Warning
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Ontario Court of Justice
DATE: 2025-05-05
COURT FILE No.: 23-48101907
Toronto Region
BETWEEN:
His Majesty the King
— AND —
M.G.
Before Justice Cidalia C. G. Faria
Heard on March 14, 2025
Reasons for Ruling on Admissibility of Accused Utterance released on May 5, 2025
Seeta Scully — counsel for the Crown
Anne Marie Morphew — counsel for the accused M.G.
Faria J.:
I. Overview
[1] M.G. is charged with one count of assault, and two counts of sexual assault against his former wife L.S.B. contrary to ss. 266 and 271 of the Criminal Code.
[2] Evidence was heard on November 18, 19 and 20, 2024, and April 4 and 7, 2025. At the end of the Crown’s case, the Defence applied for a ruling on the admissibility of an utterance the complainant testified M.G. made in early 2007. Specifically, L.S.B. testified M.G. admitted he “raped” her, the term she prefers, during a joint therapy session just over 18 years ago.
II. Evidence
[3] L.S.B. testified M.G. raped her in December 2006. Shortly thereafter, she spoke to M.G.’s older sister. L.S.B. told his sister that M.G. had raped her. M.G.’s sister suggested she go to therapy, and gave her the name of her own therapist, Maureen Toms.
[4] L.S.B. testified she contacted Ms. Toms and made an appointment. She went to 3 counselling sessions alone, and then told M.G. that he had to attend with her to a joint counselling session with Ms. Toms to discuss the “rape” in a “safe environment.”
[5] At the joint therapy session in late January or early February 2007, L.S.B. testified the rape was “discussed in length.”
[6] L.S.B. specifically testified that when M.G. was confronted with the rape, he “denied” and “lied.” She testified:
“He denied, he lied. The therapist was able to speak to him and she asked him twice, she didn’t use the word rape. She asked him twice if he had taken me and he got very upset. He was sitting on a chair with arms on my left side, he punched them, the chair, stood up, and Maureen that he had taken me and then he looked at me and he said yes, I took you. And then he went for the door, he started putting his shoes on and there some conversation between Maureen and him. She was able to bring him back to the chair. He sat on the chair with his shoes on and he looked at her and he said that he was sorry for taking me. And then he looked at me and he said that he was sorry for hurting me.” [1]
[7] When asked what she understood M.G. to be apologizing to her about, L.S.B. responded “by raping me.”
[8] In cross-examination, L.S.B. was insistent that the only reason she and M.G. went to the joint counselling was to “discuss about the rape,” although in her insistence that it was only about the rape, and that it was “absolutely not true” that they were to discuss issues in their relationship, she also states, “The purpose was to discuss about the rape that was caused to the alcohol, and the abuse I was receiving from him.” [2]
III. Position of the Parties
[9] Counsel for M.G. submits there is insufficient context available for the court to determine the meaning of the words L.S.B. testified M.G. uttered. She argues the “admission” is a partial statement, allegedly made 18 years ago, and neither the totality, nor significant portions of what was said during the entire “lengthy” therapy session “discussing the rape” are provided. Therefore, the admission evidence is inadmissible.
[10] The Crown submits the admission evidence is admissible; the issues Counsel raises go to weight. The Crown argues that L.S.B. is clear the therapy session was about the “rape” of December 2006, she is specific about the question and answer portion of the session that led to M.G.’s admission, when it occurred during the session, and the actions of the three parties in the room at the time.
IV. Legal Principles
[11] R. v. Schneider, 2022 SCC 34 is the leading authority on the relevant principles relating to the admission and use of incomplete statements.
