CITATION: Canadian National v. Teamsters Canada 2020 ONSC 7286
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-19-609-JR
DATE: 20201201
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
PATTILLO, BLOOM and KURKE JJ.
BETWEEN:
CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILWAY COMPANY
Applicant
– and –
TEAMSTERS CANADA RAIL CONFERENCE
Respondent
A. Pushalik, P.J. Ebejer, and L. Workewych, for the Applicant
M.A. Church, for the Respondent
HEARD at Toronto: November 16, 2020
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
A.D. KURKE J.
Overview
[1] This case arises out of a dispute between the parties concerning jurisdiction for work performed on January 30, 2015 by Kyle Rooney (the “grievor”) as a road service employee of the applicant and the interpretation of the collective agreement between the applicant and the respondent. The applicant asserts that the work was properly assigned to the grievor, while the respondent argues that it should have been assigned to a “yardworker” and not to a road service “conductor-only” crew.
[2] The dispute was heard by the Canadian Railway Office of Arbitration & Dispute Resolution (“CROA”). On May 28, 2019, arbitrator John M. Moreau, Q.C. issued his award upholding the grievance.
[3] The applicant (“CN”) seeks review of the arbitrator’s award, arguing that the reasons of the arbitrator are problematic and the award unreasonable.
Facts
[4] CN is a railway company operating in Canada and North America. The respondent (the “Union”) is the exclusive bargaining agent for CN employees working for train and rail yard service on CN’s eastern lines. The relationship between CN and the Union is governed by Collective Agreement 4.16 (the “Agreement”). The Agreement discusses the work classification of conductors, trainspersons and yardpersons. Each group has distinct areas of work jurisdiction in the Agreement.
[5] The grievor was a CN road service conductor working out of CN’s Toronto terminal. That terminal is quite extensive and encloses several “yards,” including the Macmillan yard and the Brampton intermodal yard (“BIT”), where container trains are broken down so that their freight can continue its journey by other modes of transportation. Terminals have designated locations known as “outer switches,” which are located outside of yards and relate to employee pay levels. The time that an employee spends within the outer switch limits is known as “terminal time” and is paid accordingly. Time spent outside that area is paid at a different rate.
[6] The grievance in this matter arose from directions given to the grievor on January 30, 2015. On that date, CN called in the grievor for work at Toronto terminal at 0130 hours. During his shift, the grievor was ordered to bring in two freight trains which had stopped before arriving at their points of destination.
[7] The parties disagree on the characterization of the grievor’s assigned work on January 30, 2015. CN maintains that the grievor was called in for what it terms “through freight turnaround service,” requiring the road service worker to travel to another location from their terminal of origin and then return back to the original terminal with a train. The Union maintains that the grievor was called in for “continuous rescue service” which it asserts is not through freight service. Whether the work was through freight service or not has ramifications that are significant in the context of jurisdiction of work assigned under the Agreement.
[8] Upon reporting for duty, the grievor was instructed first to taxi with a locomotive engineer from Macmillan yard in the Toronto terminal to Langstaff and bring train M316 back to Macmillan yard, its destination. Langstaff is located around 1.3 miles outside the Toronto terminal. The grievor performed this job as a “conductor-only consist,” meaning that he operated as a road crew with no assistant conductor helping him with the retrieval of the train. M316 passed the outer switch into Macmillan yard at 0314 hrs.
[9] At 0600 hours, the grievor was instructed to go by taxi from the Macmillan Yard and take control of train Q121, a train of more than two miles in length, located wholly within the switching limits of the Toronto terminal at Goreway, and to bring this train to BIT with a locomotive engineer. Cars from this vast train were to be uncoupled at BIT onto four separate tracks. Again, the grievor was operating in the capacity of a conductor-only road crew. He then was to bring the rest of Q121 to Macmillan yard, and passed the outer switch with train Q121 at 0840 hrs, and went off duty at 1137 hrs.
[10] The grievor claimed pay for his tour of duty on January 30, 2015 based on final terminal time starting at 0314 hours, when he passed the outer switch of the MacMillan yard with train M316, and continuing until 1137 hours, when he went off duty for the day. CN declined these hours and provided instead an adjusted ticket which calculated his final terminal time based on his passing the outer switch with train Q121 at 0840 hrs.
