ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: R. v. Puthirasigamany, 2026 ONCJ 228

DATE: 2026·04·22

NEWMARKET

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

GNANENDRAN PUTHIRASIGAMANY

JUDGMENT

Evidence and Submissions Heard: April 22, 2026.

Delivered: April 22, 2026.

Ms. Rachel Young .................................................................................. counsel for the Crown

Mr. Gnanendran Puthirasigamany ............................................................................ defendant

KENKEL J.:

Introduction

[1] Constable Santeramo was on general patrol in Vaughan when he received an Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) notification of a suspended driver for a black Honda with a specific plate. The officer confirmed that the vehicle and plate matched. He then confirmed through a different system that the registered owner was a suspended driver as a result of a prior criminal conviction for impaired operation.

[2] Mr. Puthirasigamany was stopped and identified as the driver. He was arrested for driving while prohibited contrary to s 320.18.

[3] At trial a possible right to counsel issue was raised during Mr. Puthirasigamany’s evidence, but otherwise he appeared to concede that he knew he shouldn’t have been driving but he felt compelled by personal circumstances to take the chance.

Operation While Prohibited

[4] Section 320.18(1) of the Criminal Code prohibits operation of a conveyance while prohibited from doing so by an order made under that Act, or while prohibited by any other form of legal restriction imposed “… under provincial law in respect of a conviction under this Act …”.

[5] In this case the Crown must prove that Mr. Puthirasigamany operated a vehicle (the prohibited act) while knowing that he was prohibited from doing so by the operation of provincial law in relation to a criminal conviction (the required intent).

[6] The original Information 19-11457 showed that Mr. Puthirasigamany was convicted of Impaired Operation on March 16, 2023. He received a one-year driving prohibition under the Criminal Code.

[7] In Ontario a conviction for impaired driving also results in an administrative suspension under s 41 of the Highway Traffic Act, RSO 1990 c H8. For a first offence the suspension period is one year – s 41(1)(f). The suspension continues indefinitely until a driver completes any required conduct review program (s 41(4.1)) or remedial program (s 41 (4.2)).

[8] Conduct Review Programs for conduct related to impaired driving are established under the HTA by O Reg 287/08 and other regulations. This includes the program known as “Back on Track”.

[9] Exhibit 2 is a Notice of Suspension certified under the seal of the Ministry of Transportation. That record is admissible under s 23 of the Canada Evidence Act RSC 1985 c C-5. The record shows that the notice was sent to Mr. Puthirasigamany.

[10] The Notice of Suspension advises the accused to “STOP DRIVING”. The driver is directed to return their license to the Ministry as required by s 211(2) of the HTA if the license was not already surrendered in court on conviction as required by s 211(3) of the HTA. Specific instructions are included as to how the license is to be returned. It appears Mr. Puthirasigamany did not comply with the notice direction as he still had a license card when stopped for this investigation.

[11] The notice specifically told Mr. Puthirasigamany that he must pay reinstatement fees, pay a monetary penalty and he must complete a remedial program before his license would be reinstated. The instructions go on to say that if his license is reinstated, he must install an ignition interlock before he could lawfully operate his vehicle again.

[12] The evidence at trial proved that Mr. Puthirasigamany was operating his vehicle as alleged. He knew he was a suspended driver under provincial law after his impaired operation conviction. He had not taken any of the required steps to regain his license. He took a chance for personal convenience.

Right to Counsel

[13] Mr. Puthirasigamany was advised of his right to speak with counsel upon arrest. He asked to speak with a lawyer. The arresting officer determined that Mr. Puthirasigamany could be released at the roadside as he confirmed his wife could pick him up. He asked the accused whether he wished to go to the station to speak to a lawyer in private or be released at the scene. The accused chose to be released.

[14] Mr. Puthirasigamany mentioned during his testimony that he understood the right to counsel discussion better after listening to it on the In-Car-Camera (ICC) video. That implied he may not have fully understood the discussion at the roadside. The Crown played the ICC video so the court could have the full evidence on that potential Charter issue.

[15] When read the right to counsel advice, Mr. Puthirasigamany told the officer he understood. He understood to the point where he asked to speak with a lawyer. Later the officer offered to arrange a discussion with a lawyer at the police station if Mr. Puthirasigamany wanted, but otherwise he could be immediately released at the roadside. Mr. Puthirasigamany said he did not want to go back to the station, and he asked to be released.

[16] There is no evidence of a right to counsel breach. The ICC video showed that the accused understood the conversation in English at the time. His answers were responsive to the officer’s questions and statements. It’s understandable he chose to be released at the scene as he would immediately be free to call a lawyer or anyone he wished. That was the fastest route to speak with a lawyer if he wished to do so.

[17] The officer did not investigate Mr. Puthirasigamany during the period after the arrest to the time of release. Even if there were some breach in the release prior to a right to counsel call, it had no effect on Mr. Puthirasigamany’s Charter right other than to speed up his opportunity to call counsel.

Conclusion

[18] I can find no evidence that reasonably could leave a doubt. There will be a finding of guilt.

Delivered: April 22, 2026.

Justice Joseph F. Kenkel