CITATION: Ozdemir v. Ozdemir, 2026 ONSC 577

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 304/24

DATE: 20260204

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVISIONAL COURT

Schreck, Shore, Brownstone JJ.

BETWEEN:

SUAT OZDEMIR

Appellant

– and –

KIBAR OZDEMIR

Respondent

Suat Ozdemir, on their own behalf

Edwin W. Paget, for the Respondent

HEARD at Hamilton: January 28, 2026

SHORE J.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

[1] The Appellant Father is appealing the decision of Justice McKenzie, dated June 27, 2024, and specifically the final parenting order contained in the decision.

[2] Following hearing of the Appellant’s submissions, the court advised that we did not need to hear from the Respondent. The parties were advised that the appeal was dismissed, with reasons to follow. These are the reasons.

Background

[3] The parties were married on August 23, 2014, and in March 2017, they moved to Canada. Together they have four children of various ages. The youngest child was born in April 2020, after the parties separated.

[4] Both parties are from Turkey. The Appellant has two degrees from a university in Turkey (in Accounting and Management). He worked as an accountant for many years before moving to Canada. He has had limited employment since coming to Canada. The Appellant does not speak fluent English. Throughout the proceedings the Appellant used an interpreter. Two interpreters were provided and present throughout the five-day trial.

[5] The Respondent has a university degree and has worked as a teacher in Mauritania and Vietnam. She speaks Turkish, English, French and Arabic. Since moving to Canada, she completed an ESL course and attended Niagara College. She hopes to work in the field of digital marketing.

[6] The parties separated on November 7, 2019, when the Respondent and the three children moved into a shelter.

[7] The parties entered into a Separation Agreement, dated December 13, 2019 (“Separation Agreement”). The circumstances under which the agreement was signed by the Respondent was an issue at trial, but not relevant for the purpose of the appeal.

[8] At the time that the agreement was signed, the parties only had three children, and the Respondent was pregnant with their fourth child. After the agreement was signed, the eldest child went to live with the Appellant, in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

[9] The parties resumed living together under the same roof, but signed a second agreement, titled a “Cohabitation Agreement”, dated April 29, 2020. The Cohabitation Agreement provided that the parties resumed living under the same roof due to the Respondent’s high-risk pregnancy.

[10] The agreements make a number of provisions with respect to decision-making and parenting time, including a parenting plan for the unborn child. In summary, the agreements provide that the Appellant will have decision making responsibility and primary residence of the eldest child and the youngest (then unborn) child when she turns three. The Respondent will have decision making responsibility and primary residence of the two middle children, and the youngest child up to the age of three.

[11] In June 2020, the Respondent moved out of the home with the three children. Again, the eldest child remained with the Appellant.

[12] Sometime thereafter, the parties resumed living under the same roof again, but the Respondent ultimately left for good. In June 2021, the Appellant commenced legal proceedings. In July 2021, the Respondent secured housing in St. Catherines, where the Respondent and children remain to date.

[13] From April 2022 until November 2022, the Appellant was homeless, and the eldest child lived with the Respondent and the other three children.

[14] When the Appellant found a place to live, the eldest child went back to live with him, in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

[15] When the youngest child turned three years old, the Appellant showed up at the Respondent’s door to try to enforce the terms of the agreement. As set out above the agreement provided that the youngest child will live with the Appellant when she turns three years of age. The child remained with the Respondent.

[16] There are problems with the Appellant’s current home. The Appellant acknowledges that the children are harassed and afraid when entering and leaving his home. The children wake up “in fear due to banging on the walls, dog noises and other sounds.” The Appellant’s evidence was that his housing situation is so bad that he applied "from Niagara to Mississauga" for housing and that he has considered entering a shelter so that he could perhaps move up the housing waitlist.

[17] At trial, the Appellant sought a parenting order in accordance with the agreements.

[18] The Respondent was seeking sole decision-making responsibility and primary residence of all four children.

