Court File and Parties
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 395/25 DATE: 20250613 SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO DIVISIONAL COURT
RE: ANTHONY LEDSHAM AND: JUSTICE JOSEPH HANNA AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO
BEFORE: Justice O’Brien
COUNSEL: Anthony Ledsham, Self-Represented
HEARD: In-writing
Endorsement
[1] This endorsement provides my reasons for dismissing this motion for an extension of time to file a judicial review application pursuant to r. 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.
[2] Mr. Ledsham has brought a motion seeking an extension of time to file an application for judicial review from three decisions of the Ontario Court of Justice: a decision dismissing his application for a jury trial, a decision dismissing his application for a change of venue and a decision dismissing his application to dismiss the charges against him. He alleges procedural unfairness and bias in the Ontario Court of Justice. He believes the conduct of the underlying proceeding may jeopardize his right to a fair trial under s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
[3] Although Mr. Ledsham has provided a form of transcripts of proceedings in the Ontario Court of Justice, the documents do not appear to be official court transcripts. Mr. Ledsham states this is because of Justice Hanna’s “refusal to provide written decisions.” Mr. Ledsham advises he has not yet obtained official court transcripts.
[4] Mr. Ledsham was charged with criminal harassment against an arbitrator appointed by the Superior Court of Justice to address a dispute between the Applicant and the Air Canada Pilots Association (ACPA), of which he was a member.
[5] During the case management process in this court, the court issued directions raising the concern that the proposed application was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process of the court and asking the Registrar to issue a notice under r. 2.1. The case management directions, which were provided to the parties with the r. 2.1 notice, asked Mr. Ledsham to address the following concerns in his r. 2.1 submissions:
The Divisional Court does not have jurisdiction to judicially review an order by a trial judge in an Ontario Court of Justice criminal proceeding. In any event, it would be extraordinary for any court to intervene in interlocutory orders of a criminal prosecution.
The appropriate route to challenge a disagreement with a judge’s decision is to appeal the decision. It is improper to name the judge as a respondent on appeal or judicial review.
The court also raised a concern about whether Mr. Ledsham should have ongoing access to the court because of a pattern of vexatious proceedings. In a decision dated March 24, 2022 (Ledsham v. Air Canada Pilots Association, 2022 ONSC 1877), Corbett J. of the Divisional Court put Mr. Ledsham on notice that he was considering making an order restricting Mr. Ledsham’s access to the courts in respect of the issues and parties connected with the underlying litigation. The matters at issue in that case were connected to the current motions because they related to Mr. Ledsham’s attempt to appeal a decision of the Superior Court granting an enforcement order with respect to the arbitrator’s decision. Corbett J. dismissed the appeal under r. 2.1 but ultimately declined to impose conditions limiting Mr. Ledsham’s access to the courts. He stated: “If the appellant should engage in further vexatious proceedings in this court, however, the court can consider this appeal as part of any pattern of conduct that might ground such an order in the future.”
[6] In the court’s case management directions in the current proceeding, the court noted that it was concerned the motion and proposed application now at issue may be frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The motion and proposed application are connected to the underlying dispute with the ACPA and the arbitrator assigned that dispute. The case management directions stated: “The court is considering whether Mr. Ledsham’s access to justice needs to be controlled by an order limiting his access to the courts to protect adverse parties and the administration of justice from vexatious recourse to the justice system.”
[7] Mr. Ledsham filed responding submissions. In response to the first concern raised by the court, he submitted judicial review by the Divisional Court is available in summary cases where a lower court exceeds its jurisdiction or denies procedural fairness. He states that while interlocutory judicial reviews in criminal matters are rare, they are permissible where irreparable harm, such as the loss of fair trial rights, would result. He denies his motion is frivolous because he is seeking to protect his fundamental rights in a criminal proceeding, which could result in significant consequences including imprisonment.
[8] In response to the second concern raised by the court, Mr. Ledsham acknowledged it was an error to name Justice Hanna as a respondent to his motion. He stated this error was “induced by court staff,” who he said instructed him to name Justice Hanna as a respondent. He has undertaken to amend his materials to name His Majesty the King as the respondent and to remove Justice Hanna.
[9] On the question of restricting access to the courts, Mr. Ledsham submitted that the current motion does not establish a pattern of vexatiousness. In addition, while the current motion is connected to the dispute with the ACPA, it addresses distinct criminal proceedings. In his submission, restricting his access to the courts would disproportionately infringe his s.7 Charter right to defend himself.
[10] For the following reasons, I find the application for judicial review should be dismissed.
[11] Rule 2.1 allows the court to stay or dismiss a proceeding where it appears on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The application of r. 2.1 is “limited to the clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading and there is a basis in the pleadings to resort to the attenuated process”: Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, [2015] O.J. No. 5692, at para. 8; Mohammad v. McMaster University, 2023 ONCA 598, [2023] O.J. No. 3997, at para. 6.
[12] The rule “must be interpreted robustly so that a motion judge can effectively exercise his or her gatekeeping function to weed out litigation that is clearly frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process”: Scaduto, at para. 8; Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2020 ONCA 690, at para. 8.
[13] In this case, Mr. Ledsham’s motion must be dismissed based on the first concern raised by the court. The Divisional Court does not have jurisdiction to review the orders of Justice Hanna. Criminal law falls within federal jurisdiction. The rules for the appeal of criminal matters are found in the Criminal Appeal Rules, which are made under the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Part XXVI of the Criminal Code also tightly limits the availability of certiorari. An application for certiorari is brought to a single judge of the Superior Court. The Divisional Court’s judicial review powers arise from the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1, which is provincial legislation and which does not provide any authority for the judges of the Divisional Court to review criminal orders outside of the usual criminal process. The Divisional Court therefore plainly does not have jurisdiction to review criminal orders from the Ontario Court of Justice.
[14] Mr. Ledsham cites R. v. Deschamplain, 2004 SCC 76, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 601 for the proposition that judicial review is available where a lower court exceeds its jurisdiction or denies procedural fairness. But that case involved an application for certiorari to a single judge of the Superior Court of Justice. It did not involve review by the Divisional Court and does not say anything about the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court.
[15] Because the Divisional Court has no jurisdiction, the motion is doomed to fail. I do not need to address the remaining concerns. The motion is dismissed pursuant to r. 2.1.
[16] On the final issue, I have decided not to limit Mr. Ledsham’s access to the courts. Although this motion was clearly brought in the wrong forum, Mr. Ledsham provided thoughtful submissions addressing the court’s concerns. I also accept that this case, together with the one other case in this court (before Corbett J.), which was decided over three years ago, may not be sufficient to establish a pattern of vexatious conduct to grounds such an order. This case also arises in a somewhat different context because of the new criminal proceeding, although there is a connection to the dispute with the ACPA. I reiterate the comment that if any further vexatious proceedings are brought in this court, this motion may be considered part of a pattern that could ground an order limiting access to the courts in the future.
O’Brien J
Date: June 13, 2025