Court File and Parties

Date: September 29, 2025

Court File No.: D44718/24

Ontario Court of Justice

Between:

France John Acting in Person Applicant

- and -

Michelle Laing Respondent

Counsel: Pauline Malcolm, for the Respondent

Heard: September 26, 2025

Justice: S.B. Sherr

Reasons for Decision

Part One – Introduction

[1] This trial was about the applicant's (the father's) child support obligations for the parties' 7-year-old son (the child). This was the remaining issue in this case. The parenting issues had previously been finalized.

[2] The respondent (the mother) seeks child support from the father retroactive to January 1, 2021.[^1] She asks to impute income to him for this purpose.

[3] The father's amended application on the outstanding issues was struck by the court on July 2, 2025 because of his failure to comply with financial disclosure orders. He was given limited rights of participation at this hearing, including the right to make submissions at the hearing, and to serve and file:

a) An updated financial statement.

b) His financial disclosure previously ordered.

c) His record of employment.

d) Any medical reports he wished to rely upon.

[4] The father did not serve or file anything further. He attended at the hearing. He submitted that the court should dismiss the mother's claim for retroactive support and order that he pay child support of $100 each month, starting on October 1, 2025.

[5] The court read the mother's affidavits sworn on June 21, 2025, and September 22, 2025. It also heard oral evidence from her.

[6] The issues for the court to determine are as follows:

a) What is the presumptive start date for child support? In determining this date, the court must determine the dates of formal notice and effective notice of the mother's claim for support.

b) Should the court depart from the presumptive start date, and if so, when should support start?

c) How much child support should the father pay the mother for each year he is required to pay support? Should income be imputed to him in any year?

d) In particular, should any portion of athletic grants the father received through the Sports Canada Athlete Assistance Program (Sports Canada) be imputed to him and grossed up as non-taxable income?

e) What amount of support credits should the father receive?

f) How should any arrears of child support be paid?

Part Two – Background Facts

[7] The parties met in 2014. They have the one child together.

[8] The mother is 32 years old. She lives with the child and a teenage child from another relationship.

[9] The father is 37 years old. He has another teenage child who lives with her mother.

[10] The father has worked as a personal fitness trainer for about 14 years.

[11] The father is a Senior Carded Athlete through Sports Canada. He represented Canada in track and field at the World Paralympics Championship and at the Summer Paralympics in France.

[12] The father, in his application claimed that the parties had cohabited from January 1, 2012, until September 25, 2023. The mother deposed that the parties never cohabited. The court accepts her evidence. She testified in a clear, concise and balanced manner. In addition, the mother pointed out that the father's notices of assessment, issued on December 28, 2022, are addressed to a separate address from her.[^2]

[13] The child has always resided with the mother.

[14] The father was charged with assaulting the mother on September 25, 2023. This was resolved with a peace bond after the father took the Partner Assault Response Program.

[15] The father issued his application on January 3, 2024. He amended that application on March 28, 2024.

[16] The mother filed her answer/claim on January 12, 2024. She was self-represented and did not seek child support. She only sought a restraining order and parenting orders. She subsequently obtained counsel, amended her answer/claim on May 6, 2024 and sought child support.

[17] On April 25, 2024, the parties consented to a temporary order that the father pay the mother child support of $265 each month, starting on May 1, 2024 (the temporary support order). This was the Child Support Guidelines (the guidelines) table amount for one child, based on the father's represented annual income of $31,148. This amount was subject to adjustment regarding both the amount and the start date.

[18] On October 7, 2024, the parties, on consent, finalized every issue other than holiday parenting time and child support. The consent was incorporated into a court order that day. The mother was given decision-making responsibility for the child. The father was given specified parenting time. The parties agreed to a temporary holiday parenting time schedule.

[19] On March 17, 2025, the court ordered the father to provide the mother with specified financial disclosure. This was after he had not responded to her Request for Information.

[20] The father did not provide this financial disclosure. He also did not attend court on June 9, 2025. The mother was given leave to bring a motion to strike his amended application on the outstanding issues.

[21] The father provided no further financial disclosure. His amended application on the outstanding issues was struck on July 2, 2025. The court scheduled this hearing.

[22] The mother filed a statement of arrears prepared by the Family Responsibility Office. It showed that the father is $589.26 in arrears under the temporary support order as of September 16, 2025. It also showed that many of his support payments have not been made voluntarily – they have been collected through federal diversions, including a $1,032.97 diversion payment on September 16, 2025.

