Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Court File No.: FS-04-5128
Date: 2025-07-11
Parties
Between:
Daniela Balian (Self-represented) — Applicant
-and-
Dikran Balian (Rinku Deswal, for the Respondent) — Respondent
Heard: June 5-6, 9-11, 2025
Reasons for Judgment
Mandhane J.
Introduction
[1] Daniela Balian (the applicant/“mother”) and Dikran Balian (the respondent/“father”) were married on October 17, 1987, separated on August 27, 1996, and divorced on January 14, 2000. During their nine-year marriage, the parties had two children: J.B., born June 27, 1991 (the “older child”); and E.B., born November 2, 1993 (the “younger child”). Both children are on the autism spectrum: the older child has Asperger’s, and the younger child has pervasive developmental disorder.
[2] The parties stopped speaking to each other post-separation and have had very little communication in the years since. The father remarried in 2000 and his wife (“the stepmother”) was involved in the care of both children; she worked as a mental health and addictions nurse in the hospital system and had a teenage son from a previous marriage. While the children were minors, the parents communicated during drop-offs and pick-ups, through counsel, and sometimes through the children. The older child died by drug overdose on September 17, 2013, at the age of 22. After the older child died, the parents held separate funeral services and from then on largely communicated through the litigation process.
[3] The parties are both now in their mid-sixties and retired; before retirement, the father worked as a mechanical engineer while the mother worked as an engineering draftsperson. In this application, the mother claims child support arrears going back to 2003, and section 7 expenses going back to 1999. She says that the father underpaid support while the children were minors, and that the father never paid support for the older child even though he remained under her care into adulthood. The mother says that the father failed to maintain the children on his medical insurance such that she had to pay for the children’s healthcare expenses out of pocket. In total, she claims $247,267.49 in arrears. Because of his underpayment of child support, the mother says that the father was able to save money for retirement while she has been left penniless.
[4] The father denies owing any arrears. He says that he overpaid child support when the children were minors, and that the older child was never under the mother’s care while he was an adult. He says that he always maintained health insurance for the children, and that the mother never sought his consent or contribution to special expenses prior to making them. He says that he would suffer undue hardship if he was required to pay any arrears because he is retired and the younger child—who is now 31—remains under his care and will never be independent because of his disabilities. He notes that he never sought any child support from the mother after the younger child moved in with him, and that the mother never contributed towards the younger child’s post-secondary education.[1]
[5] The parties appeared before me for a five-day trial. The mother represented herself, gave evidence, and called a family friend as a witness. The father was represented by counsel, gave evidence, and called the stepmother to testify.[2]
[6] The issues I must decide are as follows:
a) Did the father underpay child support between 2003 and 2013? If so, what is the quantum of arrears owing?
b) Should the father be required to contribute to the s. 7 expenses that the mother paid between 1999 and 2010?
c) Would ordering the father to pay child support arrears cause him undue hardship?
[7] For reasons that follow, I find that the father underpaid child support and s. 7 expenses between 2003 and 2009 such that he owes $27,150 in arrears. I find that the older child did not remain under the care of either parent after he turned 18 such that the father does not owe any child support post-2009. Because the father refused to provide a financial statement in advance of trial, there is no evidentiary basis to find that he would suffer undue hardship if he was required to pay the arrears owed.
Analysis
[8] I can make a child support order for any or all “children of the marriage”: Divorce Act, para. 15.1(1). “Children of the marriage” are defined as children under 18 (“minor children”) who have not withdrawn from the parent’s charge, or children over 18 (“adult children”) who are “under their charge but unable, by reason of illness, disability or other cause, to withdraw from their charge or obtain the necessaries of life”: Divorce Act, s. 2(1).
[9] For minor children, the presumptive rule is that the payor pays the Guideline amount: Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 (“Guidelines”), s. 3(1). For adult children, I can order that the payor pay the Guideline amount or, if that is inappropriate, an amount that I consider appropriate, “having regard to the condition, means, and other circumstances of the child and the financial ability of each spouse to contribute to the support of the child”: Guidelines, s. 3(2).
[10] For both minor and adult children, I may also order an amount of child support that is different from the Guideline amount if I find that the father would otherwise suffer undue hardship: Guidelines, s. 10(1). Regardless of my findings about undue hardship, however, I cannot depart from the Guidelines if I also find that the father would still have a higher standard of living than the mother, even after paying support: Guidelines, s. 10(3).
