CITATION: H.C. v. Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, 2025 ONSC 3742

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 041/25

DATE: 20250711

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVISIONAL COURT

K. Coats, W. Matheson, S. Nakatsuru, JJ.

BETWEEN:

H.C.

H.C. Self-represented Applicant

Applicant

• and -

CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY OF TORONTO and CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES REVIEW BOARD

Respondents

Cheryl Buehler, Counsel for the Respondent Children’s Aid Society of Toronto

Olivia Filetti and Valerie Crystal, Counsel for the Respondent Child and Family Services Review Board

HEARD at Toronto: June 10, 2025

WARNING: Further to the February 13, 2025 Case Conference Endorsement of Justice R. Charney and section 87(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, no person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

REASONS FOR DECISION

S. Nakatsuru J.

A. OVERVIEW

[1] On April 18, 2024, H.C.[^1] dropped his elementary school aged child R. off at public school. R. is a non-verbal autistic child. R. came home from school that day with red marks on the back of their thighs. H.C. believed that the marks were bruises inflicted on his child by R.’s teacher or educational assistant. H.C. contacted the school about his concerns. The following day, the school notified the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto (“CAST”) about H.C.’s complaints. CAST conducted a community caregiver investigation into the matter. The investigation did not verify the complaint.

[2] Dissatisfied, after completing internal reviews with CAST, H.C. brought his complaint to the Child and Family Services Review Board (“CFSRB”). Other than ordering CAST to provide a letter explaining the investigation and why it was unable to disclose more information gathered in the investigation, the CFSRB did not grant any other remedy. CAST provided this letter on January 10, 2025.

[3] H.C. seeks judicial review of both CAST and CFSRB decisions on the grounds he was not provided procedural fairness and the decisions are unreasonable.

[4] For the following reasons, I would dismiss H.C.’s application for judicial review.

B. BACKGROUND

1. The Statutory Framework

[5] CAST is a designated children’s aid society under s. 34(1) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1 (“CYFSA”). Under s. 35(1)(a), one of its functions is to investigate allegations or evidence that children may be in need of protection. In doing that, it follows the requirements in ss. 119 and 120 of CYFSA, ss. 30, 31 of General Matters under the Authority of the Minister, O. Reg. 156/18, and Ontario Child Protection Standards, 2016, Standard 1, Standard 2, and Appendix A. (the “Standards”).

[6] A person may make a complaint to a children’s aid society. If they are not content with the outcome of the complaint review procedure, they may bring an application for relief at the CFSRB: CYFSA, s. 120. The CFSRB may review the following matters, which are listed in s. 120(4):

1. Allegations that the society has refused to proceed with a complaint made by the complainant under subsection 119 (1) as required under subsection 119 (2).

2. Allegations that the society has failed to respond to the complainant’s complaint within the timeframe required by regulation.

3. Allegations that the society has failed to comply with the complaint review procedure or with any other procedural requirements under this Act relating to the review of complaints.

4. Allegations that the society has failed to comply with subsection 15 (2).

5. Allegations that the society has failed to provide the complainant with reasons for a decision that affects the complainant’s interests.

6. Such other matters as may be prescribed.

[7] With respect to s. 120(4)6, no such other matters have been prescribed: General Matters under the Authority of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, O. Reg. 155/18.

[8] With respect to the fourth listed ground, s. 15(2) provides as follows:

s. 15(2) Service providers shall ensure that children and young persons and their parents have an opportunity to be heard and represented when decisions affecting their interests are made and to be heard when they have concerns about the services they are receiving.

[9] The Statutory Powers and Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S. 22 does not apply to a proceeding by the CFSRB under s. 120: CFYSA ss. 119(9), 120(6). CFSRB has the authority to make orders and directions in its proceedings “as it considers proper to prevent abuses of its process”: O. Reg. 155/18, s. 50. Its Rules also provide a discretion to define and focus the issues as set out in CFSRB Rules, r. 24.4.

