CITATION: Huang v. Landlord and Tenant Board et al., 2026 ONSC 1142
COURT FILE NO.: DC-26-450
DATE: 2026-02-24
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
JIAN GUO HUANG
Applicant/Moving Party
– and –
LANDLORD AND TENANT BOARD and HAZELVIEW PROPERTIES
Respondents
Self-Represented
K. Ley, Counsel for the Respondent, Hazelview Properties
HEARD: February 17, 2026
M. Bordin J.
Overview
[1] Unless another Act provides otherwise, an application for judicial review shall be made no later than 30 days after the date of the decision: s. 5(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1 (the “JRPA”).
[2] The self-represented applicant moves for an extension of time to file an application for judicial review of the decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board (“LTB”) in Order LTB-T-042236-24 issued May 7, 2025 (the “Order”).
[3] The Order dismissed the applicant’s T2 Application which alleged the respondent landlord, Hazelview Properties (the “Landlord”), had substantially interfered with the reasonable enjoyment of the rental unit or residential complex contrary to s. 22 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17.
[4] The Landlord opposes the extension of time.
[5] Rule 38 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 applies to applications to the Superior Court of Justice for judicial review under s. 6(2) of the JRPA: . r. 68.02(2). A factum is required: rr. 38.09 and 68.04. The applicant has not filed a factum. The respondent Landlord has filed a factum. The applicant has filed an affidavit in support of his position.
The test for leave
[6] Section 5(2) of the JRPA provides for the extension of time to apply for judicial review:
The court may, on such terms as it considers proper, extend the time for making an application for judicial review if it is satisfied that there are apparent grounds for relief and that no substantial prejudice or hardship will result to any person affected by reason of the delay.
[7] The three judge panel of the Divisional Court in Unifor and its Local 303 v. Scepter Canada Inc., 2022 ONSC 5683, considered the principles applicable to an extension of time at paras. 17-19:
[17] Subsection 5(2) must be interpreted in context and giving meaning to all of its words. Subsection 5(1) is important context. The legislative reform introduced a 30-day time limit, which should be given force. Moving to s. 5(2), an extension of time is not mandatory where the two factors referenced in that subsection are satisfied. On the contrary, the subsection provides that an extension is in the court’s discretion. The two factors mentioned are prerequisites to the exercise of that discretion. They are necessary, but do not preclude the consideration of other circumstances. Given the time limit in s. 5(1), the length of delay and any explanation offered for it would be relevant considerations.
[18] Therefore s. 5(2) does not foreclose a consideration of the length of the delay, and any explanation offered for the delay, in the exercise of the court’s discretion. The impact of these facts may vary depending on the case and will now be considered in the context of a 30-day time limit. The lengthy delay in this case is therefore significant. Even before the imposition of the 30-day time limit, a delay of more than six months could justify the dismissal of an application for judicial review for delay: Kaur, at para. 4.
[19] The applicant puts forward Belyavsky v. Walsh 2022 ONSC 3135 and respectfully disagrees with its approach in this regard. In Belyavsky, the judge considered not only the two factors in s. 5(2), but also the length of the delay and explanation for the delay, in exercising her discretion to deny the requested extension of time. In my view, she was entitled to do so.
[8] In short, granting leave is discretionary. To obtain leave to extend the time to file his application, the applicant must establish two mandatory conditions: (1) that the request for judicial review has “apparent grounds for relief”, and (2) that no substantial prejudice or hardship will result to any other person affected by reason of the delay. The court may also consider other factors such as the length of the delay and any explanation for the delay. Lengthy delays in seeking leave may justify refusal of leave.
[9] The respondent submits that the court should use the same test applied by the Court of Appeal for Ontario to decide whether to grant leave to extend time for an appeal. In Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, 114 O.R. (3d) 636, at para. 15, the court stated the test as follows:
The test on a motion to extend time is well settled. The overarching principle is whether the "justice of the case" requires that an extension be given. Each case depends on its own circumstances, but the court is to take into account all relevant considerations, including
(a) whether the moving party formed a bona fide intention to appeal within the relevant time period;
(b) the length of, and explanation for, the delay in filing;
(c) any prejudice to the responding parties caused, perpetuated or exacerbated by the delay; and
(d) the merits of the proposed appeal.
