Court Information

Date: January 20, 2020

Ontario Court of Justice

Between:

Her Majesty the Queen

— and —

Treece Simpson

Before: Justice John North

Reasons for Judgment released on: January 20, 2020

Counsel

Ira Glasner and Leanne Siu ...................................................................... counsel for the Crown

Talman Rodocker .................................................................................... counsel for the Defence

Decision

NORTH J.:

I. INTRODUCTION

[1] Treece Simpson is charged with offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substance Act (CDSA) and Criminal Code.

[2] In late 2017, members of the Guns and Gangs Task Force of the Toronto Police Service (TPS) commenced an investigation into Treece Simpson. The TPS had received information from a confidential informant (CI) that Mr. Simpson unlawfully possessed a handgun.

[3] On December 20, 2017, police obtained Criminal Code search warrants for an apartment located at 3205-223 Webb Street, Mississauga (unit 3205) and a Mercedes Benz (white Mercedes). The affiant of the information to obtain (ITO) the search warrants asserted that there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe that Mr. Simpson had committed the offence of unlawfully possessing a firearm contrary to s. 91 of the Criminal Code and that evidence of this offence would be found in unit 3205 and the white Mercedes. The ITO was common to the two search warrants.

[4] On December 21, 2017, police followed Mr. Simpson to 223 Webb Drive. Mr. Simpson was arrested in the hallway on the 32nd floor of that building.

[5] During a search of Mr. Simpson incident to his arrest, police officers found controlled substances and $430 in cash in the waistband area of his pants. The officers also found a key to unit 3205. The officers used this key to enter the apartment and execute the search warrant.

[6] The police found the following items inside of unit 3205:

• 9.58 grams of a substance containing fentanyl.
• .13 grams of a substance containing carfentanil, fentanyl and heroin.
• 19.16 grams of cocaine.
• $4105.00[1]

[7] The police did not find a firearm inside the apartment.

[8] Mr. Simpson challenged the admissibility of the evidence seized at the time of his arrest and during the execution of the search warrant. He brought an application pursuant to ss. 7, 8, 9, 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) to exclude the seized evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter or for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1).

[9] The first part of the application was heard in December, 2019. At that time, defence counsel argued that Mr. Simpson's s. 8 rights had been infringed because the ITO, on its face, failed to disclose sufficient evidence upon which the issuing justice could have issued the warrants.

[10] Crown counsel argued that the ITO contained the requisite evidentiary foundation upon which the issuing justice could conclude that the statutory requirements for the issuance of the warrant had been met.

[11] I have concluded that Mr. Simpson's s. 8 rights were not infringed. Based on the grounds in the ITO, the issuing justice could have issued the search warrant for unit 3205.

[12] My reasons for these conclusions follow.

II. THE APPLICATION

[13] The search warrants were based, in part, on information provided by a CI. The ITO that was disclosed to defence counsel was redacted to protect informer privilege.

[14] At the outset of the Charter application, Crown counsel conceded that the redacted version of the ITO did not set out sufficient grounds to justify the issuance of the warrant. The Crown applied under "step six" to have the court consider the redacted portions of the ITO in relation to the Charter challenge: R. v. Crevier, 2015 ONCA 619.

[15] I was provided a copy of the unredacted ITO. It was made a sealed exhibit on the application. Crown counsel prepared a draft judicial summary of the redacted portions of the ITO. I had a number of questions for Crown counsel about the need for some of the proposed redactions. Crown counsel agreed that some additional information could be included in the judicial summary. During this process, Crown counsel and I communicated in writing. These written communications were sealed and made part of the record.

[16] Counsel for Mr. Simpson was provided with a judicial summary.

[17] After reviewing the judicial summary, defence counsel brought an application for disclosure of certain information that remained redacted in the ITO. After hearing submissions from both counsel, I asked Crown counsel to consider whether additional disclosure could be made in two specific areas without violating informant privilege. After further consideration, Crown counsel agreed that some additional information could be provided to the defence in one area. I concluded that, with the exception of information about the one area identified by the Crown, disclosing the information sought by the defence may tend to identify the CI: R. v. Omar, 2007 ONCA 117, at paras. 33-45; R. v. Leipert, [1997] 1 SCR 281, at paras. 18-19. I dismissed the application.

