# Ontario Court of Justice
**DATE:** April 2, 2026
**INFORMATION No.:** 998 24 31108354
**Central West Region — BRAMPTON**
**BETWEEN:**
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
MAYURKUMAR PATEL
**Before Justice Brian G. Puddington**
**Heard on** November 19, 2025 and January 27, 2026
**Reasons for Judgment released on** April 2, 2026
**H. Limheng** .............................................................................................. counsel for the Crown
**N. Jackson** ................................................................................................ for Mayurkumar Patel
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## Contents
- OVERVIEW... 1
- FACTS.. 2
- Evidence of Brennan Jackson.. 2
- Evidence of Constable Nigel Brown.. 4
- Evidence of Constable Tory Anderson.. 4
- Evidence of Constable Matthew Ward. 5
- ANALYSIS.. 5
- The Crown's Application for a Summary Dismissal of the Charter Application.. 5
- Section 7 of the Charter 6
- Sections 8 and 9 of the Charter 8
- CONCLUSION.. 10
---
Puddington J.:
## OVERVIEW
[1] Mr. Patel is charged with one count of operating a conveyance while his ability was impaired by alcohol, contrary to [section 320.14(1)](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-46/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-46.html)(a) of the [Criminal Code](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-46/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-46.html) and having a blood alcohol concentration that was equal to or exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood contrary to section 320.14(1)(b). His trial started before me on November 19, 2025 and then concluded on January 27, 2026.
[2] The Crown proceeded summarily and called 4 witnesses. What is somewhat unique in this case is that one of the Crown witnesses was an Assistant Crown Attorney in the Region of Peel, Brennan Jackson. The Crown also called 3 officers – Constables Brown, Anderson and Ward, all with the Peel Regional Police Service. The defence did not call any evidence.
[3] Jurisdiction, the date, and the time of the offence were all conceded at the outset of trial. Later in the case, it was admitted that Mr. Patel was the person who was arrested that day. The trial proceeded blended with applications pursuant to sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter. At the conclusion of the Crown's case, the section 10 arguments were abandoned. It was also conceded at the close of the Crown's case that if the Charter arguments being advanced by the defence were dismissed, then the Crown had otherwise proven the two offences beyond a reasonable doubt.
[4] The issue for me to resolve at this trial is therefore whether there was in fact Charter violations, and whether those violations are of such a nature to exclude the observations of the police and the Certificate of a Qualified Breath Technician under section 24(2) of the Charter.
---
## FACTS
### Evidence of Brennan Jackson
[5] On July 19, 2024, Brennan Jackson was an Assistant Crown Attorney in the Region of Peel in courtroom 412 at the A. Grenville and William Davis Courthouse in Brampton, Ontario. He was assigned to Mr. Patel's matter. I never heard any evidence as to what that matter was, nor is it relevant to any determinations I must make today.
[6] Around 3:00 pm – 3:30 pm on July 19, 2024, once the presiding judge had left the courtroom for the day, Mr. Patel started acting strangely. He apparently reached for Mr. Jackson's laptop, and when Mr. Jackson closed it, Mr. Patel picked it up, flipped it over and started demonstrating how it could be reset. While he was doing this, Mr. Jackson detected a smell of alcohol coming from Mr. Patel.
[7] This smell and his actions led Mr. Jackson to believe that Mr. Patel might have his judgment impaired by alcohol or another substance. Due to this concern, Mr. Jackson asked him twice "do you have a way to get home?". The response to this inquiry was not introduced as part of the evidence, but once Mr. Patel left the courtroom, something didn't "sit right" with Mr. Jackson. Mr. Jackson therefore went to the fifth floor of the courthouse and looked out the window to see if Mr. Patel was getting into an Uber or had some way to get home.
[8] Through the window Mr. Jackson saw Mr. Patel enter the parking lot and it looked for a moment like he couldn't decide where he was going. Mr. Patel doubled back and eventually got into a white SUV. The SUV sat there for less than five minutes, and then eventually reversed out and drove slowly towards the front of the courthouse, through a stop sign without stopping and then out of Mr. Jackson's field of vision. About two minutes later, it returned back the way it came and back into the parking lot. When the SUV came to a stop, it was parked askew in the parking spot. Mr. Patel then got out of the driver's seat and met with another person close by.
