ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

DATE: 12 12 2021 COURT FILE No.: Brampton 3111 998 19 30739

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

— AND —

RAMEZ CHEEMA

Before: Justice G.P. Renwick

Heard on: 08 September and 10 December 2021 Reasons for Judgment released on: 12 December 2021

Counsel: C. Coughlin and D. Ida...................................................................... counsel for the Crown A. Abbey.......................................................... counsel for the Defendant Ramez Cheema

RULING ON GAROFOLI [1] APPLICATION

RENWICK J.:

INTRODUCTION

[1] The Defendant has brought an Application prior to his trial on firearms charges to quash a search warrant. The Defendant claims that there are several deficiencies inherent in the Information to Obtain (“ITO”) the warrant, and the amplified record has established that there were no grounds upon which the warrant could have issued.

[2] The prosecutor opposes the Application and has cross-applied to rely upon the step six procedure outlined in Garofoli. The prosecutor concedes that the warrant would fail without considering the hidden information contained in redactions made to the ITO, to protect the identity of a confidential informant (“CI”).

[3] On the first date set aside for the hearing, a judicial summary of the redactions was created in open court. Recently, the parties provided their written and oral submissions on the ultimate warrant review. It should be noted that there was no Application made to seek further disclosure, to go beneath any of the redactions to the ITO, for leave to cross-examine the affiant, to challenge the claim of CI privilege, or to invoke innocence at stake [2] to defeat the privilege.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

[4] Garofoli hearings involve the determination of the admissibility of evidence. Constitutional considerations involving disclosure, the right to cross-examination, and full answer and defence are contextualized and balanced with other considerations. [3]

[5] The point of a Garofoli hearing is to determine whether the warrant authorizing a search and seizure was valid. The admissibility of the evidence obtained from executing the warrant is in issue. The context involves a challenge to a court order that is presumed to be lawfully made by a judicial officer. The test for the trial judge reviewing a prior authorized search is well settled:

The reviewing judge does not substitute his or her view for that of the authorizing judge. If, based on the record which was before the authorizing judge as amplified on the review, the reviewing judge concludes that the authorizing judge could have granted the authorization then he or she should not interfere. In this process, the existence of fraud, non-disclosure, misleading evidence and new evidence are all relevant, but rather than being a pre-requisite to review, their sole impact is to determine whether there continues to be any basis for the decision of the authorizing judge. [4] [emphasis added]

[6] It must also be kept in mind that the purpose of the ITO is to establish a reasonably grounded belief that the offences alleged were committed and that the requested search would afford evidence of the offence. The ITO must contain reasonable grounds to believe that these statutory preconditions have been met. The ITO affiant is not required to establish the statutory preconditions beyond a reasonable doubt, or even to establish a prima facie case. The threshold for the issuance of a warrant is low. Reasonable grounds exist at the point that "credibly based probability replaces suspicion." [5]

[7] The reviewing court must consider whether the entirety of the affidavit in support of the requested search contains reliable information upon which the authorizing justice could have granted the order; i.e ., was there “some evidence that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the authorization could have issued.” [6] For this reason, a microscopic parsing of the ITO may be inappropriate. The ITO must include full, fair, and frank disclosure, but:

…there is no need for it to be as lengthy as À la recherche du temps perdu , as lively as the Kama Sutra , or as detailed as an automotive repair manual…Ideally, an affidavit should be not only full and frank but also clear and concise. It need not include every minute detail of the police investigation over a number of months or even of years. [7]

[8] Whereas the authorizing justice is asked to consider the probability of finding evidence in a particular place, the review conducted by the trial judge is a possibility analysis – could the warrant have issued on the basis of what was submitted to the issuing justice. The test for review is exacting and permits no variance:

While different judges asked to grant an authorization on the same evidence might reasonably and properly come to different conclusions as to whether to grant the authorization, the decision of the reviewing judge as to whether the authorization could have been granted is a question of law, which admits of only one correct answer. [8] [emphasis added]

[9] The use of CIs and the privilege that attaches to their identity are a necessary evil in the detection and prosecution of criminal offences. Police require informers to solve crimes. [9] The privilege is so vital, it provides almost absolute immunity from disclosure, even “beyond the discretion of a trial judge.” [10] Courts must be alert at every stage of a trial to protect the identity of CIs.

