ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
DATE: 2025 05 02
B E T W E E N :
CITY OF TORONTO
— AND —
ALI AKBAR ROSTAMI, PARMINDER SINGH, PARAMANATHAN PARAMESWARAN
Before Justice Rondinelli
Heard on February 19, 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on May 2, 2025
V. Pankou ............................................................................................... Municipal Prosecutor
Parminder Singh and Paramanathan Parameswaran attended in person
Nobody appeared for Ali Akbar Rostami
Rondinelli J.:
Introduction
[1] The City of Toronto brings this joint appeal against three separate respondents. Each respondent was separately sentenced by Justice of the Peace N. Tahiri on August 12, 2024. Each of the respondents was charged with a red light camera offence, contrary to s. 144(18.1) of the Highway Traffic Act (“HTA”). While this charge carries a prescribed minimum fine, the Justice of the Peace instead imposed fines below the statutory minimum fine.
[2] In reducing the fines, the City of Toronto claims the Justice of the Peace failed to properly apply s. 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act (“POA”). That section provides “where in the opinion of the court exceptional circumstances exist so that to impose the minimum fine would be unduly oppressive or otherwise not in the interests of justice, the court may impose a fine that is less than the minimum or suspend the sentence.”
The Fines Imposed by the Justice of the Peace
[3] Ali Akbar Rostami pleaded guilty to a red light camera offence, contrary to s. 144(18.1) of the HTA. The following exchange then occurred between the Justice of the Peace and the prosecutor:
The Court: Madam Prosecutor, the set fine is $260. Madam Prosecutor is requesting the minimum fine which is $200 but I am going to impose $100.
A. Rostami: I appreciate it. Thank you very much.
The Prosecutor: Your Worship. Just for the record, was there anything the Court heard in regard to s. 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act that allowed you to go below the minimum, by statute not laid out by the Prosecution but by the statute?
The Court: Yes, all the circumstances of the charge, there was some issue of delay which I ignored in favour of the prosecutor. I have a docket comprised of fifteen charges, mostly red-light camera. If I were to canvas everybody and see if whether there is a ground to grant relief, I do not have that time. The judge who made the decision about the set fine probably had one case for the whole docket. And if I had one case, probably my decision would’ve been different. But also, I have a trial management responsibility here as a Judge and I have to see (inaudible) the docket should be completed in a reasonable time. All those considerations which is not probably in the mind of the prosecutor is in my mind when I am making a decision. That is why I am going to impose $100.
[4] The wife of Parminder Singh pleaded guilty on his behalf to a red light camera offence contrary to s. 144(18.1) of the HTA. The prosecutor again sought the minimum fine of $200 and the following exchange ensued:
The Court: The set fine is $260. Madam Prosecutor is requesting the minimum fine which is $200. But, given all the circumstances, I’m going to impose $100.
The Prosecutor: And, Your Worship, did the Court hear anything in regards to going below the minimum fine, taking into consideration section 59(2)?
The Court: As I indicated, given all the circumstances, I will reduce it to $100.
[5] Paramanathan Parameswaran pleaded guilty to a red light camera offence, contrary to s. 144(18.1) of the HTA and the Justice of the Peace again reduced the fine below the minimum fine, stating:
The Court: I find you guilty. Set fine is two hundred and sixty dollars. Madam Prosecutor is requesting two hundred dollars which is the minimum fine, but given all of the circumstances I am going to impose one hundred dollars sir, okay?
P. Parameswaran: Yes, I accept.
The Prosecutor: For the record, did the Court hear anything under section 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act on this last matter? To impose one hundred dollars?
The Court: No. I exercised my jurisdiction as trial management court. That I have to look at all of these charges that are before me and I have to conclude in a reasonable time and if I had the time to explore that and see whether there is a reason to exercise my jurisdiction relief from paying the minimum fine, I would’ve done this but I have to (inaudible) the minor traffic and also I have five charges of hand-held communication device. So therefore, I don’t have the time and given all of the circumstances I chose to lower the fine.