[9] While watching this unfold from the fifth-floor window, Mr. Jackson flagged down an officer who was walking by because he wanted to report that he suspected someone of driving while impaired. That court officer in turn had another officer go into the parking lot to investigate Mr. Patel's vehicle.
[10] Mr. Jackson made two video recordings of what took place in the parking lot with his personal cell phone. Those videos were played in the court and made Exhibits 3 and 4 at trial. The videos corroborated the events as described by Mr. Jackson in his testimony and also captured Constable Nigel Brown approaching Mr. Patel and conducting his investigation.
[11] When asked if he had ever directed the police to do anything in their investigation, Mr. Jackson stated that he may have helped guide Officer Brown to find Mr. Patel's car in the parking lot, but otherwise, he simply relayed his concerns about Mr. Patel's possible impairment and recorded the encounter with his phone.
[12] In cross-examination, Mr. Jackson confirmed that Mr. Patel was mandated to be in court that day to address his other matter. He also testified that the presiding judge that day had commented at one point that Mr. Patel appeared "tired". It was also conceded that at a few points during the day, Mr. Jackson had stated that his computer was slow.
[13] It was suggested to Mr. Jackson that Mr. Patel was trying to help him with his slow computer when he grabbed it after court. Mr. Jackson responded that he had no doubt that Mr. Patel was trying to be helpful, but what was strange was his, without prompting, reaching across the Crown's desk to an open laptop, and then after it was closed, still taking a computer that was not his and flipping it over.
[14] Mr. Jackson also agreed that when asking him about his ride home, he never cautioned Mr. Patel or gave him his rights to counsel.
[15] With respect to what was communicated to the officers by Mr. Jackson when he reported the suspected impairment, Mr. Jackson testified that he informed the police of his suspicions that Mr. Patel was impaired and was operating a motor vehicle, but he did not recall exactly what other information or observations he relayed to the police.
[16] When asked if he was at any time telling the police how to conduct their investigation, Mr. Jackson stated that he was never directing the police, but rather, simply expected the police to respond to a report of a possible impaired driver, regardless of whether it was a Crown reporting it, or anybody on the street. He conceded, however, that he did ask the officers to check if Mr. Patel still had a cast on his leg, guided the police to where the car was, asked them to check into whether there was a backpack in the car that Mr. Patel had been carrying earlier, and did ask them to turn on their body cameras so he could stop filming from the courthouse window.
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### Evidence of Constable Nigel Brown
[17] Constable Brown testified that he was a court officer at the courthouse that day and was approached by Mr. Jackson about a suspected impaired driver. Constable Brown then saw the vehicle in question driving slowly in the parking lot and he attended to the parking lot to investigate.
[18] When Constable Brown approached the vehicle, he saw it was parked on an angle and was not parked in a proper parking spot. Mr. Patel was outside of the vehicle and Constable Brown noticed that he had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Constable Brown radioed-in to ensure he was dealing with the same person Mr. Jackson had complained of, and it was confirmed that it was in fact Mr. Patel. He then arrested Mr. Patel for impaired operation and read him his rights to counsel and caution.
[19] When asked to specify his grounds for the arrest, Constable Brown stated it was the slurred speech, the bloodshot eyes, Mr. Jackson telling him about a possible impaired driver and the fact that the vehicle was parked on an angle and not in a proper parking spot.
[20] Constable Brown never received any "direction" from Mr. Jackson to arrest Mr. Patel, and confirmed that the ultimate arrest was based on his own grounds. The involvement of Mr. Jackson, in his view, was limited to the fact that Mr. Jackson had asked him to investigate a suspected impaired driver.
[21] Constable Ward, a Qualified Breath Technician, arrived on scene about ten minutes after Mr. Patel's arrest. Constable Brown, working at the courthouse, did not have a vehicle to transport Mr. Patel, so he had to wait for another officer to attend. Once Constable Ward arrived, custody of Mr. Patel was turned over to him.
