WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
This is a case under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, (being Schedule 1 to the Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14), and is subject to subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:
87.—(7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. — Where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding, the court may make an order,
(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing.
(8) Prohibition re identifying child.— No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.
(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged.— The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.
142.—(3) Offences re publication.— A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.
CITATION: Child and Family Services of Grand Erie v. G.L., 2023 ONCJ 573
DATE: December 15, 2023
COURT FILE No.: C105/22
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N :
CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES OF GRAND ERIE
Applicant
— and —
GL and DL and AW
Respondents
Before Justice K.A. Baker
Heard on November 28, 2023 and December 6, 2023
Reasons for Judgment released December 15, 2023
S. Luu …………..………………….……..…………………….……………………………………. Counsel for Applicant
B. Culp ……………………….……..………….……………………………………. Counsel for Respondent Mother
E. Brown …………………………….……..…………………………………………. Counsel for Respondent Father
A.W. ……………………………….……..………….…………………………….………………………. on his own behalf
A. MacDonald ………..…………………….……..………….………………………………. counsel for the children
R. Roy …………………………….……..………….……………………………………….……. counsel for the children
BAKER, J.:
[1] This was a motion brought by the Applicant agency, seeking to vary a pre-existing temporary order with respect to the placement and access of the three subject children, ML, IL and ML, ages 10, 8 and 7 respectively.
[2] The mother has also brought a Contempt motion against the Respondent father and the Applicant agency. That motion is not currently before the court for adjudication. It will be addressed following the adjudication of the motion addressing the children’s placement and parental access.
[3] This is within the context of a Protection Application commenced June 17, 2022, seeking findings of protection and an Order placing all three children in the care of the father, subject to the supervision of the Society. The existing temporary Order is that of Hilliard, J dated July 13, 2022. With respect to placement of the children, it cross-referenced a final Order made June 4, 2021, in an earlier Children’s Law Reform Act proceeding, which provided for shared parenting between the parents and an essentially equal time-share. Under its provisions, the children were with the mother from Monday after school until Thursday after school and with father from Thursday after school until Monday morning. The temporary Order provided for the supervision of the Society.
[4] The precipitating reason for the agency’s involvement was the disclosure by the children that Ms. L’s partner, AW, had physically assaulted the two boys. All three children made statements to police about these events. Mr. W was criminally charged in relation to the assaults upon M and I. His charges remain outstanding and are now scheduled for trial in April 2024. Both Ms. L and Mr. W say that the statements made by the children about the assaults are untrue and/or inaccurate.
[5] There is a high level of animosity between the two parents. Each has, at various times, accused the other of influencing the children against the other. Despite this context, the parenting situation remained stable under the existing temporary Order, and the children shared time between the parents’ home in accordance with that Order until mid-July 2023.
[6] On July 16, 2023, there was an incident at the father’s home whereby ML was bitten or nipped by a dog. The next day, July 17, 2023, the children returned to their mother’s care as per the usual summer schedule. The father had not secured medical treatment for the bite, as he did not view it as necessary. The mother told the agency worker that she took ML to a clinic, where she was apparently prescribed antibiotics.
[7] ML was due to return to her father’s home on July 27, 2023. Ms. L drove ML to her father’s that day, however the child refused to get out of the car. ML has not seen her father since.
[8] Ms. L and the agency say that ML has demonstrated a genuine and strongly held view not to have contact with her father. ML told both her mother and the agency worker, Ms. MacPherson, that her father had said hurtful things after the dog incident, including threatening to never see her again if he lost the dog as a result. This is firmly denied by the father, who says that he thought the nip inconsequential, especially inasmuch as ML was playing with the dog thereafter.
