CITATION: Democracy Watch v. Ontario Integrity Commissioner, 2021 ONSC 7383
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 632/20, 633/20, 634/20, 644/20, 645/20, 646/20, 647/20, 648/20, 660/20 DATE: 20211109
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
Democracy Watch Applicant/Moving Party and Responding Party
– and –
Ontario Integrity Commissioner Respondent/Moving Party and Responding Party
COUNSEL: Nick Papageorge and Wade Poziomka, for the Responding Party on the motion to dismiss and the Moving Party on the motion for production Justin Safayeni and Stephen Aylward, for the Moving party on the motion to dismiss and the Responding Party on the motion for production
HEARD at Toronto (by videoconference): July 20, 2021
Favreau J.
Introduction
[1] This decision addresses two motions. The first motion is brought by the respondent, the Ontario Integrity Commissioner (the “Commissioner”), to quash these nine applications for judicial review on grounds of standing, justiciability and delay. The second motion is brought by the applicant, Democracy Watch, for production of a record of proceedings.
[2] In the underlying applications for judicial review, Democracy Watch challenges nine decisions made by the Commissioner under the Lobbyists Registration Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 27 (“LRA”) following investigations into the wrongdoing of lobbyists. Democracy Watch argues that the decisions were unreasonable, were not made transparently and raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.
[3] The Commissioner argues that Democracy Watch lacks standing to bring the applications for judicial review because they do not raise serious justiciable issues and because, allowing the applications for judicial review to go forward, conflicts with the private interests of the unnamed lobbyists. The Commissioner also argues that the applications for judicial review do not raise justiciable issues and that they should be dismissed for delay.
[4] Democracy Watch opposes the Commissioner’s motion, arguing that it raises serious issues, that the issues are justiciable and that there has not been any undue delay. Democracy Watch also asks that the Commissioner be required to produce a record of proceedings pursuant to section 10 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1.
[5] For the reasons below, I grant the Commissioner’s motion. I am satisfied that the applicant does not have standing to bring an application for judicial review. In the circumstances, the applicant’s motion for a record of proceedings is moot.
Statutory scheme
[6] The Commissioner is an officer of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario appointed pursuant to section 23 of the Members’ Integrity Act, S.O. 1994, c. 38. At the relevant time, the Commissioner was J. David Wake.
[7] The LRA establishes rules that govern lobbyists in Ontario, including prohibitions against certain activities such as, pursuant to s. 3.4 of the Act, “in the course of lobbying a public office holder, knowingly place the public office holder in a position of real or potential conflict of interest”.
[8] Pursuant to section 10 of the LRA, the Commissioner is the registrar under that Act. Amongst other duties, the Commissioner is charged with conducting investigations into allegations that lobbyists have not complied with the Act.
[9] Section 17.1(1) of the LRA gives the Commissioner the discretion to “conduct an investigation to determine if any person or persons have not complied with any provision of this Act or of the regulations”.
[10] Section 17.1(3) of the LRA gives the Commissioner the discretion to “cease” an investigation “for any reason”, including in circumstances where the Commissioner believes that the “matter is minor or trivial” or “dealing with the matter would serve no useful purpose because of the length of time that has elapsed since the matter arose”.
[11] Section 17.5 of the LRA, requires the Commissioner to give notice to a lobbyist if the Commissioner believes that the lobbyist has not complied with the Act, and the lobbyist is to be given a “reasonable opportunity to be heard respecting the alleged non-compliance and any penalty that could be imposed by the registrar under this Act”.
[12] Pursuant to section 17.6, if after conducting an investigation, the Commissioner finds that a lobbyist has not complied with the Act or regulations, the Commissioner is required to give the lobbyist notice of the finding of non-compliance, the penalty imposed and the reasons for the finding and the penalty.
[13] Section 17.9(1) of the LRA sets out the Commissioner’s powers to impose a penalty. In deciding whether and what penalty to impose, the Commissioner is required to consider the public interest. Amongst the penalties available, the Commissioner can make the lobbyist’s name and the non-compliance public:
If the registrar’s finding under section 17.6 is that a person has not complied with a provision of this Act or of the regulations, the registrar may, taking into account the gravity of the non-compliance, the number of previous incidents of non-compliance committed by the same person and the number of previous convictions against the same person for offences under this Act, and if the registrar is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so, do either or both of the following:
Prohibit the person against whom the finding is made from lobbying for a period of not more than two years.