[22] In cross examination, Constable Brown was candid that he never smelled alcohol on Mr. Patel's breath. He communicated his grounds for arrest to Constable Ward, which included what was mentioned above and the fact that the Crown had provided him grounds for arrest as well. This communication of grounds to Constable Ward was captured on Constable Ward's body camera, which was made Exhibit 5 in the trial.
---
### Evidence of Constable Tory Anderson
[23] Constable Anderson was called for the sole purpose of introducing the photographs she took at the scene. Mr. Patel was already under arrest when she arrived.
[24] Exhibit 6(a) was a photograph of the white SUV Mr. Patel was seen driving that day, parked in the courthouse parking lot in the angled manner described by Constable Brown. Exhibit 6(b) was a photograph of the interior of the car, where it can be seen that an unopened can of beer was in the cupholder.
---
### Evidence of Constable Matthew Ward
[25] As mentioned, Constable Ward was the Qualified Breath Technician on the day in question. He arrived at the scene after Constable Brown had already arrested Mr. Patel.
[26] When he arrived, Constable Ward walked over to Constable Brown and asked him what was happening. Constable Brown identified Mr. Patel and told him he was under arrest for impaired operation. Constable Ward wanted to obtain Constable Brown's grounds for arresting Mr. Patel, but Mr. Patel started interrupting them. He therefore placed Mr. Patel in handcuffs and then transported him to his cruiser. He then went back to Constable Brown and received his grounds for arrest.
[27] Constable Brown told Constable Ward that the accused had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, but that he did not smell alcohol. He also pointed out that the accused had parked his vehicle over two parking spots. Given all this information, Constable Ward was content with the grounds for arrest and returned to his vehicle to give Mr. Patel his rights to counsel, and caution. When he was speaking with Mr. Patel at the cruiser, he immediately smelled the strong odour of alcohol. He also noticed his eyes to be watery and bloodshot. Mr. Patel seemed sleepy and at one point shut his eyes and put his head down and was not answering questions. Constable Ward read him the breath and drug recognition expert demands, and after transporting him back to the station, Mr. Patel provided two breath samples. One was 247 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood, and the second was 242 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.
[28] In cross examination, there were many questions about Constable Ward's notes and when they were made. His body camera footage was also played for him, including the point where Constable Brown provided his grounds for arrest. It was clarified that while Constable Brown was contacted by the Crown about a possible impairment, Constable Brown did not "receive" his grounds for arrest from Mr. Jackson.
[29] In the end, Constable Ward noted that his observations of Mr. Patel were simply that – observations. For the arrest in this case, it was Constable Brown that formed the grounds to arrest.
---
## ANALYSIS
### The Crown's Application for a Summary Dismissal of the Charter Application
[30] At the outset of the trial, the Crown sought to have Mr. Patel's Charter application summarily dismissed, as they failed to disclose sufficient information to make out the alleged violations, and the application materials were filed late.
[31] While I agreed that the Charter materials were indeed sparse and served outside the time periods, I nonetheless allowed the applications to proceed. The alleged Charter violations were being argued blended with the trial proper, and the Crown, albeit significantly curtailed, had the opportunity to respond. I also informed the Crown that after hearing the evidence and argument, they could be afforded an adjournment to prepare a response if necessary.
[32] The test for a summary dismissal is, as the Crown notes, a blunt tool. Nonetheless, trial judges may dismiss Charter motions when they do not meet the filing protocols or are entirely without merit or frivolous. In determining whether the Court should summarily dismiss an application for non-compliance with the rules, the court should consider the prejudice to the opposite party and whether any alternative remedy could address that prejudice.
[33] In this case, an adjournment would have been a reasonable alternative remedy. The Crown did not, however, seek an adjournment, but rather was prepared to conduct the trial, even on the short notice they received.
