CITATION: Guillaume v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 4044

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 246/23

DATE: 2023-07-07

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

DIVISIONAL COURT

RE: VALERIE GUILLAUME Applicant

AND: CHIEF ANIMAL WELFARE INSPECTOR AND ANIMAL CARE REVIEW BOARD Respondents

BEFORE: Justice O’Brien

COUNSEL: V. Guillaume, Self-Represented D. Lee, for the Respondent, Animal Care Review Board J. Tam, for the Respondent, Chief Animal Welfare Inspector

HEARD: In writing

ENDORSEMENT

Overview

[1] On June 13, 2023, the court provided notice to the Applicant, Ms. Guillaume that the court was considering dismissing her application for judicial review pursuant to Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 “because it appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.”

[2] Ms. Guillaume seeks judicial review of the Animal Care Review Board’s decision dated April 12, 2023. Ms. Guillaume also seeks a stay of present Board orders and future Board hearings or orders. She alleges a violation of her Charter rights by Animal Welfare Services inspectors. The proceeding leading to the decision under review relates to a dispute between Ms. Guillaume and the Respondent, Animal Welfare Services arising from a decision to remove 41 cats from Ms. Guillaume’s home. At the hearing, after the Board denied Ms. Guillaume’s preliminary motions, Ms. Guillaume left the videoconference. The Respondent requested that the Board dismiss Ms. Guillaume’s appeals as abandoned. However, the Board decided to put Ms. Guillaume on notice that her appeals may be dismissed without a hearing in accordance with the Rules of the Licence Appeal Tribunal. It issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss and gave the parties until April 21, 2023 to provide submissions on whether the appeals should be dismissed as abandoned. Ms. Guillaume commenced an application for judicial review of this decision shortly afterwards.

[3] After receiving submissions from the parties, the Board issued an order dated May 4, 2023 finding that Ms. Guillaume had not abandoned her appeals and stating that the hearing would resume on two consecutive days. The Board specified that at the resumed hearing, it would hear evidence and submissions, including with respect to the constitutional issues raised by Ms. Guillaume.

Steps leading to the r. 2.1 notice

[4] The court proceeded with several steps as part of its case management process prior to issuing the notice pursuant to r. 2.1.01. On May 3, 2023, the court issued directions to obtain the parties’ positions on the question of prematurity, as well as Ms. Guillaume’s position as set out in her notice of application that the matter was urgent. The court’s directions read as follows:

Ms. Guillaume has filed an application for judicial review of the decision of the Animal Care Review Board dated April 12, 2023. The notice of application raises the following issues:

1. Whether the application is premature given that the order sought to be reviewed is an interim order.

2. Whether the matter is urgent, as stated by the Applicant.

The Respondent is asked to provide a brief statement of its position on the above issues by email to the court copied to the Applicant within 10 days.

[5] Following the issuance of the court’s directions, Ms. Guillaume sent an e-mail to the court indicating that she would be filing a stay motion, which she asked to have heard without notice to the other parties. The court then issued a direction stating that the motion would not be heard on an ex parte basis and that no steps would be taken with respect to the motion until it was served on the parties.

[6] On May 15, 2023, Ms. Guillaume sent submissions in response to the issues raised in the court’s May 3, 2023 directions. She submitted that her application was not premature and that it should be considered an urgent matter. Her remaining submissions can be summarized as stating that: (1) The judicial review should be heard sooner rather than later. It is urgent because there is a pending matter before the Board that is related and in which the Board did not address the constitutional question; and (2) Ms. Guillaume filed the application as an urgent matter to stop the Board from making any further errors of law.

[7] The court then scheduled a case conference on June 8, 2023 to discuss the issues raised and to schedule next steps. Ms. Guillaume did not appear at the case conference. Counsel for the other two parties advised that the resumed hearing before the Board took place on June 5, 2023. They reported that there were some technical difficulties and Ms. Guillaume ultimately did not attend the hearing but that it continued in her absence. They advised the decision of the Board was under reserve.

[8] Following the case conference, the court issued directions in which it asked Ms. Guillaume to advise the court within 7 days whether she would continue to pursue this application for judicial review. The directions advised that if Ms. Guillaume was intending to pursue the application, the court would consider whether to issue a r. 2.1 notice.

[9] Ms. Guillaume responded to the directions by stating that she was still pursuing her application. She submitted that a premature application is different from one that is frivolous or vexatious and took the position that the issues in her application should still be reviewed by the court.

[10] The court then issued a r. 2.1 notice. In the cover e-mail releasing the notice, the court stated in part the following:

The court is considering dismissing this application for judicial review pursuant to r. 2.1.01 because it has the following concerns:

1. The Board’s April 12, 2023 order is moot since the Board has determined that it will not dismiss the Applicant’s appeals as abandoned and scheduled additional hearing dates.

