Ontario Court of Justice
Citation: R. v. Wells, 2020 ONCJ 294 Date: June 12, 2020
Between: Her Majesty the Queen — and — Gordon Wells
Before: Justice B. Knazan Heard on: January 30 and January 31, 2020 Reasons for Judgment released on: June 12, 2020
Counsel: Mr. Fred Bartley, counsel for the Crown Mr. Trevin David, counsel for the accused, Gordon Wells
KNAZAN J.:
INTRODUCTION
[1] In December 2018, Parliament recast the offence of failing to stop and provide a name and assistance after a collision. The new section incorporates a legal defence of reasonable excuse. This case raises the issue of whether a driver is somehow required to stop or provide their name after leaving the scene of the collision even though they had a reasonable excuse for failing to stop at the scene, provide a name and offer assistance.
[2] On March 23rd, 2019, Gordon Wells was driving and collided with a bicycle that Christopher Crawford was riding on Breadalbane Street in central Toronto. After the collision he reversed and drove away.
[3] Witnesses obtained his licence number and by the time Mr. Wells, who lives in Unionville, arrived home about one hour later, the police knew who he was and called him.
[4] The police charged Mr. Wells with dangerous driving and assault with a weapon, namely his vehicle. At the conclusion of the evidence and oral submissions on January 31, 2020, I dismissed those charges. My findings of fact, which I stated that I might elaborate on in this judgment led me to have a reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Wells intentionally drove into the bicycle and operated his motor vehicle in a dangerous manner, having regard to all of the circumstances.
[5] The police also charged Mr. Wells further, with the subject of this judgment as follows that he:
on or about the 23rd day of March in the year 2019 at the City of Toronto, in the Toronto Region, did operate a conveyance and drive on Breadalbane Street near Bay Street and knowing that the conveyance had been involved in an accident with Christopher Crawford that resulted in bodily harm to Christopher Crawford did without reasonable excuse fail to stop the conveyance and give his name and address, contrary to s. 320.16(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
[6] As clearly appears from the charge that I have set out there are several elements that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to make out this charge. Some are conceded and there is no need to discuss them as separate elements, namely, Mr. Wells was driving, his conveyance was involved in an accident that resulted in bodily harm to Christopher Crawford, Mr. Wells knew that and failed to give his name and address or offer assistance.
[7] There is a dispute about whether he stopped his vehicle at all when he backed up, but since the driver is required to do three things, stop, give their name and address, and render assistance when possible, the offence is proven whether he stopped or not.
[8] This leaves two issues for determination.
[9] The first issue is more straightforward. Did Mr. Wells have a reasonable excuse for failing to stop and provide his name and address? The prosecution need not prove that he did not, as an element of the offence. Mr. Wells must establish that he had a reasonable excuse on a balance of probabilities.
[10] The second and main issue in this case arises only if a driver establishes that he had a reasonable excuse for failing to stop as required.
[11] Mr. Wells’s reason for failing to stop as the law requires, was that he was afraid. He was afraid because Mr. Crawford had struck and damaged his vehicle while on his bicycle before the collision and that after the collision Mr. Crawford got up, walked over to his car window and punched him hard in the face, knocking off his glasses and injuring him.
[12] Should I find that this gave him a reasonable excuse for driving away, the issue is whether Mr. Wells was required to stop his vehicle at the first opportunity that it was safe for him to do so, as the prosecution contends. Another way of putting this is to ask, is a reasonable excuse at the moment of failing to stop, provide a name and offer assistance at the scene a complete answer to the charge, or can the excuse somehow expire. Since the second issue only arises once I find that Mr. Wells had a reasonable excuse for not stopping, I begin there.
ISSUE 1 – REASONABLE EXCUSE
[13] In order to evaluate Mr. Wells’s excuse, I will review the facts that I found in acquitting Mr. Wells of the other charges. At around 8:00 p.m. on March 23rd, Mr. Crawford was cycling westbound on Breadalbane at 20 to 25 kilometers per hour. He had lights and reflector tape on his bicycle but no bell. Mr. Wells was driving southbound out of a small driveway, from his son’s apartment building onto Breadalbane.
