Court File and Parties

CITATION: ANDERSON v. ALTA EXPERT ROOFING INC., 2026 ONSC 931

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-25-00000392-0000

DATE: February 13, 2026

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

DIVISIONAL COURT

RE: Appeal

J. CRAIG ANDERSON Appellant

AND:

ALTA EXPERT ROOFING INC. Respondent

BEFORE: Justice O'Brien

COUNSEL: J. CRAIG ANDERSON (Self Represented) j.craig.1@hotmail.com

ALI AMANI ali@amanilaw.ca Counsel for the Respondent

HEARD: February 11, 2026 by videoconference

ENDORSEMENT

Overview

[1] The appellant Mr. Anderson appeals the order of the trial judge, Deputy Judge McNeely, dated April 25, 2025, which dismissed his claim for damages against the respondent roofing company.

[2] There were numerous issues raised at trial. After two days of trial and in more than twelve pages of detailed reasons, the trial judge made the following findings: (1) The scope of the work agreed to between the parties was limited to laying down the roof membrane and providing roofer work related to the heat stack and plumbing vent. There was no warranty that all aspects of all work done on the roof would be leak free. (2) The appellant had not shown the respondent breached the contract and/or professional standard of care in its work. (3) The appellant did not prove that the damages claimed were caused by acts or omissions of the respondent.

[3] The appellant’s primary arguments in this court were: (1) that the trial judge erred by restricting the scope of work to express written terms and by misinterpreting the obligation of roofing contractors; (2) that the trial judge erred in misapplying the burden of proof; and (3) that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the correct standard of care for roofing contractors.

[4] The appeal was hampered by the appellant’s failure to obtain transcripts from the trial. He realizes that, because of his failure to do so, his appeal is limited to questions of law that do not require reference to the evidence other than the findings found in the trial judge’s decision.

[5] For the following reasons, the appeal is dismissed.

Standard of Review

[6] The standard of review for questions of law is correctness. A question of law involves applying an incorrect standard or legal test, or a similar error in principle. Where the legal principle is not readily extricable, the question is one of mixed fact and law: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 SCR 235, at para. 36.

Did the trial judge err in misinterpreting the scope of the contract?

[7] The appellant submits the trial judge erred in failing to apply the correct principles of contractual interpretation. Specifically, he says she ran afoul of the requirement in Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53 to consider the context and purpose of the agreement. He says the scope of work in a construction context always extends beyond the express contractual terms when the work affects the safety and integrity of the structure. He also submits the provisions of the Building Code, O. Reg. 332/12 support interpreting the scope of work to require the prevention of water leaks from the roof as a whole.

[8] I disagree that the trial judge erred in this respect. Sattva talks at para. 47 about the principles of contractual interpretation requiring a “practical, common-sense approach not dominated by technical rules of construction” such that the court may read the contract in the context of surrounding circumstances. It notes at para. 48 that the meaning of words is often derived from a number of contextual factors, including the purpose of the agreement and the relationship created by the agreement.

[9] Although the appellant did not cite Sattva to the trial judge, this is the approach she took. She did not limit her interpretation to the words of the contract between the parties. For example, she specifically considered and rejected the appellant’s claim that there was an oral agreement by which the appellant paid an extra $2,000 to fix any defects in the roof. She reasoned that both parties were sophisticated and that if the appellant had wanted a guarantee that there would be no leaks in the future, regardless of whether they related to the respondent’s work, he could have required that as a term of the contract. This common sense approach is precisely the sort of analysis Sattva requires.

[10] With respect to the appellant’s submission that the trial judge was required to consider the Building Code and other evidence of industry standards, these were not relevant to her analysis once she concluded the scope of work was limited to the written contract. As she said at para. 6 of her reasons, the respondent did not deny that professional standards were owed. Indeed, it agreed it had provided a warranty for the work covered in the contract. Its dispute was with the appellant’s submission that it had provided a warranty that all aspects of the work done on the roof, including work that was not within the scope of the respondent’s contract, would be leak-free. Given the trial judge’s conclusion that the scope of the work the respondent was responsible for was as set out in the written contract, there was no need to apply the Building Code or other professional standards.

Did the trial judge misapply the burden of proof?

