ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: R. v. Barnes, 2026 ONCJ 239

DATE: 2026 04 27

COURT FILE No.: Newmarket 998 25 91107635

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

JASON WILLIAM BARNES

Before Justice Michael Perlin

Heard on April 21 and 22, 2026

Reasons for Judgment released orally on April 22, 2026

Agatha Mapelli.................................................................................... counsel for the Crown

The defendant Jason William Barnes.................................................. on his own behalf

PERLIN J.:

[1] At the request of the accused, I will refer to him in these reasons as Jason.

[2] He is before the court charged with obstructing a peace officer under s. 129(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

[3] There is no dispute about the basic facts at issue. On August 12, 2025, Police Constable West was operating a marked cruiser enforcing traffic laws on Mulock Drive in Newmarket. He observed a car, which, using a LIDAR device, he clocked travelling at 88 kilometres per hour in a 60 kilometre per hour zone. He initiated a traffic stop to investigate a charge of speeding under s. 128 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8. Jason was the sole occupant and driver of the car. When PC West approached the car at around 6:42 a.m., he asked that Jason provide his driver’s licence, motor-vehicle permit and proof of insurance. Jason and the officer engaged in some discussion about this. Jason did not provide the documents requested. PC West asked that Jason identify himself. There was further discussion. Jason did not identify himself to the officer. PC West called for backup. Other officers attended and spoke with Jason. At no point did he provide the documents requested or identify himself as requested. He was arrested at 7:16 a.m.

[4] Jason tendered a video recording of a portion of his interaction with one of the officers, acting Sergeant Sipprell. The video was recorded by Jason on his cellphone from inside his car. It was tendered as an accurate representation of this portion of the events at issue with the agreement of the Crown. In the video, Jason indicated that he was not prepared to answer “any more questions”. Sergeant Sipprell asked Jason to provide his driver’s licence or identify himself. Jason questioned the lawfulness of the demand. Jason asked repeatedly that the officer articulate which crime he had committed, and said he would cooperate if the police could explain what crime he had committed. He expressed the view that without this information, he was not prepared to participate or recognize the authority of the police. During the interaction, the officer can be heard telling Jason that he was being investigated for speeding. He was advised by the officer that the authority to demand his licence and identification lay in s. 33 of the Highway Traffic Act.

I. Analysis

[5] Obstruction of a peace officer under s. 129(a) has three elements. It requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that

(1) A peace officer was acting in the execution of his duty;

(2) The accused obstructed the peace officer in the execution of that duty; and

(3) The accused did so willfully.

(See R. v. Gunn, 1997 ABCA 35, at para. 17; R. v. Khan, 2014 ONSC 6541, at para. 32)

[6] Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not the same as proof on a balance of probabilities, or absolute certainty. It requires more than a conclusion that it is more likely than not that the accused committed each element of the offence. It is often described as requiring that the trier of fact be sure that each element of the offence was committed.[^1]

[7] I will now consider each essential element of the offence.

A. Was PC West “a peace officer [acting] in the execution of his duty”?

[8] PC West testified he was an officer with York Regional Police. “Peace officer” is defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code as including a police officer.

[9] When he demanded that Jason identify himself, was PC West acting “in the execution of his duty”? This turns on whether PC West had lawful authority to pull over Jason’s car and demand that Jason identify himself.

[10] I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that PC West was acting in the execution of his duties when he pulled over Jason and demanded that he provide his driver’s licence and then identify himself. PC West testified that he observed Jason speeding. Speeding is an offence under s. 128 of the Highway Traffic Act. Under ss. 1 and 3 of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 33, a “provincial offences officer”, which includes a police officer, is authorized to initiate proceedings against a person whom the officer believes has committed an “offence” under an Act of the Legislature by issuing a certificate of offence and personally serving it upon the person charged. I am satisfied that investigating and laying charges for speeding falls within the duties and responsibilities of police officers in Ontario, and that identifying the suspect is integral to those processes.