Subject to subsection (4), make public the following information:
i. The name of the person against whom the finding is made.
ii. A description of the non-compliance.
iii. Any other information that the registrar considers necessary to explain the finding of non-compliance.
[14] Section 17.8 of the LRA sets out the rights of a persons against whom a finding was made to bring an application for judicial review:
Within 60 days after receiving the notice of the registrar’s finding under subsection 17.6 (1) or of the registrar’s decision under subsection 17.7 (3), the person against whom the finding is made may make an application for judicial review of the registrar’s finding or the penalty imposed, or both.
[15] Section 17.10(1) prevents the Commissioner or anyone acting under their direction from disclosing that the Commissioner is conducting an investigation and “any information, document or thing” obtained during the course of the investigation. Section 17.10(2) sets out very limited exceptions to the obligation to keep the investigation confidential.
[16] Section 17.12 specifies what information is to be published in the Commissioner’s Annual Report related to investigations under the Act:
The annual report of the Integrity Commissioner (who is appointed as registrar under section 10 of this Act) required by section 24 of the Members’ Integrity Act, 1994 shall include,
(a) the number of investigations conducted by the Commissioner under this Act during the year, including the number of those investigations that were commenced, concluded or resumed during the year and the number of matters that the Commissioner refused to investigate or referred to another person or body during the year;
(b) a description in summary form of each investigation concluded or resumed, and of each matter referred, during the year; and
(c) any other information relevant to the administration of this Act the public disclosure of which the Commissioner believes to be in the public interest.
[17] Besides the formal investigation and resolution processes set out in the LRA, the Commissioner also sometimes resolves matters through an informal resolution process. The Commissioner described the information resolution process as follows in the 2019-2020 Annual Report:
When it appears that a lobbyist has missed a deadline, the Office first assesses the matter through an informal resolution process. If a deadline was missed by a short period and the lobbyist has not had previous issues with non-compliance, the matter may be resolved with a letter from the Commissioner reminding the lobbyist of his or her responsibilities. The Commissioner may also request an explanation for the non-compliance.
The informal resolution process works to achieve compliance without using investigative resources that are better focused on more serious breaches of the Act…
[18] Democracy Watch has commenced nine separate applications for judicial review challenging decisions made by the Commissioner under the LRA. The applications for judicial review were commenced between December 21, 2020 and December 23, 2020. Democracy Watch challenges decisions summarized in the Commissioner’s Annual Report of 2019-20. The only information available to Democracy Watch and the public about these investigations is set out in the Annual Report. The names of the lobbyists are not available and no other information about the circumstances of the complaints and their resolutions is available.
[19] The nine decisions Democracy Watch seeks to review are cases where the Commissioner did not impose a penalty. The outcomes are summarized in the Commissioner’s factum as follows:
a. For Court Files No. 633/20 and 634/20, the “Commissioner discontinued the investigation because he found there was no evidence of non-compliance”.
b. For Court Files No. 644/20, 645/20 and 660/20, “the investigations we ‘ceased’ under s. 17.1(3) of the LRA. The information resolution process was followed at the conclusion of these files.”
c. For Court File No. 632/20, “the investigation was discontinued because the Commissioner found that there was no non-compliance. This finding was made after a 17.5 Notice was issued and upon receiving submissions from the affected person…”
d. For Court Files No. 646/20, 647/20 and 648/20, “the Commissioner issued 17.5 Notices and made findings of non-compliance under s. 17.6 of the LRA, but determined that it would not be appropriate to impose a penalty under s. 17.9”.
[20] Each notice of application for judicial review seeks an order quashing the decision and sets out the basis on which the relief is sought. The notices of application for judicial review are very similar.