[10] Enbridge dealt with granting leave to extend the time for an appeal from a decision of the Divisional Court exercising its appellate jurisdiction.
[11] To be sure, the two tests are very similar and consider some of the same factors, but s. 5(2) of the JRPA must be considered in granting leave to extend the time to commence an application for judicial review. Given the language of s. 5(2), and as noted in Unifor, the two s. 5(2) factors are “prerequisites”. The failure to establish either is fatal to the application.
[12] Where the underlying judicial review application does not have any “apparent grounds for relief”, the court can deny extension requests on this basis alone: Yan v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 1290, at para. 8; Jonker v. Township of West Lincoln, 2023 ONSC 1948, 167 O.R. (3d) 544, at para. 35.
[13] In Enbridge, at para. 20, the court noted that in considering the merits, the court “must be satisfied that the proposed appeal presents an arguable question of law, or mixed law and fact, requiring consideration of matters such as the interpretation of legislation; the interpretation, clarification or propounding of some general rule or principle of law; the interpretation of a municipal by-law where the point in issue is a question of public importance; or the interpretation of an agreement where the point in issue involves a question of public importance”.
[14] To determine whether the judicial review has apparent grounds for relief, the court will engage in a limited inquiry into the merits of the underlying application, including the evidentiary record: Jonker, at paras. 35 and 41. It is not a high bar, but it is a more onerous standard than the test for striking pleadings and requires that the applicant demonstrate more than simply a “tenable” argument: Jonker, at para. 40; Wahbi v. Ontario College of Teachers, 2023 ONSC 3713, at para. 15. The apparent grounds for relief should be assessed against the applicable standard of review: Jonker at para. 42.
[15] The majority of the Divisional Court in Ricketts v. Veerisingnam, 2025 ONSC 841, set out at paras. 20-24 the applicable standard of review on a judicial review application of this nature:
[20] On the appeal, the standard of review is correctness for questions of law: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, para. 8; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, para. 37. There is no appeal with respect to questions of fact or questions of mixed fact and law except where there is an extricable legal principle, which is reviewable on a correctness standard: Housen, paras. 26-37.
[21] Whether there has been a breach of the duty of procedural fairness is a question of law, subject to correctness review on appeal: Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29, 470 D.L.R. (4th) 328, paras. 26-30, 129, 169, 179. The degree of procedural fairness required is determined by reference to all the circumstances of the case: Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, paras. 21-28; Vavilov, para. 77.
[22] With respect to the application for judicial review, this court will not entertain the application or grant a remedy to the extent that the substance of the application is adequately addressed by another process, that “other process” in this case being the appeal: see Strickland v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 37, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 713, paras. 40-45. Therefore, the only issues that this court will entertain for judicial review are questions of fact, mixed fact and law (where there is no extricable question of law) and exercises of discretion: Shearer, para. 32. Upon judicial review, the presumptive standard of review is reasonableness: Vavilov, at paras. 23-25.
[23] Reasonableness review “finds its starting point in the principle of judicial restraint” but remains “a robust form of review” rather than “a ‘rubber-stamping’ process or a means of sheltering administrative decision makers from accountability”: Vavilov, para. 13. A reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker. The reasonableness standard requires a reviewing court to defer to such a decision: Vavilov, para. 85. The relative expertise of administrative decision makers with respect to the questions before them is a relevant consideration in conducting reasonableness review: Vavilov, paras. 31, 92-93.
[24] The burden is on the party challenging the decision to show that it is unreasonable. Before a decision can be set aside on that basis, “the reviewing court must be satisfied that there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency”: Vavilov, para. 100.
[16] The applicant has not appealed the Order.
Factual Background
[17] On April 29, 2024, there was a flood caused by a leaking water heater in the vacant unit above the applicant’s unit which caused flooding in the applicant’s unit and other units. The applicant brought a T2 application which was heard by the LTB on May 1, 2025.
[18] As set out in the Order, the LTB found that the Landlord’s contractors cleaned up the water and stopped the flow of water by 5:00 p.m. on April 29, 2024 and installed two industrial dehumidifiers and two industrial fans in the applicant’s unit by 8:00 p.m., and that other tenants also had industrial equipment in their units and were permitted to stay in the units.