The Governing Principles
[6] The Court of Appeal has provided interpretive guidance for applying s. 59(2) in Ontario (Environment, Conservation and Parks) v. Henry of Pelham Inc., 2018 ONCA 999 (“Henry of Pelham”). In discussing the importance of minimum fines in provincial legislation, the Court held at para. 44, “[M]inimum fines must be imposed unless the defendant satisfies the court that exceptional circumstances exist that justify the exercise of the court’s discretion to provide relief.” The Court further noted at para. 54 that the key to the exercise of the discretionary power to provide relief from a minimum fine under s. 59(2) is that the court must find that a minimum fine is either 1) unduly oppressive; or 2) otherwise not in the interests of justice.
Analysis
[7] In reducing the fines in the cases before the court, the Justice of the Peace did not expressly address the test under s. 59(2), but he appears to have relied on the “interests of justice” prong of the test since no defendant addressed situations of personal hardship, nor did the Justice of the Peace make inquiries of their financial situations.
[8] While the “unduly oppressive” prong of the s. 59(2) test deals with addressing personal situations, “the interests of justice” prong allows consideration of broader residual concerns like maintaining public confidence in the regulatory process. Since the “interests of justice” term is used in a variety of contexts and is vague in nature, the Court in Henry of Pelham declined to enumerate the factors that are properly considered in determining the interests of justice: see Henry of Pelham at paras. 58-59. The Court did, however, provide some general principles to consider. First, the discretion to granting relief against a minimum fine on the basis that it would not be in the interests of justice to impose the minimum fine cannot be exercised arbitrarily: see Henry of Pelham at para. 60. Second, a court must consider not only the interests of an individual offender but also the interests of the community protected by the relevant public welfare legislation. As the Court highlighted at para. 61, “[T]he discretionary power authorized by the POA must be exercised against the backdrop of the Legislature’s decision to emphasize deterrence by means of a system of minimum fines.” Lastly, trial jurists must provide reasons that explain and justify their exercise of discretion in accordance with s. 59(2): see Henry of Pelham at para. 62.
[9] It is clear from Henry of Pelham, that a trial jurist’s discretion prescribed under s. 59(2) is important, but it is not a judicial power that remains unfettered. As far back as the 19th Century, Lord Halsbury observed in Sharp v. Wakefield, [1891] A.C. 173 at p. 179:
An extensive power is confided to the justices in their capacity as justices to be exercised judicially; and “discretion” means when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities that that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion…It is to be, not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular.
[10] The dicta of Lord Halsbury was adopted by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in Doiron v. Haché, 2005 NBCA 75 at para. 57. The Court went on to explain at para. 57 that “to exercise discretion means to choose between two or more reasonable options. The choice must be made considering the applicable law and guiding principles and on a proper understanding of the facts.”
[11] In my view, the Justice of the Peace acted in an arbitrary manner in imposing the fines with respect to all three defendants. Undoubtedly, Justices of the Peace deal with heavy dockets in this region – whether it be in a case management court or a POA trial court. To that end, Justices of the Peace do an admirable job navigating long, grueling days. And while it may be easy to empathize with the Justice of the Peace in this case who was dealing with a busy list, the law requires more of the Justice of the Peace. Indeed, the interests of justice demands it.
[12] Application of s. 59(2) does not depend on the size of a docket. In the cases before the court, the Justice of the Peace was dealing with minor tickets that carried no driver liability (i.e. no demerit points) and relatively low minimum fines. In my view, even with self-represented defendants, the inquiry expected of Justices of the Peace under s. 59(2) in such circumstances is not complicated. For example, “Are you able to pay the minimum fine? If not, why?” are simple, straightforward questions that could be asked when dealing with minor traffic tickets. Depending on the defendant’s answer, a Justice of the Peace should be able to quickly apply the test under s. 59(2) within the parameters set out in Henry of Pelham and provide short oral reasons explaining why a fine reduction is justified or unwarranted. In this case, the Justice of the Peace did spend some time inquiring about the history of the delay of the matters before him. No similar consideration was given to the s. 59(2) test. As such, the Justice of the Peace imposed the fines in an arbitrary fashion.
Conclusion
[13] For all of the above reasons, I have concluded that the Justice of the Peace erred in applying s. 59(2) in a manner that is inconsistent with the guidance set out in Henry of Pelham.
[14] Although I would allow the appeal, the fines imposed at trial shall remain the same, since the City of Toronto requested that the fines not be increased should the appeal succeed.
Released: May 2, 2025
Justice V. Rondinelli