[21] As an example, the application for judicial review in Court File No. 632/20 challenges a decision recorded on page 52 of the Annual Report, which reads as follows:
Issue: Placing public office holders in a conflict of interest
The Commissioner investigated to determine if a consultant lobbyist failed to comply with the Act by knowingly placing a public office holder in a real conflict of interest. The lobbyist worked on a political campaign for a candidate, publicly advertised her role on the campaign as having been at a senior level and then registered to lobby the candidate, who had become a public office holder. The Commissioner found that the lobbyist had not placed the public office holder in a position of conflict because the investigation revealed that, in fact the lobbyist and the public office holder had no meaningful personal or professional relationship. The lobbyist did not hold a senior or strategic role on the campaign, as suggested by her title, which would have significantly increased the risk of a conflict. Additionally, her lobbying of the office holder was very limited. The Commissioner determined that the consultant lobbyist had not failed to comply with the Act but warned of the risk created by publicly overstating the nature of her political activities on behalf of the public office holder.
[22] In the grounds for relief section, the notice of application for judicial review describes the legislative context for the Commissioner’s decision, and then goes on to impugn the decision on the following grounds:
f. Although the Decision is very brief and vague, it seems the Commissioner decided that the lobbyist participated in an activity that created a low-enough risk of a conflict, and then lobbied the public office holder for a short-enough period of time, for the Commissioner to conclude that "the lobbyist and the public office holder had no meaningful personal or professional relationship" and, therefore, did not violate section 3.4 of the LRA.
g. The Commissioner's Decision was an incorrect and unreasonable interpretation and application of section 3.4 of the LRA to the lobbyist's actions. A lobbyist who engages in the lower-risk political activity of working on a political campaign for a candidate who becomes a public office holder, and then afterwards lobbies the office holder for any amount of time, knowingly places the office holder in a real or potential conflict of interest.
[23] The notice then goes on to set out arguments that challenge the Commissioner’s decision making process more generally. For example, the notice includes arguments that the public does not have access to information about how and what decisions the Commissioner reached in all matters investigated over the course of the year:
h. According to statistics on pages 49-50 of the Commissioner's Annual Report, the Commissioner undertook 251 Compliance Reviews in 2019-20, closing 55 of those reviews at the initial stage and resolving 167 reviews through an informal process, presumably based on the Commissioner's interpretations of various provisions of the LRA and its regulations, including the information in the Commissioner's statements in the Guidance and Bulletin.
i. No other information is provided in the Annual Report about the Commissioner's decisions to close 55 reviews at the initial stage or resolve 167 reviews through informal processes. The Commissioner only fully investigated and issued a public decision on 29 of the 251 situations that were reviewed, resulting in the 24 decisions published in the Annual Report (some of the decisions covered the activities of more than one lobbyist).
j. In addition, according to information on page 45 of the Commissioner's Annual Report, the Commissioner issued 84 Advisory Opinions during the 2019-20 fiscal year, also presumably based on the Commissioner's interpretations of the LRA and its regulations, including the Commissioner's statements in the Guidance and Bulletin.
k. As a result, the public has no information concerning how and why the Commissioner made 335 LRA enforcement decisions during the 2019-20 fiscal year, including whether the Commissioner decided in any of those 335 situations that the Commissioner reviewed to conclude that the lobbyist had not violated section 3.4 of the LRA.
[24] In addition, the notice of application for judicial review includes an argument that the Commissioner has an inherent conflict of interest because of his interest in being reappointed:
m. When the Commissioner rendered the Decision, the Commissioner was in the final months of his first five-year term, and knew that he could be approved for a second five-year term appointment under sections 23 and 23.1 of the MIA only if MPPs in the Legislative Assembly agreed unanimously to re-appoint him.
n. The Commissioner, therefore, had an incentive to decide to find all lobbyists innocent who were alleged to have violated the LRA by undertaking political activities that placed ministers, party leaders or MPPs in a conflict of interest (which would possibly also cause the minister, leader or MPP to violate the MIA). If the Commissioner ruled that the lobbyists violated the LRA, ministers, party leaders and MPPs may not agree to his re-appointment.
o. As a result of this structural aspect of the Commissioner's position, offering to the Commissioner the possibility of re-appointment, with the offer conditional on the unanimous approval of the office holders whose decisions and actions the Commissioner oversees, there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Commissioner when he rendered the Decision.
[25] The other notices of application for judicial review are similar. They each purport to challenge the summary of a decision set out in the Annual Report and include the same or similar general statements about the Commissioner’s decision-making process.
Motion to quash the applications for judicial review
[26] The Commissioner argues that the applications for judicial review should be dismissed on the following grounds:
a. Democracy Watch does not have standing to bring the applications for judicial review;
b. The issues raised on the applications are not justiciable; and
c. There has been undue delay in bringing the applications for judicial review.
