ONCJ 2021

The payor brought a motion to retroactively vary child support for the period from August 2014 to May 2019.

The court imputed income to the payor by adding back unreasonable rental interest and business losses, finding that the payor failed to justify these deductions.

The decision affirmed that variation applications cannot serve as appeals of prior orders, limiting the review of circumstances to those occurring after the last judicial determination.

Child support was varied for the years 2016-2019 based on the re-calculated income.

This decision concerns the temporary care and custody of a child, S., apprehended at birth by the Children's Aid Society.

The agency relied on a prior parenting assessment report regarding the parents' first child, which the court ultimately rejected due to concerns about the assessor's qualifications, methodology, and potential bias, particularly concerning the Metis mother.

Despite the child's serious medical condition, the court found no evidence that the mother was unable or unwilling to provide necessary medical care.

The court emphasized that children should not be removed from parents solely because specialized medical services are not available in their rural community.

The court ordered the child to be returned to the mother's temporary care, subject to supervision and a detailed plan for medical support and training.

This case concerns a temporary care hearing under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, for two children, JS1 and DA.

The applicant, Dilico Anishinabek Family Care, sought to place the children in its temporary care due to concerns of physical harm and neglect by the parents, including inappropriate discipline, failure to meet children's needs, and substance abuse.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk, citing consistent allegations from the children, the parents' uncooperative behaviour, lack of insight, and failure to complete rehabilitative programs.

The court ordered the children into the temporary care of the agency with supervised access for the parents.

The applicant agency sought a temporary supervision order for a child with special needs, alleging neglect and risk of harm by the mother.

The court found insufficient evidence for several of the agency's allegations, including drug use, striking the child, and unreasonable expectations regarding the mother's cooperation with a First Nation community and school pick-ups.

The court granted a temporary supervision order, allowing the child to remain in the mother's care subject to specific conditions, while criticizing the agency's approach.

The applicant, Dilico Anishinabek Family Care, sought a protection order for a child, P.W., based on allegations of sexual abuse by the father, L.W., against his older daughter, M.W. The father and Wabigoon Lake Ojibway Nation brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss Dilico's application, arguing no genuine issue for trial and agency failures in disclosure and consultation.

Dilico also moved to strike portions of an affidavit.

The court dismissed both summary judgment motions, finding that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed regarding the sexual abuse allegations.

The court also dismissed the First Nation's motion to strike, noting their default in filing an answer.

The matter was directed to proceed to a focused hearing to determine protection findings.

This judgment addresses three charges against Mr. Singh under the Ontario Securities Act (OSA) for unregistered trading, distribution without a prospectus, and fraud, as well as two Charter applications.

The court first dismissed Mr. Singh's application for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, finding the net delay constitutionally tolerable after accounting for defence-caused delay and the COVID-19 pandemic as a discrete exceptional event.

It also dismissed his s. 7 Charter application, which alleged his right to make full answer and defence was violated by the virtual nature of the trial, concluding he was able to participate effectively.

Subsequently, the court found Mr. Singh guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all three OSA charges, determining he was the operating mind of Rockfort and Greenview, engaged in unregistered trading and distribution of securities, and committed fraud by misrepresenting the companies as mortgage investment corporations that held no mortgages and by making other material misrepresentations to investors.

David Singh, self-represented, brought a third application to adjourn his trial on charges under the Securities Act, including securities fraud, trading without registration, and illegal distribution of securities.

The grounds for adjournment were COVID-19 constraints on virtual trial, physical health problems, and mental health problems.

The Ontario Securities Commission opposed the application, arguing it was a delay tactic.

The court dismissed the application, finding that adequate accommodations were made for the virtual trial, physical health issues were not debilitating, and while the defendant might be distressed, he was fit to stand trial and capable of self-representation given his background and the accommodations provided.

The accused, Justin Osmond, was charged with assault causing bodily harm to a young person (A.N.) in his care.

The trial focused on the reliability of A.N.'s evidence, which included numerous conflicting statements about the perpetrator and the nature of the injuries.

The defence also raised concerns about police investigation "tunnel vision" and suggested another potential perpetrator.

The court found that while the injuries occurred in the accused's care, the inconsistencies in the child's testimony, particularly regarding who caused the injuries and how, raised a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found not guilty.

The appellant, Andrew Zaranek, appealed a conviction for operating a commercial vehicle and following too closely under section 158(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

He argued that the trial justice of the peace erred by finding the essential element of speed (exceeding 60 km/h) was proven, alleging judicial notice was improperly taken.

The appellate court found that proof of speed exceeding 60 km/h is an essential element for a charge under s. 158(2).

It clarified that the trial judge did not take judicial notice of speed, but rather inferred it from video evidence and took judicial notice of the Highway 401 speed limit.

The appellate court agreed that the video evidence supported a reasonable inference that the vehicle was travelling over 60 km/h.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Diljot Sethi, appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle while holding a handheld communication device, contrary to section 78.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial Justice of the Peace found the appellant guilty, imposing a $500 fine and costs.

The appellant argued that the Justice of the Peace erred in concluding that even if his testimony was accepted, it would still constitute an offence.

The appeal court reviewed the evidence and the relevant legislation, including exceptions for hands-free use and specific actions like making or ending calls.

The court found that the appellant's admitted use of the device to access his electronic logbook, even if mounted, was not a permitted exception under the regulation.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the conviction.

The defendant brought a Garofoli application to quash a search warrant for firearms, alleging deficiencies in the Information to Obtain (ITO) and lack of reasonable grounds.

The Crown cross-applied to rely on redacted confidential informant (CI) information under the Garofoli step six procedure.

