Warning

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

This is a case under the Youth Criminal Justice Act and is subject to subsections 110(1) and 111(1) and section 129 of the Act. These provisions read as follows:

110. IDENTITY OF OFFENDER NOT TO BE PUBLISHED —(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act.

111. IDENTITY OF VICTIM OR WITNESS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED —(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a young person.

112. NO SUBSEQUENT DISCLOSURE — No person who is given access to a record or to whom information is disclosed under this Act shall disclose that information to any person unless the disclosure is authorized under this Act.

Subsection 138(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply with these provisions, states as follows:

138. OFFENCES — Every person who contravenes subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity of victim or witness not to be published) . . . or section 129 (no subsequent disclosure) . . .

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Court and Parties

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

DATE: 2024 04 17 Newmarket, Ontario

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

K.W., a young person.

Before: Justice R.M. Robinson

Heard on: 29 August 2023, 15 November 2023 and 26 March 2024

Reasons for Judgment released on: 17 April 2024

Counsel: Stephanie Henderson, counsel for the Crown Richard Fedorowicz, counsel for the young person K.W.

ROBINSON J.:

I – Introduction

[1] On 29 August 2023, K.W. entered a guilty plea to robbery (stealing while armed with an offensive weapon or imitation thereof) pursuant to s.343 (d) of the Criminal Code (“CC”). I must now determine the appropriate sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (“YCJA”).

[2] At the time of the offence, K.W. was 15 years old. He is now 16.

II – The Offence

[3] On 21 December 2022, K.W. entered the Com Pho The Ky restaurant at 7-3232 Steeles Avenue West, Vaughan, while staff and patrons were present. He produced what appeared to be a handgun and pointed it at the staff. K.W. took $500 from the cash register and then fled.

[4] With the assistance of air support, the police followed K.W. into a wooded area where he was ultimately arrested. In the vicinity of K.W.’s arrest, the police located a BB gun.

[5] No victim impact statements were provided by any of the staff or patrons who were present during the robbery.

III – The Offender

[6] I have had the benefit of receiving and reviewing a Pre-Disposition Report [“PDR”] dated 8 November 2023 by Tyler Heffernan, Probation Officer, as well as a Section 34 YCJA Assessment dated 22 February 2024 prepared by Dr. Teresa Grimbos, Clinical and Forensic Psychologist, and Ms. Lauren Hytman, Psychology Practicum Student, both at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

[7] To say that K.W. had a difficult upbringing would be a gross understatement.

[8] K.W. was born in a refugee camp in Thailand near the Myanmar border in 2007. K.W.’s mother left the refugee camp when he was one year old to seek employment elsewhere. K.W. had limited contact with his mother through Facebook thereafter and has never met his father.

[9] Upon his mother’s departure, K.W.’s maternal aunt became his primary caregiver even though she was only 12 years old at the time. K.W.’s maternal grandparents and maternal uncle also assisted in raising him in the refugee camp.

[10] K.W. immigrated to Canada at the age of eight, accompanied by his maternal grandmother, his maternal aunt and his maternal uncle. They settled in the Jane Street and Steeles Avenue West area of Toronto. Although K.W.’s maternal grandmother has legal guardianship of him, she does not speak any English and now suffers from dementia.

[11] Upon his arrival in Canada, K.W. was placed in a grade 3 class at B. Public School despite having only attended kindergarten and grade 1 in the Thai refugee camp and despite his difficulties with the English language. K.W. attended E. Public School for grades 4 and 5. It is unclear from the materials before me which school(s) K.W. attended for grades 6, 7 and 8. He completed grades 9 and 10 at W.C. Secondary School.

[12] K.W. reported finding school boring, which is not surprising considering his social and linguistic isolation. His marks throughout elementary and secondary school were mostly comprised of C’s and D’s. Some behavioural issues were noted in his Ontario Student Record. It does not appear that meaningful efforts were made to craft an individualized educational plan for K.W..

[13] It appears that K.W. has had difficulty connecting socially with peers and engaging in social activities.

[14] Dr. Grimbos and Ms. Hytman conducted psychoeducational testing on K.W. and found him to demonstrate challenges across all academic areas. In their opinion, he meets the criteria for a Mild Intellectual Disability (“MID”) and requires significant supports in order to complete his high school credits and pursue further education.

