CITATION: Bolte v. McDonald Estate, 2023 ONSC 3429
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: CV-22-00000018-0000
DATE: 2023-06-26
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Fregeau, Varpio and Nishikawa JJ
IN THE MATTER OF The Estate of Carmel Vincent Anthony Barbara, deceased
BETWEEN:
SHARON LYNN BOLTE
Respondent
(Applicant below)
– and –
BONNIE LYNN MCDONALD, the estate trustee for the estate of CARLA VIOLET MCDONALD
Appellant
(Respondent below)
Ian Wright, for the Respondent
Anne E. Posno, for the Appellant
HEARD at London by videoconference: April 24, 2023
VARPIO J.:
REASONS ON APPEAL
[1] Mr. Carmel Barbara (the “Deceased”) lived with the respondent, Ms. Sharon Bolte (the “Spouse”) in a common-law relationship for over twenty years. For the majority of the relationship, the Deceased worked for Ontario Power Generation (“OPG”) while the Spouse stayed at home. They had no children together. The Deceased had a pension with OPG, and the pair intended to use the pension to fund their retirement. Their lifestyle appeared to be moderately comfortable, but not affluent.
[2] The Deceased died intestate at 61 years of age on April 27, 2020. Given the Deceased’s passing, his assets were valued. The matrimonial home was ultimately sold and approximately $300,000 of net proceeds were placed into trust. The pension was valued at approximately $915,000. The Spouse was named as beneficiary for the purposes of the pension’s survivor benefits.
[3] The Deceased had a daughter from a previous relationship, Ms. Carla McDonald (the “Daughter”). The Deceased and the Daughter did not have much contact through the years as the Daughter suffered from addiction issues. The Deceased periodically provided the Daughter with small sums of money and saw the Daughter upon occasion. The Deceased had a life insurance policy worth $53,000 naming the Daughter as beneficiary. She apparently spent this sum of money within four months of receiving same. The Daughter tragically passed away on June 30, 2021 at 30 years of age, leaving three small children with special needs behind (the “Grandchildren”).
[4] The Spouse brought an application under the Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.S.26 (the “SLRA”) seeking support from the Deceased’s Estate. The Daughter’s mother, as the Daughter’s estate trustee, opposed the Spouse’s application.
[5] On January 14, 2022, Nicholson J. heard the application and, on March 28, 2022, released reasons wherein he awarded the entirety of the estate to the Spouse.
[6] The Daughter’s estate appeals that decision stating that the application judge erred in the following ways:
By excluding the Daughter’s residual legal entitlement to the intestate estate from the factors to be considered under s. 62 of the SLRA;
By ruling that the Deceased owed no moral duty to his Grandchildren; and
By treating the Spouse’s dependency claim as having the paramount entitlement to the entire estate.
[7] For the following reasons, I hereby dismiss the appeal.
FACTS
[8] The matter came before the court on January 14, 2022 and the application judge released reasons on March 28, 2022 (2022 ONSC 1922).
[9] At paragraphs 24 to 26 of his reasons, the application judge outlined the legislative framework that applies to this decision:
Intestacy is addressed in Part II of the SLRA. Under s. 44, where a person dies intestate and is survived by a spouse and no children, the spouse is entitled to the estate property absolutely. However"spouse" for the purposes of Part II, is defined as being a spouse under section 1 of the Family Law Act, 1990 c. F. 3 ("FLA"). That definition requires marriage. Thus, Sharon would not be considered a "spouse" under Part II.
Under s. 47 of the SLRA, in an intestacy without a spouse, the property is to be distributed equally among the deceased's children.
Part V of the SLRA permits a dependant to make a claim for support where a deceased, whether testate or intestate, has not made adequate provision for the proper support of his or her dependants. In such a case, the court may order that such provision as it considers adequate be made out of the estate of the deceased for the proper support of the dependants, or any of them (s. 58 of the SLRA).
[10] At paras. 27 and 28 of his reasons, the application judge described the definitions of “dependant” and “spouse” as per the SLRA:
A "dependant" means the spouse, parent, child or sibling of the deceased "to whom the deceased was providing support or was under a legal obligation to provide support immediately before his or her death". Furthermore"child" is defined so as to include a grandchild.
Under Part V"spouse" is defined as set out in s. 29 of the FLA, to include persons who have cohabited continuously for a period of not less than three years. Thus, for the purpose of Part V of the SLRA, Sharon qualifies as a "spouse".
