Court File and Parties

CITATION: Saltat v Correia and others, 2026 ONSC 1091

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 514/25

DATE: 2026-02-26

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

DIVISIONAL COURT

RE: MILAGROS SALTAT, Applicant

AND:

SARAH CORREIA, SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION (SEIU) LOCAL 1 CANADA, SUNNYBROOK HEALTH SCIENCE CENTRE, DESJARDINS FINANCIAL SECURITY LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, CALEYWRAY LAWYERS, GOODFELLOW ARBITRATORS INC. and HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO, Respondents

BEFORE: Matheson, Muszynski and Brownstone JJ.

COUNSEL: Milagros Saltat, Self-Represented Applicant

Gillian Ground and Rebecka Arraial, for Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre

Omar Tobah, for Desjardins Financial Security Life Assurance Company

Doug Wray, for the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 1 Canada, Sarah Correia and CaleyWray Lawyers

Tyler Matthews, for Goodfellow Arbitrators Inc.

Anna Solomon, for Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

HEARD: February 24, 2026, at Toronto

ENDORSEMENT

[1] The applicant seeks judicial review of the decision of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) dated May 23, 2025 (the Decision), and the related reconsideration decision dated August 13, 2025 (the Reconsideration).

[2] The applicant is an employee of the respondent Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre and became disabled due to a motor vehicle accident during her employment. The other parties are as follows. The applicant was a member of the respondent union and sought to pursue a grievance. The respondent Sarah Correia was an employee of the union, CaleyWray Lawyers was the union’s law firm and Goodfellow Arbitrators Inc. included an arbitrator engaged to arbitrate among certain parties. The applicant claimed insurance benefits from the respondent Desjardins Financial Security Life Assurance Company. Although the HRTO is also named as a respondent, its submissions in this Court are limited given its role as the Tribunal.

[3] The applicant has been off work since 2019. In 2024, the applicant filed an application at the HRTO alleging discrimination in the course of employment on the grounds of disability and due to her association with a person identified by another ground. In response to the application, the HRTO requested that the applicant provide additional submissions on jurisdictional issues. Specifically, the HRTO noted that it appeared that the application was filed more than one year after the last alleged incident of discrimination and there did not appear to be facts showing good faith for an extension of time, as required by s. 34 of the Human Rights Code. Further, the applicant had not explained the factual basis for her belief that the respondents’ conduct was linked to the Code grounds that had been advanced.

[4] After a review of the materials submitted, the HRTO dismissed the application. The claim against Sunnybrook was dismissed due to delay. It was based upon events that took place before the applicant did not return to work in 2019. Those events were more than four years before the application, well beyond the one-year time requirement in s. 34(1) of the Code. As set out in the Decision, the HRTO considered whether to accept a late application under s. 34(2) of the Code, correctly noting that the Tribunal had to be satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice would result.

[5] The applicant relied on medical incapacity to show good faith. The Tribunal considered the medical information put forward by the applicant along with the other evidence from the applicant. The Tribunal also considered a substantial record of the other steps that the applicant had taken after not returning to work in 2019. Briefly, the applicant had active correspondence and negotiations with her union, pursued insurance benefits, pursued arbitration, and pursued court proceedings.

[6] The Tribunal cited HRTO cases for the principle that waiting for another process was not a good faith reason for delay. The Tribunal further found that the applicant’s other activities were entirely inconsistent with an inability to submit an application to the HRTO. The HRTO was not satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith.

[7] With respect to the claims against the union, its employee and its lawyers, the Tribunal found that the applicant had not provided some factual basis for her belief that they treated her adversely. With Desjardins Insurance, the Tribunal found that the applicant was claiming the misapplication of the rules of a benefit program or misinterpreting medical information to refuse a benefit, which could not reasonably be considered a Code violation. Lastly, the Tribunal found no jurisdiction to hear an application based on the arbitrator’s adjudicative duties, nor was there a specific allegation of discrimination made against the arbitrator.

[8] As set out in the Reconsideration, the applicant submitted that there were new facts and evidence that could be determinative and were not previously available. The applicant provided a statement of facts that were said to have occurred in the period from 2017 to 2023, none of which were shown to be new or determinative.

[9] In the application for judicial review before this Court, the applicant submits that the process before the HRTO was unfair and that there are several issues with the Decision and the Reconsideration. The issues raised substantially overlap with the issues raised on Reconsideration. In oral submissions, the applicant mainly focused on her experiences while at work at Sunnybrook and the issue of delay, however, we have considered all her written submissions as well.

[10] This Court’s standard of review is as follows. The HRTO process must be fair, and the Decision and Reconsideration must be reasonable.

[11] The applicant has put forward additional material in support of this application, which the applicant seeks to rely on as supplementary evidence on the judicial review. The respondents object.

