CITATION: Labourers’ International Union of North America, Local 183 v. GDI Services (Canada) LP, 2020 ONSC 1018
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC18-491
DATE: 20200214
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
LEITCH, SACHS, and MYERS JJ.
BETWEEN:
LABOURERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL 183
Applicant
– and –
GDI SERVICES (CANADA) LP and OWEN GRAY
Respondents
Paul J.J. Cavalluzzo and Tyler Boggs, for the Appellant
Gerald Griffiths, for the Respondents
HEARD at Toronto: October 31, 2019. Written submissions on the effect of Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 received on January 27 and February 3, 2020.
BY THE COURT:
REASONS FOR DECISION
This Application
[1] The applicant Union seeks judicial review and an order quashing the decision of Arbitrator Gray dated April 23, 2018 dismissing its two grievances filed on behalf of Teresa Da Cruz reported at 2018 36673 (ON LA).
[2] The court has jurisdiction to review an arbitrator’s decision under ss. 2 and 6 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c J.1.
[3] For the reasons that follow, the application is dismissed.
The Facts
[4] The evidence before the Arbitrator was contained in a Statement of Agreed Facts settled by the parties. There are no factual disputes in this proceeding.
[5] GDI SERVICES (CANADA) LP (“GDI”) performs cleaning and maintenance services for The Cadillac Fairview Corporation Limited which owns or manages the Toronto-Dominion Centre. The TD Centre is a major office tower complex in downtown Toronto.
[6] The applicant LIUNA Local 183 (the “Union”) has exclusive bargaining rights for the employees of GDI who work at TD Centre. It is not the bargaining agent for GDI’s employees who work at other buildings.
[7] Teresa Da Cruz first became employed by GDI in 2003 as a light-duty cleaner. After working at another building or buildings, she commenced working at the TD Centre in 2007.
[8] Cadillac Fairview hired GDI to provide cleaning services at TD Centre pursuant to the terms of a written agreement. Under the agreement GDI is required to “promptly replace any personnel whose performance or conduct [Cadillac Fairview], in its sole opinion, regards as unsatisfactory”.
[9] The Union is not a party to the agreement between GDI and Cadillac Fairview.
[10] On November 20, 2016, Cadillac Fairview directed GDI to remove Ms. Da Cruz from the TD Centre because of an allegation concerning an incident that Cadillac Fairview characterized as “unacceptable behaviour”. As a result of Cadillac Fairview’s direction, Ms. Da Cruz and a Union steward met with GDI personnel in November at which time GDI informed Ms. Da Cruz she was suspended with pay while it reviewed the incident.
[11] Ms. Da Cruz and the Union deny that Ms. Da Cruz did anything wrong in the alleged incident. Moreover, she says that the complaining user of the TD Centre made a racial slur against her.
[12] In December, GDI and Union representatives met to review video surveillance of the alleged incident between Ms. Da Cruz and the complainants.[^1] No other request was made to Ms. Da Cruz to provide her side of the story to GDI.
[13] The parties agreed that “based on the direction provided by Cadillac Fairview, [GDI] did not reach a final decision as to whether [Ms. Da Cruz] engaged in any wrongdoing on November 20, 2016”.
[14] GDI never attempted to establish that it had cause to impose discipline on Ms. Da Cruz. It never claimed that it had just cause to terminate her employment. It agreed that it did not seek to justify its decision to sever Ms. Da Cruz’ employment based on the “just cause” standard set out in the collective agreement. Rather, it accepted the entitlement of Cadillac Fairview, as the building owner and under its contract with GDI, to bar people from entering upon its premises.
[15] By letter dated January 4, 2017, GDI informed Ms. Da Cruz that Cadillac Fairview had revoked her access to TD Centre on an indefinite basis. GDI was therefore unable to permit her to work at the TD Centre. GDI had no other work available for Ms. Da Cruz under the collective agreement with the Union because the workplace was limited to the one complex. Therefore, GDI informed Ms. Da Cruz that she was being placed on indefinite lay-off.
[16] In June 2017 GDI asked Cadillac Fairview to reconsider its position and lift the site ban it had imposed. Cadillac Fairview refused to do so.
[17] The Union grieved both the decision to suspend Ms. Da Cruz with pay and the decision to lay her off indefinitely.