[9] Cogent evidence as to the seriousness of the bite/nip would have been helpful. In suggesting to the worker that antibiotics were prescribed, the mother was clearly intimating that father was not acting with due diligence to address the situation. Ms. L has not however, produced any medical report in this regard. Neither does she provide her own evidence on the matter. That is unfortunate because it would likely be dispositive on the issue of the seriousness of the bite/nip and whether her insinuation was well founded or spurious. It would also be important context to the response of the respective parties to this event, which precipitated the current unfortunate situation.
[10] For their part, the boys spent time with their mother on one occasion after July 27th, and then returned to the father’s home. The boys were to go back to the mother’s home on August 7, 2023. Mr. L had the obligation under the existing Order to undertake the drive for that purpose. He did not do so, because he said the boys were refusing to go. The boys have not seen their mother since.
[11] The mother and the agency take the position that father has essentially, poisoned the boys against spending time with their mother. They say this because prior to the July 27th incident, both boys were indicating to Ms. MacPherson that they enjoyed spending time at their mother’s home.
[12] Mr. L says that in fact, the boys had been somewhat resistant to going back to their mother’s home for some time. When their seven-year-old sister got to exercise agency and refuse visits, they felt entitled to do so also.
[13] The Applicant agency and the Respondent mother say that ML should continue to reside with her mother, with access to the father in the sole discretion of the agency, taking into account ML’s views and preferences. This is supported by the OCL for ML, with the proviso that ML should have some sibling access.
[14] The Respondent father is not currently seeking access with ML. He says that given her apparent determination not to spend time in his home, she should not be compelled to do so. It should be noted however, that he says this preference is shaped by the mother’s influence. Mr. L says that the IL and ML should remain in his care with access to the mother in accordance with their views.
[15] The OCL for the boys takes the position that they should remain with their father and not have parenting time with their mother or sister. This is the view and preference articulated by the boys to the agency worker, Ms. MacPherson. The agency and the mother say that this is not a genuine expression of preferences, and it should, therefore, be disregarded by this court.
[16] There is also a secondary issue requiring address in this motion. The current Order requires that the children attend RPS, now known as EMES. ML continues to attend that school. The boys no longer do so, and the father has asserted that he is home-schooling them.
[17] The applicable law to this matter is as follows: A court may at any time vary or terminate a temporary Order made in a child protection proceeding, pursuant to s. 94(9). The statutory provisions do not provide guidance as to the criteria for doing so however.
[18] The current statutory provisions are similar to those of the previous legislation, as considered by Sherr, J in Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. M. (R)., 2017 ONCJ 784, That case addressed the criteria to be applied under that legislation.
[19] Justice Sherr noted that while the statute provides no guidance as to the test to apply to vary an Order, it did provide guidance on varying a temporary access Order. Accordingly, a separate analysis applies to variation of an Order for placement, and an Order for access. The case then went on to detail the respective tests.
[20] It is thus necessary to begin this analysis with an assessment as to whether the request is to vary the temporary access Order or the placement Order. Here, the parents are clearly seeking a variation of the placement Orders with respect to all three children. The father seeks a change of placement for IL and ML. The agency and mother are seeking a variation of placement as it relates to ML. It is clear then that the jurisprudence with respect to change of placement applies with respect to all of the children.
[21] With respect to the boys, the agency is seeking the continuation of the previous temporary order for joint parenting and equal time sharing. It is not seeking variation of placement. However, given that the father seeks a change of placement of the boys, the test as to placement must be considered.
[22] I adopt the test as described by Sherr, J. in CCAS v. M.(R.).
[23] The following is the legal test applicable to this matter:
Has there been a material change since the making of the previous temporary order?
If so, is that material change risk-based? In other words, is it a change that makes it either more likely or less likely to affect the risk of harm to the child?
If the material change is risk-based, is it significant enough to vary the child’s placement, having regard to the length of time that the status quo has been in place and how soon trial is likely to occur?
In considering step number 3, is the requested variation proportional to the change in circumstances, having regard to the court’s mandate to be guided by the paramount purposes as stated in subsection 1(1) and (2) of the Act?