[11] On May 1, 2015, the Union brought a Step III grievance alleging that CN had breached the Agreement. CN filed its response on July 23, 2015. The Union indicated that it wished to pursue arbitration, and the matter was eventually heard on May 14, 2019 by John M. Moreau, Q.C., an arbitrator for CROA, who issued his award May 28, 2019.
Issues at the arbitration and the relevant Articles in the Agreement
[12] Although the grievor had seen his pay packet reduced by the adjustment made by CN, the Union’s grievance related to jurisdictional issues, and those in relation only to the grievor’s assignment to rescue the second train, Q121. The Union raised no particular issue in relation to the rescue of train M316 in and of itself but did argue that the grievor’s tour of duty was over once he yarded train M316. The Union complained that CN improperly used a road crew, and at that a conductor-only road crew, to perform the work of yardworkers within terminal switching limits in relation to train Q121.
[13] In general, pursuant to Article 11.4 of the Agreement, conductor-only service is an exception to the general rule that both a conductor and an assistant conductor are to be present during all freight work: “11.4 Except as otherwise provided…all freight…trains will have a conductor and one assistant conductor.”
[14] Article 11.7 of the Agreement permits a conductor-only crew to perform “through freight service” so long as it meets the criteria in sub-articles (a) to (f). There are indications that “through freight service” involves more than one terminal: Article 11.7(b) commences with the words “[a]t the initial terminal…”; Article 11.7(c) commences, “[a]t the final terminal…”; Article 11.7(e) requires that the trains be designed for no more than three stops “between the initial and final terminals”. Switching activity is another issue, and a major one in this case. Article 11.7(d) allows for conductor-only crews to perform some switching with respect to “through freight” service trains, at their “initial or final terminal”:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 41, such trains are not required to perform switching in connection with their own train at the initial or final terminal; if switching in connection with their own train is required at the initial or final terminal to meet the requirements of the service, [the conductor will receive additional pay].
[15] The reference to Article 41 in Article 11.7(d) is significant and highlights the distinction between roadwork and yardwork. Article 11.7(d) permits road service crews to perform work ordinarily reserved to yard service employees in limited circumstances relating to “through freight” service. However, in general, Article 41.1 provides a definition of work that is restricted to “yard service workers”:
41.1 Except as provided in Article 12 of [the Agreement] the following will apply: switching transfer and industrial work, wholly within the recognized switching limits, will at points where yard service employees are employed, be considered as service to which yard service employees are entitled, but this is not intended to prevent employees in road service from performing switching required in connection with their own train and putting their own train away…on a minimum number of tracks. Upon arrival at the objective terminal, road crews may be required to set off 2 blocks of cars into 2 designated tracks.
[16] The Union’s position was that the grievor was not performing “through freight service” as per Article 11.7 with respect to train Q121, and that, accordingly, he should not have been assigned to rescue that train as a “conductor-only consist” according to Article 11.4. Further, as the grievor rescued train Q121 within the Toronto terminal, the Union argued that the work should not have been assigned to a road crew at all, but should have been reserved for yardworkers, pursuant to Article 41.1, as Toronto terminal employs yard service employees.
[17] CN argued that the grievor had been properly assigned to this work pursuant to Article 6.4 of the Agreement, which allows for employees to make “short trips or for turnaround service (with the understanding that one or more turnaround trips may be started out of the same terminal) and paid actual miles…” provided, among other things, “(a) that the cumulative road mileage of all trips does not exceed 120 miles”, “(b) that the distance run from the terminal to the turning point does not exceed 30 miles”, and “(c) that employees will not be required to commence a succeeding trip out of the initial terminal after having been on duty 8 consecutive hours except as a new tour of duty.” As CN saw it, the grievor properly performed two short turnaround trips before going off duty.
[18] It was also CN’s position that the grievor could operate as a “conductor-only consist” for Article 6.4 work. CN argued that the grievor was properly tasked to perform multiple train rescues as part of his tour of duty. Finally, it was CN’s position that the work performed by the grievor with respect to train Q121 was properly assigned to the grievor, a road service employee, and did not need to be reserved to yard service employees, as he was performing the switching work with respect to his “own train,” as per Article 41.1.
[19] In his award, the arbitrator found for the Union and ordered that the grievor be made monetarily whole.
Standard of review and the reasonableness of administrative decisions
[20] There is no dispute that the standard of review of the arbitrator’s decision involves a standard of reasonableness.