[19] The LTB questioned the applicant’s evidence about efforts to minimize the noise and the level of noise as well as other aspects of his evidence. The LTB noted that the Landlord’s agent testified that the drying equipment stayed at the property for 3 days and produced an invoice showing the rental period.
[20] The LTB cited Onyskiw v. CJM Property Management Ltd., 2016 ONCA 477, 132 O.R. (3d) 295, and noted that the LTB should take a contextual approach and consider the entirety of the factual situation in determining whether there was a breach of the Landlord's maintenance obligations, including whether the Landlord responded to the maintenance issue reasonably in the circumstances. The LTB cited ss. 8(2) and 8(3) of General, O. Reg. 516/06 as relevant to determining whether the Landlord substantially interfered with the reasonable enjoyment of the rental unit by the tenant or a member of the tenant's household, and whether a rent abatement is justified in the circumstances.
[21] The LTB concluded that the Landlord responded reasonably and in a timely manner; that the drying equipment was necessary and the length of time it was operated was reasonable; and that the Landlord took reasonable steps to manage the noise by allowing the applicant to turn off fans at night. The LTB was not satisfied that the noise of the fans for three days substantially interfered with the applicant’s reasonable enjoyment of the rental unit.
[22] The applicant filed a T6 application on the same date that the Order was released. He says it was because he misunderstood the direction of the LTB as to his next steps. The T6 application essentially raised the same grounds as were determined in the T2 application by the Order. The application was withdrawn by the applicant on October 28, 2025. The applicant says that he learned on that day that his concerns could not be addressed by the T6 application.
[23] The applicant states in his affidavit that “[i]n preparing my review request, I discovered a documentary inconsistency relied upon at the May 1, 2025, hearing”. He says that the Landlord had submitted a document described as an invoice for flood drying equipment, which indicated that the equipment had remained in his unit for only three days and that “upon closer inspection” he “discovered” that it was an estimate dated May 10, 2025, prepared after the drying equipment had been in use and removed. He submits that the document was used and relied upon by the LTB as evidence of how long the equipment was present in his unit and that the equipment had minimal impact.
[24] The applicant does not say precisely when he “discovered” the “documentary inconsistency”.
[25] On October 29, 2025, the Tenant filed a Request to Extend and a Request to Review the Order which had been issued almost six months earlier. In his request the applicant states that he only learned at the T6 hearing the day before that he had 30 days to request a review. He states that the same facts and evidence apply. The LTB denied the Request to Extend Deadline on October 30, 2025, noting in part that the applicant seeks to re-argue the findings in the Order.
[26] That same day, on October 30, 2025, the applicant filed another Request to Extend the time to file a Request to Review the Order. In that request, the applicant raised what he described as “new and significant circumstances that were not raised in his previous application”. Specifically, he asserted that the lease was also signed by his daughter, and his application had only been submitted in his name and that his daughter had a right to seek relief. A different member of the LTB dismissed this request in part because the fact of a joint tenancy is not a change in circumstances but rather a change in the applicant’s understanding of the same circumstances that existed earlier. The LTB also noted that the applicant sought to re-argue a matter that had already been determined.
[27] The applicant filed a third Request to Extend time on November 12, 2025. This time the applicant alleged that the evidence submitted and relied on by the LTB in the Order was discovered “recently” and is therefore new and significant. On November 13, 2025, the request was dismissed. Yet another member of the LTB did not agree and held it was an issue that should have been raised by the applicant at the initial hearing. Further, the LTB advised the applicant that he was “cautioned from filing further requests of a similar nature to extend time without obtaining legal advice; should the Tenant continue to do so, they may risk being declared a vexatious litigant and/or have costs ordered against them”.
[28] On November 13, 2025, the applicant sent the LTB a “formal Request for Reconsideration under Rule 29”. A fourth member of the LTB issued an endorsement advising the applicant that the documents could not be accepted for filing because there is no “Rule 29” under which the applicant could file a “request for reconsideration”. The LTB prohibited the applicant from filing further requests for extensions of time and further requests to review.
[29] The applicant next sought judicial review. He served and filed a notice of motion to extend time for judicial review of the Order on December 31, 2025, and an updated notice of motion and motion record on January 20, 2026.