[11] As part of my child support order, I can order that either parent provide an amount to cover all or any portion of special and extraordinary expenses, taking into account the necessity and reasonableness of the expense: Guidelines, s. 7(1). Eligible s. 7 expenses include childcare, insurance premiums, health-related expenses, extraordinary school fees and education programs, post-secondary education, and extraordinary expenses for extracurricular activities. The term “extraordinary expenses” means those that exceed the amount that the spouse can reasonably cover taking into account their income and the amount of child support they receive. The general rule is that these expenses are split proportionally according to each parent’s respective income: Guidelines, s. 7(2).
[12] There are positive obligations on litigants to provide adequate and ongoing financial disclosure to support the making of appropriate child support orders: Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, Rule 13; Guidelines, ss. 21-25. Each party must provide the other party with copies of their three most recent personal income tax returns, and notices of assessment or reassessment: Guidelines, s. 21(a)(b). For periods when the parties were employed, they must provide a recent statement of earnings: Guidelines, s. 21(1)(c).
[13] The Court of Appeal for Ontario has characterized financial nondisclosure as the “cancer of family law” because it thwarts the early settlement and just determination of cases; it results in complicated and arduous trials that are disproportionate to the complexity or importance of the issues: Leskun v. Leskun, 2006 SCC 25, para 34; Rick v. Brandsema, 2009 SCC 10, para 47; Akinsola v. Akinsola, 2022 ONSC 6906, para 38, aff’d 2024 ONCA 592. Where a party fails to meet their financial disclosure obligations, I may draw an adverse inference against them and impute an appropriate amount of income: Guidelines, s. 23; see also Meade v. Meade, para 81. My authority to impute income is discretionary and fact-specific: Levin v. Levin, 2020 ONCA 604, para 12.
[14] Unlike the situation in Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, here, the mother is not applying to retroactively increase support. Because she brought this application in 2004, the claim is properly assessed as one for prospective support and child support arrears, both of which are presumptively payable: Jansen v. DiCecco, 2025 ONCJ 189, para 49, ref’ing Mackinnon v. Mackinnon, 2005 13 R.F.L. (6th) 331 (Ont. C.A.). The only element of the claim that is truly retrospective is for the support payable before this application was commenced, i.e. in 2003. Even still, retroactive child support simply holds payors to their existing (and unfulfilled) support obligations: Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, para 25. After all, retroactive awards can always be avoided through proactive financial disclosure and proper payment: D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37, para 97; Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, para 54.
[15] Having set out the law, I now turn to the questions I must answer.
a) Did the father underpay child support between 2003 and 2013? If so, what is the quantum of arrears owing?
[16] Because of the long and complicated history of this matter, I first set out a chronology of the relevant events and my findings of fact before turning to the question at hand.
August 27, 1996 – June 30, 2003
[17] Post-separation, both children lived with the mother and the maternal grandmother, and saw the father every weekend, on Wednesday evenings, over Christmas, and in the summertime.
[18] The father first started paying support pursuant to the October 29, 1996 temporary, without prejudice order of Justice Smith; he was required to pay the mother $2,000 per month in child support and $200 in spousal support up to June 2003 (“First Temporary Order”). The First Temporary Order was enforced by the Family Responsibility Officer (“FRO”) and the parties agreed that the father complied with its terms.
[19] By way of Final Order dated December 14, 1999 (“Final Order”), the parties settled all the parenting issues, save and except for child support. The children were to continue living with the mother primarily, would see the father two out of three weekends, over Christmas, and during the summers. On the issue of child support, the Final Order contemplated that the First Temporary Order would remain in effect until June 2003, and that the parties would exchange financial disclosure before May 15, 2003, “with a view to establishing the amount of monthly support” payable commencing July 1, 2003. The First Temporary Order continued to be enforced by FRO. Pursuant to the Final Order, the father was required to maintain medical insurance for the children and, if no insurance was in place for the children, the parties were to share the costs of medical, dental and drug costs proportionally after seeking the other party’s consent to the expenditure.
[20] The parties agree that the father complied with the terms of the First Temporary Order until June 30, 2003, and while his support was being paid by FRO.
July 1, 2003 to January 1, 2004
[21] As of July 1, 2003, FRO stopped garnishing the father’s wages pursuant to the First Temporary Order, and the father started paying support directly to the mother, who continued to have primary parenting time of both children. The parties disagree on how much the father paid for the six months between July 1, 2003 and January 1, 2004 and, due to the passage of time, there are no related records. The mother testified that the father unilaterally started paying $1,084 per month as of July 1, 2003, whereas the father says that he continued to pay $2,200 until January 1, 2004.