[14] Mr. Crawford described what occurred. Mr. Wells pulled out onto Breadalbane just as Crawford was approaching. Crawford saw his car, concluded that the driver seemed not to be aware of him, and steered his bicycle out from where he was cycling closer to the curb into the middle of the street. He went over into where oncoming traffic would have been had there been any. Fortunately, there was not.
[15] He slowed down and rode alongside Wells who had completed his turn and proceeded westbound.
[16] Crawford was very upset; he perceived that he had almost been killed. He did not sense that Wells was acknowledging what he had done. He yelled and swore at him through the closed window. Seeing that Wells was driving on, he rode alongside him on his left, rode closer to the side of the car and hit the driver’s side mirror with his hand, intending to damage it.
[17] Mr. Sergay Fomin was walking on Bay at Breadalbane with his girlfriend. He had a clear view of what occurred, at least after the near miss. He had the time of day wrong but he was a strong witness who accurately described seeing the encounter between the cyclist and the driver just as Mr. Crawford and Mr. Wells described it.
[18] As he put it, he guessed they were way past the point of hitting each other, when he saw them. He was clearly, from the context, referring to the collision that did not occur, the one that Mr. Crawford avoided by veering to the left. He described Mr. Crawford slowing down and waiting for the car; Mr. Crawford agreed that he slowed down. According to Fomin, Mr. Crawford was swearing and screaming and when they were side by side, Crawford hit the side mirror on Wells’s car.
[19] Wells then veered to the left and drove into Crawford on his bicycle. Mr. Wells explained that after the mirror was struck, he turned to the right, saw the curb approaching, compensated and that is when he hit the bicycle. Fomin testified that he drove into the bike.
[20] Mr. Crawford, helpful to Mr. Wells’s case as he was in several parts of his testimony, explained that the front of the car sideswiped his bicycle and caught the wheel and brought him to the ground. He at first testified that Wells turned the vehicle into him, knocked him to the ground and that his front wheel went up over the rear of his bike and onto his leg. He later clarified that the car sideswiped him and the car’s front wheel caught his back tire and folded the bike down.
[21] In dismissing the charges of assault and dangerous driving I accepted Mr. Wells’s evidence that he did not intend to drive into Mr. Crawford in any way and that the manoeuvre that caused the accident came about as he described. That is, although he was at fault for not seeing the cyclist, not having seen him, he was surprised by his appearance to his left. Confronted by a screaming swearing cyclist who was on his left side and hit his side mirror, he turned first to the right and then when he turned back to avoid the curb, he unintentionally hit the bicycle with his car.
WHAT OCCURRED AFTER THE COLLISION – MR. WELLS’S EXCUSE FOR NOT STOPPING
[22] After the collision, Crawford punched Wells hard, knocking off his glasses and injuring him. Mr. Wells drove away from the scene and did not remain. Fomin did not see Crawford hit Mr. Wells, he said that it did not happen. None of the other persons in the area, either walking or driving, saw Crawford hit Wells. I have not referred to their evidence because the inaccuracies and the partial nature of their observations do not assist with the issues I must determine. It was Crawford who testified as to why and how he punched Wells.
[23] Wells’s excuse for not stopping and providing his name and address was that he was fearful of what would happen to him having had his mirror struck and his face punched. This is the excuse the reasonableness of which I must evaluate.
[24] The punch to the face came about like this. After Mr. Wells’s car collided with Crawford’s bicycle, Crawford was unable to move; he was under his bicycle, part of which must have been under the car wheel. Wells stopped the car, put down his window and leaned out. He then put the car into reverse and reversed away from the bicycle. Crawford, now able to move, perceived that he was fleeing. So he got up, walked to the car and punched him in the face. He testified that Wells stopped the car briefly while reversing away from him, but that he started to pull away. So he hooked his arm through the window in order to hit him and then pulled out his arm. Although he could not put everything into the punch because he had to hook his arm, he was trying to hurt Wells.