[21] CROA is a highly specialized administrative tribunal devoted to resolving railway employment disputes. CROA’s decisions are generally brief, deal with the interpretation of collective agreements, and are released quickly, in order to provide “a fluid and efficient mechanism to manage employment relations in a complex industry”: Canadian National Railway v. Teamsters Canada Rail Conference, [2017] N.S.J. 156 (S.C.), at para. 13 (“CNR v. TCRC”). CROA’s decisions have in the past attracted a high standard of deference by reviewing courts: Canadian Pacific Limited c. Fraternité des préposés à l'entretien des voies, [2003] J.Q. no 4776, at paras. 48-50.
[22] The underlying rationale for judicial review is to ensure that administrative decisions are transparent, intelligible, and justified: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, at para. 47. Unspoken understandings and apparent shortcuts in reasoning and unique concepts and language are to be expected where specialized decision-makers are rendering formal decisions in their areas of specialization. Reasons must be read together with the outcome and serve the purpose of showing that the result falls within a range of possible outcomes: Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, at paras. 13-15.
[23] The reasonableness standard permits judicial intervention only when it is necessary to safeguard the legality, rationality, and fairness of the administrative process. The process of judicial review does not encourage the reviewing court to substitute its own decision or reasoning process. Rather, the reviewing court’s task is to consider whether the decision was reasonable, with respect to the underlying rationale and the outcome of the decision: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, at para. 83.
[24] A deferential attitude requires courts to accept that arbitration is intended to provide speedy and workable assistance to parties in the interpretation of their agreement for its duration. The most suitable remedy for dissatisfaction with an arbitral result may well be a new negotiating position when the agreement is up for renewal. Apparent lapses in decisions that exasperate courts, such as the failure to refer to arguments and sub-arguments, statutory provisions, or conflicting jurisprudence, and shortcuts in the process of reasoning or the explanation of findings, may be justified to permit quicker decisions for parties that are intimately familiar with the subtleties of interpretation of the agreement and do not need everything to be spelled out: Labrador Nurses’ Union, at paras. 17, 23-25; Vavilov, at paras. 91-97, 128.
[25] Therefore, courts that review administrative decisions must be alive to the history and context of proceedings in which those decisions were rendered. That context can include the evidence before the decision-maker, the submissions of parties, and past decisions of the administrative decision-maker. In considering this larger context, apparent gaps in, or shortcomings of, the reasoning process need not require a conclusion that there has been a failure in justification, intelligibility, or transparency: Williams Lake Indian Band v. Canada (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), 2018 SCC 4, at para. 37.
[26] However, while administrative decision-makers are not bound by prior decisions of the same administrative body, where a given issue has been authoritatively established, consistency and the reasonable expectations of the parties require that departure from longstanding practices or established internal decisions will merit explanation or justification: Vavilov, at paras. 129-131; CNR v. TCRC, at para 44.
Award of the arbitrator
Applicant’s Position
[27] In this court, CN argues that the arbitrator’s award was not intelligible, as the arbitrator’s reasons were not sufficiently clear, transparent or precise. CN also complains that the arbitrator did not address arguments raised at the arbitration by the applicant, ignored relevant authorities, and arrived at an unreasonable conclusion.
[28] At the hearing, CN pointed to what it considered the key passage in the award, the final paragraph on page 9, as hopelessly flawed and unsupportable:
“I would add that I also disagree with [CN] that turnaround service is included in ‘through freight’ service. I accept the Union’s position that it would be inconsistent with the Conductor Only assignment to have such a smaller crew deal with the turnaround service contemplated in article 6.4. Had the parties intended to include turnaround service of a kind performed by the grievor during his second trip, it would have specifically included that language in article 11.7. I am reinforced in that view given that I accept that the purpose of the 1991 MOA was to limit Conductor Only Service to ‘through freight service’.”
[29] Not only do I fail to see this paragraph as unsupportable, I also do not consider this paragraph to be central to the decision. Rather, the paragraph that precedes this one, and that concludes with the words “[t]he company has failed to comply with the requirements of article 11.7 when it called a crew consist of Conductor Only to yard train Q121”, is clearly the decision in the award.