[27] The test on a motion to quash an application for judicial review is whether it is plain and obvious or beyond doubt that the application cannot succeed. This standard applies to the issues of standing and justiciability: Stewart et al. v. Office of the Independent Police Review Director et al., 2014 ONSC 6150. With respect to delay, a single judge of the Divisional Court should only dismiss an application for delay in clear cases.
Standing
[28] Democracy Watch does not claim that it has personal standing in these applications for judicial review. Rather, it states that it should be granted public interest standing. The Commissioner argues that Democracy Watch does not meet the test for public interest standing.
[29] The test for public interest standing is well established. As set out in Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 43, at para. 37, a party seeking public interest standing must demonstrate that:
a. The application raises a serious justiciable issue;
b. The applicant has a serious interest in the issue; and
c. In all the circumstances, the proceedings are a reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.
[30] As held in Downtown Eastside, para.53, these three factors are not a “rigid checklist” or “technical requirements”, but they are to be considered in a “purposive, flexible and generous manner”.
[31] In this case, the Commissioner does not take issue with the second factor, but argues that Democracy Watch’s applications for judicial review do not meet the first and third factor.
[32] As set out below, I agree with the Commissioner that, while Democracy Watch has a serious interest in the issue, the applications do not raise a serious justiciable issue and the proposed applications for judicial review are not a reasonable and effective way to bring the issues before the courts.
No serious justiciable issue
[33] There are two aspects to the question of whether a case raises a serious justiciable issue. The first is whether the matter rises to the level of sufficient seriousness to warrant allowing a nonparty to bring the proceeding forward. The second aspect focuses on the merits, but only to the extent of determining whether the proceeding is “so unlikely to succeed that its result would be seen as a ‘foregone conclusion’”: Downtown Eastside, at para. 42. I briefly address the merits below when considering the Commissioner’s arguments that the matters at issue are not justiciable. However, in my view, for the purpose of deciding whether Democracy Watch should be given public interest standing, it is sufficient to consider whether the issues raised on the applications are serious enough to warrant allowing the matter to proceed.
[34] As held in Downtown Eastside, at paras. 42 and 73, to be serious, an issue raised by a proposed public interest litigant must raise a “substantial constitutional issue” or an “important issue”. The issue must “transcend the parties’ immediate interests” and have a “broad societal impact”: Accettone Funeral Home Ltd. v. Ajax Crematorium and Visitation Centre and Bereavement Authority of Ontario, 2021 ONSC 4081, para. 48.
[35] While, in combination, the applications for judicial review purport to challenge the overall manner in which the Commissioner exercises his investigative powers under the LRA, at its core, each of the applications for judicial review is a challenge to decisions by the Commissioner respecting the conduct of individual lobbyists. This does not raise a substantial constitutional issue nor does it even raise issues of broader implication about the proper interpretation of provisions of the LRA. Rather, at most, it raises issues about the manner in which this Commissioner has exercised his discretion under the Act in individual cases over a limited time of period. For example, as reviewed above, while Democracy Watch argues in Court File No. 632/20 that the Commissioner’s interpretation of section 3.4 of the LRA was unreasonable, the issue in this case was whether the conflict of interest was sufficiently serious to warrant more action on the part of the Commissioner. This does not raise a serious issue regarding the interpretation of the LRA. Democracy Watch’s view that the Commissioner is too lenient may raise political or policy concerns, but it does not raise serious legal issues that warrant granting public interest standing.
[36] Democracy Watch relies on the decision in Democracy Watch v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FC 613, to argue that issues related to the interpretation of legislation governing lobbyists have been recognized to raise serious issues. The issue in that case was whether parliamentary secretaries are “staff” for the purposes of the relevant provision of the Code under the federal Lobbying Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.44. In that context, the Federal Court accepted that this was a serious issue, stating that “some might possibly perceive a form of loophole has been created by which, while it is or may be forbidden to lobby a Minister, it is perfectly acceptable to lobby his or her Parliamentary Secretary or the staff of that Parliamentary Secretary”.