Part Three – Start Date for Child Support

3.1 Legal Considerations

[23] The mother filed her amended answer/claim seeking child support on May 6, 2025. Support since that date is prospective support and is presumptively payable. See: Mackinnon v. Mackinnon, 2005 13 R.F.L. (6th) 331 (Ont. C.A.); Balian v. Balian, 2025 ONSC 4128. The support claimed by the mother before that date requires a retroactive support analysis.

[24] The court's authority to make retroactive support orders is contained in clause 34 (1) (f) of the Family Law Act. This clause reads as follows:

Powers of court

(1) In an application under section 33, the court may make an interim or final order,

…….(f) requiring that support be paid in respect of any period before the date of the order;

[25] In Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24 (Colucci), the court set out the framework that should be applied for applications to retroactively increase support in paragraph 114 as follows:

a. The recipient must meet the threshold of establishing a past material change in circumstances. While the onus is on the recipient to show a material increase in income, any failure by the payor to disclose relevant financial information allows the court to impute income, strike pleadings, draw adverse inferences, and award costs. There is no need for the recipient to make multiple court applications for disclosure before a court has these powers.

b. Once a material change in circumstances is established, a presumption arises in favour of retroactively increasing child support to the date the recipient gave the payor effective notice of the request for an increase, up to three years before formal notice of the application to vary. In the increase context, because of informational asymmetry, effective notice requires only that the recipient broached the subject of an increase with the payor.

c. Where no effective notice is given by the recipient parent, child support should generally be increased back to the date of formal notice.

d. The court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors continue to guide this exercise of discretion, as described in Michel. If the payor has failed to disclose a material increase in income, that failure qualifies as blameworthy conduct and the date of retroactivity will generally be the date of the increase in income.

e. Once the court has determined that support should be retroactively increased to a particular date, the increase must be quantified. The proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the Guidelines.

[26] This framework in Colucci addressed a request to retroactively increase the support contained in an order or an agreement. Courts have found that this framework should also be applied, with necessary modifications, for an original request for retroactive support.

[27] In an original application for retroactive support, there will be no need to meet the threshold requirement of establishing a material change in circumstances, as required in Colucci. The first step will be to determine the presumptive date of retroactivity as described in Colucci. The second step will be to determine if the court should depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors[^3] will guide the exercise of that discretion, as described in Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 25. The third step will be to quantify the proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity, calculated in accordance with the guidelines. See: L.S. v. M.A.F., 2021 ONCJ 554; M.A. v. M.E., 2021 ONCJ 555; A.E. v. A.E., 2021 ONSC 8189; Mohamoud v. Farah, 2023 ONCJ 103.

[28] Retroactive child support simply holds payors to their existing (and unfulfilled) support obligations. See: Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, at par. 25.

[29] Retroactive child support is a debt; by default, there is no reason why it should not be awarded unless there are strong reasons not to do so. See: Michel – par. 132.

[30] Retroactive awards are not exceptional. They can always be avoided by proper payment. See: D.B.S. – par. 97.

[31] In Michel, at paragraph 121, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized the importance of support payors meeting their support obligations and commented that the neglect or underpayment of support is strongly connected to child poverty and female poverty.

3.2 What is the Presumptive Start Date to Change Support?

[32] The first step in the Colucci framework is to determine the presumptive start date for support to be changed. To determine this, the court must look at when effective notice and formal notice were given by the mother to the father.

[33] Effective notice is defined as any indication by the recipient parent that child support should be paid, or if it already is, that the current amount needs to be renegotiated. All that is required is for the subject to be broached. Once that has been done, the payor can no longer assume that the status quo is fair. See: D.B.S., par. 121.

[34] The mother was specific about when she first sought support from the father. She said it was on the child's first birthday - November 30, 2018. She testified that the father told her when she asked him for support that "he would do what he can".

[35] The court finds that the effective date of notice was November 30, 2018.

[36] Although effective notice can be as little as broaching the topic in conversation, formal notice is something more, generally taking the form of written correspondence from the recipient or counsel or the commencement of legal proceedings. See: Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 2008 ONCJ 96; Vandenberghe v. Dittrick, 2024 ABKB 58; Jansen v. DiCecco, 2025 ONCJ 189.

[37] Here, the mother put the father on formal notice that she was seeking child support in her case conference brief dated April 17, 2024. This date pre-dates when she issued her amended answer/claim. A temporary order for child support was made on April 25, 2025.

