WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:

486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences:

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Court Information

Ontario Court of Justice

Date: September 25, 2025

Court File No.: 21-2017

Between:

His Majesty the King

— and —

Ifeoluwa Oyenuga

Before: Justice M.T. Poland

Heard on: March 27, 2024, April 29, 2025, September 5, 2025

Reasons for Judgment released on: September 25, 2025

Counsel:

• M. Jones — counsel for the Crown
• K. Marley — counsel for the defendant Ifeoluwa Oyenuga

Application for a Finding Under Section 16 of the Criminal Code of Canada

POLAND J.:

Introduction

[1] On March 27, 2024, Ifeoluwa Oyenuga was before the Court facing a two-count Information that alleged offences of sexual assault and forcible confinement. Mr. Oyenuga was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.

[2] A statement of facts was then placed before the Court. Mr. Oyenuga either agreed with, or alternatively agreed that he was not able to contest the facts established in the statement of facts.

[3] That statement of facts was made Exhibit 1 in these proceedings.

[4] In the first stage of a two-part court process, the Court found that on the dates alleged in the Information, Mr. Oyenuga committed the act portion of the offences that he is charged with.

[5] Mr. Oyenuga applies in this second phase of the proceedings, for a verdict that he was, at the time of the commission of the offences charged, not criminally responsible by reason of a mental disorder (NCRMD), in accordance with the provisions of s.16(1) of the Criminal Code.

[6] Mr. Oyenuga is presumed to be criminally responsible unless he can shoulder the burden of proving that he was NCRMD to the balance of probabilities standard.

Background

[7] In the fall of 2021, Ifeoluwa Oyenuga was a student at Lambton College.

[8] On November 3, 2021, he agreed to rent a room within an apartment that was occupied by Ms. L.M. He moved into the apartment on November 5, 2021.

[9] On November 7, 2021, Mr. Oyenuga sexually assaulted his roommate L.M. by bending her over a couch, thrusting his groin at her, and pulling her pants down. She had previously and unequivocally rejected the sexual advances that Mr. Oyenuga made towards her on November 6, 2021.

[10] The sexual assault was forceful, and forcefully rejected by L.M. She ultimately got away by fighting back and running to a neighbour's apartment.

[11] Police were called and Mr. Oyenuga was arrested.

[12] He gave a police statement the morning after he had been arrested. In that statement, he told the police a non-culpable version of the events based on accidental contact between the parties. He also stated that L.M. had falsely accused him of trying to rape her.

[13] Later in his statement, Mr. Oyenuga indicated that prior to the event leading to his arrest, L.M. had repeatedly told him that she was not interested in a sexual relationship with him. Whenever he asked for sexual consent, she said no.

[14] Mr. Oyenuga was released by the police. He attended hospital in Windsor in the next days and remained hospitalized for 16 days under the care of a psychiatrist.

The Mental Health Proceedings

[15] On his own motion, Mr. Oyenuga was assessed under the provisions of s.672(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. The assessment was carried out by Dr. William Komer who met with Mr. Oyenuga on several occasions. Dr. Komer produced three comprehensive assessment reports dated June 27, 2023, March 20, 2024, and July 7, 2024. Each of these reports addressed Mr. Oyenuga's criminal responsibility.

[16] Dr. Komer believed Mr. Oyenuga was suffering from a mental condition that rendered him incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his actions and their wrongfulness. In his initial report from June 27, 2023, he concluded:

"In my opinion, Mr. Oyenuga lacked rational perception and hence rational choice about the wrongfulness of his actions. His actions were, in my opinion, in response to command hallucinations of his mother's voice and a delusional belief that the complainant wanted to have a sexual relationship with him."

[17] Dr. Komer was of the view that Mr. Oyenuga suffered from a schizophrenia-related psychiatric disorder that was exacerbated by a drug-induced psychosis related to his consumption of crystal methamphetamine shortly before the time of the offence.