[10] The redaction of warrants that contain CI information is an exception to the broad disclosure rights of a defendant. [11] The Garofoli six steps provide a procedure for prosecutorial reliance upon protected information. These steps work alongside the wiretapping disclosure provisions in s. 187 of the Criminal Code and disclosure of other sealed or redacted ITOs. For ease of reference, the Garofoli steps are reproduced here:

1. Upon opening of the packet, if the Crown objects to disclosure of any of the material, an application should be made by the Crown suggesting the nature of the matters to be edited and the basis therefor. Only Crown counsel will have the affidavit at this point.
2. The trial judge should then edit the affidavit as proposed by Crown counsel and furnish a copy as edited to counsel for the accused. Submissions should then be entertained from counsel for the accused. If the trial judge is of the view that counsel for the accused will not be able to appreciate the nature of the deletions from the submissions of Crown counsel and the edited affidavit, a form of judicial summary as to the general nature of the deletions should be provided.
3. After hearing counsel for the accused and reply from the Crown, the trial judge should make a final determination as to editing, bearing in mind that editing is to be kept to a minimum and applying the factors listed above.
4. After the determination has been made in (3), the packet material should be provided to the accused.
5. If the Crown can support the authorization on the basis of the material as edited, the authorization is confirmed.
6. If, however, the editing renders the authorization insupportable, then the Crown may apply to have the trial judge consider so much of the excised material as is necessary to support the authorization. The trial judge should accede to such a request only if satisfied that the accused is sufficiently aware of the nature of the excised material to challenge it in argument or by evidence. In this regard, a judicial summary of the excised material should be provided if it will fulfill that function. It goes without saying that if the Crown is dissatisfied with the extent of disclosure and is of the view that the public interest will be prejudiced, it can withdraw tender of the wiretap evidence. [12]

[11] To clarify, not all six steps will be followed in every warrant challenge where there has been reliance upon CI material in the ITO. Some ITOs will contain enough non-CI material to justify the issuance of the warrant. Step five accounts for this. The prosecutor is still required to justify redactions made to protect CI privilege and to summarize the contents of these edits with the trial judge’s approval, but given that no reliance is placed on these portions of the ITO in a step five situation, the first four steps are usually uncontested.

[12] If, as in this case, the prosecution must rely upon some of the redacted material to meet the Garofoli test upon review (a sufficiency of evidence, reasonably believed, which could have supported the issuance of the warrant), resort to step six is inevitable and the first four steps take on greater significance.

[13] The judicial summary process is a critical waypoint along the step six journey. The step six analysis is predicated upon the hidden information within the redactions and the utility of the judicial summaries to assist the Defendant in challenging the privileged content.

[14] A well-crafted summary of redacted information is essential to permit the Defendant to exercise the right to make full answer and defence. The purpose of the judicial summary is to include “as much information as is possible to allow the accused to mount both a facial and a sub-facial attack on the ITO while nonetheless ensuring that informer privilege is maintained.” [13] The summary must provide the Defendant with a meaningful basis to challenge whether the CI material meets the ‘three Cs’ criteria of compelling, credible, and corroborated. [14] A weakness in one area can be compensated for in the other two. [15]

[15] While there is a paradox in having the Defendant challenge information which may be largely redacted, it must always be remembered that the Defendant does not appear at the Garofoli hearing empty-handed. The Defendant will have Stinchcombe disclosure (the entirety of the investigative file that is not clearly irrelevant or privileged), additional Garofoli disclosure (documents or information underlying the contents of the ITO), evidence adduced by the prosecution by way of amplification, evidence tendered by the Defendant, the testimony of any affiant/sub-affiant following cross-examination, the redacted ITO, and judicial summaries of the nature of the hidden information. The step six process also includes a failsafe protective mechanism: to the extent that redacted information cannot be summarized (without tending to reveal the identity of the CI), it cannot be considered during the step six review. [16]

[16] The Garofoli six steps make it clear that the judicial summary is the mechanism that ensures the right to make full answer and defence exists when challenging a heavily redacted ITO. The trial judge must make a qualitative assessment of the Defendant’s ability to challenge the redacted portions and the weight to be given to them:

Similarly, in assessing the weight to be given to the redacted information, the reviewing judge should consider the nature of the information, the extent to which the judicial summary allowed the accused to challenge it, and whether its nature is such that it was susceptible to being challenged by cross-examination or otherwise. [17]

[17] Many of the attacks upon step six reliance involve an assessment of whether the judicial summary actually fulfills its purpose: Does the Defendant have a sufficiency of information to challenge the veracity of the CI protected information.