[15] During participation in the mental health evaluation, K.W. tended to minimize and underreport his problems and concerns. He appeared to consider the expression of emotion as a sign of weakness.

[16] One significant concern consistently expressed by K.W. was financial: the prospect of having no job, no money and no stable housing.

[17] Although K.W. did not meet the criteria for Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), his mental health evaluation indicated that he has some ADHD-like challenges that may be better understood in the context of his MID diagnosis.

[18] With respect to the offence before the court, K.W. indicated that it was unplanned. Beyond that, he was unsure what made him do it other than the motivation to acquire money. K.W. did express regret, particularly for pointing the weapon at the restaurant employee. He acknowledged that he alone was to blame for his conduct.

[19] From his arrest in December 2022 to November 2023, K.W. was bound by a house arrest as part of his release conditions. In November 2023, the house arrest was replaced with a curfew that remains in place to this day. No problems have been reported with K.W.’s compliance.

[20] In September 2023, K.W. moved to Windsor with his maternal aunt and maternal grandmother. The primary motivation of K.W.’s maternal aunt for the move was to live in a smaller city with less potential negative influences for K.W..

[21] In September 2023, K.W. began grade 11 at R. Secondary School in Windsor, a school that does not offer English as a Second Language (“ESL”) classes. When efforts were made to enrol K.W. at a school that did offer ESL classes, that school turned him away because “he has been in Canada for many years.”

[22] As a result of multiple suspensions for behavioural issues, as well as his own truancy, K.W. has missed most of his grade 11 school year at R. Secondary School. In November 2023, K.W. was excluded from the school.

[23] K.W. was referred to N., a program in Windsor for youth involved in the criminal justice system. He has recently started attending classes at the school component of N.

[24] Extensive recommendations and supports were highlighted by Dr. Grimbos and Ms. Hytman in the Section 34 Assessment.

[25] K.W. has no prior convictions and comes before me as a youthful first offender. He spent three actual days in pre-sentence custody as a result of these charges.

IV – The Crown’s Position

[26] Ms. Henderson submits that a custody (6 months) and supervision (3 months) order, pursuant to s.42(2)(n) YCJA, followed by a period of probation, pursuant to s.42(2)(k) YCJA, is necessary to reflect the extremely serious nature of the crime committed by K.W..

[27] In addition, Ms. Henderson seeks a weapon prohibition (mandatory) for 5 years pursuant to s.51 YCJA, as well as a DNA order pursuant to s. 487.051(1) CC.

V – The Defence Position

[28] Mr. Fedorowicz reminds me of the difficult early years in K.W.’s life and submits that a carefully constructed probation order would best address the paramount sentencing considerations of rehabilitation and reintegration into society. In support of this position, Mr. Fedorowicz points to the significant positive changes K.W. has made since the time of his arrest.

[29] Mr. Fedorowicz concedes that a custodial disposition is statutorily available in light of the circumstances of the offence but argues that jail would be inappropriate given the circumstances of this offender.

VI – The Youth Criminal Justice Act

1. General Principles

[30] Adults and young persons are dealt with differently in our criminal justice system for a good reason. Indeed, the YCJA recognizes that young persons are not yet developmentally mature and are, therefore, less morally blameworthy than their adult counterparts. As a result, rehabilitation and reintegration play a prominent role in the YCJA.

[31] The Declaration of Principle in s.3 of the YCJA holds that:

3(1) The following principles apply in this Act:

(a) the youth criminal justice system is intended to protect the public by

(i) holding young persons accountable through measures that are proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the young person,

(ii) promoting the rehabilitation and reintegration of young persons who have committed offences, and

(iii) supporting the prevention of crime by referring young persons to programs or agencies in the community to address the circumstances underlying their offending behaviour;

(b) the criminal justice system for young persons must be separate from that of adults, must be based on the principle of diminished moral blameworthiness or culpability and must emphasize the following:

(i) rehabilitation and reintegration,

(ii) fair and proportionate accountability that is consistent with the greater dependency of young persons and their reduced level of maturity,