2. The CAST Investigation

[10] After receipt of H.C.’s complaint, CAST commenced a community caregiver investigation into the matter. H.C. stated his concerns to M.S., who was responsible for carrying out the investigation (the “Investigator”). As per protocol, the Investigator consulted with the Child and Youth Advocacy Bureau of the Toronto Police Services to determine whether a joint investigation was required. A Detective reviewed the information and advised CAST that police involvement did not appear warranted but to advise if the CAST investigation revealed any criminality.

[11] On April 19, 2024, the Investigator spoke with H.C. by telephone and obtained information about H.C.’s concerns. This was a 15-minute call. She advised H.C. of the investigation process and possible outcomes. H.C. confirmed that R.’s marks were almost gone but he sent photos of the marks.

[12] The Investigator requested H.C. to take R. to the Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect clinic (“SCAN”) at the Sick Children’s Hospital. Dr. Yeung of the SCAN team examined R. that day and provided an opinion that the mark could be a bruise or dermatitis. Dr. Yeung recommended that CAST inquire whether the school had started using any new chemicals and to gather information regarding any incidents or injuries that day. Dr. Yeung noted that if they were bruises, they were concerning due to the location and size.

[13] On April 22, 2024, the Investigator had another 20-minute phone call with H.C. who disagreed with the SCAN clinic’s assessment. H.C. complained that the examination was only done with the doctor’s “naked eye” and asserted that CAST should insist on a more thorough examination or get a second opinion. He provided a link to a website about a camera with intense lighting that could see below the skin’s surface that could be used for such examinations.

[14] On April 25, 2024, the Investigator met with R. in accordance with the Standards. This was a 45-minute meeting. H.C. was present and participated in the meeting as R. is non-verbal. H.C. provided information about R.’s experience at the school. He strongly argued that whoever was responsible for changing R.’s diaper used physical force that left bruises likely due to retaliation for an argument H.C. had had with the staff that morning.

[15] On April 29, 2024, the Investigator spoke with Dr. Yeung about H.C.’s concerns about the adequacy of the SCAN clinic’s assessment. Dr. Yeung advised that she was unfamiliar with the illumination technology suggested by H.C. The SCAN clinic did not use it. Dr. Yeung further advised that in formulating her opinion, she relied upon the academic literature and had consulted with other SCAN physicians about the case.

[16] From April 20, 2024, to May 9, 2024, the Investigator interviewed all staff members who spent time in R.’s classroom on April 18, 2024. The Investigator inquired about any concerns about child abuse or neglect, the relationship between school staff and R., any chemicals used in R.’s classroom, the staff’s conduct with R. on April 18, 2024, the interactions between the staff and H.C. that day, and anything that could have caused the marks. The Investigator also observed the classroom and its physical layout to assess the credibility and sufficiency of the information received from the staff. Thus, in addition to the medical investigation and the police contact, the investigation included information from two school administrators, five school staff, an on-site visit, and an inspection of classroom logs.

[17] Throughout the investigation, H.C. insisted that school staff had abused R. He sent follow up emails of a similar effect.

3. The Procedural History and the Decisions Under Review

The Verification Decision of CAST

[18] On June 6, 2024, the Investigator held a verification conference with her supervisor. They reviewed the information gathered during the investigation and concluded that it was more likely than not that R. was not harmed by school staff and the complaint was not verified. They considered the fact that the medical assessment was inconclusive, the absence of any observed incidents between staff and R. that day, and the existence of alternative explanations for the markings. If the marks were bruises, they could have been caused by unobserved physical interactions between R. and other children that day.

[19] That same day, the Investigator orally informed H.C. of the verification decision. She explained the balance of probabilities threshold and the fact the public school was to conduct their own internal investigation and would continue to work with H.C. about his child’s safety.

[20] In a letter dated June 11, 2024, CAST informed H.C. that the allegation of physical harm to R. was not verified. The letter was signed by the Investigator, who was identified as a “Senior Child Welfare Worker” and her Intake Supervisor.