[38] Colucci sets out that the presumptive start date for support cannot be more than three years from the date of formal notice. Here, the mother gave effective notice to the father more than three years before April 17, 2024 - the date of formal notice. Accordingly, the presumptive start date for support is April 17, 2021.

3.3 Should the Court Depart from the Presumptive Start Date?

[39] The second step in the Colucci framework is to determine if the court should depart from the presumptive start date. The court will review the legal considerations and evidence regarding delay, conduct, the circumstances of the child and hardship below.

3.3.1 Reasons for Delay

[40] In considering delay, courts should look at whether the reason for delay is understandable, not whether there was a reasonable excuse for the delay. The latter consideration works to implicitly attribute blame onto parents who delay applications for child support. See: Michel, par. 121.

[41] A delay, in itself, is not inherently unreasonable and the mere fact of a delay does not prejudice an application, as not all factors need to be present for a retroactive award to be granted. See: Michel, par. 113.

[42] Rather, a delay will be prejudicial only if it is deemed to be unreasonable, taking into account a generous appreciation of the social context in which the claimant's decision to seek child support was made. See: Michel, par. 86.

[43] In Michel, the court, at paragraph 86, set out what might be understandable reasons for delay in a support recipient coming to court as follows:

a) Fear of reprisal/violence from the other parent.

b) Prohibitive costs of litigation or fear of protracted litigation.

c) Lack of information or misinformation over the payor parent's income.

d) Fear of counter-application for custody.

e) The payor leaving the jurisdiction or the recipient unable to contact the payor parent.

f) Illness/disability of a child or the custodian.

g) Lack of emotional means.

h) Wanting the child and the payor to maintain a positive relationship or avoid the child's involvement.

i) Ongoing discussions in view of reconciliation, settlement negotiations or mediation.

j) The deliberate delay of the application or the trial by the payor.

[44] The court finds that the mother partially provided understandable reasons for her delay in coming to court, including:

a) She had a lack of information about the father's income, although his income was not much more than she suspected he was earning.

b) The father convinced her he did not have the ability to pay much support. She knew he owed support to the mother of his other child.

c) She was the victim of family violence from the father.

[45] However, the mother also made a choice not to pursue child support until the father brought this matter to court. She didn't even seek child support in her answer/claim. She testified that she wanted to give him a chance to pay more support, as he kept saying he would do more. At a certain point, she should have realized that this was not going to happen and should have advanced her claim so the father wouldn't be faced with a large retroactive support claim at this time.

3.3.2 Blameworthy Conduct

[46] Courts should apply an expansive definition of blameworthy conduct. See: D.B.S., par. 106.

[47] Blameworthy conduct is anything that privileges the payor parent's own interests over his or her children's right to an appropriate amount of support. See: D.B.S., par. 106.

[48] If the payor has failed to disclose a material increase in income, that failure qualifies as blameworthy conduct and the date of retroactivity will generally be the date of the increase in income. See: Colucci, par. 114.

[49] The failure of a payor to disclose actual income, a fact within the knowledge of the payor, is blameworthy conduct that eliminates any need to protect the payor's interest in certainty. See: Michel, par. 34.

[50] The father has engaged in blameworthy conduct as follows:

a) He did not provide the mother with any income information until this case started.

b) He failed to pay child support payments in amounts close to what he should have been paying. He knew or ought to have known that he was underpaying child support.

c) He did not comply with court orders to provide financial disclosure.

d) He has been a reluctant payor during this case. On January 15, 2025, the court ordered him to pay a portion of his arrears or else his amended application would be struck. He paid the amount ordered. On July 2, 2025, his amended application was struck due to his failure to provide financial disclosure.

3.3.3 Circumstances of the Child

[51] The child's circumstances have been disadvantaged due to the father's failure to pay adequate support. The mother testified that she could no longer afford Kumon for the child and that she had to pull him out of some extra-curricular activities. She is struggling to make ends meet despite working at two jobs.

3.3.4 Hardship

[52] If there is the potential for hardship to the payor, but there is also blameworthy conduct which precipitated or exacerbated the delay, it may be open to the courts to disregard the presence of hardship. In all cases, hardship may be addressed by the form of payment. See: Michel, par. 124.

[53] While the focus is on hardship to the payor, that hardship can only be assessed after taking into account the hardship which would be caused to the child and the recipient parent from not ordering the payment of sums owing but unpaid. See: Michel, par. 125.