(iii) enhanced procedural protection to ensure that young persons are treated fairly and that their rights, including their right to privacy, are protected,

(iv) timely intervention that reinforces the link between the offending behaviour and its consequences, and

(v) the promptness and speed with which persons responsible for enforcing this Act must act, given young persons’ perception of time;

(c) within the limits of fair and proportionate accountability, the measures taken against young persons who commit offences should

(i) reinforce respect for societal values,

(ii) encourage the repair of harm done to victims and the community,

(iii) be meaningful for the individual young person given his or her needs and level of development and, where appropriate, involve the parents, the extended family, the community and social or other agencies in the young person’s rehabilitation and reintegration, and

(iv) respect gender, ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences and respond to the needs of aboriginal young persons and of young persons with special requirements; and

(d) special considerations apply in respect of proceedings against young persons and, in particular,

(i) young persons have rights and freedoms in their own right, such as a right to be heard in the course of and to participate in the processes, other than the decision to prosecute, that lead to decisions that affect them, and young persons have special guarantees of their rights and freedoms,

(ii) victims should be treated with courtesy, compassion and respect for their dignity and privacy and should suffer the minimum degree of inconvenience as a result of their involvement with the youth criminal justice system,

(iii) victims should be provided with information about the proceedings and given an opportunity to participate and be heard, and

(iv) parents should be informed of measures or proceedings involving their children and encouraged to support them in addressing their offending behaviour.

2. Sentencing Purpose and Principles

[32] Echoing the language of the Declaration of Principle, s.38(1) of the YCJA holds that the purpose of sentencing is accountability through the imposition of just sanctions with meaningful consequences that promote rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

[33] The principles of sentencing under the YCJA are set out in ss.38(2) and (3) as follows:

38(2) A youth justice court that imposes a youth sentence on a young person shall determine the sentence in accordance with the principles set out in section 3 and the following principles:

(a) the sentence must not result in a punishment that is greater than the punishment that would be appropriate for an adult who has been convicted of the same offence committed in similar circumstances;

(b) the sentence must be similar to the sentences imposed in the region on similar young persons found guilty of the same offence committed in similar circumstances;

(c) the sentence must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the young person for that offence;

(d) all available sanctions other than custody that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all young persons, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal young persons;

(e) subject to paragraph (c), the sentence must

(i) be the least restrictive sentence that is capable of achieving the purpose set out in subsection (1),

(ii) be the one that is most likely to rehabilitate the young person and reintegrate him or her into society, and

(iii) promote a sense of responsibility in the young person, and an acknowledgement of the harm done to victims and the community;

(e.1) if this Act provides that a youth justice court may impose conditions as part of the sentence, a condition may be imposed only if

(i) the imposition of the condition is necessary to achieve the purpose set out in subsection 38(1),

(ii) the young person will reasonably be able to comply with the condition, and

(iii) the condition is not used as a substitute for appropriate child protection, mental health or other social measures; and

(f) subject to paragraph (c), the sentence may have the following objectives:

(i) to denounce unlawful conduct, and

(ii) to deter the young person from committing offences.

38(3) In determining a youth sentence, the youth justice court shall take into account

(a) the degree of participation by the young person in the commission of the offence;

(b) the harm done to victims and whether it was intentional or reasonably foreseeable;

(c) any reparation made by the young person to the victim or the community;

(d) the time spent in detention by the young person as a result of the offence;

(e) the previous findings of guilt of the young person; and

(f) any other aggravating and mitigating circumstances related to the young person or the offence that are relevant to the purpose and principles set out in this section.

[34] In determining a just sentence – i.e. one that is proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the moral culpability of K.W. – the YCJA directs that I shall apply the following principles:

• Parity (s.38(2)(b))
• Rehabilitation (s.38(2)(e)(ii))
• Reintegration into society (s.38(2)(e)(ii))
• Restraint (ss.38(2)(d) and 38(2)(e)(i))

[35] S.38(2)(f) provides that I may apply the principles of denunciation and specific deterrence.