The Internal Complaints Review Panel Decision of CAST

[21] On June 12, 2024, the Intake Supervisor spoke with H.C. by phone as H.C. strongly disagreed with the investigation outcome. The Intake Supervisor explained the general nature of a community caregiver investigation and listened to H.C.’s concerns including past incidents with the school. H.C. relayed his view that he had not known until April 18, 2024, that the staff would beat his child and his view that the principal and the staff were collectively involved. The Intake Supervisor advised H.C. about the complaints process but told him it would not result in a re-investigation.

[22] On June 14, 2024, H.C. filed a police report. After speaking with the Investigator who provided an overview of the CAST investigation, the Detective addressing the matter agreed with the CAST’s investigative steps and declined to re-open the police investigation.

[23] On June 14, 2024, H.C. took steps to initiate a complaint to CAST under s. 119 of CYFSA. H.C. spoke to the manager of Client Services, who helps with CAST’s Internal Complaints Review Panel (“ICRP”) process. H.C. strongly advocated for his child and insisted that the investigation was inadequate. H.C. was told the ICRP process would not result in re-investigation, but H.C. wished to proceed with his complaint.

[24] On June 14 and 21, H.C. provided emails about his concerns. Amongst his concerns were his views that the school failed to meet his child’s needs, he was not properly interviewed, and he was not consulted before the investigation was closed. He also complained that the worker on the investigation doubted his testimony and that CAST did not tell him what steps were taken to investigate the matter. A meeting was then held on July 15, 2024.

[25] On July 19, 2024, a letter was given to H.C. outlining ICRP’s conclusion that H.C. had an opportunity to provide information through in-person meetings, phone calls and email and his information was considered. They also concluded that the Investigator had objectively reviewed the information obtained during the investigation and that reasons for the conclusion had been given. The letter indicated that CAST was unable to provide more information to H.C. due to privacy laws.

The CFSRB’s Decision

[26] H.C. did not agree with the ICRP decision. On July 22, 2024, H.C. applied for review of the CAST decision by CFSRB pursuant to s. 120(4) of CYFSA. In the Pre-hearing Report dated September 12, 2024, CFSRB identified the specific issues to be reviewed at the hearing: O. Reg. 155/18, ss. 39-40, 42; Rules of Procedure of the Child and Family Services Review Board, rr. 22-23. CFSRB found H.C.’s complaint eligible for review on two grounds under s. 120(4)4 and 120(4)5, as follows:

• Whether H.C. was given an opportunity to be heard and represented when decisions affecting his interests were made, or a chance to be heard when he raised concerns about the services he was receiving; and

• Whether CAST failed to provide H.C. with reasons for a decision that affected his interests.

[27] On the electronic hearing date of November 14, 2024, H.C. requested CFSRB to add issues focused on his concerns about the CAST’s investigation and purported violations of CYFSA. He alleged that CAST had failed to protect his child contrary to ss. 125-26 of CYFSA by conducting its investigation in an arbitrary manner. He also alleged breaches of various other sections of CYFSA. The CFSRB adjudicator declined to address the new issues, noting that the defined issues were already decided in the Pre-Hearing Report and that the new issues argued for by H.C. were not within its jurisdiction. At the same time, the adjudicator held that she would nonetheless consider all relevant provisions necessary in coming to a decision.

[28] By Order dated December 10, 2024, the adjudicator dismissed all allegations that CAST failed to hear H.C.’s concerns. On preliminary matters, the adjudicator did not accept H.C.’s argument that the Investigator was not an authorized child protection worker under CYFSA. As well, H.C. was provided adequate disclosure of the CAST investigation.

[29] Regarding the merits of the case, the adjudicator concluded that CAST did hear H.C.’s concerns including his concerns that R. had experienced abuse by school staff and that the medical examination was lacking. Additionally, the adjudicator concluded that the Investigator was not biased, and that a formal interview process was not required for an adequate investigation. However, the adjudicator found that H.C. was not provided meaningful reasons for why CAST did not verify his allegations of abuse by school staff. The adjudicator found that even if CAST felt constrained by privacy restrictions, CAST still had an obligation to explain the factors considered in its verification decision.