[18] I concluded that the judicial summary provided the defence with sufficient information to meaningfully challenge the search warrant: R. v. Reid, 2016 ONCA 524, at paras. 91-96.

[19] In assessing the validity of the search warrant I have relied on the unredacted ITO. To explain my conclusions, it is necessary to refer to the contents of the unredacted ITO. I will follow the approach adopted by Schreck J. in R. v. Woo, 2017 ONSC 7655, at para. 14. The reference to the redacted portions of the ITO will be contained in an endnote. A copy of these reasons without the endnote will be provided to the defence and the public. An unredacted version will be sealed and placed in the court file so that it is available to any court reviewing this decision. An unredacted version will also be provided to Crown counsel.

III. THE INFORMATION TO OBTAIN

[20] On December 19, 2017, the affiant applied for a Criminal Code search warrant for unit 3205 and the white Mercedes. A justice of the peace issued a search warrant for the vehicle but denied the application in relation to the apartment. The justice of the peace provided the following reasons for denying the application for a warrant to search unit 3205:

"Insufficient grounds to believe items to be seized are at the location to be searched."

[21] The affiant drafted a new ITO in support of a search warrant for unit 3205. The application was submitted to a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice. The ITO disclosed that a justice of the peace had denied a search warrant application for this address on December 19th. For the most part, the contents of the second ITO were the same as the first ITO. On December 20, 2017, a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice issued the search warrant for unit 3205.

[22] I will briefly review the contents of the redacted ITO.

A. Appendix A

[23] The affiant set out the following list of "things to be searched for" in Appendix A:

Contraband and Evidence of Contraband

• Firearms
• Ammunition
• Magazines
• Firearm parts and paraphernalia, including cleaning tools, holsters, speed loaders
• Firearms documents including licences, registrations, authorizations and permits
• Other documents in relation to firearms, including owners' manuals, instructions, receipts, correspondence, photos and images

Evidence Revealing Possession and/or Control of Contraband

• Documents and items in relation to recent ownership, occupation, possession and association with both the search location and the property found within the search location

Electronic Devices

• Evidence in relation to all of the above categories that is stored in mobile devices found within the search location.

B. Appendix B

[24] In Appendix B the affiant stated that there were reasonable grounds to believe that on December 20, 2017 Treece Simpson unlawfully possessed a firearm contrary to s. 91 of the Criminal Code.

C. Appendix C

[25] In Appendix C the affiant summarized the results of data base searches that he conducted on "Treece Anthony Simpson." These searches revealed that:

• Mr. Simpson was not before the courts at this time.
• Mr. Simpson was on a firearms/weapons prohibition with a start date of January 26th 2017 and an indefinite expiry date.
• Mr. Simpson was subject to three driver's licence suspensions. His address in Ministry of Transportation records was 204-2345 Truscott Drive, Mississauga.
• Mr. Simpson had been convicted of the following offences:
  • 2009-06-15 Mischief under $5000 and assault
  • 2009-06-16 Assault peace officer and uttering threats
  • 2015-01-29 Assault causing bodily harm
  • 2015-01-29 Fail to comply with a recognizance, possession of a Schedule I substance, possession of a Schedule II substance, driving while disqualified
  • 2017-01-26 Aggravated assault, fail to comply with recognizance, driving while disqualified
• On March 18, 2014 Mr. Simpson attended 12 Division of the TPS. He was "restrained in handcuffs" and reported that he had just been robbed at gunpoint by unknown suspects. Mr. Simpson told the police that he had been handcuffed by the people who committed this robbery. Mr. Simpson said that the robbery occurred at Jane Street and Weston Road. He reported that the people who robbed him took his gold chain, $300 in cash, a cell phone and a dog that he was walking.

[26] The affiant conducted checks on the white Mercedes and determined that it was registered to Alina Sotiriadi (DOB July 13, 1990). Ms. Sotiriadi's address, according to the Ministry of Transportation records, was 1209-9600 Yonge Street, Richmond Hill. Ms. Sotiriadi did not have a criminal record and was not facing any charges at the time of this investigation.