[54] A large retroactive support order will cause the father hardship. He has limited financial circumstances, even if the court imputes the annual income to him sought by the mother. He has another child support obligation.[^4] However, any hardship can be addressed through reasonable monthly arrears payments.

[55] The mother will also suffer hardship if she does not receive retroactive support.

3.3.5 The Start Date for Support

[56] The court will not depart from the presumptive start date. For ease of enforcement, the court will start support on May 1, 2021. This is the first day of the first month after the presumptive start date.

Part Four - Quantification of Support

[57] The third and final step in the Colucci analysis is to quantify the proper amount of support for each year since the start date of retroactivity, calculated in accordance with the guidelines.

4.1 2021 and 2022

[58] The father's notices of assessment indicate income of $31,670 in 2021 and $31,148 in 2022. The mother accepts those figures and does not seek to impute additional income to him for those years.

[59] The monthly guidelines table amount payable by the father in 2021, based on his income of $31,670 was $270. And, for 2022 it was $265.

4.2 2023

[60] The father stated his income was $31,148 in 2023. He also received grants from Sports Canada in 2023 of $5,295. The mother asks to include the grants in his income for support purposes. She also asks that the grants be grossed up as they are non-taxable.[^5]

[61] The father does not want the court to include any portion of the Sports Canada grants in his income.

[62] Section 19 of the guidelines permits the court to impute income to a party as it considers appropriate.

[63] Clause 19 (1) (h) of the guidelines permits the court to impute income to a payor when the payor derives a significant portion of income from sources that are tax exempt.

[64] Clause 19 (1) (h) is permissive. The court can include all, some or none of the Sports Canada grants in the father's income.

[65] "Carding" is available through Sport Canada for a limited number of athletes in various disciplines. A carded athlete is given monetary support to reduce the need for employment during training and can receive tuition support while attending higher education studies. See: Cirillo v. Mai, 2016 BCSC 1524.

[66] The mother's counsel did not find a case dealing with the treatment of athletic grants and income for support purposes. However, she did provide a case dealing with student grants, which she submitted was analogous to this situation.

[67] In Mwenda v. Madituka, 2018 ONCJ 503, Justice Ellen Murray treated the father's student grants as income and grossed them up as they were non-taxable. Justice Murray considered the following factors in coming to her decision:

a) The grant funds were not a return of capital.

b) Work was expected of the father – registration and coursework in a post-secondary institution.

c) Payment was recurrent.

d) The funds were used to pay a significant proportion of his living expenses.

e) The funds were not required to pay his educational costs. Student loans covered tuition and books.

[68] Student grants were also included in a recipient's income and grossed up for support purposes by this court in Fiorenza v. Mitic, 2024 ONCJ 467 and in K.H.S. v. K.S., 2025 ONCJ 436.

[69] The Mwenda decision is helpful in conducting the analysis in this case. As in Mwenda:

a) The grants were not a return on capital.

b) Work was expected of the father. He was required to train and represent Canada in track and field events.

c) Payment of the grants was recurrent.

d) The grants were used to pay a significant portion of the father's living expenses. This was evident when examining his financial statement.

[70] The court also considered that the father had complete discretion over the use of the grants. These were not directed payments.

[71] The court likely would have excluded portions of the grants if they had been required for specific purposes related to the father's training and participation in track and field events. Such specific instances would include: if he used a portion of the grants to pay for a coach, for use of training facilities, for equipment, for travel to and from track and field events or for accommodation at such events.

[72] In case management, the father was repeatedly asked to provide evidence that portions of the Sports Canada grants were being applied for these, or similar purposes. He never provided such evidence. An adverse inference is drawn against him.

[73] The mother testified that the father worked reduced hours at Goodlife Fitness as a personal trainer so he could focus on his training. The court finds this is what the father did. The ability to reduce work hours to focus on training is one of the purposes of the Sports Canada grants, as described in Cirillo. They were used here by the father to make up the differential arising from his self-reduction in income in order to pay his living expenses.

[74] The court will include the entire amount of the Sports Canada grants in the father's income for support purposes. It will also gross up the amounts he received as this is non-taxable income.

[75] The father's income for 2023 after being grossed up is $39,353. The monthly guidelines table amount payable by the father in 2023, based on this income, is $349.

4.3 2024

[76] The father's income tax return for 2024 shows income of $23,188. He also received Sports Canada grants of $15,875 that will be grossed up. The mother provided software analysis that shows the father's 2024 income after this gross-up is $45,670. The monthly guidelines table amount payable by the father in 2024, based on this income, is $424.