[18] The parties agreed that the issue of what would happen if Cadillac Fairview barred an employee from the TD Centre was not raised or discussed during bargaining of the collective agreements effective in 2009, 2012, or 2015.
[19] The applicable collective agreement has a standard management rights clause that provides, in part:
5.01 The Union acknowledges it is the exclusive function of the Employer to:
a. Maintain order, discipline and efficiency,
b. Hire, classify, transfer, promote and lay-off employees and also suspend, discipline or discharge employees for just cause…
[20] Article 10.01(c) of the collective agreement provides that an employee ceases to have seniority rights and her employment status with GDI shall be terminated if she is laid-off for 12 consecutive months. Ms. Da Cruz’s employment with GDI therefore terminated in January, 2018 after she had been laid-off for a year.
[21] Article 13 of the collective agreement governs the layoff and recall of employees “in the case of a reduction in the work-force”. The Union relies on this clause to argue that GDI had no right to lay off Ms. Da Cruz because there was no “reduction in the work-force” as set out in Article 13.01.
[22] The parties summarized their positions in their Statement of Agreed Facts as follows:
The parties dispute the characterization of the Grievor’s severance from employment. The Union asserts that the Grievor has been unjustly terminated from her employment contrary to the terms of the Collective Agreement. The Employer asserts that because of the Commercial Contract, the site ban issued by Cadillac Fairview, and the fact that this is a single location Collective Agreement, that there is no work available for the Grievor and that was the basis for laying her off.
There is similarly no dispute that more junior employees were retained in employment and that all of the work and duties which the Grievor was previously performing are now being performed by other employees in the bargaining unit. The Employer has hired other full time light-duty cleaners into the bargaining unit since November 21, 2016.
Standard of Review
[23] The law concerning the standard by which the court will review administrative decisions has recently been modified by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65.
[24] In Vavilov the Supreme Court held that there is a presumption that the standard of review of “reasonableness” applies whenever a court reviews an administrative decision unless a different standard is otherwise provided for or required. Vavilov at para. 10. To consider whether a different standard of review is provided for or required, the court must consider the statutory basis for the proceeding and whether the administrative decision involves any questions of central importance to the legal system generally. Vavilov at paras. 17 and 62.
[25] Nothing in the JRPA provides for or requires a correctness or other standard of review in judicial review proceedings.
[26] This proceeding arises in the context of a labour grievance in the organized sector. Under s.56 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Sch A, collective agreements bind the employer and the relevant union. Moreover, s.48(1) of the statute provides that the parties must resolve disputes under a collective agreement by arbitration. Court proceedings are not contemplated for grievances.
[27] Precedents recognize the particular importance of judicial deference in the labour relations field. In Maystar General Contractors Inc. v. International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, Local 1819, 2008 ONCA 265, Gillese JA described the proper approach in the following way:
The decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, over the course of many decades, show an unbroken commitment to affording labour relations boards the highest levels of judicial deference on matters within their exclusive jurisdiction.
[28] Although the court must take care applying pre-Vavilov case law on the standard of review, there is nothing in any applicable statute nor any question of central importance to the legal system involved in this case that would justify a departure from the rationale for judicial deference in labour relations cases. In my view therefore, a standard of review of reasonableness applies in this case.
[29] In Vavilov, the Supreme Court of Canada also provided some greater detail concerning how a court is to apply the reasonableness standard. While it made many specific pronouncements, this recitation is limited to those that are of relevance to this case.
[30] First, the court’s role is to review the decision before it and not decide the matter anew. Vavilov at para 83. The court will start its review by examining with “respectful attention” the reasons provided by the administrative decision maker to understand the reasoning process. The court will look to ensure that the decision is internally coherent with a rational chain of analysis that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker. This includes being attentive to any specialized knowledge or expertise possessed by the decision maker that may illuminate underlying policy or practical realities of the relevant administrative scheme. Vavilov at paras. 84, 85, and 93.
[31] At para. 96 of Vavilov, the Supreme Court directed that even if an outcome may have been reasonable under different circumstances, it is not open to a court to disregard flawed reasons or to substitute its own justification for the outcome. Those of us who had read prior case law as requiring the court to consider whether the record disclosed additional or alternative justifications for a flawed decision have now been corrected.