[30] When the award is carefully read in its entirety in the context of the facts in this case, the arbitrator’s logic and conclusion in what is at its heart a very defined dispute are sufficiently clear and precise to satisfy the reasonableness standard. Moreover, the arbitrator’s award was plainly responsive to the arguments raised by the parties and did not improperly ignore relevant jurisprudence in arriving at its conclusion.
Discussion
[31] The arbitrator began his award with a statement that defined the parameters of the dispute: “This is a work jurisdiction case.” He then summarized the facts, noting in particular that Goreway, where train Q121 was taken control of by the grievor, was within the switching limits for the Toronto terminal, that train Q121 was more than two miles in length, and that its cars were yarded into four different tracks at BIT. The arbitrator then set out the Articles of the Agreement that required his attention: 6.4, 11.4, 11.7, and 41.
[32] The arbitrator next set out the positions of the parties. He was alive to the concerns and issues raised by each and set out CN’s position in detail.
[33] The Union complained that CN had used a conductor-only crew to perform the work of a yard service crew, which is forbidden by Article 41.1. The exception to that rule involves road service employees putting their own train away on a minimum number of tracks at the end of a tour. Arbitrator Picher in CROA 3182 had stated that Article 41.1 prevents the assignment of work in closed yards to road crews. The Union also pointed to a July 1991 Memorandum of Agreement that limited conductor-only work to through freight service and made no mention of “turnaround service” as in Article 6.4. The Union further asserted that CROA caselaw supported a distinction between “turnaround service” and “through freight service”.
[34] CN argued that Article 6.4 was intended to allow unassigned freight crews to perform one or more turnaround trips out of the same terminal, and therefore justified the grievor’s assigned work on January 30, 2015. Article 6.4’s terms had been complied with. CN further argued that the grievor was only entitled to terminal time when inside the terminal limits, but to road mileage from the outer switch to the turnaround point and back. The grievor’s tour of duty was not completed when he returned train M316, but only when he passed the outer switch with train Q121.
[35] CN further argued that the grievor’s assignment with train Q121 did not fall within Article 41.1 work of “switching, transfer or industrial work” and therefore was not restricted to yard service employees. Moreover, yarding the second train at BIT was legitimate work for conductor-only road crews, according to Article 11.7, and “it would take clear and unequivocal language” to support the Union claim that work performed wholly within switching limits belonged to yard service employees.
[36] The arbitrator began his consideration of the issues by instructing himself that a collective agreement must be read in its entirety, and its language was to be construed according to the intentions of the parties. The words used must be assigned their ordinary and natural meaning unless the context required otherwise.
[37] It is important to observe that the arbitrator found that the grievor’s dealings with train M316 “fell squarely within” the conductor-only requirements of Article 11.7. The arbitrator went on to explain why that was the case, in the context of the work jurisdiction dispute between the parties. He held that the “ordinary meaning” of a train operating in “through freight service” in Article 11.7 contemplated a beginning point and an end point, which logically required that there be an “initial” and a “final” terminal, as in Article 11.7(d). As I understand the arbitrator’s logic, train M316 was a permissible assignment because the grievor took control of that train outside a terminal, and then took it into its “final” terminal – the Toronto terminal – thus meeting the requirements of Article 11.7(d) on a rescue operation.
[38] The arbitrator next pointed out that Article 11.7(d) does permit a conductor-only crew to perform switching, so long as it is in connection with a conductor’s “own train,” which wording contemplates a “single assignment.” Contrary to the submission of CN, I do not take this to be a reference to Article 6.4, and a holding that Article 6.4 does not permit multiple rescue assignments. Rather, it refers to a requirement that service on a through freight train, to satisfy the exception set out in Article 11.7(d) and permit a conductor-only crew, must involve the movement of the train by the same conductor-only crew from one terminal to another (as in the arbitrator’s example of a “hook and go train”), or at least from outside a terminal into a terminal, if it is being rescued (as in the case of train M316). That crew can perform some switching with respect to its train. This requirement that a tour of duty for a conductor-only road crew on the subject train must involve movement outside the final terminal in fact accords with well-known CROA jurisprudence. As defined by arbitrator Picher (in AH-330), “through freight service … is the operation of a freight train between two terminals or out of and back into the same terminal.”
[39] It is readily apparent from the context of the case that the vital feature that distinguished train M316 from train Q121 was that the former was rescued outside terminal limits, while the latter was rescued from entirely within the Toronto terminal.