[18] The Ontario Court of Appeal has found that the step six procedure is both fair and constitutional. [18] The appropriate balance between the needs of law enforcement (the overriding goal of protecting CIs) and the ability to make full answer and defence is struck by the provision of well-crafted judicial summaries that enable the Defendant to challenge privileged information by argument or evidence. [19] Reducing the weight to be given to redacted portions of the ITO is another judicial tool to reduce the disclosure disparity. [20]

[19] If the judicial summary is found wanting ( i.e ., does not provide a sufficiency of information about the nature of the redacted portions of the ITO to permit the Defendant to challenge the contents), the prosecutor may not be able to rely upon some redacted portions of the ITO and the warrant may fail. Any evidence obtained from the execution of the warrant is then subject to exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

[20] After the reviewing court has considered additional disclosure requests, determined that the ITO cannot be sustained without resort to the redacted information, created or approved of judicial summaries of redacted information, granted or refused leave to cross-examine the affiant or sub-affiants, excised erroneous information, and amplified the ITO to correct any good faith errors, the court can apportion the weight to apply to the redacted information (in light of the ability of the Defendant to challenge that information in argument or by evidence), disregard the redacted information for which no judicial summary adequately protects the right to make full answer and defence, and determine “whether there was at least some evidence that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the authorization could have issued.” [21]

[21] The final review will take into account all of the evidence adduced during the Garofoli application, including any viva voce evidence adduced, the result of any cross-examination of the affiant or sub-affiants, any exhibits, the ITO (with any excisions or amplifications), the judicial summaries, and the submissions of the parties. The well-armed Defendant can make hypothetical and alternative arguments respecting redacted information that is summarized. [22] Though the step six procedure is imperfect, “it can provide the defence with the ability to meaningfully and effectively mount a challenge to a redacted ITO.” [23]

ANALYSIS

[22] The Defendant did not argue that he was unable to challenge the ITO’s privileged information due to any of the redactions or their summaries.

[23] Instead, the Defendant takes issue with the issuance of the search warrant given that the CI was un-tested and there was an apparent insufficiency of compelling and corroborated information to bolster the CI’s credibility. The arguments advanced were:

i. The affiant did not provide full, fair, frank information in the ITO, thus misleading the issuing justice (para. 22 Notice of Application); ii. The affiant included material in the ITO that was irrelevant (paras. 14, 15, 16 Notice of Application; iii. The warrant was sought while police conducted surveillance of the Defendant, yet the affiant failed to mention that the Defendant attended a residence, while possibly in possession of a firearm (para. 17 Notice of Application); iv. The affiant gave the ambiguous impression that firearms are both valuable and likely to be possessed for long periods of time and firearms are easily transferrable (para. 23 Notice of Application); v. The ITO provides no basis upon which to believe that a firearm was likely to be found at the Defendant’s home (paras. 12, 27, 29 Notice of Application); vi. The ITO provides an insufficient basis to support vague police beliefs (paras. 18, 29 Notice of Application); vii. The information from the CI is stale and could not support reasonable beliefs (paras. 20, 23, 27, 29 Notice of Application); and viii. The CI is untested and there was an insufficiency of information to determine that the information was credible, corroborated, or compelling (paras. 19, 21, 28, 30 Notice of Application).

[24] I will address each of these eight concerns, and others which became apparent during oral submissions, in turn.

[25] One of the main complaints of the Defendant is that the affiant did not provide the issuing justice with full, fair, and frank disclosure of the fruits of the police investigation. This complaint was predicated upon an interpretation of history which is not borne out.

[26] The Defendant complains that he was arrested for mischief three days before the warrant was sought and the affiant left out key information from this incident that would have assisted the issuing justice. The Defendant relies upon the amplified record, exhibit 1 – Synopsis and Police Report. The Defendant was arrested for painting graffiti on a school. [24] It is alleged by the Defendant that exhibit 1 includes information relating to the Defendant’s possible association to a gang, or someone associated to a gang.