[27] On December 18, 2017, officers with the Guns and Gangs Task Force attended the area of Kennedy's Adult Entertainment Parlour (Kennedy's) in Mississauga to locate, and conduct surveillance on, Mr. Simpson. At 9:05 p.m. police officers observed the white Mercedes pull into the parking lot of Kennedy's. Two women exited the car and walked into Kennedy's. At 11:22 p.m., Mr. Simpson was observed sitting on a stool (by the front door) inside Kennedy's. At 11:29 p.m., Ms. Sotiriadi was observed inside of Kennedy's – she approached Mr. Simpson and had a conversation with him. At 12:42 a.m., Mr. Simpson left Kennedy's and entered the white Mercedes. Mr. Simpson drove to Brampton and was "misplaced" on Gore Road.

[28] On December 19, 2017, the affiant received the following information from a member of his team:

• On December 6, 2017, the white Mercedes received a parking ticket at 223 Webb Drive.
• On December 16, 2017, a police officer attended 223 Webb Drive and located the white Mercedes in the building parking lot (in spot P1 # 24). The officer saw Ms. Sotiriadi walk up to the car. She opened a door and the trunk of the vehicle. It appeared that she was looking for something. She secured the vehicle and walked away.
• On December 18, 2017, a police officer went to 223 Webb Drive and spoke with "building management." The officer was told that unit 3205 was being leased to Treece Simpson, Latoya Brown and Nateya Brown. This unit has two registered electronic fobs to access the building and the 32nd floor. The storage locker for unit 3205 is located on the first floor. While at 223 Webb Drive the officer also took other investigative steps which resulted in the police obtaining additional information:
  • The officer reviewed video recordings taken by security cameras within 223 Webb Drive and electronic fob activity from December 16th (when the officer saw Ms. Sotiriadi walk from the white Mercedes). The officer determined that on December 16th Ms. Sotiriadi used an electronic fob that was registered to unit 3205 to access the elevator. The video-recording showed Ms. Sotiriadi take the elevator up to the 32nd floor and walk in the direction of unit 3205.
  • The officer reviewed other fob activity for unit 3205 and video recordings taken by security cameras within the building. On one of the video-recordings, the officer saw that on December 18th, at about 3 p.m., a 5'7-5'9 black man with a thin build, braided hair and a goatee accessed the elevator from the 32nd floor. The man took the elevator to the main lobby. As he walked past the front desk, he was carrying a box. The man left the building and moments later, using an electronic fob assigned to unit 3205, he re-entered the building. He was not carrying the box when he re-entered the building. The man entered the elevator and used the fob to go to the 32nd floor. When he arrived at the 32nd floor, the man exited the elevator and walked in the direction of unit 3205. The officer viewed a photograph of Treece Simpson and identified him as the man he saw using the electronic fob at 223 Webb Drive on December 18th.

[29] On December 19, 2017, police officers attended 223 Webb Drive to look for the white Mercedes. At 6:30 a.m. the police found the white Mercedes parked in spot P1 #24.

[30] In Appendix C the affiant stated that he had been a police officer for 18 years and had executed hundreds of search warrants. He had been with the Guns and Gangs Task Force since January 2010. Based on his training and background, it was his experience that:

• Drug dealers are often in possession of illegal drugs and proceeds from the sale of drugs. "This makes them obvious targets for robberies and home invasions from other criminals who are usually armed. Therefore, a drug dealer needs their firearm close by to access it."
• Drug dealers who possess an illegal firearm often keep the firearm in close proximity to them so they are able to access it.
• Police "consistently locate firearms in the residences of drug dealers reasonably believed to possess a firearm."
• Those who choose to "arm themselves with illegal firearms consistently choose to do so because they perceive the need to protect themselves and their property from other offenders, often in the course of drug dealing, or other criminal offences, and the need to be violent or threaten violence, including for extortion, debt collection and robberies."
• "Illegal firearms and ammunition for such firearms can be expensive and relatively difficult to acquire, as there are relatively fewer dealers in illegal firearms compared to other contraband such as drugs. I believe that, as a general matter, those criminals who put out the effort and expense to arm themselves with illegal firearms do so because a they are repeatedly involved in the types of criminal activities where they perceive a continuing need for a firearm. I understand that police experience is that illegal firearms and ammunition for those guns are treated and preserved and kept as relatively precious commodities. While police experience has shown that there are criminals who trade, loan, and borrow firearms, police experience also supports the observation that those criminals who go to the efforts and expense of acquiring access to an illegal firearm are seldom without one.