[30] The adjudicator therefore ordered that CAST provide H.C. with a letter setting out: (i) how a community caregiver investigation works; (ii) an explanation of the investigation process in this matter; and (iii) stating the specific statutory provisions which limit its ability to share information about the investigation with H.C.

[31] On January 10, 2025, CAST sent H.C. a letter addressing these points.

C. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

[32] The presumptive standard of review for all questions on judicial review is reasonableness: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65. None of the exceptions to the presumption of reasonableness review are applicable in this case.

[33] Regarding breaches of procedural fairness, there is no standard of review: Afolabi v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 257, at paras. 59-60. The requisite level of procedural fairness is determined by applying the factors set out in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817.

D. THE ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DECISIONS

[34] H.C. raises numerous issues on this judicial review. Many repeat the arguments he has made previously to CAST and CFSRB. Reformulated and refocused to core complaints, they are that the decisions were unreasonable, not made in a procedurally fair manner, and/or were contrary to s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

[35] I find it unnecessary to deal expressly with each one of the numerous arguments raised by H.C. Some were repetitive. All were considered. None were sufficient individually or collectively to provide a basis to overturn the decisions. I will deal more specifically with the main issues raised by H.C. as can best be ascertained from his written materials and oral submissions.

[36] Before undertaking that task, I can deal with H.C.’s Charter arguments summarily. H.C. argues CAST’s decision failed to protect his child’s security of the person and that both the CAST investigation and the CFSRB hearing were not conducted in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

[37] First, these arguments are raised for the first time on judicial review and were not raised before the CFSRB. While this is not an absolute bar for raising them before this Court, it is a factor to be considered in the exercise of the judicial review discretion: Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654, at paras. 22-29. I would not exercise that discretion to hear them in this case.

[38] Second, H.C.’s arguments dealing with the s. 7 rights of R. do not relate to s. 7 rights of H.C. While as a parent, H.C. may have his own rights under s. 7,[^2] they are not implicated on the facts of this case and H.C. has no standing to raise his child’s rights. Before a remedy is afforded under s. 24(1) of the Charter, the applicant must prove that his s. 7 rights were violated.

[39] Finally, many of H.C.’s s. 7 arguments are fundamentally the same as his submissions regarding procedural fairness and there is no injustice in addressing them in that context. Procedural fairness, which is dependent on context, is the constitutional norm: R. v. Rodgers, 2006 SCC 15, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 554, at paras. 47-49; Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 113, 121. I am mindful that administrative decision-makers must make their decisions in a Charter compliant fashion, but given the arguments raised on this judicial review, it would be needlessly duplicative to conduct a separate constitutional analysis.

[40] Therefore, H.C.’s s. 7 Charter grounds of review can be dispensed with without any further specific reference to them in these reasons.

[41] As well, CAST’s argument that the judicial review of the verification decision should be dismissed as being out of time can be dealt with in short order. I note that H.C. brought a timely application for the judicial review of the CFSRB’s decision. Had he brought a judicial review application of the CAST’s verification decision before resorting to the CFSRB process, no doubt he would have been met with a prematurity objection. I would exercise my discretion to hear the judicial review application of the CAST verification decision.

E. ANALYSIS

1. THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE CAST VERIFICATION DECISION

The Procedural Fairness of the Decision

[42] The requirements of procedural fairness are context-specific and incorporate respect for the administrative decision maker’s choice of procedure: Baker, at para. 27. The content of the duty of fairness is determined based on the factors set out in Baker, which include: (1) the nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it; (2) the nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of the statute pursuant to which the body operates; (3) the importance of the decision to the individual or the individuals affected; (4) the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision; and (5) the choices of procedure made by the agency itself. This is not an exhaustive list: Baker, at paras. 20-28.

