Court File and Parties
CITATION: Accettone Funeral Home Ltd. v. Ajax Crematorium and Visitation Centre and Bereavement Authority of Ontario, 2021 ONSC 4081
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC1220/2020 DATE: 20210604
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
Accettone Funeral Home Ltd. Applicant
– and –
Ajax Crematorium and Visitation Centre Inc. and Bereavement Authority of Ontario Respondents
Counsel: Andre Marin, Kelli Bay and Katie Black, for the Applicant Joseph Sereda for Ajax Crematorium and Visitation Centre Inc. Ejona Xega, for the Bereavement Authority of Ontario
HEARD in Toronto by video conference: May 26, 2021
Before: Backhouse J.
Overview
[1] The issue raised by the Respondents on this motion is whether the Applicant, “Accettone”, has standing to bring the underlying judicial review application which seeks to quash the decision of the Bereavement Authority of Ontario (“BAO”) granting a conditional Class-1 licence as a funeral establishment operator to Ajax Crematorium and Visitation Centre Inc.(“ACVC”).
[2] Accettone maintains that it has both private and public standing to bring the underlying application including that as a member in the same sphere of the regulated funeral industry as the ACVC, it is uniquely situated to raise BAO’s failure to enforce the applicable regulatory regime which would otherwise be insulated from any meaningful review.
[3] I have concluded that the decision to grant ACVC a conditional licence affects one entity, ACVC, and Accettone’s real interest is in eliminating a competitor rather than a genuine interest in the regulation of the funeral industry. For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that Accettone lacks both private and public standing and that the application should be dismissed.
Background Facts
[4] The BAO is s government delegated authority administering provisions of the Funeral, Burial and Cremation Services Act, 2002[^1], (“FBCSA”), on behalf of the Ontario Ministry of Government and Consumer Services. It is charged with protecting the public’s interest while regulating and supporting licensed funeral establishment operators and crematoriums, amongst other facilities. The FBCSA grants the BAO’s registrar the power and discretion to grant licences and oversee the application process.
[5] Accettone has operated as a fully licensed funeral home from premises located at the front of 384 Finley Avenue in Ajax, Ontario since 1989. It does not provide cremation services. In 2015, Diane Accettone, one of Accettone’s’s principals and a director, entered into a 20 year commercial lease with ACVC with a right to extend for 20 years which permitted ACVC to construct a crematorium and visitation centre on a formerly vacant portion of the land at 384 Finley Avenue which it did for $3.8 million. The lease permits ACVC to conduct its business on this plot of land at 384 Finley Avenue, Ajax, across the parking lot from Accettone’s funeral home. The lease’s “Permitted Use” provision refers to a “funeral visitation centre and crematorium and related use thereof”. In Accettone’s view, this permitted cremation services but not funeral services. ACVC’s view is this permitted it to carry on the funeral services business.
[6] Accettone alleges on this motion that in approximately September 2016, in addition to providing cremation services at the leased premises, ACVC began to provide funeral services contrary to its lease and without a licence.
[7] Accettone and ACVC are involved in an ongoing civil proceeding that began in February, 2017, where they each allege breach of contract and monies owing against the other party, largely over the construction of the crematorium. They are also involved in litigation in the Superior Court of Ontario in Oshawa over enforcing and upholding the land lease.
[8] Beginning in June, 2017, Accettone forwarded many complaints about ACVC to the BAO, which triggered an investigation. The BAO kept Accettone updated regarding its investigation and invited it to continue sending material with respect to further concerns. The BAO informed Accettone that ACVC was advised that conduct relating to the unauthorized/unlicensed provision of funerals would have adverse consequences on any application for license and if ACVC were to continue, there would be a “cascading effect” and “carnage”. Accettone characterized this as the BAO’s “assurances regarding the applicable consequences.”
[9] In November, 2017, Accettone purported to terminate ACVC’s lease by sending a bailiff to change the locks during a funeral and cremation service. ACVC brought an emergency motion for relief from forfeiture and an injunction restraining Accettone from interfering with ACVC’s possession pending trial which was resolved on consent. ACVC regained access to the property and continued to carry on providing funeral related and crematory services.
[10] George Marchi, the President of ACVC, deposes that Accettone is seeking to use the judicial review procedure to quash ACVC’s licence to prevent it from carrying on business in accordance with the lease and force it out of business.
[11] The BAO next received a written complaint against ACVC from Andre Marin who presented himself as an “Anti-Corruption Expert” and advised that he was filing the complaint on behalf of an anonymous party. The BAO and ACVC did not become aware that the anonymous party was Accettone until Accettone commenced the underlying application.