[25] He did hurt Wells. He knocked his glasses into his left eye and then towards his right eye and off his face into the passenger seat. Later Wells had black eyes.
[26] There is a difference in the evidence between Mr. Wells and Mr. Crawford. Mr. Wells testified that he put the car into park intending to ask Mr. Crawford if he was alright and that Crawford charged at him and punched him in the face. Mr. Crawford testified that he walked over to the car not intending to hit him but that when he saw him backing away in the car, he punched him.
[27] As Crawford agreed that Wells stopped the car, I accept Wells’s evidence that he stopped the car. This is irrelevant to his admitted failure to stop and provide his name and address within the meaning of the section, but relevant to my assessment of his honesty when he gave his reason for driving away entirely.
[28] Crawford formed his perception that Wells was driving away and not taking responsibility for his actions after he had been cut off, traumatically hit by a car and pinned down and while he was very angry. Whether or not Crawford’s subjective perception was justified, I believe Wells’s testimony as to why he did not stop or provide his name or assistance to Crawford. I find that he has established on a balance of probabilities that he drove away because he was afraid.
[29] Crawford’s evidence supports the probability of Wells’s reason for driving away. In my reasons of January 31, 2020, I refer to Crawford’s agreement that the way he behaved while driving alongside could have led the driver to panic. This was relevant to assessing why Wells drove as he did before the accident. But Crawford went further on this point and that is relevant to both the credibility of Wells’s excuse for driving away and the reasonableness of that excuse. Crawford agreed that his behaviour could be seen as not careful, aggressive and reckless and could cause not only panic but fear. And this was the behaviour before the collision between the car and the bicycle.
[30] When one adds the punch to the riding alongside the car on the left, but not passing the car, hitting the side mirror, swearing and screaming, it supports Wells’s testimony that he drove away out of fear because there was an objective basis for his fear and his subjective fear is entirely reasonable.
[31] This is the excuse that must meet the test of reasonableness on a balance of probabilities. I find that in view of what had happened to him, his subjective fear was also objectively reasonable. So much so that it would be unreasonable to expect anyone to remain at the scene after being subject to the violence of the punch.
[32] Without detracting from the legitimacy of Mr. Crawford’s anger because he had been cut off and run over, he had no right to punch Mr. Wells and no reason apart from that anger; he was required to resort to the law. If he could land a punch of that force into what he says was a moving car, he could read a licence plate. His unreasonable response buttresses the reasonableness of Mr. Wells’s excuse. Although the defence of reasonable excuse is new in this section, under the predecessor section[^1] that s.320.16 replaced, fear of personal harm has been accepted as negating the criminal intention of avoiding liability. R. v. Wood, [1999] O.J. No. 2278.
[33] Mr. Wells did not fail to stop his vehicle and provide his name and address without reasonable excuse. He had a reasonable excuse. This does not end the matter but leads directly to what I have referred to as the main issue.
ISSUE 2 – THE MAIN ISSUE: DOES S. 320.16 CREATE ANY OBLIGATION AFTER A DRIVER HAS FAILED TO STOP, PROVIDE HIS NAME OR ASSISTANCE WITH A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR HIS FAILURES?
[34] s. 320.16 of the Criminal Code reads as follows:
320.16 (1) Everyone commits an offence who operates a conveyance and who at the time of operating the conveyance knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the conveyance has been involved in an accident with a person or another conveyance and who fails, without reasonable excuse, to stop the conveyance, give their name and address and, if any person has been injured or appears to require assistance, offer assistance.
(2) Everyone commits an offence who commits an offence under subsection (1) and who at the time of committing the offence knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the accident resulted in bodily harm to another person.
320.16 (1) Commet une infraction quiconque conduisant un moyen de transport, sachant que celui-ci a été impliqué dans un accident avec une personne ou un autre moyen de transport ou ne s’en souciant pas, omet, sans excuse raisonnable, d’arrêter le moyen de transport et de donner ses nom et adresse, et d’offrir de l’assistance à une personne qui a été blessée ou semble avoir besoin d’assistance.