[22] On this point, I would draw a strong adverse inference against the father because of his failure to provide adequate, contemporaneous financial disclosure throughout this litigation. First, I find that the father refused to disclose his income to the mother between 2003 and 2007 as required by the Final Order and the Guidelines. While the father claims that he provided disclosure directly to the mother and then to her counsel after she commenced this application in 2004, he was not able to point to any related correspondence or confirmations. The first letter that refers to him providing the mother with the disclosure required by the Final Order is dated January 2007 and is addressed to the mother’s then-counsel. As will be discussed below, court orders from 2005 and 2006 all refer to the father’s obligation to disclose his income to the mother, and the implications of failing to do so in terms of the calculation of arrears plus interest. The mother would not have continued this litigation and the judges would not have made these orders if the father had been providing contemporaneous income disclosure and adjusting the support payable based on that. Moreover, the fact that the father refused to file a Financial Statement in advance of this trial, despite the legal requirement to do so, supports my finding of fact that he approaches his disclosure obligations selectively.
[23] On this basis, I reject the father’s evidence that he continued to pay child support of $2,200 until January 1, 2024. I prefer the mother’s evidence that the father unilaterally decreased his support payments to $1,084 as of July 1, 2023. This is consistent with the mother’s timing for filing this application, i.e. in January 2024 after the father refused to disclose information about his income and had been paying less support for about a period of six months. The mother said that it was around this time that she started to “feel the pinch” financially and decided to commence legal action.
[24] There was no order in place in relation to s. 7 expenses during this time frame.
January 1, 2004 to November 1, 2006
[25] As of January 1, 2004, the parties agree that the father was paying $1,084, and that there was still no court order for child support or s. 7 expenses in place.
[26] On December 12, 2005, after the father brought a motion, Justice Snowie made a temporary, without prejudice order that the father start paying $1,084 in child support based on the father’s alleged income of $85,000, commencing January 1, 2006 (“Second Temporary Order”). In so ordering, Justice Snowie stated that, “if this annual income is inaccurate there will be an adjustment retroactive of child support to January 1, 2005,” and that, “[u]pon receipt of confirmation of gross income for the Applicant husband for 2003, 2004, and 2005 an adjustment shall be made for the correct child support Guideline Amount owed.” The father was also required to pay his proportion of s. 7 expenses “reasonably incurred” by the mother retroactive to June 2003, pending the mother providing receipts. The Second Temporary Order was enforced by FRO, which began garnishing $1,084 per month from the father’s wages as of January 1, 2006.
[27] Starting in about 2006—when he was fifteen years old—the older son began using alcohol and cannabis, getting suspended from school, and being violent towards family and pets. The mother testified that she could no longer have him living in her house after he smashed a telephone over the maternal grandmother’s head. To try to interrupt his worsening behaviour, the parents agreed to send him to live with the maternal uncle in Ajax for the 2006-2007 school year. While he was living in Ajax, the father continued to pay the mother support for two children, on the understanding that she would provide the maternal uncle with some funds for his maintenance of the older child in Ajax. On this basis, I find that the mother continued to have primary parenting time of both children during this time period.
[28] Unfortunately, the older child’s problems followed him to Ajax and he was charged as a youth with assault and robbery while living with his maternal uncle.
November 1, 2006 to July 1, 2009
[29] On October 16, 2006, on consent of the parties, Justice Van Melle varied the Second Temporary Order, such that, as of November 1, 2006, the father would start paying temporary, without prejudice child support in the amount of $335 per month for two children “based on $22,000 per year that the respondent receives from E.I.” (“Third Temporary Order”). There was no mention of s. 7 expenses. The Third Temporary Order was also enforceable by FRO. The Third Temporary Order required the father to provide documentation confirming his employment situation and advising the mother if his employment situation changed. The father’s income disclosure shows that the father never earned an income of $22,000 per year as he had indicated to Justice Van Melle. Instead, his income was between $60,000 and $80,000 in those years.
November 1, 2006 to September 2007
[30] The parties agree that both children were living with the mother until September 2007, and that the father continued to pay child support of $335 per month during that time frame.