The Position of the Parties

[18] Mr. Marley, on behalf of Mr. Oyenuga, takes the position that Dr. Komer's opinion provides the foundation for a verdict that Mr. Oyenuga was NCRMD at the time of these offences. Mr. Marley asserts that Mr. Oyenuga was "suffering from a mental disorder" and was both incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his actions and that he did not know that his actions were wrong.

[19] Ms. Jones, on behalf of the Crown takes a different approach. After providing helpful submissions on the issue, based on an analysis of R v. Bouchard-Lebrun, 2011 SCC 58 ("Bouchard"), Ms. Jones conceded that the defence would be able to bear the onus to demonstrate that Mr. Oyenuga was suffering from a disease of the mind in spite of the fact that his condition at the time of the offence was likely associated at least in part with drug use.

[20] Ms. Jones parts ways with the assessment made by Dr. Komer as it pertains to the second part of the s.16 test. She asserts that the defence cannot demonstrate to a balance of probabilities that Mr. Oyenuga was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his actions, or of knowing that they were wrong.

The Law

A Two-Part Analysis

[21] Section 16 of the Criminal Code states the following:

Defence of mental disorder

16 (1) No person is criminally responsible for an act committed or an omission made while suffering from a mental disorder that rendered the person incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act or omission or of knowing that it was wrong.

Presumption

(2) Every person is presumed not to suffer from a mental disorder so as to be exempt from criminal responsibility by virtue of subsection (1), until the contrary is proved on the balance of probabilities.

Burden of proof

(3) The burden of proof that an accused was suffering from a mental disorder so as to be exempt from criminal responsibility is on the party that raises the issue.

[22] Section 16 requires a two-part analysis. Under the first part of the analysis, the Court must examine whether the accused party suffered from a qualifying disease of the mind.

[23] Here, I agree with the first part of Ms. Jones' analysis, and with Dr. Komer's conclusions. Bouchard is instructive in this regard, particularly at paragraphs 71, 73, and 75.

[24] There is a basis for a finding that Mr. Oyenuga suffered from a qualifying disease of the mind, notwithstanding that his pre-existing mental health issues were likely also negatively impacted by his drug use at or shortly before the time of the offence.

Legal Recognition of the Effects of a Qualifying Disease of the Mind

[25] An accused person may be found NCRMD where their mental disorder rendered them either:

• Incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of their act; or
• Incapable of knowing that their act was wrong.

[26] To be deemed incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act, an accused person must be unable to appreciate the nature of the act and the natural consequences that follow from it. Cooper v. R, [1980] 1 SCR 1149 at 120.

[27] The capability assessment requires a moral and not just a legal analysis. The case of R v. Dobson, 2018 ONCA 589 ["Dobson"] provides strong direction on the test to be applied.

[28] In Dobson, the Accused suffered from a mental disorder when he killed his girlfriend and a friend in a murder-suicide pact. The exact nature of Mr. Dobson's illness was unascertained, but it had schizophrenic features.

[29] In determining what is required when assessing whether an Accused person knows their act is wrong, the Court of Appeal looked to R v. Oommen, [1994] 2 SCR 507 and concluded as follows:

[A]n accused who has the capacity to know that society regards his actions as morally wrong and proceeds to commit those acts cannot be said to lack the capacity to know right from wrong. He is not NCR, even if he believed that he had no choice but to act, or that his acts were justified. However, an accused who, through the distorted lens of his mental illness, sees his conduct as justified, not only according to his own view, but also according to the norms of society, lacks the capacity to know that his act is wrong.

Dobson at para 24.

[30] When this direction is applied to a factual context where the accused's act is obviously and per se wrong, such as a circumstance involving the killing of another, the analysis may be factually complex, but the law is straightforward. The present case admits of additional complexity.

The Factual Foundation

[31] For this analysis, the acts being examined involved Mr. Oyenuga forcefully pushing his roommate L.M. against a couch, bending her over, placing his groin against her buttocks and pulling down her pants. L.M. fought back against Mr. Oyenuga successfully, pulled up her pants, threatened Mr. Oyenuga with violence and then extracted herself from the room.