[12] BAO continued to investigate ACVC and concluded around February 2019 that there was nothing to support a finding that ACVC was in contravention of the FBSCA.
[13] On April 3, 2019, the BAO received an application from ACVC to obtain a licence to operate a funeral establishment. The BAO’s evidence is that it worked with ACVC to ensure that its application and proposal for the funeral establishment would be in compliance with the FBCSA and would protect consumers’ interest. On May 15, 2019, the BAO’s manager for licensing advised ACVC that in order for the BAO to carry out its public protection mandate under the FBSCA, the Registrar proposed, pursuant to ss.16(1) of the FBSCA, to grant it a licence subject to certain conditions. ACVC agreed to the conditions without appealing as it would have been entitled to do under section 18 of the FBSCA.
[14] Accettone attempted to appeal the BAO’s decision to the Licence Appeal Tribunal(“LAT”) but was required to withdraw the appeal because Accettone had no right to appeal in relation to ACVC’s licence. Accettone then brought the underlying judicial review application. The only relief it seeks is to quash the BAO’s decision to grant ACVC a conditional licence and costs.
[15] In its application for judicial review, Accettone states in regard to the issue of standing:
“(e) The Applicant has exhausted all alternative avenues of recourse.
(f) At all material times, Diana Accettone, corporate director and vice-president for the Applicant, has been the leasor of the ACVC’s property on which they operate their business.
(g) ACVC operates on a parcel of land which is adjacent to the Applicant’s own business.
(h)The Applicant is affected both financially and professionally by ACVC’s misconduct.
(i)Both the Applicant and ACVC are regulated by the Act and the BAO and as such must be held to the same standards regarding their practising procedures.
(j)The BAO is not subject to Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, C.F.31.
(k)The Applicant is an “interested party” as defined by section 14(3) of the Act and as such is directly affected by the BAO’s decision to grant a licence to ACVC.
(l)In the alternative the Applicant submits that it should be granted standing out of public interest as
i. the professional administration and regulation of unlicensed funeral homes represent a serious justiciable issue.
ii. The Applicant is a concerned leasor, competitor and licensed funeral home, holds a real stake and genuine interest in the issue; and
iii. The present application represents a reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts as both the LAT and the BAO have refused to review the contested decision.”
[16] Accettone submits that BAO granted the impugned licence to ACVC, knowing that it provided illegal unlicensed funeral services for almost three years and in contravention of Part IV of the FBSCA. It relies upon Section 14(1) of the FBCSA which provides that an applicant is entitled to a licence unless the applicant is in contravention of the Act. Accettone submits that the BAO’s licensing of ACVC, knowing that it had been operating without a licence, gives rise to a prima facie justiciable issue wherein the BAO acted ultra vires the jurisdiction of the FB
[17] The BAO’s evidence is:
(a) that the Registrar had the authority and discretion to make this decision pursuant to ss.14(1) of the FBCSA;
(b) the Registrar had the discretion to refuse ACVC’s licence if, in his opinion, the applicant or managing employees do not have the integrity, honesty, experience and competence required to manage the business in accordance with the law, or had reasonable grounds to believe that the operation of the business by the applicant creates a risk to public health, safety or decency;
(c) in exercising this statutory imposed discretion, the Registrar also considers a myriad of factors, such as which option would protect the public interest best and avoids the ultimate consumer harm;
(d) it was the Registrar’s opinion and ultimate decision in this case that with the conditions which ACVC had agreed to, ACVC’s licensing application met all requirements and that the consumers’ interests would be protected.
(e) Accettone had no involvement in ACVC’s licensing application with the BAO or in the BAO’s decision making process to grant a conditional licence. The BAO did not consult with Accettone or seek its input in any way as to whether to issue a license with conditions to ACVC. Accettone did not make any submissions, solicited or otherwise, with respect to ACVC’s licensing application.
[18] On May 17, 2019, the Registrar granted ACVC a conditional funeral establishment Operator – Class 1 Licence which Accettone seeks to quash in the underlying application.
[19] Accettone relies on answers given on the cross-examination of the Registrar, Carey Smith, that the ACVC admitted to the Registrar that it was operating without a licence and provided funeral services for over two years in contravention of the FBCSA. BAO responds that ACVC cooperated with the BAO, was not a rogue operator and was not operating contrary to the law or operating an illegal operation from the outset as alleged.