[24] These criteria speak mainly to the risk assessment inherent in any s. 94 analysis. It does not specifically address the application of ‘best interest’ consideration. In this case, the agency initially took the position, in its Factum, that best interest considerations and specifically, views and preferences, do not apply. In this regard, it relied on the decision of Hilliard, J in Children’s Aid Society of Brant v. A. A. 2020 535 and, in particular, the court’s comments at paragraph 27 and 30, which noted:
“The test under s. 94(2) is a laddered approach, starting with the child remaining in the care of the person who had charge of the child prior to intervention under Part V of the Act.” It then went on to say, “…the legislation is clear that a child cannot be removed from the care of the person who had charge of the child prior to intervention unless a court is satisfied that there are sufficient protection concerns to do so.” The court then concluded that the applicable test did not include a ‘best interests’ component.”
[25] What distinguishes this case from that of A. A., is that in the latter, the contest was between the father and the grandparents, and the grandparents clearly had charge of the child prior to intervention. The grandparents therefore had priority for placement of the child and the ‘laddered’ approach set out in the legislation applied. It does not include a best interests consideration.
[26] Here, given the pre-existing shared parenting and equal time sharing, the Respondent parents both had charge of the three children prior to intervention. Neither has priority over the other.
[27] Accordingly, in my view, the court must be mindful of the paramount purpose of the Act, which is to promote the best interests, protection and wellbeing of children. The best interests test therefore does apply. This requires that the court give due weight to the children’s views and preferences to the extent they can be ascertained.
[28] Some discussion of the evidentiary standard at motions of this nature is required prior to addressing the children’s views. S. 94(11) of the Act establishes that the court must admit and act on evidence that the court considers credible and trustworthy. In Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. S. G. 2012 ONCJ 585, Justice Jones considered the meaning of the phrase, “credible and trustworthy” as set out in the legislation and concluded:
“I take this section to mean that at this preliminary stage in the proceeding, the rules of evidence are relaxed, but not completely suspended—I am still required to scrutinize the evidence adduced to assess the quality of the evidence and determine whether such evidence is capable of being relied upon. This section does not allow me to admit or rely upon inherently unreliable, flimsy or suspect evidence.”
[29] In that case, the court declined to apply the principled exception to the hearsay rule but did undertake a careful assessment of the hearsay to ascertain whether it was capable of being relied upon.
[30] There are also criminal cases that discuss the meaning of ‘credible and trustworthy’. In R. v. Mackie 2020 ONCJ 360, the court noted that such evidence had to have “at least a prima facie air of reliability”.
[31] In determining what evidence is credible and trustworthy, the evidence in its entirety must be viewed together. Evidence that may not be credible and trustworthy when viewed in isolation might reach that threshold when examined in the context of other evidence.
[32] The challenge in this case is that much turns on the hearsay evidence of the children’s statements, and to some degree, on their behaviour. This is where the evidential flaws assume significant proportion.
[33] The evidence of the agency worker as to what the children have said is credible and trustworthy. Ms. MacPherson has emphasized that she was careful to ask non-leading questions and to let the children tell their stories themselves. This assertion has not been challenged.
[34] The question, however, is not whether the children made these assertions. The question is whether these assertions are reliable for the truth of their content. This applies to the children’s statements relating to both their experiences in each parent’s home, as well as to the genuineness their view and preferences.
[35] These children have been the victims of a high conflict parental separation. They cannot help but be acutely aware of the antagonism between their parents. The original Children’s Law Reform Act Order hints at a history of being exposed to adult conflict and inappropriate discussions. That is the only logical reason for the inclusion of the term requiring that neither party is to discuss adult issues with the children or speak negatively about the other parent in the presence of the children. It also is reflected in the statements that the children have made expressing concern about saying anything positive about the mother to the father and vice versa. It is further buttressed by the admission by the paternal grandfather that he has recently told the boys that there is a risk that the mother would withhold them if they were to go to her home for parenting time.