[32] In a reasonableness review, the court will continue to consider the “hallmarks of reasonableness” – justification, transparency, and intelligibility and will consider whether the decision is justified in relation to the factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision. Vavilov at para. 99.
[33] Finally on this point, para. 100 of Vavilov provides as follows:
The burden is on the party challenging the decision to show that it is unreasonable. Before a decision can be set aside on this basis, the reviewing court must be satisfied that there are sufficiently serious
shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency. Any alleged flaws or shortcomings must be more than merely superficial or peripheral to the merits of the decision. It would be improper for a reviewing court to overturn an administrative decision simply because its reasoning exhibits a minor misstep. Instead, the court must be satisfied that any shortcomings or flaws relied on by the party challenging the decision are sufficiently central or significant to render the decision unreasonable. [Emphasis added].
The Arbitrator’s Decision
[34] The Arbitrator’s decision is 50 pages in length. The vast bulk of the decision consists a technical legal analysis of two strands of case law that have developed in arbitral jurisprudence concerning third-party site bans (as these types of cases have become known).
[35] The Arbitrator set out the Union’s position that:
…the just cause provision of the collective agreement does not allow the employer to rely on Cadillac Fairview’s site ban to justify its treatment of the grievor without establishing that the reasons for the ban amounted to just cause for discipline or discharge. He observed that Cadillac Fairview banned the grievor pursuant to a provision of its commercial agreement with the employer. He submitted that permitting the employer’s contract with Cadillac Fairview to override the just cause provision of the collective agreement would undermine one of the major benefits of collective bargaining to unionized employees, and allow the employer to “give away” just cause protection…
[36] The Union asked the Arbitrator to order GDI to reinstate Ms. Da Cruz to her employment position. Then, if Cadillac Fairview did not lift its site ban against her, the Union advised that it intended to bring proceedings before the Ontario Labour Relations Board to try to have Cadillac Fairview declared guilty of an unfair labour practice or declared to be a single employer with GDI so as to bind it to the just cause provisions of the collective agreement.
[37] The employer relies on prior cases in which employers have been held to be entitled to lay-off employees who are banned from third-party owned work sites where the employer has no other work for them. For example, in Babcock
& Wilcox, (1995) LAC (4th) 266, Arbitrator Power held that on the facts before him, the employer did not have just cause to terminate the employee’s employment. He nevertheless continued:
19 Unfortunately, that does not gain them much ground. The situation which confronted the employers was simple: the grievors had been banned from the [third-party’s] site, and their employers had no other work available for them. Therefore, the employers were entitled to lay them off, and that is the action which they should have taken in this case.
[38] The Arbitrator recognized two exceptions in the case law where an employer will be found liable for implementing a third-party site ban. The first occurs where the employer and the third-party are found to have colluded to use the site ban to get around the necessity of proving that the employer had just cause for termination. The Union makes no such allegation in this case. The second exception occurs in some of the case law where the employer has independently disciplined the employee as a result of the underlying allegations made by the third-party. As noted specifically above, the parties agreed that GDI did not come to any conclusion on the underlying allegations. It simply implemented Cadillac Fairview’s site ban.
[39] The Arbitrator went on to quote the following comment from the decision of Arbitrator Randall in Waste Management of Canada Corporation 2013 52676 (ON LA), [2013] O.L.A.A. No. 335, 2013 CarswellOnt 11578:
47 While the Union submits that this line of authority needs to be overturned, that the Employer should not be allowed such a free ride and that it shouldn’t be allowed such an abdication of its collective agreement obligations, I can see no way around such an outcome, absent some kind of negotiated relief in the collective agreement itself. As noted, there is no such relief. [Emphasis added.]
[40] We return to this comment later in these reasons.