[11] The motions judge then reviewed s. 62 of the SLRA which describes factors a court ought to consider when determining support for a dependant. Having described the applicable legislation, the motions judge then reviewed the governing jurisprudence including Cummings v. Cummings (2004), 2004 9339 (ON CA), 69 O.R. (3d) 398 and Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate, 1994 51 (SCC).
[12] At para. 33 of his reasons, the application judge quoted this court in Quinn v. Carrigan, [2014] O.J. No. 4589 for the applicable legal test when determining adequate financial provision for a dependant:
The Divisional Court addressed the approach to be taken in dependants' relief claims in Quinn v. Carrigan. The Court noted that the determination of "adequate" financial provision for a dependant under the SLRA is discretionary and is not an exact science (at para. 79). The court, adopting from the decision of J.R. Henderson J. in Perilli v. Foley Estate, described the manner by which the court must approach the task, as follows (at para. 82):
[82]...Therefore, in a claim under section 58 of the SLRA in Ontario, I find that the court must first identify all of the dependants who may have a claim on the estate. Then, the court must tentatively value the claims of those dependants by considering the factors set out in the legislation and the legal and moral obligations of the estate to the dependants. Thereafter, the court must identify those non-dependant persons who may have a legal or moral claim to a share of the estate. Lastly, the court must attempt to balance the competing claims to the estate by taking into account the size of the estate, the strength of the claims, and the intentions of the deceased in order to arrive at a judicious distribution of the estate. This exercise may involve the prioritization of the competing claims.
[13] The application judge then applied four-part test.
The Dependants
[14] The application judge turned his attention to the issue of who were the Deceased’s dependants as per the SLRA. At paras. 47 to 49, the application judge found as follows:
There is no question, and the Respondent rightly conceded, that Sharon qualifies as a "dependant" for the purpose of Part V of the SLRA and I make that finding.
The parties do not agree on whether Carla qualifies as a dependant under the SLRA. While clearly a "child" of Charlie, the issue is whether Charlie was providing support to her, or under a legal obligation to provide support to her, immediately before his death.
I find on the evidence before me that Charlie was not providing support to Carla, or under such a legal obligation. Therefore, she is not a "dependant" under the SLRA.
[15] The application judge quoted Bilics v. Hirjak, 1986 CarswellOnt 1684, [1986] W.D.F.L. 734, 35 A.C.W.,S. (2d) 325 and Bormans v. Estate of Bormans et al, 2016 ONSC 428 for the proposition that periodic transfers of money do not necessarily amount to dependency under the SLRA. At para. 52, the application judge held:
I agree with the analyses in Bilics and Bormans and find that they apply to the facts in the case before me. The periodic transfers from Charlie to his daughter Carla do not, in my view, constitute support that would demonstrate a relationship of dependency under the SLRA. While it appears from time to time he would provide her with differing sums of money, and I accept that he may have done so to "help her out", the evidence falls short in establishing that he was supporting her financially on an ongoing and regular basis. I have no evidence as to what purpose she used the money, although her addiction provides some clues. There is evidence that she was in receipt of Ontario Works. In fact, on a careful reading of Carla's affidavit, she provided absolutely no evidence asserting that she was dependent upon her father. She did not even mention the periodic money that she received from Charlie.
[16] Having considered the Daughter’s claim as a dependant, the application judge then considered the Grandchildren’s dependency claim at paras. 53 to 55. At para. 56, Application judge found that the Spouse was the Deceased’s only dependant at the time of death:
I have considered whether any of Carla's children could be considered to be "dependants" and conclude that they cannot. The youngest was not in existence at the time of Charlie's death. There is no evidence that Charlie had even met the children, let alone taken on any obligation to financially support them.
In Pigott Estate v. Pigott, 1998 CarswellOnt 2875, 25 E.T.R. (2d) 12, 71 O.T.C. 201, 81 A.C.W.S. (3d) 397, Kruzick J. addressed whether grandchildren could be considered to be "dependants" under the SLRA. The test adopted involved whether there was a "settled intention" to treat the grandchildren as children of his family. The court looked to the following factors:
(a) Cohabitation with the children;
(b) Treatment of the children on an equal footing with the deceased's own children;
(c) Decision making power with respect to the children's names, schooling, discipline;
(d) Continued access or visitation;
(e) Contribution financially to day-to-day needs.