Does Accettone have standing in the underlying application for judicial review
[20] The BAO submits that Accettone does not have standing for the following reasons:
(a) Accettone was not a party to the BAO’s decision.
(b) Nothing in the FBCSA grants standing to a competitor, landlord or non-party.
(c) Accettone was not directly affected by the BAO’s decision.
(d) Accettone has no public interest in the BAO’s decision.
Analysis
[21] Generally, only persons who were parties before the tribunal or who are directly affected by the tribunal’s decision may apply for judicial review.[^2] The burden is on Accettone in this case to show that they have “some special interest, private interest or sufficient interest” in the decision or proceeding.[^3]
[22] An applicant will have an interest in the proceeding where he or she has a private right that has been infringed by the respondent, or which will cause or threaten to cause special damage which extends beyond that suffered by the general public.[^4] This interest may also be conferred by statute.[^5]
[23] It is not sufficient to be interested in the decision. The requisite special, private or sufficient interest in the decision or proceeding will be satisfied when that party’s rights or obligations have been or could be affected more than the general public. They must be more than “interested observers”.[^6] An applicant can also discharge the burden by showing the decision affected their “personal or economic rights or obligations”.[^7]
Preliminary Issue-Admissibility of Accettone’s answers to undertakings
[24] Accettone seeks to rely upon its answers to undertakings. The BAO objects that this is improper pursuant to rule 39.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and is tantamount to producing a supplementary record of evidence after cross-examination.
[25] In my view, the answers to undertakings are admissible and I have considered the same, where relevant.
Accettone was not a party to the BAO’s Decision
[26] Accettone was a competitor of ACVC and Accettone’s director, Diane Accettone, is its landlord. Neither a competitor nor a landlord would have a right or entitlement to be a party to ACVC’s application process for a licence. Likewise, Accettone had no involvement in the BAO’s decision-making process to grant ACVC a licence. Accettone’s limited involvement as a complainant was in connection with the BAO’s earlier inspection of ACVC and not connected with the licencing process which is what the within application is about. There is no merit to Accettone’s argument that BAO treated Accettone at any time as a party in the licensing process. There is no merit to Accettone’s submission that the BAO provided Accettone with detailed updates regarding the progress of its investigations into ACVC because its contractual relationships with ACVC granted Accettone a right and interest in ACVC’s licensing process. As stated above, Accettone’s limited involvement was as a complainant only and not connected with the licensing process.
FBCSA does not grant standing to competitor, landlord or a non-party
[27] There is nothing in the FBCSA that confers any statutory right or entitlement to a non-party or to ACVC’s competitor or landlord to appeal a BAO decision to grant or refuse an applicant a licence.
[28] Accettone proffered no caselaw to support its position that it had standing as a landlord or competitor.
Statutory right to appeal only for applicants or licencees
[29] Section 18 of the FBCSA grants only the applicant or licencee the right to a hearing by the tribunal if the Registrar a) refuses to issue or renew a licence; b) suspends or revokes a licence; or c) applies conditions to a licence to which the applicant has not consented. Once the tribunal makes an order, the applicant or licensee then has the statutory right to appeal under section 11 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act “(LAT”)[^8]. The statute makes it clear that this right is not extended to any other party other than the applicant or licensee.