D. Appendix D

[31] In Appendix D (redacted), the affiant stated that the CI advised the police of the following:

• The CI knows a drug dealer named "Tony."
• Tony deals heroin, crack and weed.
• Tony frequents the area of "Square One" in Mississauga.
• Tony is described as male, Black, thin build, late 20's early 30's, goatee, short dreads.
• Tony drives a white Mercedes Benz model CLA 250, with the licence plate CBBH 754.
• The CI learned most of the information provided to the police through "first-hand observations and knowledge."
• The CI has been present with "Tony" while "Tony" was in possession of this firearm.
• The CI was shown a photo of Treece Simpson by the police and the CI identified Treece Simpson as person he referred to as "Tony."

IV. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

[32] Section 8 of the Charter provides that, "everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure."

A. Reasonable and Probable Grounds

[33] Before a search warrant may be granted the police must provide a justice with "reasonable and probable grounds, established upon oath, to believe that an offence has been committed and that there is evidence to be found at the place of the proposed search": Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 SCR 145, at p. 168; R. v. Campbell, 2011 SCC 32, [2011] 2 SCR 549, at para. 14.

[34] The reasonable and probable grounds standard is one of reasonable probability or credibly-based probability: Hunter v. Southam Inc., at p. 167. This standard does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even proof on a balance of probabilities: R. v. Beauchamp, 2015 ONCA 260, at para. 92.

[35] Officer training and experience may play an important role in establishing the existence of reasonable and probable grounds: R. v. MacKenzie, 2013 SCC 50, [2013] 3 SCR 250, at paras. 62-63. However, courts are not required to uncritically accept or defer to a police officer's conclusion that is grounded in his or her experience and training. Reasonable grounds to believe and reasonable suspicion are objective standards that "must stand up to independent scrutiny": MacKenzie, at para. 64.

B. Review of a Search Warrant

[36] The review of the validity of a search warrant begins from a presumption that the warrant is valid: R. v. Pires; R. v. Lising, 2005 SCC 66, [2005] 3 SCR 343, at para. 30. The onus is on the accused to establish that the ITO is insufficient: Campbell, at para. 14.

[37] A reviewing court works "within a narrow jurisdictional compass": R. v. Ebanks, 2009 ONCA 851, at para. 20. A reviewing judge cannot substitute his or her view for that of the issuing justice. It is not the role of the reviewing judge to decide whether he or she would have issued the warrant. Instead, the sole function of the reviewing court is to determine whether the issuing justice could have issued the warrant: R. v. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72, at para. 37; Ebanks, at paras. 20-22.

[38] In this case, the defence advanced a facial validity challenge to the warrant. In Sadikov, at para. 37, the Court explained that the role of a judge on a facial review is narrow and the record is fixed:

"A facial validity challenge requires the reviewing judge to examine the ITO and to determine whether, on the face of the information disclosed there, the justice could have issued the warrant: R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992, at para. 19. The record examined on a facial review is fixed: it is the ITO, not an amplified or enlarged record: R. v. Wilson, 2011 BCCA 252, 272 C.C.C. (3d) 269, at para. 39."

[39] A reviewing justice is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the contents of an ITO: R. v. Nero, 2016 ONCA 160, at para. 71. An affiant need not underline the obvious: R. v. Vu, 2013 SCC 60, [2013] 3 SCR 657, at para. 16.

[40] In determining whether the ITO contained sufficient facts to establish reasonable and probable grounds, a reviewing justice must consider the ITO as a whole. A reviewing court must conduct the review on "a contextual analysis, not a piecemeal approach to individual items of evidence shorn of their context in a vain search for alternative exculpatory inferences": Nero, at para. 68. A reviewing judge must remember that "if the inferences of criminal conduct and recovery of evidence are reasonable on the facts as disclosed in the ITO, the warrant could be issued": Sadikov, at para. 81.

V. THE DEBOT CRITERIA

[41] When deciding whether information provided by a confidential informant gives rise to the reasonable and probable grounds that are required to support the issuance of a search warrant a court must consider the Debot criteria:[2]

1. Was the information compelling?
2. Was the source credible?
3. Was the information corroborated by police investigation?

[42] The test is based on the totality of circumstances. Weaknesses in one of these areas may, to some extent, be compensated by strengths in the other two areas: R. v. Rocha, 2012 ONCA 707, at para. 16.