[36] This situation has been made worse through recent events. ML was present during acute adult conflict between her mother and her paternal aunt and uncle on July 27, 2023. On the overall evidence, none of the adults present acquitted themselves well.
[37] In the midst of this standoff, ML was put on speakerphone to an agency worker to state her “view”. That situation had the hallmarks of a performative event.
[38] These children have been trundled into interviews with police and agency workers to “tell all”. They have been put squarely into the middle of a dreadful family conflict. It is difficult to know what a 7, 8 and 10 year old could make of these events. Suffice to say it overwhelmingly points toward emotional harm.
[39] It also suggests that these children are under huge pressure to please whatever parent they are with. Indeed, that observation is contained in the agency records where it is noted that the children, “appear to be under a lot of pressure to respond to questions in a particular way to keep their caregivers happy”.
[40] The agency says that the court should put significant weight on ML’s expression of a preference not to spend time with her father. It is said this is because she has good reasons for this view, including her father having made hurtful remarks to her in the wake of the ‘dog incident’. In order to accept this submission however, the court would have to accept ML’s account of the event was reliable.
[41] There are issues with that. First, mother asks the court to accept ML’s account at face value. But mother also takes the position that ML is an unreliable witness in relation to other matters, including the very important matter of having seen her brothers being abused by Mr. W. Ms. L seems to want to pick and choose when and about what her daughter should be believed.
[42] Further, this account only developed after ML spent time with her mother. Ms. L has described the ‘dog incident’ as being a major event. Yet neither IL nor ML, who were present, seem to have said anything that might suggest it was significant. Neither has mother produced evidence to support such an account, despite the fact that medical evidence could have been obtained.
[43] On the balance of probabilities, this would seem to have been a fairly trivial incident. This supports father’s contention that he would not have thought to make a threat such as “if I lose the dog I never want to see you again”.
[44] The larger context also requires comment. Ms. L has sided unequivocally with Mr. W in his denial of any assaults on the two boys. Mr. W’s criminal trial was scheduled for early November. ML is a material witness. Four months prior to the trial, Ms. L was apparently unable to get this seven-year-old child out of the car to go to her father’s home. Shortly thereafter, Mr. W moved back into mother’s home with the blessing of the agency.
[45] It is difficult to understand how the agency would have considered it had the authority to permit such a move. Its own evidence is that the governing Order was that of Hilliard, J dated July 13. 2022. That Order includes the following proviso at paragraph #2:
“The Respondent AW shall not reside in the home of GML when the children are in the care of the Respondent GML.”
[46] The totality of this context gives rise to a potential for Ms. L to have an interest in this outcome beyond the best interests of the children. What also buttresses that concern is that she is now seeking to have both boys come into her care with a hiatus in any contact whatsoever with their father who, accepts the children’s disclosures.
[47] I appreciate that Ms. L says that Mr. W will move out should the boys be returned. But Ms. L herself clearly wants to maintain a relationship with Mr. W, given his move back into her residence. She has demonstrated a strong view that the charges are unfounded. This is obviously not determinative, but it does provide context.
[48] It is difficult to understand why the agency has unquestionably accepted the mother’s account and ML’s assertions, while approaching the statements of the boys with skepticism. The agency says the boys’ statements about a preference not to visit their mother are less credible because until shortly before supposedly refusing to attend, they were expressing that the visits with mother were positive. But similarly, there is no evidence that ML expressed any difficulties with visits with father until she refused to go after the single ‘bite/nip incident’.
[49] There is another fact that impacts not only on the context for the boys’ expression of views, as well as the other factors requiring consideration.
[50] It is the boys describing a camera or cameras at their mother’s home, with these devices apparently being trained on the interior of the home. During a meeting with the boys on August 2, 2023, before they ceased attending visits, Ms. McPherson asked IL if he felt safe at his mother’s home. IL responded, “not really”. When asked why this was so, IL said the cameras made him feel uncomfortable.