[32] When she thought an opportunity had arisen, she attempted to flee the apartment. Mr. Oyenuga intercepted her as she did so. He placed her in what is described as a "bearhug" as he attempted to drag her back into the shared dwelling. L.M. again prevailed and got away from Mr. Oyenuga.

[33] These acts exist in a context that includes the fact that Mr. Oyenuga and L.M. had no relationship history. They were new roommates, and barely knew each other. Prior to the described acts, Mr. Oyenuga had made prior advances upon L.M. She had rebuffed him and told Mr. Oyenuga that she was not interested in him.

[34] The factual context also includes at least four further and important components.

[35] First, based on his own self-reporting, Mr. Oyenuga had consumed crystal methamphetamine in the past, and at a time that was proximate to his actions on November 7, 2021.

[36] Second, Mr. Oyenuga's mental health challenges appeared to pre-date his engagement with L.M. In the time leading up to these events, there had been family conflict. He had reported auditory hallucinations involving directions to make sexual advances towards women.

[37] Third, and importantly, Mr. Oyenuga provided a statement to the police the morning after he was arrested. Parts of this statement are contained within the factual agreement contained in Exhibit 1 in this proceeding. Mr. Oyenuga made the following utterances during his police interview:

• He denied sexually assaulting L.M. and described that any physical contact between he and L.M. occurred first as a result of her tripping and falling into him.
• L.M. reacted to accidentally falling into him by alleging that he had tried to rape her and by threatening to kill him.
• He did not recall if the interaction with L.M. continued into the hallway of the apartment.
• L.M. had previously told him that she was not interested in having an intimate relationship with him, and that he needed to ask for permission to have physical contact with her.

[38] Notwithstanding this, he told the police that L.M. was interested in having a sexual relationship with him and that she had sent flirtatious messages to him in which she told him she loved him and offered to meet him late at night.

[39] Mr. Oyenuga described that L.M.'s actions in the apartment, including bending over in his presence, were designed to draw his sexual attention and to inspire his advances, but that she continued to deny him consent to sexual contact.

[40] Fourth, two days after the assault on L.M., Mr. Oyenuga returned to Windsor and was admitted to hospital for a psychiatric assessment. He remained in hospital for 17 days under the care of a psychiatrist. The information provided from this hospital attendance formed a very significant portion of the body of information that Dr. Komer relied upon in his opinion.

Dr. Komer's Opinion and Conclusions

[41] Dr. Komer's opinion was that Mr. Oyenuga was both incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his acts, and of knowing that they were wrong. He based this conclusion on his acceptance of two theories drawn from the information in his possession.

[42] First, he suggested that Mr. Oyenuga was acting on a command hallucination in which his mother directed him to "rape" L.M. and that "she was evil."

[43] Dr. Komer also indicated that at the time of the offence, Mr. Oyenuga was possessed of a delusional belief that the complainant wanted to have sexual relations with him.

[44] The propositions cited by Dr. Komer are contradictory. As the Crown pointed out during submissions, the essence of a "rape" is a sexual interaction that proceeds without the consent of the victim. Such an action is unlawful per se, much like an intentional killing of another human being. A delusion based on a command direction to rape is obviously inconsistent with a delusion in which a person believes another wants to, and thus is consenting to have sexual relations.

Challenges with the Evidence Relied Upon

[45] The distinction between these two propositions underscores a key reality of the evidentiary record that is before the Court on this Application. Dr. Komer considered two broad categories of information. First, he considered background information, including from third party sources, about Mr. Oyenuga's mental health challenges and background. These sources included Mr. Oyenuga's mother and mental health professionals who treated Mr. Oyenuga at the time of his first admission to hospital immediately after November 7, 2021, and thereafter.

[46] For the most part, the third-party sources provided only limited information about the content of Mr. Oyenuga's delusional thinking at the time of the offence.