[34] With respect to whether or not the applications were frivolous, our Supreme Court of Canada recently held in R. v. Haevischer, [2023 SCC 11](https://www.minicounsel.ca/scc/2023/11) that Charter applications must be "manifestly frivolous" to be summarily dismissed. The court found that this threshold promotes both trial efficiency and trial fairness. The "frivolous" part of the standard weeds out those applications that will necessarily fail, and "manifestly" captures the idea that the frivolous nature of the application should be obvious. If the frivolous nature of the application is not manifest or obvious on the face of the record, then the application should not be summarily dismissed and should instead be addressed on its merits. This rigorous standard allows judges to weed out those applications that would never succeed and which would, by definition, waste court time. At the same time, it also protects fair trial rights by ensuring that those applications which might succeed, including novel claims, are decided on their merits.
[35] The applications brought in this case are novel, and while ultimately they are dismissed in this case, they were certainly not "manifestly frivolous" and they were therefore appropriate to hear on their merits.
---
### Section 7 of the Charter
[36] Mr. Jackson submits, in essence, that when Mr. Patel was compelled to be at a courthouse in answer to other criminal charges, any actions or statements he made in that context violated the principle against self-incrimination, contrary to his section 7 Charter rights.
[37] Section 7 of the Charter states:
> Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
[38] The principle against self-incrimination, while also protected by section 13 of the Charter (in the context of testifying in court), is also encompassed by section 7 of the Charter's protection of the security of the person. The parameters of the general principle against self-incrimination have been succinctly described by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Fitzpatrick, [1995 CanLII 44 (SCC)](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1995/1995canlii44/1995canlii44.html), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 154 at paragraph [33](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1995/1995canlii44/1995canlii44.html) as follows:
> Any state action that coerces an individual to furnish evidence against him- or herself in a proceeding in which the individual and the state are adversaries violates the principle against self-incrimination. Coercion, it should be noted, means the denial of free and informed consent.
[39] If I understand Mr. Patel's argument correctly, he submits that because he was at the courthouse on the day in question, he and the state were adversaries, and therefore any evidence he "furnished" against himself in that courtroom that day violated the principle against self-incrimination.
[40] As was made clear in Fitzpatrick, however, the context of the relationship between the individual and the state must always be considered when conducting a section 7 analysis:
> The importance of a contextual analysis in considering the principle against self-incrimination has been underlined by the Chief Justice in Jones, supra, at p. 249. He there observed that this principle is "a general organizing principle of criminal law from which particular rules can be derived (for example, rules about non-compellability of the accused and admissibility of confessions)". The rules that flow from the application of this "general organizing principle" will vary with the circumstances. It is therefore important to focus on these circumstances each time a new application of the principle against self-incrimination is considered. Iacobucci J., we saw, was mindful of this in S. (R.J.), supra. At page 513, he stated:
>
> . . . I have suggested above that certain specific enumerations of the Charter reflect a unifying principle against self-incrimination. It stands only to reason, however, that this principle may demand different things at different times; the parameters of the principle may be found in disparate rights. (Emphasis added.)
[41] Mr. Patel's statements and actions in court were not, in my view, those protected by section 7 of the Charter. Mr. Patel was in the courtroom in response to criminal charges unrelated to those before me. He was not there for the purpose of an investigation into impaired driving, nor was he being questioned in that regard by the police, the Crown or the judge. His behaviour, actions and words that led to a suspicion by the Crown and even the court that he might be tired or impaired were in no way compelled. He was acting in a manner that gave the Crown pause and concern about his sobriety. The smell of alcohol on his breath was apparent, and the random flipping over of the Crown's laptop raised legitimate questions about his behaviour.
[42] It would be perverse to say that section 7 provides a blanket protection to all words and actions by an accused when they are compelled to attend a courtroom. While many examples could be given, consider a situation in which an individual utters a threat to a justice participant during a mandated court appearance. It would no doubt be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice to shield that criminal act with a claim that it violates the accused right against self-incrimination. It would be equally perverse to say that the smell of alcohol on Mr. Patel's breath, his flipping of the Crown's computer and his overall bizarre behaviour should be ignored by any witness in the court because it violates his right against self-incrimination.
[43] Mr. Jackson noted Mr. Patel acting in a bizarre manner and smelled alcohol on his breath. There was nothing wrong with asking if he had a ride home, and there was nothing incriminating about the response given. The Crown was similarly under no obligation to caution Mr. Patel or give him his rights to counsel.