September 1, 2007 to July 1, 2009
[31] The father says that he was overpaying support after September 1, 2007 because the older child was not living with the mother anymore such that he was only required to pay support for one child. He says that the older child lived with him and the stepmother for the 2007-2008 school year, and that he was living in a shelter between 2008-2009. The mother disagrees; she says that the older child continued living with her between 2007 and 2009, though she also admitted that he was in various group homes and shelters during this time period as well.
[32] On the issue of who had primary parenting time over the older child between 2007 and 2009, I prefer the evidence of the father and stepmother to that of the mother. The mother’s evidence about the older child’s whereabouts after he returned from Ajax at the end of 2007 was vague and non-specific. While she recalled him “coming and going” as he pleased, she could not provide any details about the dates, times or durations of his shelter stays, hospital visits, or group home placements. On the other hand, the stepmother’s evidence about the older son’s whereabouts after he turned 15 was credible and reliable because it was detailed, internally consistent, and corroborated by the father. Given her professional background, it was clear from her evidence that the stepmother played an active role in terms of finding community support services for the older child and monitoring his compliance with programming between 2007 and 2009. While she did not provide exact dates for his different placements, she was able to offer the court a coherent chronology of the older child’s whereabouts during this time period and I accept her evidence in this regard.
[33] I accept the stepmother and father’s evidence that, after participating in a youth court diversion program in 2007, the older child began living with the father and attending a special program at a local school for the 2007-2008 school year. They testified that he improved for a time before his addictions took hold again. I also accept the stepmother and father’s evidence that, sometime in 2008, the older child left the father’s home and was moving around between friends’ houses, his mother’s home, and the shelter system.
[34] In 2008, the maternal grandmother also moved out of the mother’s home and into an old age home, and stopped being involved in the day-to-day care of the children; she passed away in 2009. This coincided with the younger son leaving the mother’s care. On July 1, 2009, the younger son—who was by then 16—moved in with the father and stopped seeing the mother regularly.
[35] The father stopped paying any child support after July 1, 2009 because the younger child moved in with him.
September 17, 2009 to September 17, 2013
[36] I now turn to the mother’s claim for support for the older child after he turned 18 on September 17, 2009. Based on all the evidence, I find that the older child did not remain a “child of the marriage” after turning 18 because he withdrew from his parents’ care and was making his own decisions in all aspects of day-to-day life. While I accept the mother and father’s evidence that they both maintained a room for the older child after he became an adult and sometimes brought him food or did his laundry, I do not find that they were under any parental obligation to do so.
[37] The totality of the evidence from all four witnesses points to the older son’s addictions becoming more serious and all-consuming once he became an adult such that he was regularly moving between group homes, the shelter system, hospital admissions, friends’ apartments, and the parents’ respective homes. The mother herself admitted that he once stole her car and crashed it, which prompted her to kick him out. Another time, she admitted that she had to call the police to have his friend removed from her home. The father and stepmother both testified that he was increasingly violent towards the father and the younger child. Eventually, he ended up in prison for armed robbery. When he got out, he was admitted to the hospital. I accept the stepmother’s evidence that the older son was secretive about who he shared his health information with, and that he was manipulative in terms of playing the different parents off each other to get what he wanted. In short, by the time the older child turned 18, he was no longer a “child of the marriage” but rather a troubled young man. While on parole, the older child died by overdose on September 17, 2013—he was 22.
September 13, 2007 to Present
[38] The younger child is now 31 and continues to live with the father primarily; they say that he will never be able to live independently because of his developmental disabilities. They state that they are still involved in his day-to-day care, for example, by providing him prompts to get ready for work, buying his clothing, preparing his meals, and ensuring that he gains familiarity with new driving routes or locations before being left to navigate them on his own. The younger child has minimal contact with his mother; though the exact extent is disputed. The younger child receives Ontario Disability Support Program (“ODSP”) payments, and works part-time as a math tutor. The father has invested about $28,000 into his Registered Disability Savings Program (“RDSP”) which, with government matching and grants, now has $130,000 in it. The mother has never paid child support to the father, has never contributed to his college or university education, or contributed to his RDSP.
Quantum of Child Support Arrears Owing
[39] The father’s income for support purposes is not in dispute, nor are the amounts that were garnished by FRO when child support was being paid subject to court order. Based on my findings of fact above, I calculate that the father owes $24,650 in child support arrears (rounded to the nearest ten dollars). I arrive at these amounts based on the calculations set out in Appendix A. Overall, the father significantly underpaid child support between 2006 and 2009 when he paid child support based on an income of $22,000 despite never earning that amount. The significant arrears accrued precisely because the father refused to make adequate ongoing disclosure about his income.
b) Should the father be required to contribute to the s. 7 expenses paid by the mother between 1999 and 2010?