[12] R. v. Merritt, 2023 ONCA 3 succinctly summarizes the principles:
…it is settled law that where a partial or incomplete statement is offered into evidence as a party admission but lacks sufficient context to give meaning to the words, that partial or incomplete statement is irrelevant and lacks probative value. It is therefore inadmissible. (para. 63)
[13] Merritt quotes Rowe J. in Schneider who stressed:
That the first prerequisite to admission is ‘whether what the witness overheard had meaning, such that it was relevant to an issue at trial’, what he called ‘logical relevance’. He explained that if a jury can give meaning to the statement the accused made in a manner that is non-speculative in light of all the evidence, testimony about that statement is relevant and admissible unless excluded as a matter of discretion because its probative value is outweighed by the risk of prejudice it presents: Schneider, at para. 44-45, 63-64, 79. (para. 68)
[14] The Court in Merritt goes on to state at para 75:
The admissibility of incomplete statement evidence requires relevance, which is determined as a matter of logic and human experience by inquiring whether the evidence tends to increase or decrease the probability of the existence of a fact at issue. (Schneider at paras. 39, 76). If the meaning of the statement offered as an admission cannot be determined, it cannot logically increase or decrease the probability of the existence of a fact in issue and therefore does not meet even the low threshold of relevance.
V. Analysis and Findings
[15] L.S.B. testified unequivocally that she told M.G.’s sister her brother raped her in December 2006. L.S.B. obtained the name of a therapist from this sister. She attended several sessions on her own and then scheduled a joint therapy session with M.G. to specifically “discuss the rape” in early 2007.
[16] L.S.B. testified, again unequivocally, that during this specific session, 18 years ago, set to discuss the “rape,” and where they discussed the rape “at length,” the therapist asked M.G. directly if he had “taken” L.S.B. She testified he responded with “yes, I took you” and he apologized for hurting her. She testified M.G. banged the arms of his chair, he went to the door, he put on his shoes, and he came back to the chair before he made the admission. She also testified “take” referred to the rape of December 2006.
[17] L.S.B.’s testimony included when the admission was made, in response to what question, by whom, where, and when, in addition to a description of M.G.’s physical choreography during the making of the admission. She testified the only people in the room were M.G., the therapist and herself.
[18] The evidence provides the context for the admission to be a joint therapy session in early 2007. The session was scheduled to discuss a rape allegation of December 2006, the same rape allegation at issue at this trial. The therapist confronted M.G. with the rape accusation, and the admission is made in response to the accusation.
[19] In this case, the context is sufficient to give meaning to the words alleged to have been said that is non-speculative in light of all the evidence. The admission evidence is relevant to the core issue at trial of the December 2006 sexual assault charge. The probative value, given the relevance to the issue at trial, outweighs the prejudicial effect.
[20] Counsel’s submissions that this partial conversation alleged to have taken place 18 years ago, in a disputed context and for a disputed purpose, and without specific details about the “lengthy” discussion of this rape, will be relevant to the weight of this incomplete admission utterance, but they are not persuasive on the issue of whether the admission evidence is admissible.
VI. Conclusion
[21] The admission evidence that M.G. said during a joint therapy session in 2007, “yes” he had “taken” L.S.B. and that he was “sorry,” is admissible.
Released: May 5, 2025
Signed: Justice Cidalia C. G. Faria
[1] Transcript: November 18, 2024, pgs. 33-34.
[2] Transcript: April 7, 2025, pg. 6.
**Summary:**
This decision addresses the admissibility of an accused’s utterance made during a joint therapy session approximately 18 years prior, where the accused allegedly admitted to “taking” the complainant, a term understood to mean rape. The court found that the context provided by the complainant’s testimony was sufficient to give non-speculative meaning to the admission, making it relevant and admissible evidence. The ruling clarifies the application of the principles from *R. v. Schneider* and *R. v. Merritt* regarding incomplete statements and their admissibility based on logical relevance and probative value.
**Interesting Citation Summary:**
The case is notable for its application of the leading Supreme Court authority in *R. v. Schneider* (2022 SCC 34) and the Ontario Court of Appeal’s summary in *R. v. Merritt* (2023 ONCA 3) on the admissibility of partial or incomplete statements as party admissions. It highlights the threshold of logical relevance and the necessity of sufficient context to avoid speculative interpretation, reinforcing the evidentiary standards for admission of statements made outside of court.
**Keywords:**
- M.G.
- L.S.B.
- Sexual assault
- Admission evidence
- Joint therapy session
- R. v. Schneider
- R. v. Merritt
- Criminal Code ss. 266, 271, 486.4, 486.6
- Incomplete statements
- Logical relevance
- Probative value
- Ontario Court of Justice
**Area of Law:**
- Criminal Law