CITATION: Sarpong v LECA, 2026 ONSC 1365

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 38/24

DATE: 2026-03-11

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

DIVISIONAL COURT

RE: Richard Sarpong, Applicant

AND:

Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (LECA), Respondent

BEFORE: Justices Shore, O’Brien, I. Smith.

COUNSEL: Richard Sapong, Self-Represented Maeve Mungovan, Counsel for the Respondent

HEARD: By videoconference from Brampton on March 5, 2026

ENDORSEMENT

Overview

[1] The applicant Mr. Sarpong filed a complaint with the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (now the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency or LECA)[^1] regarding two police officers of the Peel Regional Police Service. The officers had been involved in an investigation that led to the applicant being charged with the offence of Take Auto Without Consent contrary to the Criminal Code. The applicant was an employee of FedEx. He was alleged to have taken a FedEx vehicle offsite for his own use when off duty. The Crown ultimately withdrew the charges.

[2] The applicant complained to the Director, alleging the officers’ investigation was negligent. He also alleged the officers failed to take a statement from him with respect to FedEx’s internal investigation and failed take any action to investigate his report of a related assault on him. The Director referred the complaint for investigation to the Peel Regional Police Service (PRPS). The PRPS investigators concluded the officers had reasonable grounds to lay the charge against the applicant. Although the officers did not take a statement from the applicant, it was because he had not returned their call. In any event, they concluded a meeting with him would not have changed the decision to proceed with the charge given the other evidence. The Chief of the PRPS concluded the allegations of misconduct were not substantiated.

[3] The applicant requested the Director review the Chief’s determination under s. 71 of the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 15 (PSA). The Director completed his review and issued an interim decision determining that further investigation was required. He found the investigation was deficient in that (1) the applicant was not interviewed; (2) there was a lack of information regarding whether the applicant was arrested, when the charge was withdrawn, and what was put on the record regarding the withdrawal of the charges; and (3) the report was unclear on whether FedEx had wanted to pursue criminal charges against the applicant. The Director identified further investigative steps the PRPS was required to take.

[4] The PRPS completed the further steps and issued a supplementary investigative report, with the Chief again concluding the allegations of misconduct were not substantiated.

[5] The Director continued his s. 71 review and concluded that (1) the PRPS investigation adequately addressed the issues raised in the complaint; and (2) the Chief’s findings were supported by the available evidence. On the issues he had previously raised, the Director noted that the detective conducting the complaint investigation had tried to schedule an interview with the applicant, but the applicant advised he had laid a private information against the person alleged to have assaulted him. The detective determined that the risk of interference with the ongoing or upcoming criminal matter – a concern raised with the detective by the applicant himself - was too great to warrant a further interview.

[6] The investigative report also provided a summary of the reason for withdrawing the charges against the applicant, even though the specific comments from the assistant Crown attorney were redacted as privileged. Finally, the report clarified other information about the criminal proceeding, including that the applicant was not arrested because, given the summary nature of the offence, he was instead served with a summons.

[7] The applicant has sought judicial review of the Director’s final decision. The two primary arguments the applicant raised in this court are: (1) The court should order further disclosure so that he can fairly assess the material on which the Director’s decision was based. He says that without that material, the decision was arrived at in a procedurally unfair manner; and (2) The Director’s decision was unreasonable because it relied on information that was inaccurate or inconsistent with the information available in the record.

[8] For the following reasons, the application is dismissed.

No Procedural Unfairness

[9] Complainants under the PSA are entitled to a comparatively low level of procedural fairness in the complaint investigation because they are not facing a concrete impact on their rights and interests. Significant deference is also shown to the procedural choices of the investigating police force. The law does not require a perfect investigation, and courts are reluctant to interfere in an administrative decision-maker’s investigative process unless there is bad faith or patent unfairness: Boua v. Office of the Independent Police Review Director, 2024 ONSC 2172, at para. 16.

[10] Complainants do not have an explicit right to disclosure of documents with respect to the investigation into their complaint other than disclosure of the report itself: PSA, s. 66(2). For procedural fairness reasons, there may be an entitlement to the disclosure of other material, but there is no general right to discovery, nor are complainants entitled to the disclosure that would be available in the context of a criminal prosecution.

[11] Here, a central focus of the applicant’s submissions was his request for an unredacted version of the email from the assistant Crown attorney providing the reason the charges were withdrawn. The PRPS claimed privilege over the email. There was no breach of procedural fairness in providing a redacted version of the email in the investigation report. This is because the Director did not rely on the redacted portion of the email. Instead, in his decision, the Director relied on the summary of the email found in the report. That summary indicated that the Crown’s withdrawal request was based on the assessment that prosecuting the charge was not in the public and that the incident was “better addressed as an employment issue rather than a criminal matter.” The Director’s reliance on the summary means the applicant had the information underlying the Director’s decision.

[12] The applicant raised other disclosure issues that similarly did not disclose a breach of procedural fairness because they were not relied upon by the Director. I do not intend to address every item raised by the applicant in his detailed oral submissions. Two further examples suffice.