In the within case, there is a complete dearth of evidence showing that any of these factors existed.
Accordingly, I find that the only "dependant", as defined by the SLRA, of Charlie's at the time of his death was Sharon.
[17] The application judge then engaged the following legal analysis at paras 57 and 58:
I agree with counsel for Sharon, and the concession by counsel for the Respondent, that this finding means that assets that are brought into the estate and not already assigned to Carla by virtue of s. 72 of the SLRA are not available to Carla or her heirs. The issue really becomes whether Sharon's claim is determined to be large enough to encroach, or take in its entirety, the value of the Lambton Shore property, which would otherwise fall to Carla's estate.
I should add that had I concluded that Carla was a "dependant" under the SLRA, my ultimate disposition of Charlie's estate, below, would not have been measured by the expenses to provide for her three special needs children. Those costs would never be legally assumed by Charlie. In my view, it is the moral obligation owed to Carla, and the value thereof, that is relevant.
The Value of the Spouse’s Claim as a Dependant.
[18] The application judge considered the value of the Spouse’s claim. He considered evidence filed with the court and, at para. 68, he found that:
Placing a monetary value on Sharon's claim is a difficult task. As noted, it is not simply needs based. I accept that in the event that Sharon is required to move into retirement living, her needs will significantly increase as set out in the expert reports. Mr. Phelps has estimated that the range of her future expenses for the remainder of her life expectancy is from $1,415,000 to $1,462,000 (rounded). Given that the evidence demonstrates that the entirety of the estate is therefore inadequate to support Sharon at the same lifestyle for the balance of her life expectancy, I conclude that Charlie did not make adequate provision for the proper support of Sharon. I do not feel it is a useful exercise to place an exact figure on the value of her claim given that her needs will exceed the amount available. It is the dominant claim and the issue, in my view, is whether any amount should be withheld from her. Accordingly, I prefer to determine whether any competing claim should erode the amount of Sharon's entitlement and, if so, to value that claim. However, I am prepared, if necessary to do so, to value her legal and moral claims at $1,415,000.
Non-Dependants’ Claims
[19] The application judge then considered the non-dependent claims. He excluded the Daughter’s residual legal claim para. 70 of his reasons, stating:
Charlie was under no legal obligation to provide for Carla while he was alive. She was an adult who I have already found was not dependent on Charlie. She has advanced no unjust enrichment claim, nor would one appear viable. Carla's estate only has a legal claim pursuant to Part II of the SLRA as a result of her father's intestacy. That claim is subordinate to Sharon's dependant's relief claim. But for Sharon's dependant's relief claim, Carla, and now her estate, would be legally entitled to the entire value of the Lakeshore property. However, that claim did not exist at the time of Charlie's death but instead exists as a result of his death and intestacy. As Tataryn states, at page 821, the first consideration must be the testator's legal responsibilities during his or her lifetime. In Quinn v. Carrigan, the Divisional Court recognized that the legal entitlement of an applicant to support immediately prior to the testator's death was a relevant consideration. Thus, Carla's intestacy claim, in my view, is not the type of legal claim that was meant to be considered under Part V of the SLRA. It was not a legal obligation owing to her during Charlie's lifetime.
[20] The application judge then considered whether the Grandchildren had a claim to a portion of the estate. Counsel for the Daughter’s estate argued that, since Tataryn at page 815 states that the SLRA has, as one of its purposes, the mandate that “[a]t a minimum… preventing those left behind from becoming a charge on the state”, by extension the Grandchildren had a moral claim to portions of the estate. At para. 77, the application judge rejecting this argument:
I do not believe that this argument, as noble as it may appear in the context of this case, warrants the distribution argued for by Carla's estate. I accept that the grandchildren in this case will have substantial need for support throughout their lives. However, the estate is not large enough to sustain those needs, even if I had concluded that the OPG pension was available to the grandchildren. I cannot accept that the needs of grandchildren trump those of a dependant spouse when the evidence demonstrates that the available estate is insufficient to meet her needs for the remainder of her lifetime. As the above passage from Tataryn makes clear, there is a significant competing concern with respect to ensuring the financial security of spouses.