[47] Dr. Komer's primary source of information about the actual contents of the delusional thinking was, unsurprisingly, Mr. Oyenuga himself. Mr. Oyenuga did not testify in this proceeding. To the extent that it is relied upon for the truth of its contents, the information that Mr. Oyenuga provided to Dr. Komer is largely hearsay. R v. Dobson, 2015 ONSC 2865 at paras 127-129. The evidence found in Dr. Komer's report, in this context, is receivable by the court, but it is necessarily subject to further assessment.

[48] Mr. Oyenuga was a profoundly unreliable declarant. Dr. Komer repeatedly referenced Mr. Oyenuga's inconsistency in reporting both during his testimony, and in the three reports that are filed as Exhibits in this proceeding. In Dr. Komer's words, Mr. Oyenuga was "a very poor historian" and was "not a reliable informant".

[49] Parsing out the full extent of the contradictions and indications of Mr. Oyenuga's lack of reliability as presented in the reports and the testimony of Dr. Komer would be unhelpful and unnecessary. Both the reports and the viva voce testimony of Dr. Komer were rife with examples of Mr. Oyenuga saying different things at different times about what had occurred on November 7, 2021. The information also presented major inconsistencies about why Mr. Oyenuga acted or did not act the way he did.

The Command Direction to Rape and the Requirement to Know the Act was Wrong

[50] At times Mr. Oyenuga referenced the "command direction" to rape in his discussions with Dr. Komer, but the explanations on this subject were not detailed or fulsome. There was, for example, no reason provided by Mr. Oyenuga as to why he thought he should follow a purported command to rape L.M. There was no information provided that Mr. Oyenuga believed that his failure to follow the command would result in an adverse consequence.

[51] The high point of the evidence, from the defence perspective, was Mr. Oyenuga's assertion to Dr. Komer that he associated his mother's voice, and therefore the command to rape L.M. with something that was "good". Associating his mother's voice with something "good" falls well short of presenting evidence of a delusion that encompasses a justification to rape according to the norms of society. It may also be important to note that at some points during his discussions with Dr. Komer, Mr. Oyenuga also specifically denied being commanded by the voices in his head to rape L.M.

[52] This situation is quite different from many cases where an NCR finding is made based on an understanding that the commission of an unlawful act, like a homicide for example, is necessary because the victim of the offence presents a threat to the accused, to people that he or she loves, or even to the community more generally. The only relevant evidence of that type in this case is that Mr. Oyenuga inconsistently referenced a component of the command direction in which his mother described the complainant as "evil".

[53] Of course, it nearly goes without saying that even if Mr. Oyenuga did hold a real, consistent, and offence-concurrent belief that L.M. was "evil", such a belief on its own would not provide either a legal or a moral justification to rape her. One can imagine any number of people that society generally might condemn as "evil". No one would countenance a leap from such a conclusion to the existence of a community-accepted belief that it would be acceptable to rape them.

[54] It is possible to generate a hypothetical albeit diabolical delusion in which a command to rape, much like a command to kill, might be understood by a person suffering from the delusion to be both personally justifiable and societally countenanced. There is no evidence in this case of such a belief being present in the mind of Mr. Oyenuga at any point.

[55] On the evidence that has been presented, there is an insufficient basis to make a finding that Mr. Oyenuga believed that sexually assaulting L.M. was justified both in his own view, and according to the norms of society. Therefore, there is an insufficient evidentiary basis to conclude that Mr. Oyenuga lacked the capacity to understand that his actions were wrong. Dobson at para. 24.

The Nature and Quality of the Acts

[56] Although Dr. Komer also provides an opinion that Mr. Oyenuga was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his acts, the evidence that supports this conclusion was either unstated or tied to the same body of evidence that resulted in Dr. Komer's conclusion that Mr. Oyenuga was not capable of knowing that his acts were wrong. The three reports authored by Dr. Komer that were filed as Exhibits were not of significant assistance in distinguishing the two branches of the s.16 inquiry.

