Court File and Parties

CITATION: Mehedi v. Tamlin, 2026 ONSC 407

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 181/25 ML

DATE: 20260121

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

DIVISIONAL COURT

RE: MD. GOLAM SARWAR MEHEDI, Moving Party

AND: ELAINE TAMLIN, INSTRUCTOR, CHRISTINE EDDY, CHAIR LEARNING, AND DISTANCE PROGRAM, CENTENNIAL COLLEGE, STEPHEN DANSO, COORDINATOR, DISTANCE LEARNING PROGRAM, CENTENNIAL COLLEGE, AND CENTENNIAL COLLEGE, Responding Parties

BEFORE: D.L. Corbett J.

COUNSEL: Mr Mehedi, self-represented Moving Party Natalie Kolos and Christine Kucey, for the Responding Parties

HEARD: In-writing on January 20, 2026

Endorsement

D.L. Corbett J.

[1] This is a motion for an extension of the time to seek leave to appeal from the order of L. Brownstone J. dated August 8, 2024 (2024 ONSC 4420) enforcing a settlement agreement between the parties, and ordering costs of $4,000 against the plaintiff, and a direction of Brownstone J. on November 12, 2024, declining to schedule further proceedings in the Superior Court.[^1]

[2] For the reasons that follow, the motion for extensions is dismissed, with costs.

[3] The test for an extension is as follows:

(i) whether the appellant formed an intention to appeal within the relevant time period;

(ii) the length of the delay and the explanation for the delay;

(iii) prejudice to the respondent;

(iv) the merits of the appeal;

(v) whether the justice of the case requires the granting of an extension.

See: Wellwood v. Ontario Provincial Police, 2010 ONCA 386, para 34; Rizzi v. Mavros, 2007 ONCA 350, para 16; 786 Ummah Investments Corporation et al v. Peel Standard Condominium Corporation 1021 et al, 2025 ONSC 2723, para 31 (Div Ct); Mulders v. Baggia, 2025 ONSC 3134, para 24 (Div Ct). Lack of merit alone can be a proper basis to dismiss a motion for an extension: Trivedi v. Hudd, 2022 ONCA 147, para 6; Robson v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONCA 709.

[4] This motion fails each aspect of the test.

No Explanation for Delay

[5] There is no evidence that the appellant intended to appeal within the appeal period (which, for a motion for leave to appeal, was 15 days: rr. 62.02(3) and 61.03.1(3)(a), or, if this were an appeal from a final order as of right, within 30 days: r. 61.04(1)). On any view, the time to appeal expired in August or early September 2024. This motion was commenced on August 5, 2025, nearly a year after the date of the decision of Brownstone J. No explanation is provided in the motion materials as to why the moving party waited a year before taking steps.

[6] The moving party tried to take further steps in the Superior Court after the order of Brownstone J., and one might infer that he did not understand that his recourse was to the Divisional Court rather than further proceedings in the court below. If one were to read the materials generously, this could account for delay to November 12, 2024 (when Brownstone J. refused to schedule further proceedings in this matter), but it is not an explanation for the very lengthy delay thereafter before steps were taken in this court.

Unreasonable Delay

[7] The period of delay is on its face unreasonable. In the absence a cogent explanation for the lengthy delay, it is inexcusable.

Prejudice to the Respondents

[8] Such a lengthy delay is inherently prejudicial to any respondent. Beyond this inherent prejudice, I see no prejudice to the respondent College. However, the moving party also named his instructor at the College and two other College employees, as defendants in the action. The prejudice to a personal defendant in such a proceeding includes the stress and other personal costs associated with having a proceeding hanging over their heads for years.

The Merits of the Appeal

[9] I see no merit to the appeal. The motion judge was entitled to make factual findings on the evidence that was before her that she accepted. She did that, and an appeal court is required to defer to her factual findings. On those findings, there is no error of principle below: the motions judge found that the parties settled the action for $4,000, a finding that was available on the evidence: the plaintiff signed minutes of settlement, a release, and a consent to an order dismissing the claim: on the documents it was clear the parties had agreed to a settlement for $4,000.

Justice of the Case

[10] The underlying claim itself appears to be likely frivolous. The moving party sued for $1 million over grades he received in courses at the College – without pursuing internal appeals and review mechanisms and judicial review of final grades decisions to the Divisional Court. That is the proper recourse for a student aggrieved with their grades.

[11] The moving party then entered into a settlement agreement and related documentation for a settlement for $4,000 – objectively, in all the circumstances, a nuisance settlement payment.

[12] The bald allegations of “negligence” and “breach of fiduciary duty” in the “fresh fresh amended statement of claim” are ungrounded in a legal basis for finding a duty of care, or a fiduciary duty, owed by a college to its students – and these allegations are in any event untethered to an arguable breach of duty when the plaintiff failed to pursue the proper recourse available for challenging grades. The preposterous damages claimed further contribute to the overwhelming air that the claim itself was likely frivolous.

Balancing the Factors

[13] I dismiss the motion primarily because of the length of the delay, the prejudice to the individual respondent, and the apparent lack of merit in the proposed appeal. The other factors also weigh against granting the extension, but not so strongly as the three factors that strongly indicate that the extension should be refused. None of the circumstances weigh in favour of exercising my discretion to grant the extension.

Costs

[14] The motions judge exercised her discretion in awarding costs of $4,000. There is no error in principle in her having done so: the award is well within the range of costs awards ordinarily made for what was, in substance, a straightforward matter.

[15] Costs are an indemnity. The fact that the costs consume the entire settlement amount does not render the costs award unfair: it illustrates why the moving party’s conduct in contesting the settlement in further litigation was impractical. The further proceedings in this court show that the moving party has not understood this point: if he litigates an issue and loses, he should usually expect to indemnify the losing party for a portion of their costs. The same holds true for this motion.

Disposition

[16] The motion for extensions of time is dismissed. The moving party shall pay costs of this motion to the responding parties in the amount of $3,000, inclusive, payable within thirty days. To be clear, this costs award is in addition to the $4,000 in costs awarded by Brownstone J.

“D.L. Corbett J.”

Released: January 21, 2026

[^1]: I note that it seems clear that the impugned order is final. This point was not addressed in case management or by the moving arty in their motion materials. The responding parties argued that the order is final and jurisdiction lies with the Court of Appeal. However, the impugned order is within the monetary jurisdiction of the Divisional Court, so the extension motion is properly in this court in any event: that jurisdiction is established by the amount awarded in the judgment ($4,000) and not the amount claimed in the proceeding ($1 million). The test for an extension is the same whether viewed as a motion for leave to appeal or an appeal as of right, so there is no need to decide whether the order is final or interlocutory.