Ss.14(3) of the FBCSA does not give Accettone standing
[30] Accettone relies upon ss.14(3) of the FBCSA which provides a definition of “interested person” for the purposes of determining whether an applicant is entitled to receive a licence. Ss.14 provides:
14 (1) An applicant is entitled to a licence or to a renewal of the licence unless,
(a) the applicant or an interested person in respect of the applicant,
(i) is in contravention of this Act or the regulations, or
(ii) would be in contravention of this Act, the regulations, another Act or a municipal by-law if the applicant were issued a licence;
(b) the applicant is not a corporation and,
(i) having regard to the applicant’s financial position or the financial position of an interested person in respect of the applicant, the applicant cannot reasonably be expected to be financially responsible in the conduct of business,
(ii) the past conduct of the applicant or of an interested person in respect of the applicant affords reasonable grounds for belief that the applicant will not carry on business in accordance with the law and with integrity and honesty, or
(iii) the applicant or an employee or agent of the applicant makes a false statement or provides a false statement in an application for a licence or for renewal of a licence;
(c) the applicant is a corporation and,
(i) the past conduct of officers or directors of the applicant or of an interested person in respect of the applicant affords reasonable grounds for belief that its business will not be carried on in accordance with the law and with integrity and honesty, or
(ii) an officer, director, employee or agent of the applicant makes a false statement or provides a false statement in an application for a licence or for renewal of a licence;
(d) in the case of an applicant for a licence to operate a cemetery, crematorium, funeral establishment, casket or marker retailing business, transfer service or other bereavement activity for which a licence is required under the regulations, or a renewal of such a licence,
(i) in the opinion of the registrar, the applicant or managing employees of the applicant do not have the integrity, honesty, experience and competence required to manage the business in accordance with the law, or having regard for the financial position of the applicant or managing employees, the applicant or managing employees cannot be reasonably expected to be financially responsible in the conduct of the business,
(ii) the applicant is unable to provide the resources and facilities required to manage a business, or
(iii) the registrar has reasonable grounds to believe that the operation of the business by the applicant creates a risk to public health, safety or decency;
(e) in the case of an applicant for a licence to operate a funeral establishment, casket or marker retailing business, transfer service or other bereavement activity for which a licence is required under the regulations, or a renewal of such a licence, the applicant is,
(i) a board of trustees established for the purpose of operating a cemetery, except if the applicant is otherwise a person within the meaning of section 87 of the Legislation Act, 2006 and is applying in that capacity, or
(ii) any organization or group of persons organized for the purpose of operating a cemetery, except if the applicant is otherwise a person within the meaning of section 87 of the Legislation Act, 2006 and is applying in that capacity;
(f) the applicant fails to satisfy the other requirements that are prescribed;
(g) the applicant or other person that is prescribed has not successfully completed the educational requirements that are prescribed;
(h) the applicant is in breach of a condition of the licence; or
(i) the applicant fails to comply with a request made by the registrar under section
(2) A licence is not transferable.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person shall be deemed to be an interested person in respect of another person if the person is associated with the other person or if, in the opinion of the registrar,
(a) the person has or may have a beneficial interest in the other person’s business;
(b) the person exercises or may exercise control either directly or indirectly over the other person; or
(c) the person has provided or may have provided financing either directly or indirectly to the other person’s business.
[31] Accettone submits that it has standing as an interested person within the meaning of ss.14(3) because:
(a) It is clearly associated with ACVC by virtue of the lease and because it is a member in the same sphere of the same regulated profession;
(b) It exercises control both directly and indirectly over ACVC by virtue of the obligations contained in the lease;
(c) It has provided financing both directly and indirectly to ACVC’s business; and
(d) It is listed as an “interested party” on ACVC’s insurance policy which was provided by ACVC to the BAO in the context of its application for licensure.
[32] Accettone asserts that it has a financial interest in ACVC and a right or control over ACVC’s business operations through: 1) the lease; 2) as an additional insured under ACVC’s insurance policy; 3) under the Occupier’s Liability Act as an occupier because it could be liable to third parties if they are injured on the premises and 4) by virtue of its status as a licensee of the BAO.
[33] Accettone cannot rely upon the lease to support its claim for standing as it is not a party to the agreement. The lease is between Diane Accettone and the numbered company of ACVC.
[34] Accettone is not an owner, shareholder, or director and has no legal connection to ACVC. ACVC submits that Accettone has no financial interest in ACVC and never provided financing directly or indirectly to it. ACVC requested and relies upon Accettone’s failure to produce any contracts or loan or financing agreements between the parties. In any event, even if Accettone has the kind of financial interests it asserts in ACVC, it has not shown that those interests were affected by the decision to grant ACVC a licence. Accettone has not shown that the granting of a licence to ACVC will cause or threaten to cause it special damage which goes beyond that suffered by the general public.
[35] Moreover, even if Accettone qualified as an “interested person” under ss.14(3), there is nothing in the FBCSA whereby that entitles it to any special rights or entitlements with respect to the applicant’s licencing application process.
[36] The meaning of “interested person” in ss.14(3) must be read within the context of ss.14(1) which sets out the grounds upon which the Registrar can refuse an application for a licence. For example, an application for a licence can be refused if an “interested person” of the applicant for license is in contravention of the FBCSA or its regulations, or his or her past conduct in respect of the applicant affords reasonable grounds for belief that the business will not be carried on in accordance with the law and with integrity and honesty.
[37] According to the evidence of the Registrar, Carey Smith, who gave evidence in this proceeding, “interested person” under s.14(3) is intended to capture individuals such as a business partner or beneficiary of the applicant that may have an impact on the applicant’s ability to meet its obligations when conducting its business. Accettone has no such influence over ACVC’s business. Neither this nor being a member of the same regulated profession is the kind of association intended by the definition of an “interested person” under subsection 14(3).