[44] What happened in that courtroom was, simply, that out of an abundance of caution and concern for the community, Mr. Jackson watched Mr. Patel to ensure he was not going to drive a car. Unfortunately, Mr. Patel did enter a car and the Crown properly called the police to report the suspected criminal offence. There were no violations of Mr. Patel's section 7 rights in the process.
---
### Sections 8 and 9 of the Charter
[45] Counsel also submits on behalf of Mr. Patel that the police did not have the requisite grounds to detain and arrest Mr. Patel on the day in question, thereby violating his section 8 and 9 Charter rights.
[46] Addressing the section 9 argument first, police officers have broad powers to stop a vehicle for the purpose of checking on the sobriety of the driver. This is a power that the police have both at common law and through statutes such as the Highway Traffic Act. As our Court of Appeal noted in R. v. Gardner, [2018 ONCA 584](https://www.minicounsel.ca/onca/2018/584) at paragraph [23](https://www.minicounsel.ca/onca/2018/584):
> The actions of the police in stopping a vehicle under their authority at common law or by statute only constitutes an unconstitutional stop if the reason for the stop is unconnected to a highway safety purpose.
[47] It is clear from the record in this case, and undisputed, that Constable Brown approached Mr. Patel in the parking lot on July 19, 2024 to determine his sobriety after being told and seeing for himself that Mr. Patel had operated the white SUV. It was not a random stop, though arguably they also had the authority to do that, had they chosen that path. Instead, Constable Brown was acting on a complaint by Mr. Jackson about a suspected impaired driver. Mr. Jackson, having observed Mr. Patel's behaviour in court, the smell of alcohol on his breath, and his operation of a motor vehicle, reported his concern about Mr. Patel being impaired to the police. This is no different than a member of the public observing a car swerving on the road and reporting a suspected impaired driving to 911. The section 9 application is therefore dismissed.
[48] The more nuanced issue in this case is the validity of the arrest of Mr. Patel. The evidence disclosed that Constable Brown did not himself observe any of Mr. Patel's bizarre conduct in the courtroom, nor did the Crown communicate that conduct to him. Constable Brown only had information that the Crown "suspected" Mr. Patel to be impaired, but did not have the basis for that suspicion.
[49] As mentioned, Constable Brown was entitled to rely on the report from the Crown in order to approach Mr. Patel and conduct a further investigation. But the report from Mr. Jackson, on its own, was insufficient to form the necessary grounds for arrest.
[50] In order for an arrest to be lawful, the arresting officer must subjectively believe that there are reasonable grounds for making it and, as well, that belief must be reasonable from an objective point of view. In R. v. Macfie, [2023 SKCA 39](https://www.canlii.org/en/sk/skca/doc/2023/2023skca39/2023skca39.html), the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan provides a recent and helpful summary of six points to keep in mind when assessing reasonable and probable grounds. At paragraphs 35-40, the court notes:
- First, in determining whether there are reasonable grounds, a police officer need have nothing more than objectively reasonable grounds to believe a person's ability to drive is slightly impaired by virtue of the consumption of alcohol.
- Second, in order to satisfy the standard of reasonable grounds, the Crown does not have to prove that the inferences drawn by the officer were accurate. Nor does it have to establish that there was a prima facie case for conviction or that the case against the accused was provable beyond a reasonable doubt. "Reasonable grounds" is a less demanding standard that signifies what has been described as the point at which probability replaces suspicion.
- Third, indicia of impairment are not to be considered independently or piecemeal. Rather, they should be considered in combination. As this Court said in R v Restau, [2008 SKCA 147](https://www.canlii.org/en/sk/skca/doc/2008/2008skca147/2008skca147.html) at para [14](https://www.canlii.org/en/sk/skca/doc/2008/2008skca147/2008skca147.html), 314 Sask R 224, "it is an error to dissect and consider the indicia of impairment in isolation".
- Fourth, and relatedly, all of the incriminating and exonerating evidence must be considered. This said, evidence that the officer reasonably believes to be unreliable may be left out of the equation.