The court reviewed the ITO, including the judicially summarized redacted material, and found sufficient grounds for the warrant's issuance.

The application was dismissed, and the evidence was deemed admissible.

The Crown sought to admit four statements from a deceased witness (J.T.) at a preliminary hearing under s. 540(7) of the Criminal Code.

The court applied the "prima facie air of reliability" test to determine admissibility.

It found the portions of J.T.'s statements related to the kidnapping credible and trustworthy due to corroborating evidence, despite procedural deficiencies in statement-taking.

However, the portions related to drug possession and the identification of "Z" were deemed unreliable and were excised, as J.T.'s account was inconsistent and self-serving regarding her involvement with drugs.

The court affirmed its power to excise unreliable portions of a statement.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a successful motion to change brought by the mother (Logan) regarding child support.

The mother claimed full recovery costs of $4,648.44, which were unopposed by the father (Mills).

The court reviewed the principles of costs, emphasizing their role in indemnification, encouraging settlement, sanctioning inappropriate behaviour, and ensuring justice.

The father's conduct, including his failure to provide financial disclosure and intentional under-employment, was deemed unreasonable.

The court found the mother's claimed costs reasonable and proportionate, ordering the father to pay the full amount.

The father was also restricted from bringing future motions to change without leave.

The defendant, Regina Dos Santos, was charged with impaired driving, driving with an excess blood alcohol concentration (BAC), and two Highway Traffic Act offences.

The trial included a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of her arrest and the admissibility of breath test results.

The court found that while the police had reasonable grounds for arrest, the defendant's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated due to the police's failure to address her obvious language difficulties, leading to the exclusion of the breath test evidence.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted of the excess BAC charge.

However, based on circumstantial evidence, including her poor driving, vehicle damage, admission of alcohol consumption, and statements, the court found her guilty of impaired driving.

The remaining provincial offence was left for further submissions.

Karen Cady was found guilty of fraud and possession of forged documents.

The Crown applied for forfeiture of proceeds of crime and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The court ordered forfeiture of real property and a motor vehicle, but exercised its discretion under s. 462.41 of the Criminal Code to return a portion of the sale proceeds to innocent third-party secured creditors, Computershare Trust Company of Canada and TD Auto Finance (Canada) Inc., to satisfy their legitimate interests.

A fine in lieu of forfeiture of $928,063.61 was imposed on Cady for the remaining proceeds of crime, with an 8-year payment period and a 4-year default imprisonment term.

Karen Cady pleaded guilty to defrauding her employer, Henninger’s Diesel Ltd., of over $1 million and possessing a forged document.

This was her third fraud conviction, with previous offenses also involving employers.

The court considered aggravating factors including the breach of trust, magnitude and sophistication of the fraud, its duration, and the significant impact on the victim company and its employees.

Mitigating factors included her guilty plea.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, imposing a four-year penitentiary term, a 10-year prohibition from positions of financial trust, a non-communication order, and a restitution order for the full amount of the loss.

In this criminal trial, the accused, Maggie Hallikainen, faced charges of impaired operation and over 80 blood-alcohol concentration.

The impaired charge was dismissed earlier.

The accused brought a Charter application, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking exclusion of evidence.

The court found a serious breach of the applicant's section 8 Charter rights due to the arresting officer's unreliable and inconsistent evidence, particularly concerning the Approved Screening Device (ASD) test administration and note-taking.

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Additionally, the Crown failed to prove the over 80 charge beyond a reasonable doubt due to unresolved discrepancies between two Certificates of a Qualified Technician.

Consequently, the remaining charge was dismissed.

This is a judicial interim release (bail) hearing where the Crown sought the detention of the accused on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court considered the accused's lengthy and violent criminal record, including previous convictions for assault and probation breaches, and current allegations of attempted murder and criminal harassment.

The proposed release plan, involving the Toronto Bail Program and electronic monitoring, was deemed insufficient to mitigate public safety concerns given the gravity of the alleged offences and the accused's history.

The court also considered the accused's status as a member of a vulnerable population under s. 493.2 of the Criminal Code but found that the Crown had met its onus for detention on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol.

The trial addressed several Charter issues, including the validity of a breath demand (s. 8), delay in reading rights to counsel (s. 10(b)), and a "Mok" issue concerning the monitoring and recording of the defendant's use of the toilet in a police cell (s. 8).

The court dismissed the challenges to the breath demand and the delay in reading rights, finding police actions reasonable.

However, the court found a Section 8 Charter violation regarding the toilet privacy, as the measures taken (fogging video, blanket provision without instruction) were inadequate to ensure a reasonable degree of privacy.

Despite the violation, the court denied a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence, concluding there was no sufficient causal or temporal connection between the Charter breach and the obtaining of the breath samples or other evidence.

The defendant was found guilty of impaired operation, and the excess alcohol count was stayed on the Kienapple principle.

This preliminary inquiry addressed charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking against three accused.

The Crown sought to admit evidence via a s.540(7) application, primarily relying on police notebook notes.

The court found significant issues with the admissibility and trustworthiness of much of the Crown's evidence, particularly hearsay statements within officer notes, which prevented the defence from cross-examining critical witnesses.

While some drug trafficking activity was inferred, the court found insufficient evidence to establish constructive possession for most charges against Bogdan Butean and Justin David Gurley.

Natalie Tovah Abuhav was committed to stand trial only on the charge of Possession for the Purpose of Trafficking Percocet, as her identification was found with those specific drugs.

The other charges against her, and all charges against Butean and Gurley, were not committed for trial due to lack of sufficient evidence for committal.