[43] H.C. argues that the verification investigation/decision was procedurally unfair. According to H.C., the procedural flaws includes that the Investigator was not properly qualified to conduct the investigation, was biased in her investigation, did not competently investigate his son’s injuries, and did not keep H.C. adequately informed about its progress or allow him to participate.

[44] In assessing these submissions, I must look to the Baker factors. The verification decision was very important to H.C. and R. At the same time, it was also important to the staff who were alleged to have maltreated R. and more generally to the school: Chapman v. York Region Children's Aid Society, 2021 ONSC 2620 (Div. Ct.), at paras. 42-43.

[45] The other Baker factors are shaped by the nature of the proceeding and the law. As said in Chapman at paras. 44 and 46:

The regulatory scheme here includes the CYFSA, the Standards and the Eligibility Spectrum. The latter two set out minimum standards for child protection investigations, including procedures designed to ensure that CAS workers apply similar standards to make consistent and accurate decisions. The investigation must be thorough and balanced and in compliance with the regulatory scheme, given the lack of other procedural protections, such as an oral hearing with the right to cross-examine or the right to a full appeal.

We accept that the role of the CAS is investigative, not judicial, so there is no requirement for a formal oral hearing. However, given the serious impact of the finding on an individual, and the lack of an appeal from such a determination, procedural fairness in the circumstances requires adequate notice, disclosure, and an opportunity to respond prior to a decision.

See also Finn v. Highland Shores Children’s Aid Society, 2023 ONSC 5495 (Div. Ct.), at para. 21; Stamatis v. Children's Aid Society of Toronto, 2017 ONSC 7056 (Div. Ct.), at para. 76.

[46] I agree with CAST that this community caregiver investigation complied with the principles of procedural fairness as demonstrated by:

(i) Multiple opportunities for H.C. to speak with the Investigator, to present his concerns and to provide his evidence and information. This included email communications from H.C. Given that this was not a family-based community caregiver investigation but an institutional community caregiver investigation,[^3] the Standards did not require a formal interview with H.C. unless there were protection concerns regarding the family;

(ii) H.C. was provided information about the investigation. The nature and scope of the disclosure demanded by H.C. was not required for a community caregiver investigation.[^4] H.C. was made sufficiently aware of the nature of the investigation and its results;

(iii) An expert medical examination was sought from the SCAN clinic at the Hospital for Sick Children and H.C.’s concerns about the clinic’s failure to use illumination technology were addressed with the assessing physician;

(iv) All necessary elements, including joint consultation with the police, interviews with all potential witnesses, and examination of the classroom required for community caregiver investigations under CYFSA and the Standards, were complied with.

[47] There is no support for H.C.’s attacks on the qualifications and objectivity of the Investigator. She was a qualified child protection worker. Along with her supervisor, she produced affidavits before the CFSRB swearing that she was so designated. These facts were accepted by the adjudicator. The fact the Investigator did not produce a form of certificate as argued for by H.C., is not a reason to disturb this factual finding. Moreover, the record does not reveal any bias or reasonable apprehension of bias on the Investigator’s part. This complaint originates mainly from H.C.’s disagreement with the outcome of the verification decision itself. Further, the investigation results were reviewed by the Investigator’s supervisor who also participated in the verification decision.

[48] The process used was procedurally fair.

Reasonableness of the CAST verification decision

[49] H.C. makes many submissions challenging the reasonableness of the verification decision. In the main, they reflect H.C.’s strong disagreement with the outcome of the investigation. These arguments include that the Investigator was inconsistent in her statements, the investigation was arbitrary and ignored relevant evidence and the Investigator made factual errors such as accepting the alternative diagnosis of dermatitis when it was “obvious” R. suffered bodily harm.

[50] I would not give effect to any of these arguments.

[51] Although the reasonableness standard of review is robust, it starts from a position of respect for the administrative decision maker. The applicant has not shown that the decision was unreasonable. In this case, one deficiency was identified, and corrected. The reasons provided were initially deficient. CAST provided the January 10, 2025, letter, which rectified this deficiency.

