Court File and Parties

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

DATE: 2021 01 28 COURT FILE No.: Toronto 19-55000721

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

— AND —

NAGAMUTHU RAVEENTHRAN

Before: Justice Peter N. Fraser

Heard on: January 14 & 15, 2021 Reasons for Judgment released on: January 28, 2021

Counsel: Michael Coristine, counsel for the Crown Glen Henderson, counsel for the defendant Nagamuthu Raveenthran

Fraser J.:

Reasons for Judgment

[1] Nagamuthu Raveenthran stands charged with a single count of impaired driving arising out of motor vehicle collision on March 2, 2019.

[2] The complainant, Raj Sharma, was stopped at a red light in a westbound lane of Rexdale Boulevard at Kipling Avenue in Toronto. He was the driver of a red Jaguar F-Pace. Mr. Raveenthran was driving a black Toyota Camry westbound on Rexdale boulevard when he collided with Mr. Sharma’s vehicle. Mr. Sharma heard no screeching of tires that might have indicated breaking and described the impact as very intense. The front driver’s side of the Camry struck the rear passenger side of the F-Pace causing the front corner of the Camry to crumple. There appeared to be very little visible damage to the F-Pace.

[3] There was no dispute that Mr. Raveenthran was the driver of the Camry or that he caused the collision. Nor were the facts in this case the subject of any real dispute. The main issue at trial was whether the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s ability to operate his motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

[4] As in any criminal trial, the accused is presumed innocent. The Crown must prove the essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof rests squarely on the Crown throughout the trial and never shifts to the defence.

[5] A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary or frivolous doubt. It must not be based upon sympathy or prejudice. Rather, it is based on reason and common sense. It is logically derived from the evidence or absence of evidence: R. v. Lifchus, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320. Even if I believe the accused is probably guilty or likely guilty, that is insufficient. In those circumstances I would be required to give the benefit of the doubt to the accused and acquit.

[6] A trial judge must consider the cumulative effect of all the evidence as it relates to the issue of whether a driver's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol: R. v. Reeves, 2018 ONSC 5082 at para. 76; R. v. Bush, 2010 ONCA 554 at paras. 54-58. The ultimate question is not whether there are other possible explanations for individual circumstances, but whether the accused’s guilt is the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the whole of the evidence: R. v. Griffin, 2009 SCC 28 at para. 27.

[7] According to section 320.14(1) of the Criminal Code, the offence is made out if the accused’s ability to operate a motor vehicle is impaired “to any degree”. This language codifies previous case law holding that the degree of impairment need only be “slight” in order to ground a conviction: see R. v. Stellato, [1993] O.J. No. 18 (ON CA), affirmed [1994] 2 S.C.R. 478](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1994/1994canlii94/1994canlii94.html); R. v. Grant, 2014 ONSC 1479 at para. 50.

[8] The Crown submits that impairment by alcohol has been proved on the basis of the collision itself, Mr. Raveenthran’s unsteadiness on his feet, the presence of food or vomit on his shirt and the fact that he urinated upon himself at the roadside. The Crown also relies on the accused’s utterance to paramedics that he had two vodkas some 6 1/2 hours before the collision. The Crown cautions against a piecemeal analysis of these facts and stresses the importance of the cumulative effect of the evidence of impairment. The defence counters that the facts relied upon by the Crown are subject to competing interpretations and the accused’s guilt is not the only reasonable inference based on the whole of the evidence.

[9] In my view the circumstances surrounding the collision are consistent with impairment by alcohol, but they are consistent with other reasonable explanations as well. For example, a collision of this nature may result from distracted driving, from a driver falling asleep at the wheel or from medical issues. I note there was evidence before me that the accused had issues with his blood sugar level. I would also observe that a right turn lane opened up just behind where the complainant’s vehicle was stopped. Mr. Raveenthran may have misjudged an attempt to enter the turn lane and hit the back corner of the F-Pace.

[10] I place very little weight on the evidence of Mr. Raveenthran’s unsteadiness on his feet. The complainant, Mr. Sharma, saw him get out of his vehicle and place his hands on the car to steady himself. This occurred moments after a serious collision; one which caused pain and stiffness to the complainant’s neck and lead to Mr. Raveenthran being attended to by paramedics in the back of an ambulance. This gesture is equally consistent with him being shaken up or hurt by the collision. Police Constable Kah testified the accused was unsteady climbing into the back of the ambulance and moving to the stretcher once inside. This observation was confined to a very short time and to a small, crowded space. Given these limitations, and the serious nature of the collision, this observation has little (if any) evidentiary value.

[11] The complainant testified that the accused urinated in his clothes as he stood at the roadside after the collision. This fact, in conjunction with the collision itself, tends to support the Crown’s contention that he was intoxicated. I accept, as a matter of common sense and experience, that a heavily intoxicated person may lose bladder control. The defence contends that there are other causes of incontinence, including medical conditions, physical trauma and other natural causes. I find that intoxication is one of several explanations for what was observed in this case. I would evaluate PC Kah’s observation of the vomit or dried food on Mr. Raveenthran’s shirt in much the same way.

[12] The evidence summarized to this point is potentially indicative of impairment by alcohol. However, I do not consider it to be capable of establishing the fact of impairment to the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The circumstances detailed above allow for competing interpretations, even when their cumulative effect is weighed in the manner the Crown advocates. There was an absence of evidence in respect of many typical indicia of intoxication. There was no evidence of an odour of alcohol emanating from the accused, slurred speech or glossy, red eyes. PC Kah did not interact closely with Mr. Raveenthran, such that he might have observed such indicia if they existed, and the officer who did interact with him and make the arrest did not testify at trial. I would further observe that there was no evidence of open containers of alcohol in the vehicle. No one saw the accused consuming alcohol. And there were no breath samples tendered in this case.

[13] The Crown places considerable reliance on Mr. Raveenthran’s utterance to the paramedics that he had two vodkas at 3:00 PM. However, the collision in this case occurred well after 9:00 PM, more than six hours after the admitted consumption of alcohol. Based on the presumptions contained in section 320.31(4) of the Code, I would not expect Mr. Raveenthran to have any alcohol in his system by the time of driving: see also R. v. Paszczenko; R. v. Lima, 2021 ONCA 615 at paras. 42-43.

[14] The Crown submits that the only component of the utterance I should accept is the admission of alcohol consumption. According to the Crown I should reject the specific details of how much alcohol was consumed and when. In my view, even if the utterance could be parsed in that way, there would be no basis to reliably differentiate between the exculpatory parts and that which is said to incriminate.

[15] The Crown encourages me to use the evidence surrounding the collision and Mr. Raveenthran’s condition at the roadside as the basis for interpreting the utterance as evidence of recent alcohol consumption. This argument is superficially attractive, but engages in a kind of circular reasoning. The utterance is pivotal to the Crown’s contention that an otherwise equivocal constellation of facts is indicative of impairment. The circumstances surrounding the collision should not be used to interpret the utterance as proof of recent alcohol consumption, and the utterance then used to show that alcohol consumption caused the circumstances surrounding the collision.

[16] Finally, Mr. Raveenthran’s “admission” to consuming two vodkas more than six hours before the collision is the functional equivalent of denying alcohol consumption in a relevant quantity or time period. The Crown lead this evidence. Even if I were to reject some specific components of the utterance, I would not invert the remainder and treat it as a positive assertion of the very proposition that was denied. In short, I do not find the utterance to constitute evidence of impairment at the time of driving.

[17] Based on the evidence as a whole, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Raveenthran’s ability to operate his motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

[18] The charge is dismissed.

Released: January 28, 2021 Signed: Justice Peter N. Fraser