[36] Chief Justice Lamer explained the principle of denunciation in the following terms:

The objective of denunciation mandates that a sentence should also communicate society’s condemnation of that particular offender’s conduct. In short, a sentence with a denunciatory element represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender’s conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society’s basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law… Our criminal law is also a system of values. A sentence which expresses denunciation is simply the means by which these values are communicated. In short, in addition to attaching negative consequences to undesirable behaviour, judicial sentences should also be imposed in a manner which positively instills the basic set of communal values shared by all Canadians as expressed by the Criminal Code.

[37] Unlike the adult sentencing regime, general deterrence as a sentencing principle is inapplicable in the youth context:

…when the statute speaks of “accountability” or requires that “meaningful consequences” be imposed, the language expressly targets the young offender before the court: “ensures that a young person is subject to meaningful consequences” (s.3(1)(a)(iii)); “accountability that is consistent with the greater dependency of young persons and their reduced level of maturity” (s.3(1)(b)(ii)); “be meaningful for the individual young person given his or her needs and level of development” (s.3(1)(c)(iii)). Parliament has made it equally clear in the French version that these principles are offender-centric and not aimed at the general public… In my view, the words of the statute can only support the conclusion that Parliament deliberately excluded general deterrence as a factor of youth sentencing.

VII – Analysis

1. Custody

[38] Both Ms. Henderson and Mr. Fedorowicz agree that the custody gate in this case is open – i.e. custody is statutorily available. I agree.

[39] S.39(1)(a) directs that a youth justice court shall not commit a young person to custody unless the young person has committed a violent offence.

[40] S.2(1)(b) defines a “violent offence” as an attempt or a threat to commit an offence that includes as an element the causing of bodily harm. Bodily harm includes physical or psychological harm.

[41] K.W. robbing a restaurant with what appeared to be a handgun, at a minimum, constitutes an attempt or threat to cause psychological harm to the victims. I find support for this conclusion in Justice West’s reasons in R. v. D.D.:

In my view the robbery of a convenience store’s two clerks, where an imitation handgun is brandished by one of the perpetrators although not the young person being sentenced, even if the clerk believes the handgun is fake and not real, is an attempt or threat by the perpetrators to cause bodily harm to the clerks if they do not comply with the perpetrators’ demands. Bodily harm includes both physical harm as well as psychological harm (see R. v. McGraw, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72, which defined “serious bodily harm” as “any hurt or injury, whether physical or psychological, that interferes in a substantial way with the physical or psychological integrity, health or well-being of the complainant”). It follows “bodily harm” would include any hurt or injury, whether physical or psychological that interferes in any way with the physical or psychological integrity, health or well-being of the complainant.

[42] Having concluded that the custody gate is open, I must go on to apply the provisions in s.39(2) which prohibit me from imposing custody unless I have considered all alternatives to custody that are reasonable in the circumstances and determined that there is not a reasonable alternative that is in accordance with the purpose and principles in s.38.

[43] In assessing the reasonable alternatives to custody, s.39(3) requires that I take into account:

(a) The alternatives to custody that are available;

(b) The likelihood that the young person will comply with a non-custodial sentence, taking into account his or her compliance with previous non-custodial sentences; and

(c) The alternatives to custody that have been used in respect of young persons for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.

[44] If I were to accede to Ms. Henderson’s request for actual custody (as opposed to a deferred custody and supervision order), I would be focusing almost exclusively on the principle of denunciation to the exclusion of the other sentencing principles. A custodial sentence in jail would perhaps address the extremely serious circumstances of the offence but would inadequately address the very particular circumstances of this offender.

[45] In coming to the conclusion that actual custody is not warranted in the present case, I have considered the following factors among others:

(a) K.W. was less than 15 years and 4 months old at the time of the offence. He was, and is, a child.

(b) The formative years of K.W.’s life were unimaginably traumatic. He was born in a Thai refugee camp and separated from his parents immediately and permanently.

(c) K.W.’s integration to Canada has been fraught with countless obstacles. He immigrated to Toronto at the age of eight with his maternal grandmother, maternal aunt and maternal uncle. His maternal grandmother, who has legal guardianship of him, does not speak any English and suffers from dementia. K.W.’s difficulty with the English language has understandably caused his performance at school (and his enthusiasm for school) to suffer. In many respects, the school system has failed him as he has been deemed not proficient enough in English for regular classes, but no longer eligible for ESL classes because “he has been in Canada for many years.”