(2) Commet une infraction quiconque commet une infraction prévue au paragraphe (1), sachant que l'accident a entraîné des lésions corporelles à une autre personne ou ne s'en souciant pas.
[35] I have determined that the Crown has proven all elements of the offence. But Mr. Wells in turn, has established that he had a reasonable excuse for failing to meet the obligations that the section establishes. Put another way, he is guilty of the offence except that Parliament has provided a particular defence right in the section that absolves him of guilt. He has established a reasonable excuse for his failures. That, on a plain reading of the words of the section, should lead to his acquittal.
[36] However, Crown counsel, relying on the decision of the Provincial Court of British Columbia, in R. v. Griffith (summarized in the Court of Appeal decision, 2019 BCCA 37), submits that even if Mr. Wells had a reasonable excuse for failing to stop, he still was required to go to a police station or call the police and report the accident.
[37] In Griffith, the provincial court judge determined that under s. 252 of the Criminal Code, supra, footnote 1, that was repealed and replaced by s.320.16 in December 2018, the obligation to stop and provide name, address and assistance after being involved in a collision was a continuing one.
[38] By the time the appeal was heard, the new section had been enacted. In the British Columbia Court of Appeal, Justice Fitch precisely predicted the situation that confronts me as a result of the enactment of s.320.16(1) of the Criminal Code: R. v. Griffith, supra.
[39] Griffith killed a pedestrian when he drove away at a high rate of speed out of fear for his life when he found himself threatened by other persons, not the pedestrian. He did not stop or provide his name or assistance.
[40] The trial judge found that it was unreasonable to stop immediately after the accident based on Griffith’s fear. Therefore, he was not prepared to find the appellant liable for the offence “immediately upon his having left the scene.”
[41] The trial judge went on to find that the statutory obligations that s.252(1) created may be temporarily suspended when immediate compliance is practically “impossible.” But he further found that the obligations are not “thus relieved” and must be discharged “as soon as reasonably practical.”
[42] On appeal, Griffith conceded that the offence was a continuing one and that the trial judge was correct. In view of that, Justice Fitch stated at para. 61:
In light of the concession made by the appellant in oral argument, it is unnecessary to resolve whether the judge properly interpreted the scope of the provision. Indeed, it would be unwise to do so in circumstances where the section has been repealed and recast, the point was not fully argued, and addressing it may have implications for the current provision, the interpretation of which is best left for another day.
[43] In this case, the day for the interpretation of the new section has arrived.
[44] Having received argument on the proper interpretation of the new section, I conclude that the section as framed creates an offence of failing to stop, provide name and address, and render assistance when necessary without reasonable excuse. It creates an obligation to do all of those things, but the latter two are dependent on stopping. If there is a reasonable excuse for failing to stop and provide the information and assistance at the scene, then the charge has not been made out. I reach this conclusion on the basis of the principles of statutory construction.
[45] A plain reading of the section creating the charge, set out above, yields its meaning. The actus reus of the offence is to fail to stop and provide name and address and render assistance where necessary. The mental element is the intention to drive away. A further specified intent, to avoid criminal or civil liability that formed part of the predecessor section has been eliminated. The only mental element in the section is the intent to fail to meet any of the three requirements, to stop, provide name and address, and render assistance when necessary.
[46] The reasonable excuse forms neither part of the actus reus nor the mens rea. I disagree with the authors of Impaired Driving and Other Driving Offences in Canada, A Practitioner’s Handbook, Toronto, Edmond 2019, where at page 152 they write that the requirement to show a reasonable excuse is part of the mens rea of the offence. It is not. It is as an excuse for his crime even though he committed the actus reus with the necessary mens rea, Stuart Criminal Law, 6th Edition, Carswell p.485.:
The excuses reflect a policy consideration that someone who has committed a criminal act should nevertheless be absolved.
[47] A reasonable excuse provides a defence to a particular offence, which would not be available if the words “without reasonable excuse” were omitted, Stuart, supra at p. 544, writing of the reasonable excuse for failing to provide a breath sample and citing R. v. Brownridge, 1972 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1972] S.C.R. 926.