[41] The Arbitrator then turned to the competing line of cases advanced by the Union. In those cases, the employer has been held to the just cause provisions of the collective agreement regardless of the site ban by the third
party. For example, in C. H. Heist, (1991) 1991 13373 (ON LA), 20 L.A.C. (4th) 112, [1991] O.L.A.A. No. 48, 1991 CarswellOnt 6419, Arbitrator Verity held:
28 In any case of discipline, the onus of proof is on the employer. In these particular circumstances, Heist was faced with competing contractual rights. In the service industry, it is often difficult to respond effectively to customer complaint regardless of the merit of any such complaint. At the same time, it must be recognized that art. 2.02(b) of the collective agreement confers exclusive jurisdiction upon Heist to discipline for just cause. There is no provision in that agreement to discipline an employee or hold an employee out of service at customer request. In circumstances where the employer suspends an employee pending an investigation, the propriety of that suspension will depend upon whether misconduct is ultimately established at arbitration. If no such misconduct is found, the suspension will be treated by arbitrators as unjustified and compensation will be awarded for lost wages and benefits.
[42] The most forceful statement of the principle relied upon by the Union was made in Dynamex Express (2001), 102 L.A.C. (4th) 284, 2001 CarswellOnt 5944 (Rayner):
11 However if Dynamex is correct in its assertion that it can treat its arrangement with the grievor as frustrated because of the actions of the third party it is in effect saying that it can contract with two parties at the same time and that if the terms of the two contracts come into conflict it can walk away from its obligations under one of the contracts because of its obligations under the other. Such a conclusion does not seem justified in principle in fairness or in law. If A contracts with B and then contracts with C A can hardly justify breaking his contract with B because of his contract with C. That set of facts does not amount to frustration of the contract with A and B.
[43] Some of the case law would impose a duty on the employer to conduct an inquiry to reach its own conclusion as to the wrongdoing alleged against the employee. While these cases have armed some arbitrators with a basis for holding the employer liable for failing to inquire, the arbitrators never say where the duty to inquire is found in the collective agreement or what the purpose or effect of the proposed inquiry would be. That is, even if GDI inquired
and determined that the allegations against Ms. Da Cruz did not amount to cause for dismissal and even if it fully “went to bat” for Ms. Da Cruz with Cadillac Fairview, both GDI and Ms. Da Cruz remain subject to Cadillac Fairview’s entitlement to determine whom it allows on its property.
[44] Ultimately, the Arbitrator distinguished the cases relied upon by the Union. He held that while the just cause provision of the collective agreement is important, it is not a basis to give an interpretation to the agreement that its words do not reasonably bear. At para. 77, he held:
A just cause provision is not a guarantee that the availability of bargaining unit work to employees, or to a particular employee, will not be adversely affected by customer choices or other circumstances that are beyond the control of the employer.
[45] Moreover, the Arbitrator rejected the argument that GDI had given away the employees’ just cause rights. He held that Cadillac Fairview’s right to control whom it allows on its land pre-existed its agreement with GDI. The agreement between GDI and Cadillac Fairview did not create a new right in Cadillac Fairview; it preserved Cadillac Fairview’s pre-existing rights.
[46] The Union argued that it did not know of GDI’s agreement with Cadillac Fairview when it negotiated its collective agreement. The Arbitrator held:
83 The parties’ Statement of Agreed Facts recites that “[i]n the normal course, the Employer contracts with the owner or property management company to perform cleaning and/or maintenance services for a specific building or group of buildings” and that “the Collective Agreement in question covers a site specific location comprising the TD Centre all controlled by Cadillac Fairview.” In those circumstances it could reasonably be expected that Cadillac Fairview, or any other owner or property management company with which the employer contracted, might retain and exercise its rights as property owner or manager to control access to the work site. If there was no discussion in bargaining about who controlled access to the workplace and on what terms, then the union had no reason to suppose that the employer’s contract with Cadillac Fairview had eliminated Cadillac Fairview’s control and given the employer exclusive control over who could access the site to perform work for the employer. The employer’s agreement to the just cause provision was not a representation or warranty that its customer had no
power to preclude an employee from performing bargaining unit work at the TD Centre. There was no conflict between the just cause provision of the collective agreement and the employer’s agreement with its customer that the customer had control over who worked at the work site to which the customer controlled access.