[57] During his testimony, Dr. Komer did address Mr. Oyenuga's ability to appreciate the nature and quality of his acts. In doing so, although he noted that his conclusion was based on the existence of Mr. Oyenuga's mental illness, he did not identify the sources of information that led him to believe that Mr. Oyenuga was irrational to the point of not appreciating the nature of his act, or the natural consequences that would flow from it. See Cooper at 120.

[58] Instead, Dr. Komer appropriately pointed out that Mr. Oyenuga's account of what had transpired in the apartment was markedly inconsistent. The events reported by Mr. Oyenuga included a version where he said he took no culpable actions towards L.M., instead blaming any physical contact on an accident. Mr. Oyenuga presented an alternate version where he claimed that he did not remember what had occurred. At one point Mr. Oyenuga also reported that he had attended back at the apartment after leaving in an effort to try to reason with L.M. and to "…. apologize if I did anything wrong". Such an action seems incongruent with Mr. Oyenuga's otherwise asserted description of animus and irrationality on the part of L.M. who he said slipped and fell into him, and thereafter accused him of rape and threatened to kill him.

[59] It is possible, as Dr. Komer averts to, that Mr. Oyenuga's inconsistency, and perhaps also his more recently asserted lack of memory was related to an after-the-fact realization on his part that his actions towards L.M. were wrong. In that event, such an explanation might represent an effort at what Dr. Komer referred to as "perception management". Perception management involves the presentation of a deliberately false account. This occurred long after the events, and at a time where Mr. Oyenuga was described as stable. A lie like this necessarily makes Mr. Oyenuga's self-reporting suspect. It is also hard to distinguish from the possibility that Mr. Oyenuga knew that his actions were wrong from the outset.

[60] An ex post facto realization on Mr. Oyenuga's part might be understandable if the evidence showed that he was unwell at the time of the events but gained insight later. The challenge here is that, at least in part, Mr. Oyenuga's explanation to Dr. Komer bears very close similarities to the explanation that Mr. Oyenuga gave to the police and that are captured at paragraph 18 of the Agreed Statement of Facts. This explanation was given less than a day after the events, and even before Mr. Oyenuga attended at the hospital in Windsor.

The Consent Theory

[61] Although he told the police that his contact with L.M. had been accidental, Mr. Oyenuga also advanced elements of the "consent theory" to the police during his interactions with them. In so doing, however, Mr. Oyenuga also acknowledged that other sexual advances that he had made towards L.M. in the days or hours before the culminating interaction had been rebuffed. He described that she had plainly communicated her absence of consent to any intimate interactions with him. It is clear that Mr. Oyenuga was capable of understanding consent and lack of consent and of understanding that L.M. had, before the ultimate engagement, expressed her wish to be left alone. Mr. Oyenuga's expression to the police about his belief that L.M. was attracted to him, notwithstanding her earlier denial of his advances is not necessarily evidence of delusional thinking. It might be aberrant, but it is also commonly encountered in cases of sexual assault that bear no requirement for an assessment under s.16 of the Criminal Code.

[62] The "consent theory" advanced by Dr. Komer was based on Mr. Oyenuga explaining a belief that the complainant welcomed his sexual advances. Dr. Komer quite properly described Mr. Oyenuga's description that L.M. consented to his actions as "delusional". To some extent, Dr. Komer relied on Mr. Oyenuga's assertions about L.M. text messaging him. It is difficult to conclude, based the evidence presented, whether Mr. Oyenuga's assertions about the text messages were true, misapprehended, based on delusional thinking, or were simply a lie that he told to support his position that L.M. was attracted to him.

Consent is Defined Narrowly at Law

[63] If Mr. Oyenuga was in fact suffering from a delusional belief about L.M.'s consent it might be possible to conclude that he was incapable of understanding the nature and quality of his acts. Such a belief, however, would necessarily occur only in a very narrow set of circumstances. In my view, there is no evidence to support the existence of these circumstances in this case.

[64] The consent of another to a sexual interaction is both and legal and a moral concept. It is a legal concept insofar as it distinguishes that which is culpable from that which is not. It is a moral concept because it defines the difference between an entirely normal interaction and a morally repugnant interference with the bodily integrity of another.