[37] Democracy Watch has not identified any similar issues in this case. Instead, Democracy Watch focuses on the outcome in each of the nine matters at issue, and speculates that the Commissioner is being too lenient in applying the LRA. Based on the outcome in these nine matters, Democracy Watch speculates that the Commissioner is not properly applying section 3.4 of the LRA and that he was motivated to avoid making public findings that would implicate anyone with power over his reappointment. However, these are not serious legal issues. Rather, they are speculative.
[38] With very little information, the applicant speculates that the Commissioner is not properly exercising his discretion when investigating and disposing of complaints. Without articulating a clear and serious legal issue, the applications for judicial review have the air of a fishing expedition designed to circumvent the privacy protections in the legislation. In my view, they do not raise a serious issue.
Not a reasonable or effective way to bring the issue before the courts
[39] In Downtown Eastside, at para. 51, the Supreme Court listed a number of examples of matters a court should consider in deciding whether a proceeding brought by a proposed public interest litigant is a reasonable and effective way to bring a matter before the courts. The Supreme Court stated that one of those factors is the “potential impact of the proceedings on the rights of others who are equally or more directly affected.” The Court went on to warn that “courts should pay special attention where private and public interests may come into conflict”.
[40] In this case, there is no question that the proposed applications for judicial review comes into conflict with the private interests of the lobbyists who were under investigation.
[41] First, as far as the lobbyists are concerned, these matters are now at an end. Allowing the applicant, a stranger to the dispute, to seek to reopen these matters and quash the Commissioner’s decisions clearly creates a conflict between the lobbyists’ private interests and the public interest advocated by the applicant.
[42] Second, the LRA specifically provides that the lobbyists under investigation are not to be identified unless the Commissioner finds misconduct and determines that public identification is warranted. Allowing these applications for judicial review to go forward would inevitably conflict with this protection in the LRA. The lobbyists would have to be notified and given an opportunity to respond. While the applicant argues that the lobbyists do not need to be publicly identified, it nevertheless seeks the full records upon which the Commissioner based his decisions. These records contain the lobbyists’ identity and details of the complaint and investigation, which, again, is not information that is to be made available to the public.
[43] Third, the legislative scheme suggests that only lobbyists are to have standing to challenge a decision of the Commissioner under the Act. This is clear from the wording of section 17.8 which provides that a person against whom the Commissioner makes a finding can bring an application for judicial review within sixty days of receiving notice. In Democracy Watch v. Ontario Integrity Commissioner, 2020 ONSC 6081 (Div. Ct.) at paras. 39-40, this Court held that it would undermine a similar statutory scheme in that case to allow members of the public to challenge a decision where a statutory provision states that only the subject of an inquiry could bring an application for judicial review.
[44] Democracy Watch argues that there is no other effective method for challenging the Commissioner’s decisions. Lobbyists have no interest in challenging a decision that results in no finding of misconduct or no penalty. There is some merit to the argument, but it runs contrary to the statutory scheme. Democracy Watch may have legitimate concerns about a scheme that provides for very little public information about the Commissioner’s investigations. However, this does not give the court the authority to ignore the statutory scheme. Giving Democracy Watch public interest standing to bring these applications for judicial review would effectively allow for circumvention of the scheme. This is not a reasonable way to bring the issue before the courts.
Conclusion on the issue of standing
[45] In my view, the applicant should not be granted public interest standing to challenge the Commissioner’s decisions. This is not a close call. The Commissioner’s decisions deal with findings and the exercise of discretion in the context of complaints against individual lobbyists. The LRA sets out a clear process for dealing with those complaints. The proposed applications for judicial review should not be allowed to transform what is essentially an investigation into the conduct of specific individuals, whose rights to privacy and finality are protected under the LRA, into a public inquiry into the manner in which the Commissioner exercises his discretion. While the applicant may have legitimate concerns, an application for judicial review that essentially focuses on the disposition of individual complaints, without raising more than speculative concerns regarding the disposition of those complaints, is not the proper forum for raising such issues.
[46] My finding that the applicant lacks standing to bring the application for judicial review is sufficient to dismiss the applications. However, for the sake of completeness, I deal briefly with the issues of justiciability and delay also raised by the Commissioner.