[51] Rather remarkably, the agency did not immediately follow up by asking questions about this revelation. A few days later, on August 10, 2023, ML noted that he too felt uncomfortable at his mother’s home, because of the cameras in the home. He then went on to express that he was discomforted by the notion of “him” watching us. He then clarified that by “him”, he meant Mr. W. ML said a first step to address his discomfort would be for the cameras to be removed. IL agreed removal of the cameras would be good.
[52] To her credit, Ms. McPherson addressed this and other identified concerns with the mother on August 17, 2023. Ms. McPherson sets out Ms. L’s response to the other concerns, but there is no indication mother responded to the camera issue. Rather surprisingly, especially given the agency’s position in this motion, there is also no indication that the agency pursued the issue with mother. Even more remarkably, in an affidavit sworn one month and five days after Ms. McPherson’s affidavit, Ms. L does not comment on the camera issue. Specifically, Ms. L does not dispute that she has cameras trained on the interior of the home and that they are being used to permit Mr. W to view the boys during the time they are in the home.
[53] It is not clear on the evidence when the boys learned they were being watched in their mother’s home. It is not clear that the agency made any inquiry as to whether the cameras had audio capacity between a remote watcher and the watched. Neither was there any obvious inquiry as to whether the cameras were recording.
[54] Two points may be made in this regard. First, the boys discovering that they were being observed through video cameras inside the home, apparently by the individual who is accused of assaulting them, provides relevant context to their expression of their views. This context has been completely disregarded by the agency.
[55] Second, mother’s behaviour in either orchestrating or permitting this situation raises significant questions about her judgment, including her commitment to protect the boys.
[56] With respect to ML, there has been a material change insofar as ML has, for whatever reason, come to the view, as expressed to Ms. McPherson, that everyone in the paternal family “hates” her. Mr. L does not wish to have ML spend time in his home. In the circumstances, it would clearly be detrimental to ML to continue the arrangement under the prior Order.
[57] The access provisions proposed by the agency and supported by ML’s OCL will at least permit access should the circumstances change.
[58] There has also been a material change with respect to the placement of IL and ML. This is based on two factors. First, and most significant, is the revelation of the cameras and the boys knowledge thereof. The second is the change of the dynamic with respect to the three children. ML is the youngest of the children. The cessation of her time in father’s home is a material change that effects her brothers.
[59] The material change as it relates to the cameras is, in my view, risk based. It raises a myriad of questions about mother’s commitment to protect the boys from their alleged assailant. These questions have been left entirely unaddressed by mother and Mr. W.
[60] It is difficult to see how a supervision Order could mitigate the risk when the mother is refusing to reveal what is going on here. That conclusion is buttressed by two things. First and most importantly, the agency and the mother seem to be acting in concert to disregard the unequivocal term of the governing Order with respect to Mr. W not residing in the home. Second, is both the mother and the agency’s disregard of the boys’ preference to have the cameras removed before they return to the home.
[61] The presence of these cameras is also confirmatory of the reliability and genuineness of the boys’ preference not to spend time at their mother’s home.
[62] This current situation is obviously, far less than ideal. Children of this age should not be given the message that they have the responsibility to make important decisions for themselves. But that is precisely what has happened here. The court however is left with this de facto status quo of some four months duration. Various steps could have been undertaken in the meantime to attempt to address the issues and normalize the situation so adults resume taking on the responsibility to organize these children’s lives. The mother could have explained and then removed the cameras. The agency could have diligently addressed this obvious red flag. The agency could have been more proactive in procuring reconciliation counselling for the children. For that matter, the agency could have been more even-handed in dealing with this difficult situation. But none of these things happened.
[63] Ultimately, I have concluded that the least detrimental course is to leave the de facto status quo as it relates to placements and access arrangements in place until it can be addressed more therapeutically or until the matter receives a full hearing at trial.
