Court File and Parties

CITATION: Mendes v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2025 ONSC 5810

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO. 621/24

DATE: 2025-10-14

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO DIVISIONAL COURT

RE: MYLES MENDES, Appellant AND: ROYAL BANK OF CANADA, Respondent

BEFORE: Nakatsuru J.

COUNSEL: Self-represented Appellant Natalie Marconi, for the Respondent

HEARD at: Toronto, October 14, 2025

ENDORSEMENT

[1] Myles Mendes did not pay the outstanding amount of his Royal Bank of Canada credit card. The card was cancelled. He owed $16,211.82. Mr. Mendes was sued in small claims court. On September 11, 2025, Deputy Judge Vicars granted judgment in the Royal Bank’s favour. Mr. Mendes now appeals.

[2] On today’s date for the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Mendes initially did not show up at the appeal which was being conducted virtually. Attempts were made to contact him by the Court and Ms. Marconi, counsel for the respondent. Ms. Marconi advised that she received an email message from Mr. Mendes advising he was having difficulty connecting to the Zoom link that he was provided.

[3] Fortunately, Mr. Mendes did connect to the appeal. We then proceeded to hear the appeal. Mr. Mendes made detailed and thorough oral submissions and made references to several judicial authorities to support his position.

[4] Before getting to his submissions, Mr. Mendes had asked for a brief adjournment of the appeal to upload his authorities and be in a better position to effectively present his case. I denied that adjournment as it was not in the interests of justice to do that. It turned out that I was able to get those authorities before me and Mr. Mendes made his submissions quite ably. It was abundantly apparent that he had diligently prepared his oral submissions in advance.

[5] As well, Mr. Mendes had requested before me on the appeal date an in person hearing for similar reasons. Again, this was denied as this virtual hearing provided him with a complete and fair appeal hearing. Again, Mr. Mendes was able to make his submissions clearly and in full. There was no disadvantage to the parties in conducting this appeal virtually as is the practice of the Divisional Court.

[6] On the appeal, numerous grounds of appeal have been raised. I have considered each carefully.

[7] I do not give effect to any of these grounds. In the analysis, I have given full recognition to the fact that Mr. Mendes was a self-represented litigant at his trial.

[8] Regarding the failure to grant Mr. Mendes an adjournment, the trial judge made no reversible error in this. She considered the history of the case including the fact Mr. Mendes had just requested an adjournment two days before his trial date which was denied by Justice O’Brien on the basis the request was not substantiated. When the request was renewed on the date of the trial, the trial judge heard Mr. Mendes out, who then took up her offer for the parties to speak to an administrative judge to see if the matter could be settled. However, the trial judge made it clear to Mr. Mendes that if no settlement was reached, the trial was to commence in the afternoon and if Mr. Mendes did not attend, his statement of defence would be struck. Mr. Mendes did not return claiming he went to the hospital due to his medical condition. His statement of defence was struck, the trial conducted, and judgment rendered.

[9] I find that deference should be afforded to the trial judge’s decision. She applied the correct test and exercised her discretion judicially. She observed the various reasons given by Mr. Mendes for his requests for an adjournment including his well-being, his financial situation, his need for legal representation and being ill-prepared. The trial judge gave no credence to any of them. The trial judge reviewed the medical note that was given to the court saying that a “medical condition” prevented Mr. Mendes from “working” until September 24th, and found it to be insufficient, observing Mr. Mendes was able to attend court and had participated in the mediation that day. Regarding his email that he had to go to the hospital that was sent after the mediation failed, the trial judge found it insincere. She found it was a stalling tactic. These are findings of fact that were available to the trial judge who was in a superior position than this Court to make such determinations.

[10] Given these factual findings, the trial judge was entitled to strike the statement of defence.

[11] Moving on, there is no merit to the appellant’s submission that the trial judge failed to consider or erred by conflating liability with damages. Liability was straightforward. The trial judge readily could have made a finding of liability based on the affidavit of Danielle Beausejour, an employee of the Royal Bank, presented on the non-contested trial.

[12] The appellant also argues that the reasons are insufficient. However, this matter was not raised in the notice of appeal and the appellant’s factum. On that basis, the ground of appeal should not be entertained. However, alternatively, I also find that when the reasons of the trial judge are considered in light of the evidence led at the trial, they were sufficient. They provide a basis for meaningful appellate review and advised the parties the why of the decision when the reasons are considered in context.

[13] There was nothing wrong with the trial judge later amending the judgment of September 11, 2024, as this simply corrected an administrative error regarding the date from which prejudgment interest was to be awarded. It was in keeping with the manifest intention of the trial judge.

[14] The remaining grounds of appeal have no merit. This includes the argument made by the appellant that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias. I do not see anything in the conduct of the hearing that would justify this ground of appeal.

[15] No error of law was shown. No palpable or overriding error has been demonstrated with respect to any factual findings or mixed questions of fact and law in the decision.

[16] For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed.

[17] Regarding costs, taking into account all relative factors including the simplicity of the matter and the reasonable expectations of the parties, a proportionate award of costs is an all-inclusive amount of $1,500 payable by the appellant to the respondent forthwith.

Nakatsuru J.

Released: October 14, 2025.