[43] As Allen J. observed in R. v. Bedi, 2014 ONSC 4392, at para. 112, "addressing the three Debot inquiries poses a particular challenge with a heavily redacted ITO." That is because "much of the detailed and potentially most persuasive evidence could possibly identify the CI or narrow the pool of persons to a limited few who would know those details." As a result of these constraints, my reasons will not contain the degree of detail that I would usually provide.

1) Was the Information Compelling?

[44] In assessing whether information is compelling a court must consider factors such as the degree of detail provided, the means of knowledge and whether the information that the CI provided was based on first hand observations or second hand observations. In Meecham, at para. 18, Schreck J. stated that this aspect of the Debot analysis:

"…relates not to the source of the information, but rather the information itself and whether it has the characteristics that lead to the conclusion that it is reliable. A tip can be said to be compelling if it is detailed and based on first hand observations that are reasonably current." See also: R. v. Greaves-Bissesarsing, 2014 ONSC 4900, at paras. 35, 40-42.

[45] In this case, most of the information provided by the CI was based on first-hand observations. When the CI's information was not based on first-hand observations it was clearly set out in the ITO. The most probative information was reasonably current. The information was sufficiently detailed. In my view, the information provided by the CI in support of the conclusion that Mr. Simpson unlawfully possessed a firearm was compelling.

2) Was the Source Credible?

[46] In R. v. Meecham, 2018 ONSC 7033, at para. 18, Schreck J. stated that the credibility assessment, "relates to the trustworthiness of the source of the information in the ITO and will involve considerations such as the informer's motivation, his or her criminal history and any past history in providing information to the police." See also R. v. Greaves-Bissesarsing, at paras. 35-39. No individual factor is determinative: Meecham, at para. 13.

[47] While a CI's motive for providing information is a relevant factor in assessing credibility, the fact that a CI was motivated by financial gain or some other form of consideration is not unusual and does not (by itself) completely discredit a CI. As Goldstein J. noted in R. v. Kebede, 2018 ONSC 6304, at para. 36, "credibility often comes from the amount of reliable information supplied in the past and the entrenchment in the criminal world." See also R. v. Herta, 2018 ONCA 927, at paras. 29-33.

[48] In some cases, it will not be possible to assess the credibility of a tipster because the person provided the information anonymously. The fact that a tipster provided information anonymously does not, by itself, disqualify the information: R. v. Basset, at para. 15.

[49] In this case, the ITO disclosed the CI's motivation for providing information to the police and what would happen if the information turned out to be false or misleading. This information is relevant to the CI's credibility.

[50] This was not a case where the tipster was anonymous. The CI has provided information to the police on more than one occasion in the past. The ITO stated that the CI has "proven forthright and accurate through investigations and arrests" in the past. The ITO disclosed what kind of contraband, if any, was seized by police as a result of the CI's information. The ITO disclosed whether charges were laid as a result of the CI's information in relation to at least one investigation. The ITO did not disclose whether anyone was convicted in relation to the investigations for which the CI provided information. The ITO did not disclose whether the CI ever provided information that the police did not act on.

[51] While there were some factors in the unredacted ITO that detracted from the CI's credibility, there were also factors that enhanced the CI's credibility. In my view, the factors with respect to credibility are overall neutral.

3) Was the Information Corroborated by Police Investigation?

[52] Corroboration refers to "any supporting information uncovered by the police investigation": Greaves-Bissesarsing, at para. 35. While the police are not required to confirm every detail in an informant's tip or corroborate the very criminal act in issue for a confirmative detail to have probative value respecting the accuracy of an informant's information "meaningful corroboration requires more than confirmation of neutral or easily discernible facts": Meecham, at para. 22. See also R. v. Lewis (1998), 122 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 490; Rocha, at para. 22; Herta, at paras. 38-40; Greaves-Bissesarsing, paras. 43-45. Confirmation of "innocent" details is not as strongly corroborative of CI's information as confirmation respecting the targeted criminality itself.

[53] A target's criminal record can be used to corroborate confidential information, particularly where it is recent and similar to the criminal activity alleged by the confidential informant: R. v. MacDonald, 2012 ONCA 244, at paras. 22-24; Beauchamp, at para. 113.