[21] In the end, the application judge found that the Daughter had a moral claim to a portion of the estate at para. 80 of his reasons:
I am prepared to acknowledge, even in the absence of a finding of dependency, that Charlie's gratuitous periodic payments to Carla over the years supports the view that he recognized owing a moral obligation towards her. I reiterate that this is not a case such as Verch Estate where the deceased's intentions were made clear by the provisions of a will and the independent adult children asked the court to override that clear intention by invoking moral obligation. In this case there is no will and Charlie's intentions are unproven. I accept that it is open to the court in this context to conclude that a judicious father would have provided some further amount for Carla, even in the face of her problems with addiction. However, it is my view that Carla's claim had she still been alive, respectfully, cannot approach the claims of Charlie's spouse of over two decades.
The Balancing
[22] At paras. 81 to 83 of his reasons, the application judge described the balancing that he intended to perform in valuing the competing claims:
I note in Tataryn, at page 823, the Supreme Court described that claims based on both legal and moral obligations would take priority. The Supreme Court also described the moral claims of independent adult children as more tenuous. This clearly favours Sharon.
The Supreme Court also noted that there are many ways of dividing assets that may be adequate, just and equitable. In this case, as I have already noted, Charlie's intentions are not clearly discernible and the manner in which his affairs was ordered is open to competing interpretations. It thus falls to this Court to attempt to determine what amount, if any, should Sharon forego for the benefit of Carla's estate, and thus, Charlie's grandchildren.
Since I have concluded that neither Carla nor her children qualify as "dependants" under the SLRA, the factors listed in s. 62 do not apply to them.
[23] At paras 84 and 85, the application judge found that the “judicious husband” in the circumstances of this case would have ensured that the Spouse received the entirety of his pension benefits and the proceeds of sale from the matrimonial home:
In my view, the judicious husband, as described in the cases, would have wanted his spouse of 25 years to be able to live mortgage free in the home that she had shared with him, with the OPG pension supporting a comfortable lifestyle. I also accept that a judicious father would have made provision for his daughter, even one with considerable troubles, and in fact Charlie did so. The $53,000 that Charlie provided to Carla through the life insurance policy is entirely consistent with the amounts that he periodically gave to her if he had continued to make them over approximately 20 years. However, faced with a substantial shortfall between the amount available to Sharon and her projected expenses, I cannot conclude that, as a judicious father and husband, Charlie would have, or should have, left the entirety of the home in which he cohabited with Sharon to Carla. This is especially so given Carla's unfortunate difficulties with drug addiction.
This is not a case such as Quinn v. Carrigan, or Webb v. Belway, in which there were sufficient assets in play to recognize all moral claims. There is a shortfall here. Accordingly, I am not prepared to carve out of what Sharon requires to maintain the lifestyle she enjoyed with Charlie some further amount to acknowledge the tenuous moral claim of Carla's estate.
[24] Finally, the application judge considered the impact that his decision would have upon the Grandchildren, who would receive nothing from the estate. At paras. 86 and 87, he stated:
I recognize that this is a harsh result from the perspective of Carla's children. However, I have concluded that the case must be considered a balancing between Sharon and Carla, and not Sharon and Charlie's grandchildren. Simply put, the terrible plight that the children undoubtedly find themselves in cannot place them anywhere near the level of entitlement of Charlie's long time dependant life partner. In short, Charlie was responsible for Sharon's well-being, not his grandchildren's.
I also reiterate that I have determined that Carla's estate's claim cannot be measured by a determination of what her children's financial needs may be. If I were to have allowed some amount for Carla's estate, even as a "dependant", it would have been commensurate with what a parent might allow as a legacy for his or her child, keeping in mind the peculiar risks that Carla's circumstances presented. Charlie had no obligation to support Carla or her children. Her claim would not have significantly encroached upon Sharon's share.
POSITION OF THE PARTIES
[25] The Daughter’s estate appealed the application judge’s decision. The estate submitted that the application judge erred in the following ways:
By excluding the Daughter’s residual legal entitlement to the intestate estate from the factors to be considered under s. 62 of the SLRA;
By ruling that the Deceased owed no moral duty to the Grandchildren; and
By treating the Spouse’s dependency claim as having the paramount entitlement to the entire estate.
[26] The Spouse submits that the application judge made no error in principle, did not fail to consider relevant evidence, and reasonably exercised his discretion under Part V of the SLRA. As such, the appeal ought to be dismissed.
