Human Rights - ONSCDC

The applicant sought judicial review of a college's decision to involuntarily withdraw him from a respiratory therapy program after he failed clinical placements.

He also challenged the college's refusal to process his internal academic appeal due to missed deadlines.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the college's academic decision was reasonable and justified by patient safety concerns.

The court also held that the college did not breach procedural fairness in strictly enforcing its internal appeal deadlines.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision dismissing his discrimination claim for being filed one day beyond the one-year limitation period.

The HRTO had refused to extend the time limit, finding the delay was not incurred in good faith.

The Divisional Court found this decision unreasonable, noting the applicant had filed a timely complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission and moved with reasonable dispatch to file with the HRTO after the federal commission declined jurisdiction.

The HRTO's decision was set aside and the matter remitted for a determination on the merits.

The appellants appealed a trial decision awarding the respondent $15,270 in Charter damages for breaches of his s. 10(b) rights during a police detention.

The respondent had previously been granted a stay of criminal proceedings for the same breaches.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge failed to properly apply the Ward test for Charter damages.

The Court held that the stay of proceedings adequately served the functions of vindication and deterrence, and that an award of damages was not an appropriate and just remedy in the circumstances.

The University of Waterloo sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision ordering it to implement a Prior Learning Assessment and Recognition (PLAR) pilot project as a systemic remedy for discriminating against an applicant with learning disabilities.

The University argued the Tribunal improperly relied on inadmissible expert evidence and that the remedy violated its institutional autonomy over admissions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable.

The Court held that the Tribunal did not improperly rely on inadmissible expert opinion and that the PLAR pilot project was a tailored, proportional remedy that respected the University's academic standards while addressing the specific discrimination suffered by the respondent.

The applicants sought judicial review of the City of Toronto's decision to revoke a special event permit for a cultural festival after violent protests erupted on the first day.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it moot since the 2023 festival dates had passed and the 2024 festival proceeded without incident.

The court also noted that the City's decision was substantively reasonable given the immediate risk to public safety, and declined to rule on the jurisdictional and Charter issues.

The applicants, a reporter and a newspaper, sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) decision that upheld the refusal to disclose the names and badge numbers of police officers subject to misconduct complaints.

The applicants argued the IPC Adjudicator failed to consider their freedom of expression rights under section 2(b) of the Charter when applying the public interest override in section 23 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the Adjudicator erred by dismissing the Charter argument solely because a formal notice of constitutional question was not filed.

The application for judicial review was granted, the IPC decision was quashed, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing before a different adjudicator.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a Condominium Authority Tribunal (CAT) decision dismissing its application to remove a second dog from the respondent's unit.

The CAT found that the respondent's partner required the service dog as an accommodation for a disability under the Human Rights Code, and awarded $15,000 in damages for discriminatory treatment.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the CAT did not err in law in its accommodation framework and did not breach procedural fairness in awarding damages or a common expense credit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that summarily dismissed his application.

The applicant had alleged that his termination during his probationary period was based on sex discrimination and reprisal.

The HRTO found no reasonable prospect of success because the applicant provided no evidence connecting his termination to a protected ground.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the application, finding the HRTO's decision was logical and justified.

The applicant sought judicial review of an HRTO decision that struck the personal respondents and dismissed his human rights application at a summary hearing.

The Divisional Court found the HRTO's decision to strike the personal respondents was reasonable, as the corporate respondent accepted vicarious liability.

However, the court held the HRTO unreasonably dismissed the application by failing to justify its conclusion that there was 'no evidence' of discrimination despite the applicant's factual assertions.

Furthermore, the HRTO breached procedural fairness by ordering a summary hearing after a previous Vice-Chair had already directed a merits hearing which had commenced.

The application for judicial review was granted and the matter remitted to the HRTO for a merits hearing.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision declaring her a vexatious litigant.

The court initiated a review under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to determine if the proceeding was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found that the applicant's son, who had previously been declared a vexatious litigant himself, was improperly attempting to represent his mother and pursue the litigation on his own behalf without her sworn authorization or proper medical evidence of her capacity.