[27] I cannot accept this argument. The synopsis and police notes make absolutely no reference to a gang or any gang association. The fact that someone is arrested for painting graffiti does not inexorably lead to a conclusion of gang activity, even if the graffiti includes the phrase “Family over Everything.”

[28] Moreover, even if I could conclude that in the days leading up to the application for a search warrant the police had information respecting the Defendant’s possible interaction or association with a gang, the fact that more ammunition was apparently missing from the ITO does little to assist the Defendant. I agree that if there were gang affiliation information it ought to have been presented to the issuing justice, but respectfully, this amplification does little to undermine the grounds that were included.

[29] The second argument is about the relevance of some of the information in the ITO. This submission also fails. Generally, providing information about an address and its residents is vital information an issuing justice ought to have when considering the intrusiveness of a residential search and/or the likelihood that other occupants rather than the target of the search might be in possession of contraband. In this case, inclusion of an arrest and a caution for marihuana possession in 2017 could not possibly have misled the issuing justice nor was this information likely to have been given any inordinate weight.

[30] The third submission concerns surveillance that had taken place the same day that the police sought the warrant. Police surveillance notes became exhibit 3 on the Application. In relation to the surveillance, the ITO notes only the following:

i. Surveillance commenced at 11:45am; ii. A black Hyundai with Ontario licence plate CJKF930 was observed parked at the bottom of the driveway; iii. This vehicle is registered to Asif CHEEMA born July 6, 1965; iv. This male is believed to be Ramez CHEEMA’s father v. At 3:03pm Ramez CHEEMA was observed exiting 64 Prouse Drive, Brampton wearing a dark toque, blue jeans, and a blue/white wind breaker; vi. [a photograph apparently taken of the Defendant walking with a male is included]; and vii. Observations are continuing of this male awaiting this application.

[31] Exhibit 3 details the route taken by the Defendant and the unknown male and the Defendant’s entry into a Scotia Bank, before the Defendant is seen entering a Tim Horton’s.

[32] At 15:55 hours, the surveillance notes read:

T1 w ML out of Tims, North door. E/B Vodden on South side. Plan to A T1 O/F when solo, when safe to do so (24).

[33] I have concluded that the surveillance notes make it clear that by 3:55 pm, the police had decided to arrest the Defendant on foot, “when solo, when safe to do so.”

[34] The warrant itself was sent by email to the issuing justice of the peace at 4:02 pm, according to the email attached to the ITO.

[35] The Defendant’s concern arises from the surveillance notes that follow this chronology. At 16:23 hours (4:23 pm) the Defendant was observed by surveillance officers going into 9 Newton Ct. There is no description of the structure at that address. The Defendant complains that the police watched the Defendant walk around with another male and eventually enter a residence, possibly in possession of a firearm, but conveniently, the affiant did not mention any of this in the ITO.

[36] Several points can be made. The timing of the completion and submission of the warrant Application precluded information that was learned afterwards. The affiant cannot be faulted for withholding information learned during subsequent surveillance, that may have created alternate suspicions. There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that the police knew where the Defendant was headed or that there was any attempt to prevent relevant information from coming to the attention of the authorizing justice.

[37] As well, there is no evidence that 9 Newton Ct. is a residence. There is no evidence of the significance of the unknown male or the address entered. In the absence of any evidence, I am unable to conclude that there is any relevance to this information or that it ought to have been put before the issuing justice.

[38] I agree with the Defendant that most firearms are easily concealed and transported. However, there is no evidence to even suspect that the Defendant was in possession of a firearm when he left home at 3:03 pm. I do not agree that the affiant conspicuously excluded the information about the Defendant’s attendance at 9 Newton Ct. in order to improve the likelihood that any firearm in the Defendant’s possession would have remained at the Defendant’s residence.

[39] The Defendant’s fourth complaint was lodged primarily during oral submissions. It amounts to a concern that the affiant provided conflicting beliefs about the likelihood that the Defendant would retain a firearm at his home, and the ease with which he could have transferred it to a criminal associate. I do not find that the opinion of the affiant would have misled the issuing justice in any way. While I agree somewhat with the suggestion that the source of some of the affiant’s opinions is absent, the opinions are secondary, and they do not overshadow the compelling information in the ITO.