[11] Under s. 216 of the Highway Traffic Act, an officer “in the lawful execution of his or her duties and responsibilities” has the power to require drivers to stop. As I will discuss momentarily, under s. 33 of that Act, an officer may demand that a driver surrender their driver’s licence, and, failing that, identify him- or herself.

[12] Police also have a recognized common-law duty to control the traffic on public roads: see R. v. Waugh, 2010 ONCA 100, at para. 25. PC West may also be understood to have been acting in pursuit of this common-law duty when he stopped Jason and engaged in the investigation.

B. Did Jason engage in conduct amounting to obstruction?

[13] Jason was asked to identify himself and did not do so. Quite rightly, Jason notes that, generally speaking, it would not make sense for doing nothing to be considered a crime. Indeed, in the context of the offence at issue, the law provides that wilful obstruction requires conduct: either some positive act or an “omission to do something which one is legally obliged to do”: R. c. Lavin, 1992 CarswellQue 2143 (C.A.), at paras. 11-12; R. v. Brake, 2016 ONSC 6903, at para. 155.

[14] However, a failure to identify oneself to a police officer when there is a lawful duty to do so is a classic example of conduct held to constitute obstruction of a peace officer: see e.g. R. v. Moore (1978), 1978 160 (SCC), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 195.

[15] Obstructing in this context means making it more difficult for the police to carry out a specific duty they were performing at the time: R. v. Khan, 2014 ONSC 6541, at paras. 30, 31. Crown counsel fairly points to authority in Ontario that the de minimis principle applies to an obstruction charge, such that for conduct to be found to obstruct, “there must be more than causing a police officer a fleeting or momentary diversion or expenditure of effort”: R. v. Khan, 2014 ONSC 6541, at para. 24.

[16] I am satisfied that on the facts of this case, Jason, by failing to surrender his documentation and failing to identify himself, made it more difficult for PC West to continue his investigation for speeding contrary to the Highway Traffic Act. I note that police were able to find some identification information about Jason, when PC Sipprell conducted searches of various databases to ultimately find a photograph that corresponded with Jason’s appearance, and, through that, a name. However, it cannot be said that this fact means that Jason’s conduct was not obstructive. Significant time was expended at the roadside, and additional police officers were called upon to assist as a result of Jason’s failure to identify himself. The Highway Traffic Act investigation, in essence, ground to a halt while police dealt with Jason for around 30 minutes at the roadside. This cannot be characterized as de minimis obstruction. The diversion was far more than momentary.

[17] The remaining question is this: did Jason have a legal duty to identify himself? PC West initially demanded that Jason surrender his driver’s licence, vehicle permit and proof of insurance. Under the Highway Traffic Act and Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.25, a “driver” or “operator” of a motor vehicle “shall” carry these documents when driving and “shall surrender” them to a police officer upon demand: Highway Traffic Act, ss. 7(1), 7(5), 33(1); CAIA, s. 3(1). Subsection 33(3) of the Highway Traffic Act creates an additional duty for a person “who is unable or refuses to surrender his or her licence” following a demand. Such a person,

shall, when requested by a police officer […] give reasonable identification of himself or herself and, for the purposes of this subsection, the correct name and address of the person shall be deemed to be reasonable identification.

[18] I am therefore satisfied that a “driver” who fails or refuses to provide a driver’s licence upon demand of a police officer has a legal duty to provide their correct name and address.

[19] Jason questioned whether he was a “driver” of a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act. Under s. 1,

(1) a “driver” is “a person who drives a vehicle on a highway”,

(2) a “vehicle” includes a “motor vehicle”, which includes “an automobile”, and

(3) a “highway” “includes a common and public highway, street, avenue, parkway, driveway, square, place, bridge, viaduct or trestle, any part of which is intended for or used by the general public for the passage of vehicles and includes the area between the lateral property lines thereof”.