[64] There is no evidence to suggest that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the existing temporary Order of July 13, 2022, should be varied and indeed, this was not argued. In fact, in its Notice of Motion the agency seeks the continuation of the Order that Mr. W not reside in the home when the children are in the care of mother. Both terms will be reiterated in my Order, with some modification to more clearly address the arrangements under this Order. Term #4 regarding access to AW would seem to have been interpreted by the agency as license to disregard term #2. In my view, this is not a reasonable reading of the Order. Term #4 clearly needs to be set aside and readdressed.
[65] The next issue is sibling access.
[66] There is really nothing in the evidence to suggest that the siblings have a troubled relationship. After the imposition of the original CLRA Order, they have moved in tandem between the two parental homes. This continued under the temporary Order in this proceeding. There is a potential benefit to them in maintaining their relationship, especially as they navigate a situation of parental warfare. This is a relationship that is worth preserving.
[67] I appreciate that the boys have apparently expressed a preference not to see their sister. But there is really no context to this other than the obvious, ML has stopped coming to the father’s home. The problem would not seem to be so much with each other, but rather the impact of the current situation on them.
[68] Then there is the issue of the children’s schools. The CLRA Order provided that the children would attend RHPS, now known as EMES. Additional provisions of the Order required the parties to consult with one another in the event that the Applicant (the mother) was to relocate out of that school’s catchment area. What is apparent from these terms is that there was a clear expectation by the parties that the children would attend school.
[69] When the school term commenced in September of 2023, the boys were in the de facto exclusive care of the father. Mr. L initially enrolled the boys in the public school closest to his home in HC, being PRPS. The children were initially permitted to attend, however later, school authorities questioned Mr. L’s authority to register the children, given he was unable to produce proof of exclusive decision-making authority. At that point, Mr. L withdrew the boys from school.
[70] Mr. L says he has been ‘home schooling’ the boys. He has not produced any details in that regard. He has not offered any rationale for why the boys should be home-schooled instead of attending an actual school. He has not demonstrated that he is providing adequate scholastic instruction.
[71] The expectation of the parties was that all the children would attend school. They are of an age where school is important, both academically and socially. They need to be in school.
[72] It makes little sense for the boys to have to travel to and from school in Brantford from their father’s home in SW, particularly given they did not start the school year at the R/EM school. They should complete their school year in the school within their catchment area.
[73] Temporary Order to go:
The child MLL, born [...], 2015, shall be placed in the care of the Respondent mother, GML, subject to the supervision of the Child and Family Services of Grand Erie.
The term of supervision shall be as follows:
a) The Respondent AW shall not reside in the home when any of the subject children are in the care of the Respondent mother, GL.
b) The mother shall permit the agency workers into the home and to have access to the child(ren), including private visits as may be requested by the workers, including on an unscheduled basis.
c) The mother shall not permit any access between the child(ren) and AW except in accordance with the provisions of the governing Order.
d) The mother shall forthwith advise the agency of any change in contact information.
e) The mother shall not allow anyone to stay overnight in the home without the express written permission of the agency worker.
f) The mother shall sign any necessary releases to permit the children to receive counselling and for the agency to obtain information from any counselors for the children.
g) The agency shall not provide any direction to the parents that contravenes any governing Order of this court.
h) The agency shall forthwith provide details of its efforts to secure counseling and in particular reconciliation counseling for the subject children to the mother, including particulars of agencies/individuals contacted and the children/family’s status on any waiting list. This information shall be updated no less than once per month.
i) The agency shall forthwith investigate mother’s assertion that the child ML was taken to a clinic and provided medical treatment in July of 2023 and shall provide a written report of its findings to all parties and the OCL.
j) The mother shall disable all internal cameras in the home during the time that any child is in her care.
k) The mother shall sign any releases to permit the father to obtain information from third party service providers to the child and shall keep the father advised of the contact information for third party service providers. The mother shall also ensure that copies of the child’s report cards are provided to the mother.
l) The mother shall forthwith advise the agency in writing as to whether there are any video recordings of the children currently or previously in her possession.
m) The mother shall cooperate with the agency in facilitating sibling access.