[52] To provide context to the assessment of the reasonableness of the decision, the legal framework for an institutional community caregiver investigation requires CAST to:

(a) Determine the appropriate response to information alleging that a child is or may be in need of protection within 24 hours of receiving such information,

(b) If the appropriate response is a child protection investigation, CAST must complete the following steps:

• conduct a review of current and historical information;

• prepare an investigation plan;

• if information is received alleging a criminal offence, inform police and work with the police according to established protocols;

• interview the alleged victim(s), staff witnesses (current and former), child witnesses, facility administrator, supervisor of the alleged perpetrator, and the alleged perpetrator;

• examine the physical layout of the setting;

• complete a safety assessment; and

• complete a risk assessment if necessary.

(c) Ensure the assigned worker has specialized skills and knowledge in the area of community caregiver investigations;

(d) Ensure the case is reviewed with a supervisor at least once during an investigation;

(e) Make the verification decision in a conference which includes, at minimum, the worker and their supervisor and uses a balance of probabilities threshold;

(f) When sufficient information is gathered to determine whether the child is safe and whether there is any longer-term risk of maltreatment, the verification decision is made.

See CYFSA, s. 126; O. Reg. 156/18, ss. 30, 31; the Standards.

[53] In this case, all the requirements except for the preparation of an investigation plan were met by the community care investigation. The preparation of an investigation plan was not a critical aspect of the investigation in this case, and its absence does not render the decision unreasonable. The Investigator, who was experienced in community caregiver investigations, followed all the steps that would have been included in an investigation plan.

[54] Many of H.C.’s complaints are not supported by the record. For example, H.C. argued that the Investigator did not investigate R.’s injuries but just accepted the dermatitis diagnosis. This is not correct. The Investigator did inquire into whether new chemicals were introduced at the school. She did consider the medical evidence and found it to be inconclusive. Other points raised by H.C. are arguments simply about the weight to be afforded to certain evidence or lack of evidence. This does not render the decision unreasonable.

[55] With respect to the January 10, 2025, CAST letter provided after the initial letter was found deficient, it describes the different types of caregiver investigations and how they are conducted, specifically highlighting why a risk assessment was not required. It further explains the balance of probabilities standard. It outlines the steps taken during the investigation in this case and the information CAST relied on. It describes how information about R.’s history with the school guided the investigation. It also describes the investigation’s exploration of past concerns and patterns at the school. It explains that CAST was unable to provide specific questions and answers from interviews with school staff members, because under Part X of CYFSA it was required not to disclose personal information without consent.

[56] In my opinion, when the verification decision is assessed for intelligibility, justifiability, and transparency, I find it to be reasonable.

2. THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE CFSRB DECISION

[57] On the application for judicial review of the CFSRB decision, H.C. repeats many of his arguments made against CAST.

[58] To start the analysis, the limited remedies given by statute to CFSRB needs to be acknowledged. CAST had already conducted a community care investigation and reached a decision. CFSRB had no authority to change the verification decision. The only relevant remedy in H.C.’s case given to CFSRB under s. 120(7) of CYFSA was to order written reasons for the complaint or to dismiss the complaint. None of the various remedial powers under s. 120(7) would give H.C. what he truly sought: the quashing of the verification decision and ultimately the upholding of his complaint.

The Procedural Fairness of the CFSRB Decision

[59] The various arguments made by H.C. about the unfairness of the CFSRB’s hearing include that it too was biased, the lack of disclosure ordered by it, errors in its treatment of the evidence, its refusal to allow him to raise new issues at the hearing or receive further emails after the hearing, and its failure to order legal representation for him at the hearing.

[60] None of these arguments are accepted.

[61] The hearing was procedurally fair. H.C. participated in an electronic oral hearing and had the opportunity to present documentary evidence, give oral testimony, cross-examine witnesses and to make oral submissions. The evidence admitted and considered by the adjudicator was relevant and probative to the issues she had to decide. Although the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, does not apply to CFSRB, it has broad discretion under the common law to admit or exclude evidence unfettered by the strict rules of evidence: Lorne Sossin, Robert W. Macaulay & James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure Before Administrative Tribunals, s. 22:3.