- Fifth, there is no checklist of indicia of impaired driving that must be satisfied before an officer's subjective beliefs about impairment can be found to be objectively reasonable. While, of course, it is easier to establish reasonableness when an accused exhibits all or most of the typical and most obvious indicators of impairment by alcohol – bloodshot and glassy eyes, slurred speech, reduced motor skills, odour of beverage alcohol, problems with cognition, erratic driving – the absence of one or more of those indicators will not necessarily be fatal to the Crown's position. Unlike what the trial judge in this case seems to have believed, the root issue is never whether the officer in question could have conducted a more thorough investigation. Instead, the issue is whether, on the facts as found, the officer's subjective beliefs were objectively reasonable.
- Sixth, there is no minimum period during which a police officer must observe a driver before making a breath sample demand. If the facts warrant, the basis for a reasonable belief as to the impaired operation of a vehicle can be established quickly.
[51] In the case at bar, I find that Constable Brown had the subjective belief that Mr. Patel's ability to drive was slightly impaired by the consumption of alcohol, and his subjective belief was objectively reasonable in the circumstances. In his testimony, he articulated his grounds to be the slurred speech, the bloodshot eyes, the Crown telling him about a possible impaired driver and the fact that the vehicle was parked on an angle and not in a proper parking spot. Looking at these articulated grounds in context and as a whole, the arrest was reasonable. Constable Brown's credibility and reliability were never meaningfully challenged, and the body camera footage filed as Exhibit 5 appears to corroborate Constable Brown's testimony about the slurred speech and bloodshot eyes that Mr. Patel was exhibiting. Exhibit 6(a) also shows that the SUV was parked across two parking spots, as described by Constable Brown. The section 8 application must therefore also fail.
---
## CONCLUSION
[52] As mentioned, the trial on its merits was never really in dispute, and the determination of this case, for the most part, rested on the outcome of the Charter applications. Nonetheless, I will address the offences briefly and explain why I have found they were proven by the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt.
[53] Impaired operation under [section 320.14(1)](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-46/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-46.html)(a) of the [Criminal Code](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-46/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-46.html) requires proof that the ability of the accused person to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol or drug at the time of driving. The Crown is not required to prove any specific level of impairment; evidence that establishes any level of impairment in the ability to drive caused by alcohol or drug is sufficient proof of the offence. See R. v. Stellato, [1993 CanLII 3375 (ON CA)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/1993/1993canlii3375/1993canlii3375.html), [1993] O.J. No. 18 (Ont. C.A.) at paragraph [14](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/1993/1993canlii3375/1993canlii3375.html).
[54] In all the circumstances, I find that the Crown called credible and reliable evidence that Mr. Patel's ability to operate a vehicle was impaired by alcohol. Mr. Jackson witnessed some bizarre behaviour in the courtroom and smelled alcohol on Mr. Patel's breath. The videos (Exhibits 3 and 4) show very slow driving, Mr. Patel's car stopping in the driveway of the courthouse at an angle for no apparent reason, and then proceeding through a stop sign. The officers described the car parked on an angle, over two spaces when they approached him. He had slurred speech and bloodshot eyes, and appeared tired to the qualified breath technician. In the cup holder of Mr. Patel's vehicle, there was an unopened can of beer. Back at the police station, Mr. Patel provided samples of his breath that registered 3 times the amount of alcohol permitted.
[55] Those readings, of course, do not necessarily mean that Mr. Patel was impaired at the time he operated his conveyance. But with respect to the source of any impairment I find, the breath readings are a piece of evidence from which I am entitled to draw an inference that Mr. Patel consumed alcohol before or during his operation of the vehicle. It is clear that he did not consume any alcohol after he had care and control of the vehicle, as he was arrested immediately upon exiting the SUV. In all of these circumstances, I have no doubt that Mr. Patel's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired, and the source of that impairment was, at least in part, by alcohol.
[56] With respect to count 2, counsel took no issue with the breath readings obtained within the prescribed time after Mr. Patel was found operating a conveyance. They are clearly in excess of 80mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.
[57] With respect to both counts, therefore, there will be a finding of guilt.
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Released: April 2, 2026
Justice B.G. Puddington
minicounsel