[40] The mother claims section 7 expenses for a broad category of expenses that she incurred when both children were living with her, between 1999 and 2006. Many of the expenses were accompanied by receipts or some other form of supporting paperwork. The mother asks that the father contribute proportionally to over $10,000 in orthodontic and dental treatment for the children, about $1,500 in psychological therapy for the older child, and various expenses for playschool, school, summer camps, tutoring, and extracurricular activities. The mother also claims $1,500 in “lost wages” for time spent accompanying the children to appointments, $800 in “car usage and gas”, $15,000 for the maternal grandmother’s babysitting contributions prior to her death, and legal fees paid to Legal Aid Ontario.
[41] As a preliminary matter, I would dismiss some of the mother’s claims because they are not founded in law or lay outside my jurisdiction. First, I do not have the jurisdiction under s. 7 of the Guidelines to order that the father contribute to the mother’s lost wages. Second, the mother’s claim for contribution to her mother’s babysitting contributions is not tenable because she has not established that these costs were actually “incurred”; it would be absurd to allow the mother to claim for a notional amount calculated after the fact, which she never paid: Guidelines, s. 7(1)(a). Third, the claim for amounts paid to Legal Aid Ontario is properly addressed through a claim for legal costs at the end of the proceeding. Fourth, the claim for “car usage and gas” and time spent with the children at appointments are not enumerated or “extraordinary expenses”; these are the types of expenses that are already covered through the receipt of child support: Guidelines, s. 7(1.1)(a).
[42] I now turn to the mother’s claim for contributions towards health, education, and extracurricular activities. Under cross-examination, the mother admitted that she never sought the father’s consent in advance of incurring any of the expenses for which she now claims reimbursement, explaining that it was useless to do so because he would hang up on her, and because they eventually stopped speaking altogether. Strictly speaking, while the Final Order contemplated the mother obtaining the father’s consent prior to incurring expenses, Justice Snowie’s Second Temporary Order required the father to pay s. 7 expenses “reasonably incurred” going back to 2003, without requiring the mother to obtain his prior consent.
[43] In relation to dental care and orthodontics expenses incurred between 2003 and 2007, the mother admitted that the father maintained dental insurance for the children, and that she received about $1,500 from his insurance towards those expenses. She claimed that the father eventually cut the children off from his insurance, but could not recall when that was. She never sought his contribution to the outstanding amounts that she paid out of pocket at the time the expenses were incurred. The father was adamant that he never removed the children from his health insurance while he was employed, and that he would have paid for his proportionate share of any expenses that were brought to his attention.
[44] On the whole, I accept the mother’s evidence that she incurred dental, orthodontic, and educational expenses for the children and that she paid for them out of pocket. Her evidence about her income was not challenged, and she was earning much less than what the father was earning during the same time period (see Appendix A for a comparison of their incomes). However, given the passage of time and the conflicting information about the mother’s access to the father’s health insurance, I would only order the father to pay a lump sum of $2,500 towards the past s. 7 expenses.
c) Would ordering the father to pay child support arrears cause him undue hardship?
[45] The father says that requiring him to pay child support arrears would result in undue hardship because the mother never paid him child support or contributed to s. 7 expenses after the younger child moved in with him in 2009, because he is still caring for the younger child, and because he is now retired. While I am sympathetic to the father’s ongoing responsibilities to the younger child, the analysis required under the Guidelines is largely financial and focused on the relative standard of living between both parties after support is paid.
[46] Here, the father refused to file a financial statement in advance of trial on the basis that it was “not relevant.” This tactical decision deprived the court of any evidence before me about the father’s current financial position. On this basis alone, I refuse to entertain the father’s claim of undue hardship. In any event, all the evidence points to the father having a much higher standard of living than the mother. While the mother owns a home, she has no other assets and no significant retirement savings. The father always earned more than her and, from the deductions noted on his annual notices of assessment, I infer that he has been able to make sizeable contributions to his retirement savings, and that he was able to do so in part because he was underpaying child support. There is no undue hardship to the father in requiring him to pay the child support and s. 7 arrears that I have ordered.
[47] The father shall pay $27,150 in child support and s. 7 arrears, inclusive of pre-judgement interest. Ordering payment of prejudgment interest would not be fair given the long delays in bringing this matter to trial.
