CITATION: Papushina v. University Health Network, 2025 ONSC 3094
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 176/25
DATE: 20250527
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
DIVISIONAL COURT
RE: ELENA PAPUSHINA, Applicant
AND:
UNIVERSITY HEALTH NETWORK, THE MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, KELICIA LETLOW-PEROUNE, FDM GROUP CANADA INC., HIS MAJESTY THE KING IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO AS REPRESENTED BY THE MINISTRY OF CHILDREN COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondents
BEFORE: Matheson J.
COUNSEL: Self-Represented Applicant
Naomi Margo, counsel to University Health Network
Sophia Zaidi, counsel to the Manufacturers Life Insurance Company
Daniel Iny, counsel to Kelicia Letlow-Peroune
Sabrina Fiacco, counsel to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
Hailey Ji, counsel to His Majesty the King in right of Ontario
HEARD at Toronto: May 27, 2025, in writing
ENDORSEMENT
[1] By notice from the Registrar dated April 14, 2025, the applicant was given notice that the Court is considering making an order staying or dismissing this proceeding under r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] The following directions of April 14, 2025 give background to the notice under r. 2.1:
The applicant seeks judicial review of an HRTO decision dated Jan. 31, 2025 (the Decision), and what is described as any related decision (listing prior decisions later in the notice). The HRTO Decision declares the applicant Elena Papushina a vexatious litigant, referring to six HRTO applications that were dismissed on May 29, 2024.
The Decision refers to another person -- Alexandre Papouchine – the applicant’s son. Alexandre Papouchine was declared a vexatious litigant including an order that he could not commence further proceedings before the HRTO without obtaining prior leave to do so. That decision was upheld by this Court: Papouchine v. Touram LP d.b.a. Air Canada Vacations, 2022 ONSC 7010. After lengthy reasons for decision, the Divisional Court noted as follows:
The Applicant [Alexandre Papouchine] commenced eleven complaints before the Tribunal that were (a) trivial; (b) were easily explicable on non-discriminatory bases; (c) did not implicate a protected ground in the Human Rights Code; and/or (d) were apparently grounded on the Applicant’s stated subjective belief that he would have been treated better but for his ancestry and place of origin (an Eastern European who is “not a member of the nobility”). Three of these complaints were dismissed summarily prior to the decision under review in this application. On the record before the Tribunal, the Applicant had repeatedly commenced frivolous complaints. In the circumstances, finding the Applicant a vexatious litigant was reasonable.
Before reaching the Decision that is the subject of this new application for judicial review, the HRTO had put the parties on notice that it was concerned that Alexandre Papouchine was filing Applications with the HRTO under his mother’s name in circumvention of the vexatious litigant order against him (Papouchine Vexatious Litigant Order). In the lengthy reasons for the Decision, the Tribunal concluded as follows:
[50] I have reviewed all six Applications and find that Mr. Papouchine was active in the preparation of the Applications and took steps to file the Applications with the Tribunal. The complaints in the Applications were (a) trivial, (b) easily explicable on non-discriminatory bases, (c) did not implicate a protected ground of the Code, and/or (d) were grounded on the subjective belief that Mr. Papouchine or the applicant should have been treated differently. The Applications have the same hallmarks of vexatiousness that the Tribunal observed in the applications resulting in the Papouchine Vexatious Litigant Order.
[51] Further, Mr. Papouchine’s continued attempts to reinsert himself into the Tribunal’s processing of the Applications and attempts to pursue the litigation after the Tribunal’s Interim Order disqualifying him from being the applicant’s representative and Mr. Papouchine’s repeated breaches of the Tribunal’s orders demonstrate that Mr. Papouchine actively pursued the six Applications.
[52] Further, I find that Mr. Papouchine’s continued involvement in the proceedings after the Tribunal’s Interim Order disrespected the Tribunal and its processes. The Tribunal must take appropriate action to protect the integrity of the Tribunal’s processes and the administration of justice.
With respect to the applicant, the Tribunal concluded as follows:
[63] For the foregoing reasons and taking into account all of the circumstances and having regard to the Papouchine Vexatious Litigant Order and the whole history of the Applications, I find that the applicant, Elena Papushina, should be declared a vexatious litigant. I further find that the applicant should be required to obtain written leave from the Tribunal to file further applications against any respondent.
In response to this new application for judicial review, the respondent Manulife requests that the Court invoke the process under r. 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In addition to receiving this request, there is a concern on the face of the documents submitted in this Court that it is Alexandre Papouchine, not Elena Papushina, who is actually pursuing this application for judicial review. The Notice of Application for Judicial Review states that it is being brought by Elena Papushina “represented by” Alexandre Papouchine. Further, Alexandre Papouchine is the person who has been communicating with this Court, not his mother, including by providing a submission in response to the r. 2.1 request. Alexandre Papouchine also submitted a letter of March 23, 2025, saying he was “representing” his mother. In the circumstances of this application, it is not clear that it is the applicant herself who wishes to pursue this application.