[19] The trial judge’s decision provides for the Respondent to have sole decision-making responsibility of the children and primary residence. The order gives the Appellant parenting time with the children, the details of which are set out below.

[20] The Appellant is seeking an order quashing the trial judge’s decision and granting a parenting order in accordance with the agreements.

Grounds of appeal

[21] The Appellant has raised the following questions on his appeal:

a. Did the trial judge err in law or in fact by relying on a decision that was based on materially incorrect translations from Turkish to English, thereby violating the Appellant's right to a fair hearing under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 7 and s. 14?

b. Did the trial judge fail to give appropriate weight to the valid separation agreements dated December 13, 2019, and April 29, 2020, which both parties had signed and which provided for shared parenting?

c. Did the trial judge's decision constitute a palpable and overriding error by failing to establish a clear parenting time schedule and by effectively minimizing the Appellant's role as a father, contrary to the children's best interests under the Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12?

d. Did the Appellant suffer prejudice due to lack of legal representation, and did the court fail to ensure procedural fairness in a complex family law case involving a self-represented litigant with language barriers?

[22] I will address each of these grounds in turn.

Analysis

Translation at Trial

[23] The Appellant submits that the translator did not properly interpret his testimony during trial. The example he provides relates to his cooperation in completing the documents for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (“OCL”).

[24] The Appellant relies on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Tran, 1994 56 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 951, for the proposition that his rights under section 14 of the Charter were violated because the translator did not properly translate his evidence.

[25] The decision in Tran is easily distinguished from this case. In Tran, it was clear and obvious that there were issues with the translation. The translator did not give simultaneous translations, but simply summarized the evidence in a few sentences after a series of questions and answers. Further, the court had both a copy of the English transcript, as well as a transcript of the Vietnamese translation, translated verbatim back into English.

[26] During the trial, the Appellant had concurrent and simultaneous translations. The Appellant submits that specific words were misunderstood or translated incorrectly. The onus to prove there were issues with the translation lies with the Appellant. He failed to provide any evidence to the court. The Appellant did not file a transcript. He did not file any evidence from a translator, confirming the incorrect translation. He is asking the court to accept his submissions without evidence. I find that there is no evidence to support the Appellant’s position and therefore he has not met his onus.

[27] Although not contained in his written material, in oral submissions the Appellant submitted that he advised the trial judge that he was concerned about the translator. Counsel for the Respondent submits that at no time during the trial did the Appellant raise a concern regarding the translator. Again, the transcript was not produced and there is no evidence before the court to support the Appellant’s position.

[28] Further, there were two translators present throughout the entire trial. The Appellant did not clarify whether he took issue with both translators or just one of the translators.

[29] I find the Appellant has not met his onus and therefore this ground of appeal is dismissed.

Weight to be given to the Agreements

[30] The Appellant submits that the trial judge did not give proper weight to the agreements signed by the parties. At trial and at the appeal before this court, the Appellant seeks an order enforcing the parenting provisions in the two agreements. The Appellant submits that the agreements were valid and binding under the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c F.3, and therefore should have been enforced. Even if the agreements were found to be valid (which was a live issue), the Appellant entirely ignores and fails to address section 56 of the Family Law Act.

[31] As correctly highlighted by the trial judge, section 56 of the Family Law Act provides:

56 (1) In the determination of a matter respecting the education, moral training or decision-making responsibility or parenting time with respect to a child, the court may disregard any provision of a domestic contract pertaining to the matter where, in the opinion of the court, to do so is in the best interests of the child. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 56 (1); 1997, c. 20, s. 10 (1); 2020, c. 25, Sched. 1, s. 28 (9). (emphasis added)

[32] As set out at paragraph 86 of the decision, the trial judge properly considered the weight that should be given to the parenting provisions in the agreements and ultimately determined that the parenting provisions set out in the agreements were not in the best interest of the children. The trial judge then proceeded to review the evidence and determine what parenting plan would be in the best interest of the children.