[65] The law defines consent narrowly. Among other things, consent at law must be unequivocal, communicated and continuing. The absence of consent is defined as existing within the actus reus of the offence, and it is decided in reference to the state of mind of the complainant. R v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 at para. 25. Here, there was clearly no consent.

[66] The central question to be answered is this: Was Mr. Oyenuga's belief in L.M.'s consent affected by the operation of his delusional thinking? Accepting for the moment that Mr. Oyenuga was possessed of delusional thinking about L.M.'s attraction to him, it is still the case that the propriety of a belief in consent is not an all or nothing proposition. It depends on the facts that are presented.

[67] Here, the agreed facts include the proposition that L.M. previously asserted her lack of consent to sexual interactions with Mr. Oyenuga, perhaps repeatedly. More importantly for our purposes, however, the facts also demonstrate no actual communication of consent by L.M. towards Mr. Oyenuga. Furthermore, when Mr. Oyenuga made the impugned advance that resulted in him bending her over on the couch and pressing his groin against her buttocks, and then pulling her pants down, L.M. actively resisted and in fact fought back against him.

[68] In short, on the facts agreed, Mr. Oyenuga must have been aware that there was no communication of consent, and that his application of force had been met with resistance. No evidence in this case suggests that Mr. Oyenuga was unable to accurately assess quantifiable physical realities. Even if Mr. Oyenuga was possessed with a delusion-activated mistaken belief in L.M.'s consent at the outset of the interaction, his only legal recourse upon being presented with resistance was to immediately discontinue his actions. He did not do so and only ultimately stopped his advance when L.M. successfully physically extricated herself from his grasp. In the face of her strong and active resistance, Mr. Oyenuga's belief in her consent could not have existed and continued throughout the full and entire course of the interaction.

[69] Similarly, any original and exculpating delusional belief that Mr. Oyenuga might have had about L.M.'s consent could not have existed at the moment the sexual interaction began because there is no evidence she actively communicated her consent or that he believed she had done so.

[70] Although some evidence exists about Mr. Oyenuga's beliefs about L.M.'s attraction to him as a general matter, there is no evidence in this case that Mr. Oyenuga was suffering from a delusion that L.M. communicated her consent to this specific sex act at this specific time in some way. There is no evidence that Mr. Oyenuga was suffering from a delusion that L.M.'s clear no meant yes. Both would be required to constitute consent to the sexual interaction that was described.

[71] The foregoing obviously rests on a legal analysis. It is not one that Dr. Komer entertained. Dr. Komer adopted a broad or expansive approach to consent that did not explore the requirement that it be actively communicated and ongoing. That is unsurprising. This observation is not intended as a criticism of Dr. Komer. His expertise is that of a forensic psychiatrist. It is the Court's responsibility to conduct the s.16 analysis through a legal lens. That is why the ultimate issue must be decided by the court and not by an expert.

Consent and the Requirement to Know the Acts are Wrong

[72] It must be acknowledged that the question of whether Mr. Oyenuga ought to be held criminally responsible does not depend on an entirely legal analysis. The appropriate query when one examines whether an accused knew his actions were wrong has a moral dimension that requires an assessment of whether Mr. Oyenuga felt personally justified in his actions, and whether he saw his conduct as justified according to the norms of society. Dobson at para 24.

[73] The only appropriate conclusion to draw is that the socially-accepted moral dimension of appropriate sexual interactions between persons informs and sets the conditions for the legal requirements of consent in cases of sexual assault. Defining the norms of society as it pertains to the offence of sexual assault must have, as its starting point, an assessment based on societal views expressed through statute and jurisprudence.

[74] Society would not justify, excuse or countenance the actions of an individual who engaged sexually with another in the absence of communicated consent, or someone who did so despite a clearly communicated absence of continuing consent. Sexual assault presents as an area of the law where there is substantial if not perfect legal and moral overlap. As a particularly stigmatized crime against the person, the offence of sexual assault can be distinguished both from offences that are more regulatory in nature, and that may not express a moral component.

