CITATION: Martel v. Verdun et al., 2024 ONSC 2966
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-23-2798
DATE: 20240524
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
McGee, Myers, and Leiper JJ.
BETWEEN:
Paulette Martel
Appellant
– and –
Emmy Verdun, Dave Siebel, and Sandra Morval
Respondents
Self-represented
Melinda Andrews for the Respondents
HEARD: at Ottawa (by videoconference):
May 23, 2024
Myers J (orally):
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
[1] The appellant appeals from the decision of Ryan Bell J. dated May 1, 2023 and, if necessary, seeks leave to appeal the costs award made by the judge on June 14, 2023.
[2] The appellant argues that her private property rights are not subject to the communal rights of the other King’s Landing residents. The courts have repeatedly held that the owners have all agreed and are bound by the Co-Tenancy Agreement that they each signed on purchasing their homes. Ms. Martel does not accept the interpretation that has been put on the agreement by judges of the Superior Court and upheld by the Court of Appeal. This lawsuit is at least in part a relitigation of issues previously determined against the position advanced by Ms. Martel when she intervened in Furr v Duhamel, 2018 ONSC 1780, aff'd 2019 ONCA 824, application for leave to appeal dismissed 2020 25163 (SCC).
[3] The interpretation of a contract is a question of mixed fact and law. Absent an extricable error of law, the trial judge’s interpretation will be accorded deference on appeal. I find that there are no errors in the trial judge’s interpretation of the relevant clauses of the Co-Tenancy Agreement in this case. Ms. Martel’s objections are largely based on the premise that the agreement does not interfere with owners’ rights to deal with their private property as they see fit and they should not be subject to the costs incurred or inflicted by other owners in the name of the community. That premise generally accords with the common law rights of owners of property. But Ms. Martel fails to appreciate or accept that she and all the other owners agreed to subjugate some elements of their private property rights in the Co-Tenancy Agreement. The court interprets that agreement in accordance with its terms and the law applicable to contractual interpretation. The contract binds the parties who signed it. If the contract puts limits on owners’ common law private property rights, then the contract governs. The court respects the rights of people to enter into binding contracts to manage their own affairs. That is what has happened here.
[4] I agree with the trial judge’s analysis of each of the interpretive issues raised by Ms. Martel. The judge adopted a reasonable interpretation of the contract in accordance with its terms, the agreement as a whole, and the objectively known surrounding circumstances. The contract is not limited to addressing the requirements imposed by the National Capital Commission as Ms. Martel asserts.
[5] The trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding that Ms. Martel did not owe arrears on the additional assessment until June 1, 2013. Her decision was grounded in the evidence before the court. There is no basis for this court to intervene despite Ms. Martel preferring a different interpretation of the evidence that was before the trial judge.
[6] It follows that the appeal is dismissed. I would then deny leave to appeal the costs ordered by the trial judge. Costs are highly discretionary. A judge’s costs order will not be interfered with on appeal unless she made an error in principle or the order is plainly wrong. Here, the costs awarded are several times the amount in issue. This is not a question of access to justice however. Ms. Martel was continuing her quest to establish her principles despite the courts having already ruled against her on the main interpretive issue. This action was largely relitigation. The trial judge addressed the correct principles. She noted the application of the respondents’ contractual right to indemnity for costs, the Mortgages Act, and the role of Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Her analogy to the condominium context was entirely apt. Like a condominium, if the respondents are denied costs recovery, then Ms. Martel will have foisted on the other owners the costs she caused committee members to incur. There is no reasonable basis to review the judge’s discretion on costs.
Costs Submissions
[7] The appellant shall pay the respondents the sum of $27,280.40 costs on a full indemnity basis. Post judgment interest runs on the costs at the rate of 15% per annum simple interest.
McGee J.
Myers J.
Leiper J.
Released: 2024-05-24
CITATION: Martel v. Verdun et al., 2024 ONSC 2966
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-23-2798
DATE: 20240524
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
McGee, Myers, and Leiper JJ.
BETWEEN:
Paulette Martel
Appellant
– and –
Emmy Verdun, Dave Siebel, and Sandra Morval
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Myers J (orally)
Released: 2024-05-24