[33] At paragraph 92 and 93 of the decision, the judge finds as follows:

[92] The father's plan that two children live with him and two with the mother is not in their best interests and the father has presented no evidence as to why this arrangement would be in their best interests. He has simply relied on the Separation Agreement to argue his position.

[93] Ms. Ozdemir, on the other hand, has provided ample evidence as to why the children should remain in her full-time care with sole decision-making authority to her.

[34] The trial judge then carefully went through the evidence presented at trial and set out why the Appellant’s proposal (to enforce the terms of the agreements) was not in the best interest of the children, and why the Respondent’s proposal was in the best interest of the children, having regard to the factors set out in section 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12.

[35] The trial judge found that:

[96] Ms. Ozdemir has a comprehensive plan to care for all four children. They will live together in an appropriate home. They will attend school together in St. Catharines. They have friends and a community in St. Catharines. They have a doctor and dentist they can all attend. There is a support system in St. Catharines.

[97] No such plan was presented by Mr. Ozdemir. Mr. Ozdemir's plans for the future are unclear. His current home is not an appropriate permanent home for the children.

[98] He is considering moving to a shelter so that he could possibly move up the housing wait list faster. Mr. Ozdemir has applied for housing as far as Mississauga and so presumably will move two children there should they be placed in his care. While this court appreciates the housing issues that face many people, particularly those with limited income, this issue has been resolved by Ms. Ozdemir and she has an appropriate home for all four children.

[36] The trial judge also set out several examples where he found the Appellant did not act in the best interest of the children.

[37] I find the trial judge properly identified the law and then applied the facts to the law. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed on this ground.

The parenting schedule is clear

[38] The Appellant submits that the schedule set out by the trial judge is not clear.

[39] The order provides as follows:

Mr. Ozdemir shall have liberal and generous parenting time with the children Bahar Erva Ozdemir born on January 4, 2016, Fatma Zehra Ozdemir born on November 22, 2017, Hatice Kubra Ozdemir born on November 22, 2017, and Ela Nur Ozdemir born on April 16, 2020, to include:

a) Two out of every three weekends from Friday after school until Sunday at 5:00 p.m., commencing Friday, July 5, 2024.

b) During the months of July and August, Mr. Ozdemir's weekend parenting time shall be expanded to Friday at 3:00 p.m. to Monday at 9:00 a.m.

c) In the event that Mr. Ozdemir, cannot take all four of the children as a result of his vehicle only accommodating three children, then one child shall stay with Ms. Ozdemir, on each of the father's weekends on a rotating basis.

[40] The Appellant submits the wording that he shall have “liberal and generous parenting time with the children” is unclear. There is nothing unclear about the terms of the order. Immediately below, the judge specifies the terms of the liberal and generous parenting time, with a specific schedule.

[41] At paragraph 110 of the decision, the trial judge specifically identifies that it is not in the best interest of the children to have undefined parenting time:

I do not find it to be in the children's best interests that there be no defined parenting time, as proposed by Mr. Ozdemir. It is of note that the only time Mr. Ozdemir suggested anything other than undefined parenting time was during his closing submissions.

[42] For these reasons the appeal cannot succeed on this ground.

Procedural fairness and self-represented litigants

[43] The Appellant submits that he was prejudiced because he was not represented at trial and because the court did not ensure he was granted procedural fairness. Specifically, the Appellant submits that the court's “failure to ensure the Appellant understood the process - despite clear language barriers and lack of counsel - contributed to an unfair outcome.”