[40] Perhaps the strongest of the Defendant’s arguments is that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that a firearm would be found at the Defendant’s residence. This argument goes to the heart of the Defendant’s predicament: He has limited access (through judicial summaries) to the redacted information. As a result, the Defendant has made a theoretical, facial-validity argument respecting the sufficiency of the grounds in the ITO.

[41] I am satisfied that the redacted information provided a sufficient basis for the issuing justice to conclude that the affiant’s beliefs were reasonable and well-placed. When the entire backdrop of the investigation and the information from the CI is considered, there is no doubt that the unredacted ITO provides a basis upon which the search warrant for the Defendant’s residence could have been granted.

[42] Obviously, the Defendant does not know the provenance of the privileged information, the level of detail included, and anything about the CI’s background. The Defendant may well wonder whether the CI claims to have witnessed the Defendant in possession of a firearm, or whether the CI had learned about this from someone else, or whether the Defendant was alleged to have told someone (either the CI or someone who told the CI) that he was in possession of a firearm. The Defendant has no information about why it would be reasonable to believe that he would likely possess a firearm in his residence.

[43] Although the Defendant has not complained that he is unable to challenge the redacted material, I must be satisfied that there is enough available information to enable the Defendant to challenge the redacted contents in argument or evidence before the prosecutors’ reliance on privileged information will be upheld.

[44] The following paragraphs in the ITO are implicated by the redactions made to the information that was before the issuing justice:

Appendix C: 5.f. 5.g. 5.h. 8.a.

Appendix D: 1.[date] 1.a. 1.e. 1.f. through 1.o. 2. through to the end of Appendix D.

[45] In R . v. Crevier , the Defendant claimed that she could not effectively challenge whether the three Cs from Debot were met, because of the redactions made to the ITO to protect the CIs. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the judicial summaries were adequate because although the police had not taken great lengths to corroborate the criminality alleged, there was a sufficiency of information to assess and challenge the credibility of the CI, whose information was compelling. A similar analysis applies here.

[46] Several points need re-iteration. Firstly, the step six process contemplates that the Defendant will be deprived of some information. The issue is the Defendant’s ability to challenge the redacted information. Again, no issue has been taken by the Defendant that he was unable to mount a facial or sub-facial attack upon the ITO given any imperfection in the judicial summaries. As the court held in Crevier :

Provided the accused's right to full answer and defence is protected, an otherwise sufficient ITO should not, therefore, be found inadequate simply because of redactions made to preserve informer privilege. This would frustrate the utility of many search warrants and the interest of law enforcement. [25]

[47] Secondly, a defendant who is deprived of relevant information is not automatically deprived of his or her right to make full answer and defence. [26] The Defendant has several sources of information with which to assess the cogency of the CI information: trial disclosure; Garofoli disclosure; the judicial summary; and access to knowledge solely held by the Defendant. The Defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the judicial summary, nor did he seek to go beneath any of the redactions, or to cross examine the affiant, but these were potential avenues of other sources of information.

[48] Lastly, the Defendant need be aware of only the nature of the redacted details, not the details themselves. [27]

[49] I find that the judicial summaries, save for Appendix C. paragraph 5.h., for which no summary was provided, are appropriate, sufficient, and helpful to the Defendant. [28] The judicial summary exercise was conducted in open court in the Defendant’s presence. There were very few sealed notes passed between the court and the prosecutor. The judicial summary details the type of information and whatever can be said about its content, without tending to narrow the possible pool or reveal the identity of the CI.

[50] In this case, save for one redaction, no complaint is taken with the judicial summary disclosed to the Defendant. Having considered the privileged information and the judicial summary in this case, I conclude that the Defendant had ample ammunition with which to challenge the redacted information in argument or by evidence.

[51] The sixth complaint of the Defendant is also unfounded. Again, without the ability to go beneath the redactions, the Defendant hypothesizes that the privileged information is insufficient and conclusory. I find that the authorizing justice was provided an ample basis upon which to find that the CI’s knowledge was corroborated in significant respects [29] and it was not information that was necessarily known to the general public. As well, there was a lot of detail to the information which provided added credibility to the CI information and its compelling nature.

[52] The Defendant also argues that the 90-day window within which the CI information arrived reduces its cogency. In fairness, the Defendant conceded that the more recent the CI information, the more valuable it would be. Nothing more can be added here besides noting that the unredacted ITO put the authorizing justice in the best position to determine the value of the information, in light of everything else known. I have no concerns that any latency of the CI knowledge was not appropriately considered by the issuing justice.