Access to the child MLL, born [...], 2015, by the Respondent father, DBL, shall be at the discretion of the CFSGE as to location, duration, frequency and supervision. Visits to consider the child’s expressed views and preferences. Agency to consult with M’s Children’s Lawyer with respect to access arrangements.
The children, MCBL, born [...], 2013 and ISL, born [...], 2015 shall be placed in the care of the Respondent father, DBL, subject to the supervision of CFSGE.
The terms of supervision shall be:
a) The father shall permit the agency workers into the home and to have access to the child(ren), including private visits as may be requested by the workers, including on an unscheduled basis.
b) The father shall cooperate with the workers, and shall meet with them as requested. During any such interaction, the father shall communicate civilly and shall provide any requested information concerning the children.
c) The father shall not permit any access between the child(ren) and AW except in accordance with the provisions of the governing Order.
d) The father shall forthwith advise the agency of any change in contact information.
e) The father shall not allow anyone to stay overnight in the home without the express written permission of the agency worker.
f) The father shall sign any necessary releases to permit the children to receive counselling and for the agency to obtain information from any counselors for the children.
g) The agency shall not provide any direction to the parents that contravenes any governing Order of this court.
h) The agency shall forthwith provide details of its efforts to secure counseling and in particular reconciliation counseling for the subject children to the father, including particulars of agencies/individuals contacted and the children/family’s status on any waiting list. This information shall be updated no less than once per month.
i) The father shall sign any releases to permit the mother to obtain information from third party service providers to the children and shall keep the mother advised of the contact information for third party service providers. The father shall also ensure that copies of the children’s report cards are provided to the mother.
j) The father shall ensure that the children attend school regularly and on time as per all terms of this Order.
k) The father shall cooperate with the agency in facilitating sibling access.
Neither party shall discuss adult issues with the children, including these proceedings or speak negatively about the other parent or the other parent’s family within the hearing of any child.
Paragraph #4 of the temporary Order of July 13, 2022 shall be set aside and the issue of AW’s access to the children shall be addressed at the return of this matter on December 21, 2023. Any party taking a position in this regard shall provide a specific written proposal with respect to the issue. Parties to use their best efforts to develop a joint proposal.
Access to the children IL and ML to the mother, GML shall be at the discretion of the CFSGE as to location, duration, frequency and supervision. Visits to consider the child’s expressed views and preferences. Agency to consult with those children’s Children’s Lawyer with respect to access arrangements.
All visits to be subject to the terms set out at paragraphs 3 (c-m) of the Applicant agency’s Notice of Motion dated September 5, 2023.
The three children shall have access with one another with the particulars of such access, including frequency, timing, location, duration and supervision arrangements to be in the discretion of the agency, but to occur at a minimum of once every two weeks for two hours. Access to be re-assessed after four visits to reconsider frequency and other issues. The results of such reconsideration to be provided to the parents and the OCL’s in writing within seven (7) days.
The Applicant agency shall provide all transportation to and from sibling access.
The child ML shall continue to attend EMES and her school placement shall not be changed without the consent of all parties or further court Order. Consent of the parties shall not be unreasonably withheld.
The children IL and ML shall be immediately enrolled at and shall attend PRPS and their school placement shall not be changed without the consent of the parties or further court Order. Consent of the parties shall not be unreasonably withheld.
The outstanding Contempt motion, together with any residual issues relating to this motion shall be addressed at the return of this matter on December 21, 2023.
Dated at Brantford, Ontario
This 15th day of December, 2023
The Honourable Justice K.A. Baker