[75] Even if I was to accept Dr. Komer's conclusion that Mr. Oyenuga was operating under a deluded belief that L.M. was generally attracted to or welcoming of sexual advances by him, there is not a sufficient evidentiary foundation presented in this case that would allow me to conclude that any such delusion extended to a false belief that L.M. communicated consent to this sexual act or that her clear "no" somehow meant a clear "yes". In the absence of evidence of such a delusion, the only appropriate conclusion that may be drawn in my view is that Mr. Oyenuga did in fact understand that his actions were unjustified and morally wrong.

[76] Mr. Oyenuga's ongoing physical assault of L.M., expressed in the s.279(2) offence is also important to consider. That charge reflects Mr. Oyenuga's effort to prevent L.M.'s flight to safety or to return her to the apartment where he had just touched her over her clear resistance. The facts presented about the forcible confinement demonstrate some evidence of the existence of a mind that was not operating under a delusion of any consent, let alone a contemporaneously communicated and ongoing consent.

[77] It is more likely that Mr. Oyenuga's attempt to confine L.M. was indicative of a recognition that he had offended against her. It either represented an extension of his original effort to sexually assault her, or it was an effort to prevent her from fleeing so that she could escape to safety. Either way, given that these actions were effectively contemporaneous to the sexual assault against L.M., they are difficult to square with a concept of a belief that she had consented to his advance.

[78] Mr. Oyenuga's relatively proximate statement to the police in which he deployed an obviously false version of the events supports this assessment. Although one must hold open the possibility that Mr. Oyenuga's lie to the police about L.M. accidentally coming into contact with him was an ex post facto gained consciousness of guilt, there is no evidence to support the suggestion that Mr. Oyenuga's purported delusions were markedly transient, fragile or capable of being resolved within hours of the commission of the offence. Given the temporal connection to the sexual assault, Mr. Oyenuga's effort to mislead the police was more consistent with a recognition of wrongdoing that was present at the time of the offence than it is to the contrary inference.

Conclusion

[79] As the Crown concedes, and as Dr. Komer contends, I find that Mr. Oyenuga was suffering from a disease of the mind at the time of the offence. His pre-existing mental health difficulties were, without doubt, adversely affected by his decision to consume crystal methamphetamine at the time of or shortly before this offence was committed.

[80] Although I have drawn conclusions that Mr. Oyenuga understood the nature and quality of his acts, and knew that they were wrong, such a finding is not required to dispose of this Application.

[81] Dr. Komer is a highly experienced and very respected forensic psychiatrist. He spent considerable effort on this matter and attempted to assist the court to the very best of his abilities. The Court is grateful for his assistance in this case.

[82] Unfortunately though, the information provided by Mr. Oyenuga to Dr. Komer, and the evidence presented to this court through the Agreed Statement of Facts demonstrates a lack of reliability on the part of Mr. Oyenuga. He has, by obvious inference, also resorted to deception and obfuscation in his dealings with Dr. Komer.

[83] The information that provided the foundation for the opinion was shot through with inconsistencies. Mr. Oyenuga was neither a reliable nor a credible source of information. The theories of command-direction and a consent-delusion that were relied upon by Dr. Komer are alternative and, in my view, are not reconcilable.

[84] Neither proposition pointed to by Dr. Komer strongly supports a legal conclusion that Mr. Oyenuga was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his actions, nor of knowing that his actions were wrong.

[85] Given the inherent weakness in the source material, I conclude that the weight that I can attribute to the reports and testimony of Dr. Komer are insufficient to permit the Defence to bear its onus to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Oyenuga should be found not criminally responsible on account of a mental disorder.

[86] I conclude therefore that the presumption found at s.16(2) of the Criminal Code remains intact. Mr. Oyenuga will not be exempted from criminal responsibility in this matter by reason of a mental disorder.

Released: September 25, 2025

Signed: Justice M.T. Poland