor Company and a union alleging constructive discrimination based on religion.

The complainants, adherents of the Worldwide Church of God, sought to be excused from Friday night shifts to observe the Sabbath.

The Board found that accommodating the complainants would cause undue hardship to Ford due to high absenteeism, quality, and safety concerns, and to the union due to significant interference with the seniority rights of other workers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The applicant, a federal Crown corporation, sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Board of Inquiry adding it as a respondent to a human rights complaint.

The complainant alleged that the rent calculation formula for social assistance recipients in her co-operative housing, mandated by the applicant's funding agreement, was discriminatory.

The Divisional Court quashed the Board's order, holding that the applicant's imposition of funding conditions was a valid exercise of the federal spending power under s. 91(1A) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, finding that provincial human rights legislation must be read down so as not to impair the essential powers of a federal agency carrying out its core functions.

The appellants, a commercial printer and its president, refused to print letterhead and business cards for the Canadian Lesbian and Gay Archives due to the president's religious beliefs regarding homosexuality.

A Board of Inquiry found this constituted discrimination based on sexual orientation and ordered the appellants to provide printing services to gays, lesbians, and their organizations.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the finding of discrimination but found the Board's order overly broad, as it could compel the printing of materials directly conflicting with the president's core religious beliefs.

The Court amended the order to exempt the appellants from printing materials that reasonably conflict with the core elements of the president's religious beliefs, while affirming the order in all other respects.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission brought an application for judicial review of an interim decision made by the Board of Inquiry regarding the production of records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no exceptional or extraordinary circumstances to justify fragmenting the ongoing hearing before the Board.

The Court held that the Board's decision was a reasonable exercise of its discretion at a preliminary stage, particularly in applying the balancing test from A.M. v. Ryan and considering the confidentiality undertaking in place.

Costs of $3,500 were awarded to the respondent employer against the Commission.