[12] An application for judicial review normally proceeds based on the materials that were before the administrative tribunal. The applicable legal principles limit a party’s ability to put forward additional evidence on an application for judicial review.

[13] The applicant’s record contains two affidavits as well as documents such as medical records and other materials that are not part of an affidavit. Some of the material overlaps with the record of proceedings. Although not necessary, it need not be struck out. The affidavit of the applicant dated August 18, 2025, set out steps taken HRTO and, under the heading “Legal Errors and Procedural Fairness”, includes statements setting out the applicant’s views on that topic. Those statements are not evidence but we have considered them as part of the applicant’s submissions.

[14] The second affidavit, dated November 18, 2025, sets out statements under the heading “Misconduct of Original Counsel” that refer to other proceedings such as the LTD benefits claim, the arbitration and a Law Society complaint, concluding that counsel took advantage of the applicant’s vulnerability. That affidavit includes a statement that there was misconduct in the HRTO proceedings and that counsel withdrew from these court proceedings. There are no specifics.

[15] To the extent that the proposed supplementary evidence about counsel relates to procedural fairness at the HRTO or in the proceedings leading up to the hearing in this Court, it may be permitted under the legal test for supplementary evidence, as set out, for example, in Keeprite Workers’ Independent Union v. Keeprite Products Ltd. (1980), 29 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.). However, that evidence is insufficient to provide a foundation for an allegation of procedural unfairness due to the conduct of counsel. We note that the applicant was self-represented at the HRTO and in this Court. There are no specific facts put forward, only conclusory statements that do not provide a basis to pursue a claim of procedural unfairness on this basis. To the extent that the application record includes new documents and makes new statements of fact regarding other grounds, they do not meet the test to supplement the record of proceedings.

[16] With respect to other allegations of procedural fairness, the applicant submits that there ought to have been a different process at the HTRO to accommodate her disabilities including an in-person hearing. This must be considered in context.

[17] In 2024, the applicant submitted a request for accommodation to the HRTO. The applicant requested permission for her husband to act as her representative and as a witness, for extended time limits and for additional time to complete forms. She also asked for the proceeding to be in-person. In response, the HRTO informed the applicant that her husband could act as her representative, setting out the needed steps, and noted that there were no witnesses at a mediation. The HRTO further indicated that extensions of time could and should be requested as relevant deadlines may arise. And the HRTO indicated that after a hearing event or mediation was scheduled, the applicant could request an in-person hearing together with supporting medical documentation.

[18] To the extent that the applicant made accomodation requests after the above, they were granted. There was no procedural unfairness.

[19] The applicant also makes an allegation that the HRTO was biased, relying on the tone and the language in the reasons for the Decision and the Reconsideration. Our review of those decisions shows no basis for this ground.

[20] Moving to the other issues raised, the burden is on the applicant to show that the Decision and Reconsideration are unreasonable.

[21] The applicant challenges the Decision to dismiss the claim against Sunnybrook as too late. The applicant continues to submit that her medical condition provides the good faith reason that the HRTO ought to have given her an extension of time beyond the one-year time period. However, the Tribunal considered the applicant’s medical records and evidence regarding this submission along with the substantial record of the applicant’s other activities and applied correct legal principles, concluding that a good faith reason had not been established. The applicant may disagree with that decision, but she has not shown that it is unreasonable.

[22] The applicant further submits that there was a continuing contravention so the one-year time period does not apply. She submits that the discrimination that she experienced throughout her time at work at Sunnybrook and through the entire later process of her insurance applications, grievance process and other steps taken after she did not return to work meet the test for a continuing contravention. This submission overlooks the difference between the events here and a succession or repetition of discrete acts of discrimination of the same character. The last date of alleged discrimination at work at Sunnybrook was in 2019. The subsequent events do not amount to discrete acts of discrimination of the same character resulting in a continuing contravention.

[23] The applicant has not met her burden to show that the Decision and Reconsideration regarding Sunnybrook are unreasonable. The decisions have the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility, and transparency: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, at para. 100.

[24] Nor has the applicant met her burden with respect to the other respondents. The Tribunal found that based on the record before it the applicant had not provided some factual basis for her belief that the union, its employee and its lawyers had treated her adversely. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s claims about the insurance benefit program could not reasonably be considered a Code violation. The Tribunal found no jurisdiction to hear an application based on the arbitrator’s adjudicative duties. In each instance, the applicant has not shown any legal, factual, or reasoning error that would render the Decision or the Reconsideration unreasonable.

[25] This application is therefore dismissed. With respect to the two costs outlines that were filed, the applicant shall pay costs of $500, all inclusive, to Desjardins, and costs of $500, all inclusive, to Goodfellow.

Matheson J.

Muszynski J.

Brownstone J.

Date: February 26, 2026