ANALYSIS
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
[27] Section 76 of the SLRA provides that an appeal from Part V lies with the Divisional Court:
Appeal
76 An appeal lies to the Divisional Court from any order of the court made under this Part. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26, s. 76.
[28] Relief under Part V of the SLRA is discretionary: see Cummings v. Cummings at para. 56.
[29] The standard of review for an alleged error of law is correctness: see Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235.
[30] The standard of review for a discretionary decision is one of deference, based upon whether the application judge reasonably informed his or her decision: see Housen, and Quinn v. Carrigan, at paras. 68 and 69.
Issue 1: Legal Entitlement and s. 62 of the [SLRA](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-s26/latest/rso-1990-c-s26.html)
[31] The Daughter’s estate submits that the application judge’s failure to consider her residual legal entitlement to the estate within his s. 62 SLRA analysis is an error in law. The Daughter advanced this general argument but did not specify whether the alleged error occurred during the application judge’s examination of the Daughter’s dependency claim, the Grandchildren’s dependency claim or the Spouse’s dependency claim. Accordingly, I will consider the application judge’s reasons with respect to all said claims.
[32] With respect to the Daughter’s and the Grandchildren’s dependency claims, it should be noted that the Daughter’s estate conceded in oral argument that she is not contesting the application judge’s finding that neither the Daughter nor the Grandchildren were dependants of the Deceased.
[33] I believe that this concession is ultimately dispositive of the Daughter’s and the Grandchildren’s putative claims under s. 62 of the SLRA.
[34] Section 58 of the SLRA deals with support for dependants:
Order for support
58 (1) Where a deceased, whether testate or intestate, has not made adequate provision for the proper support of his dependants or any of them, the court, on application, may order that such provision as it considers adequate be made out of the estate of the deceased for the proper support of the dependants or any of them. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26, s. 58 (1).
[35] Section 62 deals with the factors to be considered when hearing a motion brought under s. 58 of the SLRA:
Determination of amount
62 (1) In determining the amount and duration, if any, of support, the court shall consider all the circumstances of the application, including,
(a) the dependant’s current assets and means;
(b) the assets and means that the dependant is likely to have in the future;
(c) the dependant’s capacity to contribute to his or her own support;
(d) the dependant’s age and physical and mental health;
(e) the dependant’s needs, in determining which the court shall have regard to the dependant’s accustomed standard of living
[36] Section 62 contains numerous other non-exhaustive factors. It does not list “other legal claims” as a relevant factor.
[37] The Court of Appeal for Ontario discussed the applicability of s. 62 of the SLRA in Cummings where, at para. 27, Blair J.A. stated for a unanimous court:
When judging whether a deceased has made adequate provision for the proper support of his or her dependants and, if not, what order should be made under the Act, a court must examine the claims of all dependants, whether based on need or on legal or moral and ethical obligations. This is so by reason of the dictates of the common law and the provisions of sections 57 through 62 of the Act.
[38] Accordingly, it would appear that someone must be a “dependant” under the SLRA to engage a section 62 SLRA analysis. I note that the application judge dismissed the Daughter’s and the Grandchildren’s claims by stating that “[s]ince I have concluded that neither Carla nor her children qualify as "dependants" under the SLRA, the factors listed in s. 62 do not apply to them.”
[39] Therefore, the application judge committed no error when he applied the logic in Cummings and dismissed the Daughter’s and the Grandchildren’s dependency claims.
[40] A different analysis applies to the application judge’s treatment of the Spouse’s dependency claim. As noted in para. 70 of his reasons, the application judge held that he would not consider the Daughter’s “intestacy claim [because], in my view, [it] is not the type of legal claim that was meant to be considered under Part V of the SLRA”. Therefore, the application judge did not balance the Daughter’s legal claim as against the Spouse’s dependency claim in his s. 62 SLRA analysis. Instead, the application judge balanced the Daughter’s moral claim to the estate as against the Spouse’s claim to same.
[41] In the circumstances of this case, the application judge’s methodology is of no moment. The intrinsic value of the Daughter’s claim – whether framed as a legal or a moral claim – was considered extensively by the application judge. Reading his reasons as a whole, the application judge attributed reasonable weight to the Daughter’s claim based upon the evidence before him including: (a) the Daughter’s lack of contact with the deceased; (b) her addiction issues; (c) the fact that she had already received $53,000 from an insurance policy and had spent same within four months of receipt; and (d) the fact that the Daughter was not a dependent of the Deceased. It cannot be said that the application judge’s result would have differed had he framed the Daughter’s claim as a legal claim – as opposed to a moral one – since the weight to be given to the Daughter’s claim in the balancing process would have been based upon the same evidence irrespective of the framing.