[44] The following are the steps taken by the court to ensure the process was fair to the Appellant:

a. At paragraph 60 of the Decision, the judge provides that “the court has made attempts to assist Mr. Ozdemir in this trial and to guide him in the presentation of his evidence.”

b. The Judge clarified and reviewed with the Appellant the order that he was asking the court to make;

c. The trial judge explained the best interest of the child test;

d. The trial judge provided the Appellant with a copy of section 24 of the CLRA, to assist him in preparing his evidence;

e. The trial judge explained to the Appellant that section 24 contained a list of things that she would be considering when making her decision;

f. Both the day before and the morning of the Appellant giving evidence, the trial judge explained to the Appellant that they require evidence as to the children's best interests and why his proposal with respect to decision-making, primary residence and parenting time is in the children's best interests.

g. The trial judge clarified for the Appellant that they could disregard any provision in the Agreement regarding the children if the trial judge did not find the provisions were in the children's best interests.

h. On May 2, 2024, the Appellant was provided with a copy of the Guide for Self-Represented Litigants;

i. The Appellant was allowed to bring notes with him to the witness stand when giving his evidence;

j. At the end of his testimony, the Appellant was given a 20-minute break to review his notes and consider whether there was anything else he wanted to tell the court.

k. An interpreter was available to the Appellant throughout the proceedings.

l. For a period of time, he was represented by counsel. He also had the assistance of duty counsel for the motion with respect to the appointment of the OCL.

[45] The court’s obligation to self-represented litigants is outlined in the Canadian Judicial Council’s Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons, which was endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 470, at para. 4.

[46] As articulated by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R v. Morillo, 2018 ONCA 582, 362 C.C.C. (3d) 23:

[11] According to these principles, self-represented persons are expected to familiarize themselves with relevant legal practices and to prepare their own case. However, self-represented persons should not be denied relief on the basis of minor or easily rectified deficiencies in their case. Judges are to facilitate, to the extent possible, access to justice for self-represented persons.

[12] Appellate judges should therefore attempt to place the issues raised by a self-represented litigant in their proper legal context.

[47] In more precise terms, judges should assist self-represented litigants by:

a. Explaining not just the applicable procedures, but also the relevant law and its implications;

b. Providing self-represented litigants with information to assist them in asserting their rights and raising arguments before the court; and

c. Ensuring that procedural and evidentiary rules are not used to unjustly hinder the legal interests of self-represented parties.

Watterson v. Canadian EMU, 2016 ONSC 6744 (Div. Ct.), at para. 38.

[48] However, there are limits to a judge’s duty to assist self-represented litigants. A judge must maintain their neutrality and impartiality. Further, “while it is within a judge’s discretion to control the court process and to grant latitude to a self-represented litigant on procedural issues, that discretion does not extend to rectifying substantive legal deficiencies.” See: Davis v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2024 FCA 115, at paras. 39-40, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 41763 (October 9, 2025).

[49] I find that there was no breach of procedural fairness. In considering the steps taken by the trial judge, as set out above, I find the trial judge satisfied their obligation to ensure the process was fair to the appellant as a self-represented litigant. Therefore, this ground of appeal is dismissed.

Costs

[50] At the end of the hearing, the parties were asked to make costs submissions. The Respondent is seeking costs in the sum of $5,000.

[51] The Appellant submits that he cannot afford to pay costs.

[52] The Respondent was the successful party and is entitled to her costs. She filed a bill of costs in the sum of $8,876.60, although it underestimated the time for attendance at the appeal. The hours and rate charged by the lawyer are reasonable, having regard to his experience and year of call.

[53] I have considered the various factors with respect to entitlement and quantum of costs.

[54] In the circumstances, costs of $5,000 are reasonable.

Disposition

[55] The appeal is dismissed with costs payable by the Appellant to the Respondent in the sum of $5,000 inclusive.

Shore J.

I agree _______________________________

Schreck J.

I agree ______________________________

Brownstone J.

Released: February 4, 2026

CITATION: Ozdemir v. Ozdemir, 2026 ONSC 577

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-00000304-0000

DATE: 20260204

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVISIONAL COURT

Schreck, Shore, Brownstone JJ.

BETWEEN:

SUAT OZDEMIR

Appellant

– and –

KIBAR OZDEMIR

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Released: February 4, 2026