[13] The applicant sought production of an email, dated April 3, 2024, referenced in a footnote in the investigative report. LECA acknowledges the email was not produced in the record of proceeding. It explains that if the email existed, it could not be located. The email was purportedly from the detective undertaking the conduct investigation to the Director’s office, addressing the concern that a further interview with the applicant risked interfering with the upcoming court matter. However, the Director noted in his decision that the detective relied on the applicant’s own concern about a further interview. The Director quoted the detective as stating that a further interview was not justified given the risk to the upcoming criminal proceedings, “particularly given the concern Mr. Sarpong articulated in his email dated December 15, 2023.”

[14] Since the applicant had himself raised the concern about the risk to the criminal matter, the absence of an email adverting to the same concern cannot be a basis for finding the Director’s decision to have been made in a procedurally unfair manner.

[15] As a final example, the applicant sought disclosure of what he says were missing parts of the underlying police investigation report that led to the charge against him. He also sought a copy of FedEx’s internal report into the incident involving him. He does not suggest the Director relied on information from this material and the material is not in the record of proceeding. Nor does he otherwise justify why the Director needed to obtain this information, or why it was relevant and needed to challenge the Director’s decision. He states the police report would give more information about the officer who swore the information, but there is no suggestion the officer swore the information on any basis other than the evidence collected by the two responding officers. As set out above, there is no general right to disclosure (outside of the record of proceeding on judicial review) or discovery. The absence of this material did not give rise to procedural unfairness.

Director’s Decision was Reasonable

[16] The standard of review for the Director’s decision is reasonableness: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, a para. 23; Boua, a para. 13. To be reasonable, a decision must be based on reasoning that is both rational and logical. Reasonableness review is not a “line-by-line treasure hunt for error”: Vavilov, at para. 102. In order for a reviewing court to find a decision unreasonable, any shortcoming in the decision must be more than a minor misstep. The Supreme Court of Canada stated in Vavilov, at para. 100:

The burden is on the party challenging the decision to show that it is unreasonable. …Any alleged flaws or shortcomings must be more than merely superficial or peripheral to the merits of the decision. It would be improper for a reviewing court to overturn an administrative decision simply because its reasoning exhibits a minor misstep. Instead, the court must be satisfied that any shortcomings or flaws relied on by the party challenging the decision are sufficiently central or significant to render the decision unreasonable.

[17] Reviewing courts are also not to intervene in the factual findings of administrative decision-makers absent exceptional circumstances: Vavilov, at para. 125.

[18] Here, the applicant has engaged in a detailed review of what he considers to be inaccuracies in the Director’s decision or inconsistencies between the decision and the record. We find these arguments overly parse the wording of the decision or record and amount at most to minor missteps.

[19] For example, the applicant pointed to parts of the record where it was noted that the FedEx representative advised that FedEx wanted the police to pursue the investigation compared to another statement where it was said FedEx wished to pursue the investigation criminally. This can easily be understood as a clarification. In any event, the Director relied on FedEx’s position only to say it was reasonable for the officers to charge the applicant once FedEx confirmed they wished to proceed with the matter. Whether the FedEx representative directly said the company wished to proceed with the investigation or with the “criminal” investigation does not change the important point, which was that the prosecution had a willing complainant.

[20] The applicant also takes issue with the Director’s statement that the evidence showed he had taken the FedEx vehicle. He claims this is a misstatement of the video surveillance. He points to information from the police report that the police had “no visual” of the applicant taking the vehicle. But the Director’s statement, properly quoted, was that, “collectively” the evidence showed the applicant had taken the vehicle. The evidence included not only the surveillance video, but also a statement from a witness and review of a FedEx log. There is no basis to intervene in the Director’s finding on this point.

[21] As a final example, the applicant points to parts of the record that state the police officer was required to swear an information and issue a summons, whereas other portions of the record focus only on the need to issue a summons. However, the facts related to the summons were relevant only because the Director was trying to understand whether the applicant was arrested. Because the offence was a summary conviction offence, the applicant could only be brought to court by a summons. This explained why there was no arrest. It was not necessary to highlight details about the swearing of the information.

[22] In short, the applicant has pointed to minor wording changes that do not inform the substance of the Director’s decision and that provide no basis for finding it to be unreasonable.

Other Issues

[23] Although not raised in his oral submissions, the applicant raised additional issues in his written submissions. For example, he submitted it was unreasonable for the Director to uphold the Chief’s findings when he was not interviewed after the Director raised this concern in the initial decision requiring that further investigative steps be taken. The failure to interview him did not render the decision unreasonable considering the explanation provided in the Director’s decision. As set out above, the Director accepted the concern raised by the applicant, which is that interviewing him could interfere with a pending criminal matter for which the applicant had sworn a private information.

[24] The applicant also alleges a breach of his rights under ss. 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. There is no merit to these allegations. They do not appear to have been raised before the Director and the applicant has not shown how the test under either provision could be met given the nature of his rights as a complainant and in the circumstances of this case.

Disposition

[25] The application is dismissed. LECA was substantially successful on the preliminary motion before Trimble J. and entirely successful on the application. However, it does not seek costs and none are ordered.

_____________________ Shore J.

O’Brien J.

_____________________ I. Smith J.

Released: March 11, 2026

[^1]: On April 1, 2024, the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019 (CSPA) came into force. As a result, the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) transitioned to become LECA. However, the Complaints Director under the CSPA continues to exercise the powers and duties of the Independent Police Review Director in respect of complaints, such as the applicant’s complaint, under the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 15.