Alexandre Papouchine has no standing to represent his mother in this Court. The applicant is not able to be represented by a non-lawyer without leave and she has not sought leave. Further, given that Alexandre Papouchine has been declared vexatious, the applicant should not assume that she would be granted leave to be represented by her son. However, if she needs a representative, she could ask someone else to do so.
Alexandre Papouchine has said that his mother is in the hospital and has provided some of his own emails from 2024 saying that his mother has health problems. However, there is no proper medical evidence before this Court from a licenced treating physician, setting out the applicant’s current health status and its impact on her ability to participate either as a self-represented party or to instruct a proper representative.
There also appear to [be] issues with the merits of the application for judicial review.
Rule 2.1(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court may make an order staying or dismissing a proceeding that appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. If it may be appropriate to make an order under subrule (1), the court shall direct the Registrar to give notice to the parties that the proceeding may be stayed or dismissed. The process provides an opportunity for the moving party to make written submissions in response, which are then considered by the Court.
Given the above circumstances, the Registrar is directed to send out a notice under r. 2.1 regarding this application for judicial review. In addition to any response to that notice, the applicant shall provide her sworn or affirmed affidavit that it is she, and not her son, that wishes to pursue this application.
If the applicant’s health is a factor in responding to the above, a proper medical report shall be provided to the Court as soon as possible and in any event by the time the reply to the r. 2.1 notice is due.
[3] Alexandre Papouchine has since made submissions in response to the notice under r. 2.1, again purporting to represent his mother. This continues to be problematic. He has already been notified that leave of the Court is required before a non-lawyer can represent a party in this Court. Leave has not been sought nor granted. A doctor’s letter has now been submitted, but it does not resolve this issue.
[4] The doctor’s letter says that the applicant is currently at the Humber River Health Reactivation Care Centre, as of April 2, 2025, having been in the Humber General Hospital since November 10, 2024. On the applicant’s health status, the letter says only that the applicant “continues to require ongoing hospitalization due to her cognitive and physical impairments.” The letter does not say what those impairments are or to what extent they prevent the applicant from participating in the Court process. The letter does not explain how those impairments did permit the commencement of this legal proceeding in the applicant’s name during that same time period, yet also means she cannot participate in the proceeding commenced in her name.
[5] Further, there is no affidavit from the applicant providing that it is she, not her son, who wishes to pursue this application, as required by the above directions. This legal proceeding was commenced in the period referred to in the doctor’s letter. If the applicant was able to take that step there should now be her evidence that she intended to do so.
[6] In this situation, I cannot conclude that the applicant herself has authorized these proceedings. If she has capacity, she ought to have complied with the above directions. She could also have sought leave to have someone represent her. If the applicant does not have capacity, she must have a litigation guardian and she does not have one, let alone a person who meets the requirements of r. 7. Her son has been declared a vexatious litigant and the underlying issues are about him, putting him in a conflict of interest. Yet all the steps that have been taken are by Alexandre Papouchine. This application is an abuse of process.
[7] I would reach the same conclusion even if I took into account the response from Alexandre Papouchine to the r. 2.1 notice. I accept, for purposes of this r. 2.1 process, that he has not been able to retain a lawyer, cannot afford one, and that although he does not have a power of attorney, he is his mother’s substitute decision maker at the hospital. I do not accept that the cases of Jesus Christ, Giordno Bruno, Socrates and others are relevant to the application. Nor is Alexandre Papouchine’s critique of some of his own cases of assistance. The submissions about the merits are plainly at odds with the HRTO proceedings and support the conclusion that the application is a route to challenge rulings made about Alexandre Papouchine rather than about his mother. Considering these and the other submissions made by Alexandre Papouchine, and the absence of confirmation of the applicant’s authorization or other necessary steps, this application is vexatious and an abuse of process.
[8] I further note that the HRTO order challenged in the application does not preclude the applicant from bringing proceedings in appropriate circumstances. It requires leave to do so. If the applicant has an application she wishes to make to the HRTO, on her own account, she may still seek leave to do so.
[9] Subrule 2.1.01(1) authorizes the Court to dismiss a proceeding as frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. However, r. 2.1 should only be used for “the clearest of cases”: Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, at para. 8. This is such a case.
[10] This proceeding is therefore dismissed under r. 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Matheson J.
Date: May 27, 2025