Costs
[48] In setting the proper amount of costs to award, I must consider the reasonableness and proportionality of each parties’ behaviour as it relates to the importance and complexity of the issues, including their time spent, any written offers, any legal fees, and any other relevant matter: Rule 24(12). The Family Law Rules expressly provide that, depending on the conduct of the parties and the presence or absence of offers to settle, a judge may increase or decrease what would otherwise be the appropriate quantum of costs awarded: Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840, paras 11-19.
[49] The mother was more successful at trial and is presumptively entitled to costs. I found that her conduct was generally reasonable, and that she was prepared for trial. Her aides were particularly helpful in terms of understanding the basis for her claims. The father’s conduct at trial was also reasonable though I would note that his refusal to make adequate and timely disclosure complicated the matter. The father made a single monetary offer to settle, on May 16, 2025, when he offered the mother $20,000 to resolve all the claims between them. The mother did not accept this offer and proceeded to trial. In the end, the mother was more successful at trial than the father’s offer to settle.
[50] The mother claims a total of $47,405 in costs on a full indemnity basis; this includes $18,405 in legal fees paid between 2000 and 2010, and about $29,000 in costs while she was self-represented. By way of comparison, had the father been successful, he says that he would have sought costs in the amount of $114,807.71.
[51] I would order that the father pay the mother a total of $30,000 in costs. This amount adequately compensates the mother for legal fees incurred, as well as the time spent preparing for various motions and for trial.
Final Order
[52] In total, the father owes the mother $57,150 in retroactive support and costs. This order is subject to post-judgement interest at the applicable rate.
Appendix A
| Year | Father’s Income ($) | Mother’s Income ($) | Number of Children | Monthly Guideline Amount ($) | Monthly Amount Paid | Monthly Arrears | Monthly Interest @4.5% | Total Arrears + Interest |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2003 – 6 months | 111,878 | n/a | 2 | 1,617 | 2,200 | 593 | 26 | 3,658 |
| 2003 – 6 months | 111,878 | n/a | 2 | 1,617 | 1,084 | -533 | -24 | -3,339 |
| 2004 | 69,418 | 36,930 | 2 | 1,057 | 1,084 | 26 | 1 | 332 |
| 2005 | 85,080 | 29,209 | 2 | 1,285 | 1,084 | -201 | -9 | -2,522 |
| 2006-10 months | 62,698 | 30,730 | 2 | 955 | 1,084 | 129 | 6 | 1,343 |
| 2006-2 months | 62,698 | 30,730 | 2 | 955 | 335 | -620 | -27 | -1,297 |
| 2007 – 8 months | 80,232 | 29,796 | 2 | 1,214 | 335 | -879 | -40 | -7,352 |
| 2007 – 4 months | 80,232 | 29,796 | 1 – younger child only | 977 | 335 | -642 | -29 | -2,683 |
| 2008 | 63,730 | 36,023 | 1 – younger child only | 1,300 | 335 | -965 | -43 | -12,106 |
| 2009-6 months | 39,082 | 40,794 | 1 – young child only until July 1 | 444 | 335 | -108 | -5 | -682 |
| 2010 | 73,753 | 42,951 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2011 | 80,733 | 43,941 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2012 | 80,496 | 38,261 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2013 | 78,843 | n/a | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
TOTAL: -$24,648
Mandhane J.
Released: July 11, 2025
Endnotes
[1] The father’s request to amend his pleadings on the first day of trial to seek child support arrears and s. 7 expenses from the mother was denied because he never brought a motion to do so since this litigation was commenced back in 2004. I found that it would be unfair to the self-represented litigant to expand the scope of the dispute at trial without giving her a chance to file a response.
[2] At the opening of trial, the mother sought to rely on a Request to Admit that she had served on the father and to which he had not replied. I granted the father leave to file an affidavit explaining why no response to the Request to Admit had been served and filed. Based on the affidavit filed by Ms. Deswal’s law clerk, I accept as a fact that the father failed to respond to the Request to Admit because of his counsel’s inadvertence, and through no fault of his own. I advised the parties that I would address the matter in my final reasons, but that the mother should conduct the trial as though she was required to prove the facts stated in the Request to Admit. On the whole, I refuse to take the facts stated in the Request to Admit as admitted without proof of the same. Any admission was inadvertent and it would be unfair for the father to suffer because of the sins of his lawyer.