[30] Just recently, the applicant produced a draft application for judicial review. It is dated December 10, 2025, and was uploaded to Case Center the day before the hearing. In the notice of application, the applicant seeks:
a. to “quash” the LTB decision of November 13, 2025, regarding his request to review and extend the time;
b. a “declaration that fraud, misrepresentation or previous undiscoverable evidence constitutes “new and significant evidence”” that must be considered;
c. an order directing the LTB to determine his October 31, 2025, request to review and extend the time dated October 31, 2025, including the misleading invoice; and
d. a declaration that the LTB misapplied rule 16.6 and improperly threatened him with a vexatious litigant warning.
[31] The draft notice of application is broader than the relief sought in the motion to extend time.
Leave denied
[32] The principal basis advanced by the applicant in submissions for seeking judicial review was the “discovery” of the “documentary inconsistency”. He asserts he intended to seek relief from the day he received the Order but that he mistakenly proceeded with a T6 application, and when he realized that was not the correct process, he began his requests for review until he was prevented from requesting further reviews, at which point he sought judicial review.
[33] The applicant asserts that allowing the Order to stand when it relied on the “estimate” gives rise to a right to judicial review and that the LTB’s refusal of his request related to this document gives rise to procedural unfairness. He submits he could not have identified the issue with the document within the statutory time for an application for judicial review. Finally, he submits that not allowing judicial review would allow the Landlord to rely on misleading evidence and deny him justice.
[34] The applicant has not raised “apparent grounds for relief” in his application or submissions.
[35] The fact that the “estimate” is dated May 10, 2024, does not mean it is inaccurate. On its face, it was generated a year before the hearing and very shortly after the flood and remediation work. The applicant could have cross-examined on the document at the hearing. Moreover, the LTB accepted the evidence of the Landlord that the drying equipment was on site for three days; the LTB did not rely only on the document. Finally, it is clear that the conclusions of the LTB also depended on not accepting the applicant’s evidence in many respects and that the conduct of the Landlord generally was reasonable.
[36] The LTB is an expert tribunal. The reasoning in the Order is internally coherent and sets out a rational chain of analysis that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the LTB. The reasonableness standard requires a reviewing court to defer to such a decision. The applicant has raised no “apparent grounds for relief” with respect to the reasonableness of the LTB’s conclusions in the Order or with respect to the Requests to Review.
[37] Further, the applicant has not raised “apparent grounds for relief” regarding procedural unfairness. The “estimate” was available and referred to at the hearing. The applicant could have examined it more closely at the time and cross-examined on it. His failure to do so and the LTB’s denial of his third Request for Review when this issue was first raised does not give rise to procedural unfairness. Finally, the LTB did in fact consider the applicant’s Requests for Review. They were not denied for being late.
[38] It is not clear that there is prejudice to the respondent other than the passage of time. However, the application does not disclose apparent grounds for relief. This alone is sufficient to deny leave.
[39] Turning to other factors, the delay in this case is significant.
[40] I do not accept that the applicant formed an intention to bring the application for judicial review within 30 days of the Order.
[41] In his affidavit, the applicant does not clearly set out when he discovered the “documentary inconsistency”. The applicant’s reasons to challenge the Order evolved between May 7, 2025, and Nov 12, 2025. He first commenced another application seeking the same relief. He then sought a review. When that was denied, he raised the joint tenancy as a basis for a review. In none of these steps did he raise the issue with the “estimate”. He did not raise the issue until his third Request for Review on November 12, 2025, as he was reaching for yet another reason to challenge the Order. This was more than six months after the Order. However, the document had been in his possession all along and was used at the hearing. He could have discovered this alleged ground for judicial review within 30 days of the Order if he had carefully reviewed the “estimate” at the time of the hearing. This factor also weighs against granting leave.
[42] The application for leave to extend the time for judicial review is denied.
M. Bordin J.
Released: February 24, 2026
CITATION: Huang v. Landlord and Tenant Board et al., 2026 ONSC 1142
COURT FILE NO.: DC-26-450
DATE: 2026-02-24
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
JIAN GUO HUANG
Applicant/Moving Party
– and –
LANDLORD AND TENANT BOARD and HAZELVIEW PROPERTIES
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
M. Bordin J.
Released: February 24, 2026