2. The Applicant’s application for judicial review is premature as the April 12 order was an interim order, which did not dispose of the appeals. In addition, in its subsequent May 4, 2023 order, the Board specifically confirmed that it would hear evidence and submissions on the constitutional issues.

3. After receiving the Board’s disposition of her appeals on the constitutional and other issues, it would remain open to the Applicant to seek judicial review of that final decision in this court.

I recognize that the Applicant has already sent submissions to the court on the issue of prematurity. If she has anything to add to respond to the court’s specific concerns as identified above, the r. 2.1 notice provides her with another opportunity to do so. She has 15 days to provide those submissions.

[11] Following receipt of the notice, Ms. Guillaume sent an e-mail to the court referencing an “intention to appeal the decision of the single judge, concerning [her] matters, before the Divisional court” and stating that she would:

be taking legal actions, under international laws, particularly under the United Nations Declaration and various laws, or governing statutes, for what [she believes] to be the infringement of [her] human rights, by this court and by the parties to this case and the agencies, or divisions, of the Canadian government that they represent.

[12] She subsequently filed submissions responding to the r. 2.1 notice in which she reinforced that her application raised a constitutional question. She asserted her right to have the court determine the alleged violation of her constitutional rights.

Analysis

[13] I conclude that Ms. Guillaume’s application should be dismissed under r. 2.1.01.

[14] The Court of Appeal for Ontario has repeatedly highlighted that the dismissal of a proceeding as abusive under r. 2.1.01 is a blunt instrument, reserved for the “clearest of cases”: Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, at para. 8; Khan v. Law Society of Ontario, 2020 ONCA 320, 446 D.L.R. (4th) 575, at para. 6; Hart v. Balice, 2022 ONCA 787, at para. 7.

[15] An application for judicial review should be dismissed as frivolous, vexatious and/or an abuse of process if it cannot possibly succeed or be of any benefit to the applicant: Awada v. Allstate, 2021 ONSC 8108 (Div. Ct.), at para. 6.

Mootness

[16] Ms. Guillaume’s application is manifestly moot. In Guillaume v. Barney Rivers Investments Inc., 2021 ONSC 7203 (Div. Ct.), this court stayed an appeal from an interim order of the Landlord and Tenant Board under r. 2.1.01 in circumstances where there was no practical purpose to the appeal. It appears that the appellant in that case, Valerie Guillaume, was the same person as the applicant in the current case. The court reasoned in part that there was no practical purpose to the appeal because it likely would be moot by the time it was heard by the court. The court also noted that Ms. Guillaume’s asserted “right to shelter” did not raise any viable claim under the Charter: at para. 7.

[17] There is similarly no practical purpose to the current application. This application is doomed to fail. The application seeks to judicially review a decision of an interim order of the Board that has become moot. The Board released a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the appeals but then determined it would hear the appeals. Further, to the extent Ms. Guillaume is concerned that the Board at the first hearing did not address her constitutional issues, it expressly advised that it would hear them at the resumed hearing of the appeals, which it has now done. The decision is under reserve. In short, the issues in the decision under review have been resolved. It would put the parties and the administration of justice to needless expense to permit the application to continue.

Prematurity

[18] This application also should be dismissed as premature.

[19] In Awada, Corbett J. set out the guiding principles for a prematurity analysis, which I adopt. They emphasize that, absent exceptional circumstances, courts should not interfere with ongoing administrative proceedings until after they are completed or until effective remedies are exhausted. This avoids the fragmentation of proceedings. Justice Corbett underscored, at para. 9, the importance of the principle of prematurity in this court, stating that it is followed “scrupulously.” Further, “with active case management being instituted more and more by administrative tribunals, the practical importance of the principle has in no way diminished.”

[20] Raising a constitutional question does not generally constitute exceptional circumstances permitting an applicant to proceed in this court prior to the conclusion of the administrative proceeding: Kustka v. College of Physicians of Ontario, at paras. 31-32. In addition to the concern about fragmentation, this court benefits from having the findings of the tribunal on the constitutional issue. Ms. Guillaume has not raised any exceptional circumstances that would justify the interference of this court in this case, particularly where the Board has heard the constitutional issue and reserved its decision. Ms. Guillaume will have remedies available to her in this court. She may seek judicial review of the Board’s determination on the constitutional issue when she receives the Board’s decision.

[21] Ms. Guillaume’s application to review the Board’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss is without merit. This is not a close call. The application is moot and premature. It is impractical for the court to proceed with it. Therefore, it is dismissed.

O’Brien J.

Date: July 7, 2023