Court File and Parties
CITATION: Marcelo v. Personal Insurance Co., 2026 ONSC 19
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 628/25
DATE: 20260105
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
DIVISIONAL COURT
RE: FLORDELIZA MARCELO, Appellant
AND:
THE PERSONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent
BEFORE: Matheson J.
COUNSEL: Yoni Silberman, for the Appellant
Yalda Aziz, for the Respondent
Maia L. Bent and Jeffrey J. Moorley, for the proposed Intervener, Ontario Trial Lawyers Association
Gűn Koleoğlu, for the Licence Appeal Tribunal
HEARD: January 5, 2026, in writing
ENDORSEMENT
[1] The Ontario Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA) seeks leave to intervene in this appeal as a friend of the Court under r. 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] The appeal challenges a reconsideration decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) dated July 9, 2025, and related LAT decision dated November 21, 2024. The appeal hearing is on January 26, 2026.
Appeal
[3] In the underlying LAT proceedings, the appellant applied for benefits arising from a motor vehicle accident. The appellant proceeded to the LAT, challenging the respondent insurer’s use of the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).
[4] Before the LAT, the appellant did not show that her accident-related injuries warranted removal from the MIG. The LAT found that the appellant’s injury was a “contusion” within the meaning of “minor injury” under the SABS. The request for reconsideration was dismissed.
[5] In the appeal to this Court, the appellant alleges that the LAT erred in law in finding that her injury was a “contusion” in the definition of a minor injury under the SABS. This is the issue about which OTLA seeks leave to intervene. I make no comment on the other issues in the notice of appeal and whether they are questions of law (as is required for a right of appeal).
Leave to intervene as a friend of the Court
[6] The test for leave to intervene as a friend of the court is well-established. “The overarching issue is whether the [proposed intervener] is likely able to make a useful contribution to the resolution of the appeal without causing injustice or prejudice to the immediate parties”: Animal Justice v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2024 ONCA 941, at para. 10., citing Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd. (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 164 (C.A.), at p. 167.
[7] The proposed intervener must usually meet at least one of the following three criteria, as set out in Animal Justice, at para. 11:
the proposed intervener has a real, substantial and identifiable interest in the subject matter of the proceedings;
the proposed intervener has an important perspective distinct from the immediate parties; or
the intervener is a well-recognized group with a special expertise and a broadly identifiable membership base.
[8] A proposed intervener must advance useful and different submissions on the issues raised by the parties: R. v. McGregor, 2023 SCC 4.
[9] Interventions may not be useful in the following circumstances:
(i) where a perspective or interest is adequately represented without a proposed intervener’s involvement; and,
(ii) where the submissions of a proposed intervener are duplicative of the submissions of others: Animal Justice, at para. 13.
[10] Both circumstances apply here. OTLA’s proposed factum overlaps substantially with the submissions in the factum of the appellant. It overlaps on principles of statutory interpretation, the nature of the SABS, and submissions on the specific interpretive issue. Having reviewed the appellant’s factum (which was delivered long before the OTLA materials and therefore available to OTLA), I am not persuaded that OTLA’s proposed submissions, put forward based on a broader perspective, add sufficiently to this issue to grant leave to intervene. In this case, there is no reason to conclude that the parties will not provide all the assistance the Court requires to address this issue. The perspective and interests are adequately represented without OTLA’s involvement.
[11] On the overarching issue on this motion, I conclude that OTLA is unlikely to make a useful contribution to the resolution of the appeal. This motion is dismissed.
[12] I acknowledge the respondent’s request not to hear OTLA’s motion because OTLA’s conduct has caused it prejudice. I decline that request, although it has merit. OTLA did not commence its motion in compliance with the Consolidated Practice Direction for Divisional Court Proceedings. This has had an impact on the progress of the motion. OTLA has failed to deliver and upload a notice of motion or motion record, even now. OTLA did not ask for or otherwise have permission to avoid those steps. Although I have not taken this course of conduct into account on this motion, OTLA should not expect to avoid responsibility for its process failings in the future.
Matheson J.
Date: January 5, 2026