[38] Accettone states that it qualifies for standing as an “interested person” because it maintains a financial interest in ACVC by virtue of its status as a licensee pursuant to the FBCSA and that ACVC has obtained an unfair advantage by not paying the associated regulatory costs for as long as other licensees have. The effect of this position, if correct, is that all BAO licensees could be granted standing in this case or in similar applications. This submission has no merit.
[39] It should be noted that a person is deemed to be an “interested person” under (a), (b), or (c) of ss.14(3) only if the registrar is of the opinion that the requirements are met. It is evident from the evidence of Carey Smith that “in the opinion of the registrar”, Accettone was not an “interested person.” Moreover, as stated above, even if it was an “interested person”, it did not thereby acquire any special rights or entitlements with respect to ACVC’s licensing application process.
Accettone was not directly affected by the BAO’s decision-no private interest
[40] Accettone has no special, private or sufficient interest in the BAO’s decision granting ACVC a conditional licence. None of Accettone’s rights pursuant to statute or common law as a licensed funeral establishment operator were infringed by the BAO granting ACVC a conditional licence. As Accettone has not demonstrated that a right has been infringed, it does not have private standing. As acknowledged by Accettone during the cross-examinations, this application is really about a business seeking to have the licence of a competitor revoked so it can eliminate the competition. Losing a market advantage purely because it now faces a competitor next door does not provide Accettone a basis for seeking declaratory relief.
[41] Accettone’s grounds for standing are similar to those considered in the case of Behr v. College of Pharmacists of British Columbia.[^9] Behr brought an application alleging that the College of Pharmacists of British Columbia failed to properly interpret and enforce a bylaw, such that it was improperly allowing ‘internet pharmacies’ to advertise prescription drugs to US consumers. The issue of standing was dealt with as a preliminary objection. The court dismissed the application on the basis that Behr had failed to demonstrate the infringement of a right held by him under statute, common law or in equity. While he was an interested observer, he was not a person whose legal rights had been infringed by the College’s policy in respect of the bylaw’s interpretation or with respect to the manner in which it regulated internet pharmacies generally.[^10]
[42] Accettone’s counsel sought to distinguish Behr on the basis that although a pharmacist, Behr was found to lack standing because he did not own, manage or work in a pharmacy providing internet pharmacy services whereas Accettone and ACVC work in the same sphere of the funeral industry. In my view, that is too narrow a reading of the ratio of the decision. Like Behr, Accettone lacks standing because none of its rights or entitlements as a licensed funeral establishment are being infringed.
[43] In Pieters v. Ontario College of Teachers[^11], the applicant, a Vice Principal of a school complained to the Investigations Committee of the College of Teachers about the Principal’s conduct. The applicant brought an application for judicial review of the Investigation Committee’s decision not to refer his complaint to the Discipline Committee. The court dismissed the application on the grounds that he had no standing. The court relied on the fact that the relevant legislation did not confer party standing on a complainant and that the applicant did not have a special interest in the decision of the Investigation Committee. As a complainant, his position was no different than any member of the public or other members of the Ontario College of Teachers.
[44] Similarly, Accettone has no special interest in the decision to grant ACVC a licence and Accettone’s interest as a complainant in this case is insufficient to grant it standing to pursue this application.
Accettone has no public interest in the BAO’s decision
[45] As an alternative argument, Accettone claims that it should be granted standing on a public interest basis.
[46] The test for considering whether a matter is of public interest is three part:
Whether the case raises a serious justiciable issue;
Whether the party bringing the action has a real stake or genuine interest in its outcome; and
Whether the suit is a reasonable and effective means of bringing the issues before the courts in all of the circumstances.[^12]
[47] These three factors are not to be interpreted as a “rigid checklist” or “technical requirements” but instead “should be seen as interrelated considerations to be weighed cumulatively, not individually, and in light of their purposes.[^13]
[48] To be a serious justiciable issue, the issue must be a “substantial constitutional issue” or an “important one” that raises issues of public importance that transcend the parties’ immediate interests.[^14] Issues that can rise to this level need to have broad societal impact.[^15]
[49] The fact that Accettone alleges that ACVC was issued a conditional licence in contravention of the FBCSA does not mean that the requirement for a serious justiciable issue has been met. There is no broad societal impact here such as existed in Downtown Eastside[^16]. Here the issue is one entity’s operation and whether the decision to grant it a conditional licence should be quashed. There are likewise no legal concerns of broad significance or systemic issues. There is an absence of a true lis between the parties. Accettone mischaracterizes the underlying application as a concern over BAO’s failure to uphold its regulatory obligations and its failure to regulate the funeral industry under the FBCSA. There is no evidence of Accettone’s real and continued interest in the broader issue of regulation of the funeral industry. Accettone’s real interest is with respect to ACVC’s licence. This is a transparent attempt to have the licence of a competitor revoked so it can eliminate the competition. The issues raised in the recently published report from the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario regarding the BAO which Accettone purports to rely upon are properly dealt with by the Ministry of Government and Consumer Services, not by the courts.