Concluding that the application was an abuse of process and an attempt to circumvent prior orders, the Divisional Court dismissed the proceeding.

The applicant sought an order compelling the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario to issue a decision on his discrimination complaint, which had been pending since March 2021.

Before the application was heard, the tribunal released its decision dismissing the complaint due to delay.

The applicant argued the court should still hear the application despite it being moot, alleging irreparable harm from the delay.

The Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot application, finding it focused on the specific circumstances of the complaint rather than broader issues of public importance.

The application was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision of Brownstone J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As the responding parties did not provide costs outlines, the court made no order as to costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her application for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant alleged discrimination based on creed after her employment was terminated for failing to comply with a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness, found no denial of procedural fairness, and concluded that the Tribunal's determination that the applicant's singular belief against the vaccine did not constitute a 'creed' under the Human Rights Code was reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his application against the Federation of Law Societies of Canada.

The applicant alleged constructive discrimination after the National Committee on Accreditation required him to complete two years of in-class instruction because his foreign law degree was obtained through online self-study.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding the mode of study policy was not a protected ground under the Human Rights Code and applied to all students regardless of place of origin, age, or family status.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, holding that the Tribunal's decision was reasonable and procedurally fair.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of two Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decisions that dismissed his discrimination application as an abuse of process and denied reconsideration.

The applicant also brought multiple procedural motions before the Divisional Court, including requests for adjournments, stays, and judicial recusals, alleging systemic bias and procedural unfairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed all motions, finding no denial of procedural fairness or reasonable apprehension of bias.

On the merits of the judicial review, the Court held that the HRTO's decisions were reasonable, noting the applicant's repeated failures to comply with tribunal directions and excessive filings.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his discrimination application as an abuse of process due to his persistently discourteous and disruptive behaviour.

The applicant alleged reasonable apprehension of bias, procedural unfairness, and unreasonableness.

The Divisional Court declined to dismiss the judicial review for delay, accepting the applicant's medical explanation.

However, the court dismissed the application on the merits, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, no breach of procedural fairness, and concluding that the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the underlying application for abuse of process was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The applicant, a child with Autism Spectrum Disorder, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing their claim that changes to the Ontario Autism Program discriminated on the basis of age and disability.

The tribunal had declined to decide whether the definition of 'age' in section 10 of the Human Rights Code, which limits age discrimination claims to persons 18 or older, violated section 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court held that the tribunal was required to decide the Charter issue as it was properly pleaded and necessary to resolve the applicant's claim.

The tribunal's decision was quashed and the matter remitted for resolution of the constitutional question.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division upholding findings of professional misconduct, a five-month suspension, and costs.

The misconduct related to his representation of a vulnerable family law client, filing an affidavit containing personal attacks on a judge, and maintaining a website about a dismissed Canadian Judicial Council complaint.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the disciplinary actions reflected a proportionate balancing of the appellant's freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and rejecting his s. 15(1) Charter and procedural arguments.

The applicant sought costs against the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario after successfully bringing an application for judicial review.

The Tribunal had erroneously dismissed her human rights application for failing to comply with case assessment directions, despite her having filed the required documents.

The Tribunal consented to the judicial review but opposed the request for costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the request for costs, finding that the Tribunal's error was made in the course of its administrative functions and that it did not assume an adversarial role in the proceedings.

No costs were awarded.

The applicant, a police officer, sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission upholding her dismissal for discreditable conduct and insubordination.

The charges stemmed from her failure to attend internal investigations and her use of a personal Twitter account to make inappropriate comments about the Chief of Police and others.

The applicant argued she was denied procedural fairness and accommodation for her post-traumatic stress disorder, and that her dismissal infringed her Charter rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the hearing officer reasonably accommodated her and properly proceeded in her absence.

The Court also upheld the Commission's finding that sections 7 and 15 of the Charter were not engaged, and that her dismissal was a proportionate limit on her freedom of expression under section 2(b).