[11] The appellant submits the trial judge wrongly required the appellants to disprove the respondent’s defence. The respondent argued that additional work was done on the skylight after its work was completed. Specifically, it said a second curb (which is a box frame at the base of the skylight being installed) was added by the skylight installer. In the respondent’s submission it was the skylight installer who failed to ensure the membrane was wrapped over the top of the curb. The appellant submits the trial judge’s analysis on this point required him to prove causation beyond a balance of probabilities.

[12] There was no error in the application of the burden of proof. The trial judge required the appellant to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that the respondent’s work was defective. The respondent was entitled to point to work that was done after its work as the source of deficiencies. There was no error in the trial judge considering all the circumstances, including the respondent’s defence, in determining the appellant did not meet his burden.

Did the trial judge err in applying the standard of care?

[13] The appellant submits the trial judge erred in applying the standard of care. He relies on Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co., 1995¸1 S.C.R. 146 to say that contractors have a professional duty to ensure their work does not contain defects that pose foreseeable danger. In his submission, the defects in the respondent’s work included not only the leaking roof but also other problems, such as the incorrect installation of the heat stack.

[14] The trial judge did not commit an error of law in applying the standard of care. She considered whether there were defects in the roofing work and did not find any defects caused by the respondent. She therefore found the respondent was not liable for the appellant’s damages.

[15] At para. 23 of her reasons, the trial judge specifically identified all the defects cited in the roof inspector’s report submitted by the appellant. She reviewed each allegation and concluded the appellant had not proven it was caused by the defendant. With respect to the allegations regarding the failure to wrap the membrane over the curb, for example, she found at para. 28 that the evidence did not demonstrate the respondent failed to wrap the membrane over the only curb that was in place when it did its work. Any subsequent modifications to the skylight were not the responsibility of the respondent. At para. 41, she stated the allegations that the membrane was placed over a clearly defective roof was not proven.

[16] As another example, the trial judge was not persuaded the respondent’s work on the heat stack was defective. She rejected the appellant’s expert evidence that a “cone and storm collar” was necessary at the base of the heat stack to protect the roof surface from the risk of fires. She instead accepted the respondent’s evidence that there are other methods for preparing the surround at the base. She concluded there was therefore no breach of the standard of care in the respondent’s work on the heat stack.

[17] In oral submissions in this court, the appellant focused on a paragraph of the respondent’s factum addressing the trial judge’s assessment of the appellant’s expert’s evidence. The paragraph stated the judge accepted the evidence of the expert witness. This was not an entirely accurate summary of the trial judge’s findings. However, the respondent’s misstatement of the judge’s findings does not demonstrate an error in the judge’s legal analysis.

[18] In short, the trial properly considered whether the respondent’s work had caused defects and concluded it did not. These were factual findings. There was no error of law in the way she assessed the standard of care.

Other Issues

[19] Although not pursued in oral argument, the appellant made two additional arguments in his factum. First, he submits the trial judge erred in improperly assessing his expert evidence by dismissing the evidence as “vague” and “unpersuasive.” There is no merit to this argument. The trial judge was entitled to assess the expert evidence and to dismiss it on the basis that it did not provide sufficient detail or precision to be helpful to the court.

[20] Second, the appellant submits the trial judge failed to properly consider the chronology of events as circumstantial evidence of causation. I disagree. The trial judge directly addressed the appellant’s argument about the chronology of events. She stated at para. 46 of her reasons:

Chronology is not the same thing as causation. Because there were leaks after the membrane was placed does not implicate the membrane or the defendant. The fact that the new roofer's work has not been followed by leaks does not implicate the defendant's work. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving to be more likely than not that the seven leaks complained of were the result of a breach by the defendant of its contract and the standard of professional care owed by it as a roofer.

[21] At para. 52, the trial judge went on to say she was not satisfied by the arguments on chronology or by the expert evidence that the appellant had proven the problems complained of were caused by the respondent. The trial judge therefore expressly considered chronology, but did not find it a sufficient basis to demonstrate causation. There was no error of law in her treatment of this argument.

Disposition

[22] The appeal is dismissed. The respondent seeks costs on a substantial indemnity basis; however, he has not justified why costs would be ordered on an elevated scale. The appellant shall pay the respondent costs of the appeal in the amount of $3,000 all-inclusive.

O’Brien, J.

Released: February 13, 2026