[40] The arbitrator then, still in the context of the reference to “switching” in Article 11.7(d), goes on to cite a passage from CROA AH-560, another decision of arbitrator Picher, referred to by Wood J. in CNR v. TCRC, at para. 31:
“the foregoing article [equivalent to Article 11.7(d)] clearly contemplates situations in which conductor only crews are required to perform switching at initial or final terminals. Firstly, it is paramount that such switching must be ‘in connection with their own train’. They are not to perform switching intended for the purposes of another train or yard movement. Secondly, such switching must be necessary ‘to meet the requirements’ of the service.”
[41] This is a significant citation in the context of train Q121. For the exception in Article 11.7(d) to apply, the switching performed by a conductor-only crew must be done “to meet the requirements of the service.” It was CN’s position that Article 41.1 (misidentified as “4.16” in the award) did not apply, and that Article 11.7(d) governed, as in yarding the cars from train Q121, the grievor was simply undertaking the work that the original conductor-only crew of train Q121 would have had to do at the completion of their trip, so that that the work was necessary “to meet the requirements of the service,” in the language of Article 11.7(d).
[42] The arbitrator did not accept this reasoning. In the context of the facts of this case, that was because train Q121 was rescued entirely within Toronto terminal, so the inbound trip was already finished, and the destination achieved before the grievor took control of the train. What would have been the requirements of the service of the original crew in yarding the cars of train Q121 was not applicable, because that crew had left their own train wholly within the terminal but before reaching BIT. At this point, the only “service” that remained for train Q121 was yardwork, not “through freight.” The arbitrator noted that “the two-mile long train had to be yarded into 4 different tracks” at the intermodal facility, which satisfied the definition of “switching, transfer or industrial work” in Article 41.1. Article 11.7(d) did not apply, and Article 41.1 did.
[43] CN complains that the arbitrator cited no jurisprudence in differentiating yard service work from road service work. It argues that road service crews are indeed permitted to perform switching. However, in the view of the arbitrator, complex movements of a two-mile long train to separate its cars into four tracks was not “the requirements of the service” for a conductor-only crew at an intermodal facility. It was open to the arbitrator to make this finding, a factual determination which aligns with a decision of arbitrator Picher in AH-583, holding that:
“the separate breaking up and marshalling of cars to separate positions on the intermodal pads is of a different order of work, going beyond the requirements of the service to what is in effect the undue performance of yard work in dismantling a train, beyond the contemplation of the Conductor-Only Agreement.”
[44] The decision in AH-583 was discussed at some length in CNR v. TCRC, a case to which the arbitrator made repeated reference. Moreover, CN’s concern that its various authorities (CROA 4559, AH 60, CROA 804, CROA 2973, CROA 11) should have been considered by the arbitrator but were not, ignores the factual context of this case, involving a conductor-only consist assigned to rescue and yard a two-mile long train from entirely within its destination terminal onto four tracks. CN’s authorities were not particularly relevant to these facts. Rather, as recognized and accepted by Wood J., in CNR v. TCRC, the meaning of “the requirements of the service”, according to Arbitrator Picher in three Awards considered in the case, is a factual determination and (at para. 38):
“…must be determined based upon the individual circumstances and, in particular, external factors, such as safety regulations, operating rules, and time constraints. There is nothing in any of these awards to suggest that transfer of cars to an intermodal facility will meet the requirements of the service criteria in all cases.”
Arbitrator Moreau, based on the factual considerations of this case, was of the view that the grievor’s assignment to yard cars from train Q121 did not meet “the requirements of the service.” On the facts in this case, such a holding cannot be said to be unreasonable.
[45] The arbitrator then concluded this part of the discussion with a further reference to CNR v. TCRC, at para. 30. There, Justice Wood stated, “Whether the switching done by [the grievor in the case] was incidental to the CN instruction or in relation to his own train is irrelevant if that instruction to move the cars to the [intermodal terminal] was not authorized under article 11.7(d)” [emphasis added]. By this reference, it is apparent that the arbitrator both understood that Article 11.7 only superseded Article 41.1 if the elements of Article 11.7(d) were satisfied, and concluded that they had not been.