[62] I now address the procedural points made by H.C. more specifically.

[63] There is no merit to the bias argument. The essence of H.C.’s complaint about bias appears to be that the adjudicator found the Investigator to be a child protection worker who was unbiased in her conduct of her duties. H.C. may disagree with this finding but it was open for the adjudicator to make and it did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the adjudicator.

[64] The CFSRB is empowered to ensure a fair but expeditious hearing: Walters v. Centurion Property Associate Inc., 2024 ONSC 7093 (Div. Ct.), at para. 27. The rulings were in keeping with the proper exercise of those powers. As an example, admitting the Investigator’s affidavit and leaving open the question of weight did not render the hearing procedurally unfair. It was clear she had material and probative evidence to give.

[65] The extent of the disclosure sought by H.C. was not necessary given the limited scope of remedies available to the CFSRB adjudicator. Her analysis regarding this was sound. Given the scope of remedies CFSRB could exercise on the facts of this case, the limiting of the issues did not render the hearing unfair. It was within the discretion of CFSRB to limit the hearing to the issues that were canvassed and ordered at the pre-hearing conference pursuant to the CFSRB’s authority under s. 50 of General Matters under the Authority of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, O. Reg. 155/18.

[66] Finally, H.C.’s submission was that counsel should have been appointed for his child. However, H.C. was the applicant and not R. and thus, it was not a child who required legal counsel. This was a reasonable distinction made by CFSRB.

[67] None of the powers exercised by the adjudicator led to an unfair hearing. The Supreme Court of Canada in Baker at para. 27 noted that the fairness analysis should “take into account and respect the choices of procedure made by the agency itself, particularly when the statute leaves to the decision-maker the ability to choose its own procedures, or when the agency has an expertise in determining what procedures are appropriate in the circumstances”. Both principles apply in this case.

The Reasonableness of the CFSRB Decision

[68] H.C. challenges the reasonableness of the CFSRB decision in several ways. Broadly speaking, on the judicial review of this decision, many of the complaints made against CAST are repeated against CFSRB in challenging the CFSRB decision. However, I have already found that CAST fulfilled their statutory mandate in conducting their investigation, provided procedural fairness to H.C., and made a reasonable verification decision. Thus, these are not valid grounds to contest the reasonableness of the CFSRB decision.

[69] Of the ones not already dealt with that I can detect from H.C.’s submissions, H.C. submits that CFSRB breached s. 87(8) of CYFSA by disclosing H.C.’s identity. There was no breach of the confidentiality provision that I can discern from the record before this Court and nothing that shows that the decision is unreasonable.

[70] In addition, H.C. submits that the CFSRB failed to grant an adequate remedy and it should have ordered a new investigation. This remedy was not available. Therefore, the CFSRB decision to ask CAST to explain its reasons better was reasonable.

[71] In sum, I find the CFSRB decision reasonable. It is intelligible, transparent, and justified.

F. DISPOSITION

[72] The application for judicial review is dismissed.

[73] Nothing said in this judgment should be taken as questioning H.C.’s sincerity in pursuing his complaint.

[74] The respondents do not seek costs. None are therefore awarded.

Nakatsuru J. I agree:

Coats J.

I agree:

Matheson J.

Released: July 11, 2025

[^1]: On consent, the title of proceedings has been amended to remove the reference to acting as a litigation guardian for R. The application is brought by H.C.

[^2]: For example, see New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), 1999 653 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46.

[^3]: A family-based community caregiver is a childcare setting within the context of a family. A community care giver in an institutional out-of-home is a non-family setting such as daycares, group homes, schools, religious institutions or sporting organizations: the Standards.

[^4]: Part X of CYFSA prohibits disclosure of information without the consent of the person whose personal information is involved, as set out in that Part.