[47] Ultimately, the Arbitrator held that GDI had not disciplined Ms. Da Cruz under the collective agreement. He held that the seniority and bumping provisions of Article 13 of the collective agreement did not apply to the circumstances confronting the parties and that the employer correctly regarded Ms. Da Cruz as being laid-off when she was barred from the workplace. As he put it, at para. 94, even if no particular provision of the collective agreement permitted a layoff, that language was an “apt description” of the status of “an employee without a current work assignment (and, consequently, without the pay that would be earned by performing a work assignment) for reasons that do not involve the imposition of discipline by the employer”. Accordingly, he found that GDI did not breach the parties’ collective agreement and dismissed the grievances.
The Union’s Arguments
[48] The Union argues that the Arbitrator erred by failing to implement legislative policy under the Labour Relations Act, 1995 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He argues further that the Arbitrator failed to consider the applicability of “Charter values” as required by the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 SCR 395
[49] The Union submits that all labour disputes must be resolved in arbitration under s. 48(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 and that s.48(17) of the statute provides all unionized employees in Ontario with “just cause” protection to enhance their job security.[^2] He argues that the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized the fundamental right to collective bargaining under
the Charter and that the just cause protection is one of the most important provisions to enable vulnerable workers to vindicate their collective bargaining rights. See: Wilson v. AECL, 2016 SCC 29, [2016] 1 SCR 770, at paras. 51, 63, and 68-69; CASAW, Local 4 v Royal Oak Mines Inc., 1996 220 (SCC), [1996] 1 SCJ No. 14, 1 SCR 369, at para. 45.
[50] The Union also submits that the Arbitrator erred in focusing on Cadillac Fairview’s demand to remove Ms. Da Cruz instead of seeing the case as one of discipline by the employer. It argues that the employee is vulnerable so the Arbitrator should have adopted the interpretation of the events and the collective agreement most favourable to her. Moreover, the Union states that the Arbitrator failed to adopt the interpretation of the collective agreement that best promoted Charter values under Doré. The Unions submits that the Arbitrator ought to have read protection against third-party site bans into the just cause rights of employees under the collective agreement to protect employees’ constitutionally recognized collective bargaining rights.
[51] The Union argues that the Arborator wrongly distinguished the cases put forward by the Union to support a duty on the employer to investigate a third-party site ban. It submits that without a duty to investigate, the employer is not providing the due process enshrined by the just cause protection. In this case, he submits that Ms. Da Cruz has been left in the “Kafkaesque” position of losing her job without ever being heard on the merits.
The Employer’s Position
[52] GDI argues that, absent bad faith, the relevant case law acknowledges the employer’s right to treat Ms. Da Cruz as laid-off under the collective agreement. The Arbitrator reasonably interpreted the collective agreement as recognizing management’s right to treat a site banned employee for whom it has no other work as being laid-off. This situation is separate and distinct from Article 13 of the collective bargaining agreement which deals with layoffs when there is a shortage of work.
[53] GDI submits that the issue of Charter values was not raised with any force before the Arbitrator. In any event, the Charter recognizes the fundamental right to collective bargaining. Interpreting a collective agreement so as to fully promote the intentions of the parties accords with the enhancement and enforcement of workplace democracy through collective bargaining.
[54] Moreover, GDI argues that since the parties never chose to bargain concerning the effect of third-party site bans, the Charter has no real application. No one has tried to bargain collectively on this issue; nor has anyone been denied its right to do so.
[55] In all, GDI argues that the Arbitrator’s decision follows a well-established existing line of jurisprudence and is reasonable.
Analysis
[56] The Arbitrator’s decision is internally coherent with a rational chain of analysis that is justified in relation to the facts and law. He interpreted the collective agreement to recognize management’s right to lay-off an employee who is the subject of a third-party site ban under a single site collective bargaining agreement. Article 13 of the collective bargaining agreement deals with seniority and bumping rights when there are layoffs, but it does not itself qualify or supersede management’s right to lay-off as expressed in the management rights clause. The Arbitrator’s decision was consistent with a well-established line of labour jurisprudence on the issue.
[57] The Arbitrator’s reasons reference the Union’s Charter values argument, but do not deal with that argument. As noted in Vavilov at para. 91, the reasons for a decision do not have to deal with all the arguments that the parties made. However, where the reasons contain a fundamental gap a reviewing court is not to fashion its own reasons (para. 96).