[50] None of Accettone’s rights are affected by the decision it seeks to impugn. It can still operate as a funeral home, compete against ACVC and carry on as its landlord if it chooses. As discussed above, Accettone does not have a real stake or genuine interest in the appropriateness of ACVC’s licensing. Accettone does not have standing because the decision to licence ACVC may affect it economically. It has not established the requisite special or private interest in the proceeding beyond that of other competitors or the general public. Accettone’s submission that it is uniquely situated to bring the underlying application as a member in the same sphere of the same regulated industry has no merit.
[51] Diane Accettone has clear and obvious private remedies available in civil court to address any claims of breach arising from the lease. If a right arises between the parties under a commercial agreement, the remedy for any wrongdoing is in the civil court. In fact, Ms. Accettone has already made use of one of these remedies when she commenced a civil action against ACVC in Superior Court for breach of contract. This application is not a reasonable and effective means of bringing the issues before the courts in all the circumstances. Accettone does not meet the test for standing on a public interest basis. Moreover, the court retains jurisdiction to refuse public interest standing to undeserving applications.[^17] To allow Accettone who has no direct interest in a matter to challenge the routine issuance of a licence would potentially open the floodgates to frivolous challenges being made by competing businesses any time a licence was granted to a competitor.
Conclusion
[52] The underlying application is dismissed in its entirety for lack of standing.
[53] The parties have advised that they have reached agreement on the issue of costs. Accordingly, costs shall be dealt with on the basis of the parties’ agreement.
___________________________________ Backhouse J.
Released: June 4, 2021
Bereavement Authority of Ontario, 2021 ONSC 4081
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC1220/2020
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
Accettone Funeral Home Ltd.
Applicant
– and –
Ajax Crematorium and Visitation Centre Inc. and Bereavement Authority of Ontario
Respondents
Backhouse J.
Released: June 4, 2021
[^1]: Funeral, Burial and Cremation Services Act, 2002, SO 2002, c.33. [^2]: J.N.v. British Columbia Commissioner for Teacher Regulation, [2019] B.C.J. No.894 citing S.Blake, Administrative Law in Canada, (3rd ed.) Markham:Butterworths Canada Ltd., 2001. [^3]: Pieters v Ontario College of Teachers, [2008] O.J. No.527 (S.C.J.), at para.4 quoting Cowan v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1966] 2 O.R. 309; Emerman v. Assn. of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of British Columbia, [2008] B.C.J. No.1663 at para.19. [^4]: Behr v. College of Pharmacists of British Columbia, 2005 BCSC 879. [^5]: Emerman v. Assn. of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of British Columbia, [2008] B.C.J. No.1663 at para.19. [^7]: Behr v. College of Pharmacists of British Columbia, 2005 BCSC 879, at paras.15, 18 and 28. [^6]: Robichaud v. College of Registered Nurses of Nova Scotia, 2011 NSSC 379. [^8]: Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O.1999,c.12, Schedule G. [^9]: Behr v. College of Pharmacists of British Columbia, 2005 BCSC 879. [^10]: Behr v. College of Pharmacists of British Columbia, 2005 BCSC 879, para.28. [^11]: Pieters v. Ontario College of Teachers, [2008] O.J. No.527 (S.C.J.) [^12]: Attorney General of Canada v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45 at para.2. [^13]: Attorney General of Canada v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45 at at para.53. [^14]: Attorney General of Canada v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45 at paras. 42 and 73. [^15]: See Del Valley v. Law Society of the Northwest Territories, [2017] N.W.T.J. No.29 and J.N. v. British Columbia Commissioner for Teacher Regulation, [2019] B.C.J. No.894. [^16]: Attorney General of Canada v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45. [^17]: Canwest MediaWorks Inc.v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2008 FCA 207(CA), at para.26; Affirmed: 2008 FCA 207 (CA).