4.4 2025

[77] The father produced no evidence of his income or of any Sports Canada grants for 2025. He represented to the court that:

a) He no longer runs track and field.

b) He no longer receives Sports Canada grants.

c) He was involved in a motor vehicle accident in February 2025 and cannot work.

d) He is on social assistance.

[78] The mother asks the court to impute a full-time minimum wage income to the father, starting on January 1, 2025. She claims he is intentionally unemployed or underemployed.

[79] The jurisprudence for imputation of income sets out the following:

a) Imputing income is one method by which the court gives effect to the joint and ongoing obligation of parents to support their children. In order to meet this obligation, the parties must earn what they are capable of earning. If they fail to do so, they will be found to be intentionally under-employed. See: Drygala v. Pauli.

b) The Ontario Court of Appeal in Kohli v. Thom, 2025 ONCA 200, affirmed that the following three questions should be answered by a court in considering a request to impute income:

1. Is the party intentionally under-employed or unemployed?

2. If so, is the intentional under-employment or unemployment required by virtue of his or her reasonable educational needs, the needs of the child or reasonable health needs?

3. If not, what income is appropriately imputed?

c) The onus is on the party seeking to impute income to the other party to establish that the other party is intentionally unemployed or under-employed. The person requesting an imputation of income must establish an evidentiary basis upon which this finding can be made. See: Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322. However, in Graham v. Bruto, 2008 ONCA 260, the court inferred that the failure of the payor to properly disclose would mitigate the obligation of the recipient to provide an evidentiary basis to impute income.

d) Once a party seeking the imputation of income presents the evidentiary basis suggesting a prima facie case, the onus shifts to the individual seeking to defend the income position they are taking. See: Lo v. Lo, 2011 ONSC 7663; Charron v. Carriere, 2016 ONSC 4719.

e) As a general rule, separated parents have an obligation to financially support their children and they cannot avoid that obligation by a self-induced reduction of income. See: Thompson v. Gilchrist, 2012 ONSC 4137; DePace v. Michienzi.

f) The receipt of social assistance is not sufficient proof of one's inability to work for support purposes. See: Tyrrell v. Tyrrell, 2017 ONSC 6499. The court cannot take judicial notice of any eligibility requirements for social assistance. Nor can it delegate the important and complex determinations of employability and income earning capacity to unknown bureaucrats applying unknown evidence to unknown criteria. See: Abumatar v. Hamda, 2021 ONSC 2165; S.P. v. D.P., 2024 ONCJ 665.

g) The court must have regard to the payor's capacity to earn income in light of such factors as employment history, age, education, skills, health, available employment opportunities and the standard of living enjoyed during the parties' relationship. The court looks at the amount of income the party could earn if he or she worked to capacity. See: Lawson v. Lawson.

h) The court will usually draw an adverse inference against a party for his or her failure to comply with their disclosure obligations as provided for in section 21 of the guidelines and impute income. See: Smith v. Pellegrini; Maimone v. Maimone.

i) The payor must prove that any medical excuse for being underemployed is reasonable. See: Rilli v. Rilli.

j) Cogent medical evidence in the form of detailed medical opinion should be provided by the payor in order to satisfy the court that his/her reasonable health needs justify his/her decision not to work. See: Cook v. Burton and Stoangi v. Petersen.

k) In Davidson v. Patten, 2021 ONCJ 437, Justice Carole Curtis set out that a party resisting a claim for imputation of their income based on medical reasons should provide a medical report setting out at least the following information:

i. Diagnosis;

ii. Prognosis;

iii. Treatment plan (is there a treatment plan? And what is it?);

iv. Compliance with the treatment plan; and,

v. Specific and detailed information connecting the medical condition to the ability to work (e.g, this person cannot work at the pre-injury job; this person cannot work for three months; this person cannot work at physical labour; this person cannot return to work ever).

l) Support payors must use reasonable efforts to address whatever medical limitations they may have to earn income. This means following up on medical recommendations to address these limitations. See: Cole v. Freiwald, [2011] O.J. No. 3654, per Justice Marvin A. Zuker, paragraphs 140 and 141.

[80] The court finds that the father is intentionally unemployed without a valid excuse for the following reasons:

a) He provided none of the financial disclosure required by prior court orders.

b) He provided no medical evidence to support his position that he was injured or that his injuries prevent him from working.

c) He provided no evidence that he has a treatment plan or is following a treatment plan.

d) He provided no evidence that he was in a motor vehicle accident.

e) He provided no evidence that he is on social assistance.

f) He provided no evidence that he is attempting to work or retrain.