[53] The Defendant’s final complaint respecting the CI’s credibility is largely addressed when considering all of the unredacted information, the attempts of the police to corroborate some of the details provided by the CI, and the compelling nature of the information itself. The confidential information was highly particularized and detailed. The other information provided about the CI (its background, its motivation, and its knowledge of the Defendant) and the source of the CI’s knowledge, all mitigate in favour of reasonable reliance upon it.

[54] Step six Garofoli applications necessarily entail a qualitative assessment of the ammunition afforded a defendant to challenge reliance upon unknown information. The defendant knows little about the CI, the source of its knowledge, the timeliness of the information, the haste with which it has been acted upon, and the level of detail which may enhance its compelling nature.

[55] I conclude on a balance of probabilities that this Defendant has not been prejudiced in any respect by the prosecution’s reliance on redacted material in the ITO.

CONCLUSION

[56] I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there was a sufficient basis for the authorizing justice to have granted the search warrant that led to the recovery of two firearms in the Defendant’s residence.

[57] The Application is dismissed, the search warrant is upheld, and the results and evidence of the authorized search are admissible in the Defendant’s trial.

Released: 12 December 2021 Justice G. Paul Renwick

[1] R . v. Garofoli , [1990] S.C.J. No. 115. [2] R . v. Leipert , [1997] S.C.J. No. 14 at paras. 20-22 , 26-27, and 33-34. [3] R. v . Pires and R. v . Lising , 2005 SCC 66 , [2005] S.C.J. No. 67 at paras. 28-31 . See also R. v . Crevier , 2015 ONCA 619 , [2015] O.J. No. 5109 (C.A.) at paras. 54-60 and 99-102 . At para. 101 of Crevier , the Court of Appeal clarifies that the right to make full answer and defence during a Garofoli application is “defined in context; it is not limited or reduced.” [4] Garofoli , supra, at para. 56 . [5] Hunter v. Southam Inc . , [1984] S.C.J. No. 36. [6] R. v . Araujo , 2000 SCC 65 , [2000] S.C.J. No. 65 at para. 51 . [7] Araujo , supra , at para. 46 . [8] R . v. Meddui et al., [2021] O.J. No. 1626 (C.A.) at para. 5 . [9] Bisaillon v . Keable , [1983] S.C.J. No. 65 and Leipert , supra , at paras. 9-12 . [10] R. v . Basi , 2009 SCC 52 , [2009] S.C.J. No. 52. at para. 37 and Bisaillon, supra . [11] R. v . Stinchcombe , [1991] S.C.J. No. 83 at paras. 16-17 and 20-25 . [12] Garofoli , supra , at para. 79 . [13] Crevier , supra , at para. 83 . [14] R. v . Debot , [1989] S.C.J. No. 118 at para. 53 . [15] Crevier , supra , at para. 107 . [16] Crevier , supra , at para. 87 . [17] Crevier , supra , at para. 88 . [18] R. v . Gero , [2021] O.J. No. 351 (C.A.) at paras. 40-53 . [19] The court in Crevier suggests possible challenges that could arise under step six at paras. 77-79. [20] Crevier , supra, at paras. 88 and 90 . [21] Araujo , supra , at para. 51 . [22] See R. v . Iyeke , [2016] O.J. No. 5885 (S.C.J.) at paras. 18-20 , for example. [23] Prosecuting and Defending Drug Cases: A Practitioner’s Handbook , by Nathan Gorham, Jeremy Streeter, and Breana Vandebeek (2019: Emond Professional, Toronto) at p. 111. [24] For the sake of the record, I note that the affiant included this outstanding charge (including the date) on the bottom of page 3 of Appendix C of the ITO. [25] Crevier , supra, at para. 47 . [26] Crevier , supra, at para. 53 . [27] Crevier , supra, at para. 72 . [28] In oral submissions, the prosecutor agreed that the information protected by the redaction in Appendix C at paragraph 5.h. was not judicially summarized through inadvertence and thus, could not be relied upon. In the end, the information protected by this redaction was actually disclosed in other parts of the ITO. [29] I am mindful that the corroboration did not involve the alleged criminality. This is not unusual. It will be rare that police are able to confirm the suspected criminality apart from the confidential information. See Crevier , supra , at para. 109 .