[54] In this case, the police corroborated some of the information provided by the CI during the investigation. In the ITO the affiant states that Mr. Simpson's criminal record for drug offences corroborates the CI's information. In MacDonald, at para. 23, the Court concluded that the "cogency of the criminal record depends on its similarity to the criminal activity alleged by the tipster and the age of the record." In my view, the fact that Mr. Simpson was convicted of two counts of simple possession of a controlled substance in 2015 does not provide significant corroboration of the CI's information that Mr. Simpson was trafficking heroin, crack and marijuana. To a limited extent, I believe that Mr. Simpson's criminal record for crimes of violence and the information that he was subject to a weapons prohibition corroborates the CI's information that Mr. Simpson was unlawfully in possession of a handgun. While a court could reasonably give Mr. Simpson's criminal record some weight, by itself, it clearly does not establish reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Simpson was unlawfully in possession of a handgun or that evidence of this offence would be found at unit 3205.

[55] The CI's information that Mr. Simpson drove the white Mercedes was corroborated by police surveillance. The CI's information that Mr. Simpson "frequents the area of Square One in Mississauga" was, to a limited extent, corroborated by the evidence that Mr. Simpson lived near Square One. The redacted ITO reveals that the CI provided the police with some information about "Tony" (Mr. Simpson) and Kennedy's. The police surveillance on December 18th provided some corroboration of the CI's information that involved Mr. Simpson and Kennedy's. The last three items are neutral facts that are not as strongly corroborative of the CI's information as information regarding the targeted criminality would be.

[56] In my view, the most meaningful corroboration was in relation to part of the CI's tip that cannot be disclosed because of informant privilege. This part of the CI's tip involved "more specific, exclusive information." Corroboration of such information will be "more persuasive than corroboration of commonly known information": R. v. Bruno, 2019 ONSC 3798, at para. 13. See also R. v. Fermah, 2019 ONSC 753, at para. 12. I will refer to this evidence in an endnote.

[57] In my view, there was some corroboration of the CI's information.

VI. CONCLUSION

[58] In my view, the information provided by the CI met the Debot criteria and, along with the other information that was before the issuing justice, justified the issuance of the search warrant for unit 3205.

[59] The information was sufficiently compelling, credible and corroborated to establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe that Mr. Simpson was unlawfully in possession of a firearm.

[60] Further, there was a credibly-based probability that evidence of this offence would be found at unit 3205. The existence of reasonable and probable grounds that Mr. Simpson unlawfully possessed a firearm would not, on its own, give rise to reasonable and probable grounds to believe that a search of any address he attended: Herta, at para. 51. However, the grounds in the ITO established more than mere attendance at unit 3205. The police investigation established a strong connection between Mr. Simpson and unit 3205. Mr. Simpson leased this apartment. Two days before the warrant was issued, he used the electronic fob that was registered to unit 3205. On that day, he was observed on the 32nd floor of the building, walking in the direction of unit 3205. On December 16th the white Mercedes was parked in parking spot P1#24 at 223 Webb Drive. On December 19th, at 6:30 a.m., the white Mercedes was parked in the same parking spot.

[61] The CI told police that Mr. Simpson trafficked heroin, crack cocaine and marihuana. The CI told police that (within 45 days of the issuance of the search warrant) he or she saw Mr. Simpson in possession of a handgun. In the affiant's experience, drug dealers are often targets of robberies and home invasions because they are "usually in possession of illegal drugs and proceeds from the sale of the illegal drugs." It was the affiant's experience that drug dealers who possess illegal handguns usually keep them easily accessible to protect themselves. In my view, the affiant's experience makes sense and can be applied to the circumstances of this case.

[62] Again, some of the grounds which support the conclusion that evidence would be found at unit 3205 have been redacted. This redacted information is contained in the endnote.

[63] When considered as a whole, the ITO established a sufficient basis to conclude that there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe that Mr. Simpson had committed the offence of unauthorized possession of a firearm contrary to s. 91 of the Criminal Code and that evidence in relation to that offence would be found at unit 3205.

[64] The issuing justice could have issued the warrant. Mr. Simpson's s. 8 rights were not infringed.

[65] The remaining Charter issues will be argued on January 20, 2020.

NORTH J.

Endnote: Redacted

[1] Most of these items were found in a safe. $1105 was found on the bedroom dresser. 0.2 grams of cocaine was found under a bed. I have been advised that the police did not search the Mercedes Benz.

[2] R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 SCR 1140, at p. 1168.