[42] Ultimately, the application judge recognized that the Daughter was entitled to the residue of the estate: “[t]he issue really becomes whether Sharon's claim is determined to be large enough to encroach, or take in its entirety, the value of the Lambton Shore property, which would otherwise fall to Carla's estate.” Then, he engaged the analysis in Quinn v. Carrigan and found that the Spouse was the Deceased’s only dependant, and that the value of her claim exceeded the value of the estate. The application judge then weighed the import of the competing claims and determined that the Spouse was entitled to the entirety of the estate given the weakness of the Daughter’s and the Grandchildren’s claims. In this way, the application judge considered the Daughter’s residual legal claim to the Deceased’s estate as the foundation upon which the Spouse’s s. 62 SLRA analysis was considered. Reading his reasons as a whole, therefore, it is clear that the application judge applied the correct law, considered the relevant evidence and came to a reasonable decision that is entitled to deference.
[43] His reasons contain no error as regards the Spouse’s dependency claim.
Issue 2: Moral Duty Owing to the Grandchildren
[44] The application judge’s finding that there was no moral duty owed to the Grandchildren is an exercise of discretion that is entitled to deference. Given the fact that the Deceased had virtually no relationship with the Grandchildren, this finding is consistent with the factors described in Pigott Estate. The appellant provided no basis to suggest that this finding was inconsistent with the binding jurisprudence.
[45] The application judge also considered the plight of the Daughter’s children sympathetically and, despite his obvious concern for their well-being, nonetheless arrived at a reasonable decision based upon the Deceased’s lack of involvement in the lives of the Grandchildren and the fact that the Deceased did not support the Grandchildren financially during his lifetime.[^1]
[46] The application judge quoted the correct test, he considered appropriate evidence and he came to a reasonable conclusion. This finding is owed deference and does not constitute an error.
Issue 3: Spouse’s Paramountcy
[47] The application judge did not commit an error in awarding the entire estate to the Spouse.
[48] Reading his reasons as a whole, the application judge considered the following facts in coming to a reasonable balancing of interests:
a. The Daughter had a residual legal interest to the estate;
b. The Daughter was not a dependant under the SLRA, but had a moral claim to support;
c. The estate was not large enough to provide for the Spouse’s needs during her lifetime;
d. The Daughter had already received $53,000 in a life insurance policy; and
e. The Daughter’s claim was weak given the lack of contact between the Deceased and the Daughter.
[49] Further, the application judge held that the Grandchildren’s lack of moral claim was such that the Spouse’s lifestyle should not be diminished given the likelihood that the Deceased’s estate did not have adequate funds to meet the Spouse’s needs in her lifetime.
[50] As he was required to do by Quinn v. Carrigan, the application judge considered the competing claims of the dependants and non-dependants, he made reasonable assessments in that regard and came to a reasonable decision. Nothing in his reasons suggests that he failed to adequately consider the principles in Tataryn and Cummings or otherwise fettered his discretion. In balancing the competing claims, the application judge’s decision to prioritize the Spouse’s claim over the more tenuous claim advanced by the Daughter’s estate was within his discretion and was entirely reasonable.
CONCLUSION
[51] In sum, the application judge considered the correct legal analysis, weighed appropriate evidence and drew reasonable conclusions based upon same.
[52] His reasons contain no error.
[53] Appeal dismissed.
COSTS
[54] As per the agreement between the parties, there shall be no costs paid by either party.
“Varpio J.”
I agree: “Fregeau J.”
I agree: “Nishikawa J. J.”
Released: June 26, 2023
CITATION: Bolte v. McDonald, 2023 ONSC 3429
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Fregeau, Varpio and Nishikawa JJ.
BETWEEN:
SHARON LYNN BOLTE
- and –
BONNIE LYNN MCDONALD, the estate trustee for the estate of CARLA VIOLET MCDONALD
REASONS on appeal
Released: June 26, 2023
[^1]: Indeed, the application judge appropriately noted that one of the Grandchildren was not alive at the time of the Deceased’s passing.