(d) K.W. has been socially isolated since arriving in Canada, failing to form meaningful friendships and unable to connect with a social network that speaks his mother tongue, K[…].

(e) The results of the s.34 Assessment indicate that K.W. suffers from Mild Intellectual Disability with ADHD-like challenges. It appears that these conditions were previously undiagnosed and, therefore, unaddressed.

(f) The s.34 Assessment identified K.W.’s persistent fear of poverty and homelessness. It also identified K.W.’s belief that recognizing his concerns and emotions was a sign of weakness. None of this is surprising, considering that K.W. grew up in a refugee camp, forced to fend for himself in the face of constant instability. Thrust into the English school system in Canada, K.W. was again largely left to fend for himself.

(g) I note that the offence committed by K.W. was financially motivated, which is not surprising given his persistent fear of poverty and homelessness.

(h) I accept that K.W.’s expression of remorse for his actions is genuine. In this regard, I consider his guilty plea to be an important mitigating factor.

(i) K.W.’s situation has changed drastically in the 15 months since his arrest. He and his family have relocated to Windsor, a smaller city away from negative peer influences in Toronto. K.W. has been referred to N., a program in Windsor for youth involved in the criminal justice system. He has recently started attending classes at the school component of N.

(j) K.W. spent three days in pre-sentence custody after his arrest in December 2022. From December 2022 to November 2023, he was bound by a house arrest as part of his release conditions. From November 2023 to present, he has been bound by a curfew. There have been no concerns regarding his compliance.

2. Probation

[46] In my view, the term of probation suggested by Mr. Fedorowicz would not be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of K.W., as required by s.38(2)(c).

[47] Although denunciation is not the pre-dominant sentencing principle, it is nonetheless an important sentencing principle for me to consider given the aggravating nature of an armed robbery at a restaurant.

[48] I note the findings in the s.34 Assessment that K.W. “may not be ready to make changes in his life or engage in treatment” and that he is “assessed to be in the (lower end of the) Moderate risk range for continued behavioural difficulties”. A term of probation, alone, would not adequately address the important sentencing principle of specific deterrence.

3. Deferred Custody

[49] In my view, a deferred custody and supervision order, followed by a term of probation, would meet all of the relevant sentencing objectives in this case.

[50] S.42(5) provides that:

The court may make a deferred custody and supervision order under paragraph (2)(p) if

(a) The young person is found guilty of an offence other than one in the commission of which a young person causes or attempts to cause serious bodily harm; and

(b) It is consistent with the purpose and principles set out in section 38 and the restrictions on custody set out in section 39.

[51] While I am satisfied that the psychological harm inherent in robbing a restaurant with what appears to be a handgun constitutes “bodily harm”, there is an insufficient basis for me to conclude that “serious bodily harm” has been made out. In this regard, I note that none of the staff or patrons provided victim impact statements.

[52] Carefully crafted deferred custody and supervision conditions, and subsequent probation conditions, will properly reflect the seriousness of the offence and K.W.’s degree of responsibility. Any breach of the deferred custody and supervision order will result in K.W.’s re-incarceration.

[53] A deferred custody and supervision order strikes the appropriate balance with respect to all the relevant sentencing principles: accountability, rehabilitation, reintegration into society, restraint, denunciation and specific deterrence. Indeed, as required by s.38(e)(ii), a deferred custody and supervision order is the most likely sentence to rehabilitate K.W. and reintegrate him into society.

[54] I am also satisfied that a deferred custody and supervision order meets the often-elusive sentencing principle of parity, as a similar sentence was imposed (or upheld) in the following cases involving robbery with a weapon: R. v. J.P.L.H.-D., 2013 BCCA 295; R. v. D.D., 2021 ONCJ 173; R. v. K.O., 2020 ONCJ 367; R. v. K.M.S., 2007 SKCA 16; R. v. K.D.B., 2011 ABCA 28; and R. v. J.S., 2009 ONCA 812.