Justiciability
[47] The Commissioner argues that his decisions do not affect the rights, interests or privileges of any party, and accordingly are not subject to judicial review. In making this argument, the Commissioner relies on a series of decisions where this Court and the Federal Court of Appeal have found that the decision not to conduct an investigation is not justiciable in circumstances where there is no public complaints process: see, for example, Democracy Watch v. Ontario Integrity Commissioner, 2020 ONSC 6081 (Div. Ct.) at paras. 72-73; Attorney General of Canada v. Democracy Watch, 2020 FCA 69, at paras. 28-31; and Democracy Watch v. Attorney General for Canada, 2021 FCA 133, at paras. 39-43. In response, Democracy Watch argues that the decisions at issue in this case are not decisions not to pursue an investigation but, rather, decisions related to the outcome of an investigation. Given my finding that Democracy Watch should not be granted public interest standing, I do not have to decide this issue. However, I note that there is some merit to Democracy Watch’s argument on this issue, at least in respect of those matters where the Commissioner found misconduct but chose not to impose a penalty. The decisions the Commissioner relies on are situations where the courts have held that the decision not to conduct an investigation is not justiciable. In contrast, the decisions here involve the outcome of an investigation. If the subjects of the investigation, rather than Democracy Watch had brought an application for judicial review challenging a finding of misconduct, even if there was no penalty, they would arguably have a right to challenge that decision.
As noted above, on a motion to quash an application for judicial review, the Court is to apply a “plain and obvious” test. If I had found that Democracy Watch should be given public interest standing, I would have held that it is not plain and obvious that the decisions made by the Commissioner are not subject to judicial review and I would have left that issue to be decided by a panel of the Divisional Court.
Delay
[48] Similarly, if I was not dismissing the applications for judicial review on the basis that Democracy Watch does not meet the requirements for public interest standing, I would have deferred the issue of delay to the panel hearing the application for judicial review.
[49] The issue of whether there has been undue delay in commencing the applications for judicial review is not plain and obvious.
[50] A number of factors weigh in favour of finding that the application for judicial review should not be dismissed for delay. Section 5(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, which imposes a thirty-day deadline for bringing an application for judicial review, does not apply because the decisions at issue were made before that provision came into effect. Rather, the applicable timelines are those established at common law by the Divisional Court to the effect that, generally, an application for judicial review should be started no later than six months after the decision under review was made: De Pelham v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, 2011 ONSC 7006 (Div. Ct), at para. 14. Here, the applications for judicial review were started on December 21 and 23, 2020. The Commissioner advised the subjects of the investigations of the outcomes between September 11, 2019 and April 4, 2020. But the Annual Report setting out the summary of the investigations and their outcomes was published on June 22, 2020, which is approximately six months before the applications for judicial review were commenced. In addition, at the time the Annual Report was released, limitation periods and deadlines were suspended due to the pandemic until mid-September 2020.
[51] In contrast, a number of factors weigh in favour of dismissing the applications for judicial review for delay. As reviewed above, the LRA sets out a sixty-day limitation period for the subject of an investigation to bring an application for judicial review from a decision of the Commissioner. While Democracy Watch is not the subject of the investigations, it would arguably be unfair for the subjects of the investigations to face shorter deadlines than Democracy Watch. In addition, the six month deadline that predates section 5(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, is not a hard and fast rule. Prejudice to the respondent is always relevant. In this case, there may be a good argument of prejudice to the subjects of the investigations.
[52] Given these countervailing considerations, it is not plain and obvious that the applications should be dismissed and, if I had found that Democracy Watch should be given public interest standing, I would have left the issue of delay to the panel hearing the applications for judicial review.
Motion for a record of proceedings
[53] Given my conclusion that the applications for judicial review should be dismissed on the basis of standing, it is not necessary for me to decide whether the Commissioner is required to produce a record of proceedings in this case.
Conclusion
[54] For the reasons above, the Commissioner’s motion to quash the nine applications for judicial review is granted. Democracy Watch’s motion for a record of proceeding is dismissed.
[55] As agreed between the parties, no costs are awarded on the motion.
Favreau J.
Released: November 10, 2021
CITATION: Democracy Watch v. Ontario Integrity Commissioner, 2021 ONSC 7383
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 632/20, 633/20, 634/20, 644/20, 645/20, 646/20, 647/20, 648/20, 660/20 DATE: 20211110
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
Democracy Watch Applicant/Moving Party and Responding Party
– and –
Ontario Integrity Commissioner Respondent/Moving Party and Responding Party
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Favreau J.
Released: November 10, 2021