[46] The arbitrator continued on to state that, “[i]n light of the language of Article 11.7(d) the interpretation of what is meant by the requirements of the service is central to this judicial review.” In what was obviously intended to be his decision on the grievance, he then summarized his conclusions (on page 9):
“The second rescue trip inside the switching limits should therefore have been performed by the Yard Service or switcher crews and not by a Conductor Only crew. As the grievor noted, he was on his final terminal time once he completed the first trip at 3:14 and yarded M31. The company has failed to comply with the requirements of article 11.7 when it called a crew consist of Conductor Only to yard train Q121.”
[47] CN complains that the arbitrator did not state here how he arrived at the conclusion that the second rescue trip should have been performed by a yard service crew. That is simply to ignore the arbitrator’s reasoning from earlier in the award. The arbitrator set out again here that train Q121 was “inside the switching limits.” The reference to the grievor being on “his final terminal time” is a factual finding merely making clear that the grievor was also within Toronto terminal. Both train Q121 and the grievor were in the same terminal, so there could be no movement out of and back into a terminal on this rescue. Accordingly, it could not be considered to be “through freight” service, so Article 11.7(d) did not apply, and any rescue of train Q121 should have been performed by a yard service crew and not a conductor-only road crew, in accordance with Article 41.1.
[48] As to the final paragraph on page 9 of the award, impugned at this hearing by CN, it is plainly limited to the facts of this case. The arbitrator was not stating that “turnaround service” is never included in “through freight” service, for he had already found that the turnaround service to rescue train M316 was unexceptionable for a conductor-only consist. His focus was on train Q121: “Had the parties intended to include turnaround service of a kind performed by the grievor during his second trip, it would have specifically included that language in article 11.7” [emphasis added]. The arbitrator then referred to the 1991 MOA, whose purpose was to limit conductor-only service to “through freight service.” The arbitrator thereby held that only turnaround service that involved at least leaving a terminal before returning to the terminal could be considered “through freight” service.
[49] CN further argues that this paragraph ignores CROA 4559. In that decision, however, Arbitrator Sims only went so far as to state that “I am not persuaded that ‘through freight service’ (assuming the Article 11.7 sub-clauses are met) can only ever apply to an A to B run and not to an A to A via B run.” Contrary to the submissions of CN on this review, Arbitrator Moreau did not find “through freight service” and “turnaround service” to be mutually exclusive, contrary to CROA 4559. Rather, he held that “through freight service” could include “turnaround service,” just not of the sort relating to train Q121. The arbitrator properly focused on the facts of the case and did not depart from established CROA jurisprudence.
[50] The arbitrator then ordered that the grievor be made monetarily whole, which presumably required that, since he had been improperly called out, while on terminal time, to perform yard service work on train Q121, he should receive the terminal time that he originally claimed, from the point that his one appropriate service on train M316 crossed the outer switch into Macmillan yard.
Conclusion
[51] The rationale of the arbitrator’s award left unsaid many understandings that would have been obvious to those versed in the language and culture of the Agreement. The arbitrator relied on CROA decisions that he left unstated, preferring to refer more often to the decision of Justice Wood in CNR v. TCRC and the CROA decisions cited therein. As so often in CROA cases, the arbitrator’s determinations depended on the particular facts of the case. The arbitrator focused on the points at issue and explained how he came to conclusions on each point.
[52] The award’s conclusion, that the yarding of train Q121 should have been done by a yard crew and not by the grievor, falls within the range of acceptable outcomes based on the facts in issue. The arbitrator found that, and explained why, the service both should not have been performed by a road crew, and in particular by a conductor-only consist. Where he disagreed with CN, he did so clearly, and explained the reasons for his disagreement. The decision was reasonable, both with respect to its underlying rationale and its outcome.
[53] For the above reasons I would dismiss the application for judicial review.
[54] On prior agreement of the parties, the respondent is entitled to $5,000 in costs, all inclusive.
Date: December 1, 2020 A.D. Kurke J.
I agree ___________________________
L.A. Pattillo J.
I agree ___________________________
I.S. Bloom J.
CITATION: Canadian National v. Teamsters Canada 2020 ONSC 7286
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-19-609-JR
DATE: 20201201
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Pattillo, Bloom and Kurke JJ.
BETWEEN:
CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILWAY COMPANY
Applicant
– and –
TEAMSTERS CANADA RAIL CONFERENCE
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
A.D. Kurke J.
Released: December 1, 2020