[81] An adverse inference is drawn against the father for his failure to provide this evidence.

[82] The father has considerable experience working as a personal fitness trainer. Based on his previous earning history, the court finds he has been capable of earning an annual income of at least $35,000 since January 1, 2025. The monthly guidelines table amount payable by the father starting on January 1, 2025, based on this income, is $304.

[83] The guidelines table amounts were changed on September 10, 2025. Starting on October 1, 2025, the father's monthly payments shall be $284.

Part Five – Support Credits

[84] The mother testified that the father has sporadically given her cash or paid for some items for the child since November 30, 2018. She estimated he paid between $2,000 and $2,500 from November 30, 2018 until April 30, 2024.

[85] The mother estimated that the father paid her about $1,000 between January 1, 2021 and April 30, 2024. The court accepts her evidence. The father will receive a support credit in that amount.

Part Six - Calculation and Payment of Arrears

[86] Support has accrued pursuant to this order as follows:

• 2021 - $270 x 7 months = $1,890
• 2022 - $265 x 12 months = $3,180
• 2023 – $349 x 12 months = $4,188
• 2024 - $424 x 12 months = $5,088
• 2025 - $304 x 9 months = $2,736

Total: $17,082

[87] The father is credited with child support payments of $1,000 paid between January 1, 2021 and April 30, 2024, reducing the total to $16,082.

[88] The court will also deduct the amount of $3,650.74 from the accrued support, being the support paid by the father pursuant to the temporary support order. The court arrived at this figure by taking the $4,240 that has accrued under that order ($265 x 16 months) and deducting the $589.26 that is still owing as of September 16, 2025.

[89] The arrears as of September 16, 2025 are $12,431.26 ($16,082 - $3,650.74).

[90] The father shall also be credited with any payments received by the Family Responsibility Office from September 17, 2025 until September 30, 2025.

[91] The court recognizes that the father has very limited financial circumstances. It will permit him to pay the arrears at $150 each month. This will give him many years to pay them. However, he must maintain his ongoing child support payments and these arrears payments in good standing if he wishes to continue to receive this indulgence. If he fails to do so, the entire amount of arrears then owing shall immediately become due and payable.

Part Seven – Conclusion

[92] A final order shall go on the following terms:

a) The father owes the mother $12,431.26 for child support arrears, as calculated in this decision. If the Family Responsibility Office collects further child support from him between September 17 and September 30, 2025, this shall be deducted from the arrears.

b) The father may pay the arrears at $150 each month, starting on December 1, 2025. However, if he is more than 30 days late in making any arrears payment or ongoing support payment, the entire amount of arrears then owing shall immediately become due and payable.

c) The father shall pay the mother ongoing child support of $284 each month, starting on October 1, 2025. This is the guidelines table amount for one child, based on the father's imputed annual income of $35,000.

d) The father shall provide the mother with his complete income tax returns and notices of assessment by June 30th each year, together with documents showing all grants received from Sports Canada, if any, over the prior year.

e) Nothing in this order precludes the Director of the Family Responsibility Office from collecting arrears from any government source (such as income tax or HST returns), inheritances, or lottery or prize winnings.

f) A support deduction order will issue.

[93] The mother advised the court that she was not seeking costs from the father. She submitted she just wanted a fair amount of support for the child. She had no desire to punish the father. The father should consider himself very fortunate that she took this approach.

[94] The court thanks Ms. Malcolm for her very professional presentation of this case.

Released: September 29, 2025

Justice Stanley B. Sherr

[^1]: The mother sought child support retroactive to January 1, 2017 in her amended answer/claim. She moderated that position at trial.

[^2]: This date is almost 9 months before the date the father claims the parties separated.

[^3]: See: D.B.S. v. S.R.G.; Laura Jean W. v. Tracy Alfred R.; Henry v. Henry; Hiemstra v. Hiemstra, 2006 SCC 37. These factors are: 1. Whether the recipient spouse has provided a reasonable excuse for his or her delay in applying for support. 2. The conduct of the payor parent. 3. The circumstances of the child. 4. The hardship that the retroactive award may entail.

[^4]: The court did not receive particulars regarding this obligation or if it is being met.

[^5]: The mother testified she received her information about the Sports Canada grants the father received in 2023 and 2024 through his previous counsel. She said she was unable to verify if these were the full extent of the grants. She said she was willing to accept the grant amounts disclosed to her to conclude the case.