VIII – Disposition

[55] On one count of robbery (stealing while armed with an offensive weapon or imitation thereof) pursuant to s.343 (d), I sentence K.W. as follows:

Deferred custody and supervision order (s.42(2)(p) YCJA) Duration: 5 months Conditions:

1. Report to your youth worker within 24 hours and thereafter as directed by your youth worker.
2. Reside with your aunt, M.H., at an address approved of by your youth worker.
3. For the entire length of this order be in your residence daily between 10 pm and 6 am, EXCEPT:
   • For any medical emergency involving you or a member of your immediate family; and
   • With the prior written permission of your youth worker, to be carried on your person during these times.
4. Do not contact or communicate in any way, directly or indirectly, by any physical, electronic or other means, with Mary DURO, Xuan Tuan NGUYEN and Thi Hoa Giang BUI, EXCEPT:
   • For a letter of apology delivered through your youth worker.
5. Do not attend within 250 m of 3232 Steeles Avenue West, Vaughan, Ontario.
6. Attend school or such other place of learning, training or recreation as directed by your youth worker and provide proof as required by your youth worker and sign releases to allow the youth worker to confirm your attendance.
7. Do not possess any weapons as defined by the Criminal Code.
8. Attend and actively participate in all assessments, counselling or rehabilitation programs as directed by your youth worker and complete them to the satisfaction of your youth worker, including but not limited to: anger management, substance abuse, psychiatric or psychological issues, stress management, literacy, life skills and the “N.” program.
9. You shall sign any release of information forms as will enable your youth worker to monitor your attendance and completion of any assessments, counselling or rehabilitative programs as directed.
10. You shall provide proof of your attendance and completion of any assessments, counselling or programs as directed.
11. You shall perform 50 hours of community service work before the expiry of this order.
12. Write a letter of apology to each of Mary DURO, Xuan Tuan NGUYEN and Thi Hoa Giang BUI, and deliver it to your youth worker.
13. Keep the peace and be of good behaviour.
14. Appear before the Youth Justice Court when required to do so by the Court.
15. Inform your youth worker immediately on being arrested or questioned by the police
16. Comply with such reasonable instructions as your youth worker considers necessary in respect of any condition of this order to prevent a breach of that condition or to protect society.

Probation Order (s.42(2)(k) YCJA) Duration: 2 years Conditions:

1. Report to your probation officer within 24 hours of the expiry of your deferred custody and supervision order and thereafter as directed by your probation officer.
2. Reside with your aunt, M.H., at an address approved of by your probation officer.
3. Do not contact or communicate in any way, directly or indirectly, by any physical, electronic or other means, with Mary DURO, Xuan Tuan NGUYEN and Thi Hoa Giang BUI.
4. Do not attend within 250 m of 3232 Steeles Avenue West, Vaughan, Ontario.
5. Attend school or such other place of learning, training or recreation as directed by your probation officer and provide proof as required by your probation officer and sign releases to allow the probation officer to confirm your attendance.
6. Do not possess any weapons as defined by the Criminal Code.
7. Attend and actively participate in all assessments, counselling or rehabilitation programs as directed by your probation officer and complete them to the satisfaction of your probation officer, including but not limited to: anger management, substance abuse, psychiatric or psychological issues, stress management, literacy, life skills and the “N.” program.
8. You shall sign any release of information forms as will enable your probation officer to monitor your attendance and completion of any assessments, counselling or rehabilitative programs as directed.
9. You shall provide proof of your attendance and completion of any assessments, counselling or programs as directed.

Mandatory Weapons Prohibition (ss.42(2)(j) and 51 YCJA) You are prohibited from possessing weapons for a period of 5 years.

DNA Order (s.487.051(1) CC) As robbery is a primary designated offence, you are ordered to provide a sample of your DNA today at the Newmarket courthouse.

[56] I will ask that a copy of these Reasons for Sentence, as well as a copy of the s.34 Assessment be provided to the Provincial Director as well as K.W.’s maternal aunt, M.H.

[57] I would like to thank both counsel for their cooperation throughout these proceedings and for their extremely helpful submissions.

[58] I would be remiss not to thank K.W.’s family members for their faithful attendance in court and their full cooperation throughout the PDR and s.34 Assessment process.

Released: 17 April 2024 Justice R.M. Robinson