[20] Jason was driving an automobile on a public street used by the general public for the passage of vehicles. He was a “driver”. He owed a legal duty to identify himself by providing his correct name and address. He failed to discharge that duty by declining to identify himself to PC West. By failing to comply with his obligation to identify himself, he obstructed PC West in the execution of his duties, investigating and enforcing provisions of the Highway Traffic Act.

C. Did Jason “willfully” obstruct PC West?

[21] The offence at issue is one of general intent. This means that it requires proof that the accused intentionally committed the prohibited act. But it does not require proof that the accused intended by doing so to bring about some other prohibited consequence. See Gunn, at paras. 38-52.

[22] If all that is required is proof that Jason intentionally failed to identify himself, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that this standard is met. Officers testified, and the video evidence discloses, that Jason was asked many times to hand over his documents and identify himself, and he deliberately declined to do so. In the video, Jason expressed the view that he was not obliged to comply. He effectively offered to comply if the police could satisfy him that he was obliged to do so.

[23] Some case law suggests that more is required to establish the mental element for obstruction: proof that the accused knew the individual obstructed was a peace officer and that the individual obstructed was engaged in the execution of their duty: see R. v. Noel, 1995 1105 (B.C.C.A.), at paras. 20-21. In Noel, the court explained that in most cases, a peace officer “will caution the offending individual, at which point any doubt as to that person’s knowledge of the circumstance that the officer is engaged in the execution of his duty will disappear”. That is what happened here. I have no doubt that Jason knew the people he was dealing with were police officers engaged in the execution of their duties. Officers were in full uniform operating marked police cruisers. PC West activated his emergency lights, leading Jason to pull over his car. PC West identified himself and advised Jason that he had been pulled over for speeding. To the extent that Jason’s comments on the video may be taken as suggesting that he did not know what offence he was being investigated for, I reject that evidence and am not left in doubt by it. On the video, PC Sipprell explained that the investigation was under the Highway Traffic Act for speeding.

[24] What is the effect, if any, of the fact that Jason clearly believed he had no legal duty to comply with the police demand that he provide his driver’s licence or otherwise identify himself? It is clear from all the evidence, including his statements to police captured on video, that he genuinely believed more was required from police before any obligation would be triggered for him to comply.

[25] As I have explained, the law is clear: Jason was a driver who had been stopped by a police officer in the lawful execution of his duties. In the circumstances, under s. 33 of the Highway Traffic Act, Jason was legally obliged to comply.

[26] Does Jason’s mistake afford him a defence?

[27] The law is also clear that, generally, to commit an offence, the accused need not know or believe that their conduct is illegal. A belief that illegal conduct is in fact legal is a mistake of law. Under s. 19 of the Criminal Code, “[i]gnorance of the law by a person who commits an offence is not an excuse for committing that offence.” So, for example, in R. v. Jones, 1991 31 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 110, where the accused mistakenly believed that a particular law did not apply to them in the circumstances at issue, this was a mistake of law and afforded no defence. See Gunn, at paras. 53-55.

[28] It follows that if an accused owes a legal duty and fails to discharge it, it is not a defence that they did not know they owed the duty or believed that they did not owe the duty. Put more concretely in the context of this case, although I am satisfied Jason genuinely believed he had no obligation to comply, he was mistaken. He had a legal duty to comply. His mistake as to the substance of the law is not a defence.

II. Disposition

[29] I am satisfied that each essential element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jason wilfully obstructed PC West, a police officer engaged in the execution of his duty.

[30] As such, I find Jason guilty of the one charge before the court.

Released: April 27, 2026

Signed: Justice M. Perlin

[^1]: See e.g. R. v. Lifchus, 1997 319 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, at paras. 34, 36; R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, at para. 242. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty, or proof beyond any doubt; although it falls much closer to absolute certainty than to proof on a balance of probabilities. A reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on sympathy or prejudice, or one that is imaginary or frivolous. It is doubt based upon reason and common sense that arises logically from the evidence or absence of evidence.