[58] In our view, the Arbitrator’s failure to conduct a Charter values analysis does not render his decision unreasonable. In Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 1 the Supreme Court recognized that the right to collectively bargain was protected by s. 2(d) of the Charter. The decision under review does not involve a limitation on Ms. Da Cruz’s right to collectively bargain or to join the union of her choice. Nor does it raise any issue that impacts on the Union’s ability to raise any matter that it wishes in the collective bargaining process. Ms. Da Cruz’s situation could have been avoided if the Union had chosen to make third-party site bans the subject of specific negotiation in the face of the existing law. No case law was provided to us to support the Union’s argument that it violates the Charter or offends Charter values for an arbitrator to interpret a collective agreement in accordance with the existing law on third party site bans.
[59] Whether we agree with every distinction drawn by the Arbitrator for every precedent case that he cited is not germane. The Arbitrator gave transparent and intelligible reasons for following the line of cases that he followed and for interpreting the collective agreement as he did. While one could spend many pages parsing each of the relevant precedents, we see no need to do so. None was binding upon the Arbitrator as he noted. Moreover, this is not an area where a statute or the facts dictate a single result. There are two strands of case law.
[60] At para. 132 of Vavilov, the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the question of what a reviewing court should do where there are competing strands of case law:
[132] As discussed above, it has been argued that correctness review would be required where there is “persistent discord” on questions of law in an administrative body’s decisions. While we are not of the view that such a correctness category is required, we would note that reviewing courts have a role to play in managing the risk of persistently discordant or contradictory legal interpretations within an administrative body’s decisions. When evidence of internal disagreement on legal issues has been put before a reviewing court, the court may find it appropriate to telegraph the existence of an issue in its reasons and encourage the use of internal administrative structures to resolve the disagreement. And if internal disagreement continues, it may become increasingly difficult for the administrative body to justify decisions that serve only to preserve the discord.
[61] In this case, there is no single administrative tribunal whose members disagree on the applicable law regarding third party site bans. Rather, various arbitrators have decided the cases before them based on different considerations. The issue of whether actions taken by an employer are disciplinary depends on individual circumstances. As noted in the Waste Management decision quoted earlier in these reasons, the issue of third-party site bans is susceptible to negotiation among unions and employers. Individual collective agreements may treat the issue quite differently depending on the needs and wishes of each pairing of union and employer.
[62] That being said, there is clearly disagreement on the question of whether taking away the job of an employee such as Ms. Da Cruz because of a third
party site ban can be considered a “layoff” or should be treated as a “termination”, requiring that it be justified under the “just cause” provisions of the agreement. Doing the former, as was done in this case, has the effect of depriving a vulnerable employee of her employment and of doing so in a manner that gives her no opportunity to defend herself against the accusations that led to that deprivation or to engage the protection of the bargained for “just cause” provisions. Doing the latter requires the employer to continue to employ an employee when, through the actions of a party it cannot control, it has no work for that employee. The interests at stake on both sides are compelling and it is not surprising that the case law reflects disagreement on how those interests should be resolved. As a court reviewing the decision of an expert decision maker it is not our role to resolve the dispute, as yet. However, it is appropriate for us to signal that the dispute exists and that it would be helpful if an attempt could be made to achieve consistency on the matter.
[63] In conclusion, the decision of the Arbitrator on uncontested facts was reasonable. Therefore, the application is dismissed.
[64] The parties agreed that costs fixed at $20,000 all-inclusive would follow the event. The Union is therefore ordered to pay GDI costs of $20,000.
Leitch J.
Sachs J.
Myers J.
Release Date: February 14, 2020
CITATION: Labourers’ International Union of North America, Local 183 v. GDI Services (Canada) LP, 2020 ONSC 1018
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC18-491
DATE: 20200214
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
LEITCH, SACHS, and MYERS JJ.
BETWEEN:
LABOURERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL 183
Applicant
– and –
GDI SERVICES (CANADA) LP and OWEN GRAY
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BY THE COURT
Released: February 14, 2020
[^1]: No formal complaint was ever launched by the complainants. Cadillac Fairview acted on its own behalf after it learned of the incident from its security guards.
[^2]: We note that one needs to read s.48(17) quite purposively to reach this conclusion. But for the purposes of this analysis, we accept the Union’s submission for argument’s sake.