[48] How then, does the statutory defence of reasonable excuse operate with respect to the particular crime of failing to stop and provide name and assistance?
[49] Reading the section leads to the conclusion that once the defendant establishes his reasonable excuse, the inquiry has ended. The three requirements are conjunctive, a driver must (may not fail to) stop, provide his name and address and render assistance when necessary. Under the previous repealed section the requirements were conjunctive: R. v. Roche, 1983 CanLII 130 (SCC), [1983] 1 SCR 491. Thus an accused had to do all three and must do all three under the current section.
[50] Two of the three can only be done at the scene. The ability to stop and render assistance only exists there. Once a driver has not stopped with a reasonable excuse for not stopping, and has not rendered assistance, with a reasonable excuse for not rendering assistance, the section as it reads is exhausted and cannot be the foundation of guilt, even if the circumstances giving rise to the reasonable excuse no longer exist. It is impossible to stop a vehicle after a collision after you have not, as one is no longer at the scene and it is impossible to render assistance when one is no longer at the scene. While the accused’s behaviour after he fails to stop with a reasonable excuse for having done so, might be relevant in determining both the sincerity and the reasonableness of his failure to stop, that behaviour does not give rise to guilt for this offence.
[51] The one requirement imposed that might potentially be partially carried out is providing a name and address, for example by a phone call to the police, although even that interpretation requires one to stretch the meaning of the words of the statute. The section contemplates all three acts being done at the scene.
[52] Crown counsel submits that having failed to stop with a reasonable excuse, he was required to call the police. This, in my opinion, would require reading into the section words to the effect that, having failed to stop and provide name and address and assistance, but with a reasonable excuse for the failure, the driver must report the accident to the police, a requirement that appears nowhere in the section. And Parliament could have included such a requirement, as the Ontario legislature did in the Highway Traffic Act, ss. 199 and 200.
[53] The section contemplates that the operator of a conveyance do three things: stop at the scene, provide name and address, and offer assistance to any person who is injured or appears to require assistance. The section contemplates everything happening at the scene. That is the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words and plain meaning of the words in the context of the whole section that excuses a failure to do all three actions, when the failure is reasonable.
[54] And, the one principle approach to the interpretation of an Act as set out in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, paragraph 21 is:
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously, with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.
[55] This principle was confirmed in Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42 at paragraph 26. There the Supreme Court stated that this, the principled approach is:
“buttressed by s.12 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, which provides that every enactment “is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.”
[56] The scheme and the object of the Act is to set out the Criminal Law of Canada which has as its fundamental purpose the protection of society: R. v. Lyons, 1987 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 at p. 329. Having created an offence without reference to any intent on the driver to avoid liability, and having provided for a reasonable excuse that excuses the commission of the offence, and having imposed an evidentiary burden on the accused to establish the reasonable excuse, Parliament has spoken clearly and described the prohibited behaviour. That is, failing to do any of the three actions without reasonable excuse for the failure. That is a harmonious reading of the Act.
[57] Crown counsel makes a submission that effectively reads into the section a requirement to report the accident when it is safe to do so even if the driver has a reasonable excuse for not stopping in the first place. He bases this on Parliament’s intention and the judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Griffith, supra, where the Court accepted the concession of the accused under the previous, different section, that there was a continuing obligation to report an accident.
[58] In my opinion, reading in a continuous offence attempts to fulfill a perceived intention to criminalize failure to report an accident. Parliament has made no reference to criminalizing such conduct. Reading in such an intention introduces dissonance into the reading of the Act and not harmony as required by Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd.. It would require one to read some equivalent of the awkward addition that I have referred to above, that is, having failed to meet any of the requirements but with a reasonable excuse for having done so, that reasonable excuse would no longer excuse the driver for a failure to provide his name and address.
[59] With respect to authorities, the Griffith case does not assist in interpreting s.320.16 except to the extent that Justice Fitch pointed out the wisdom of waiting for the “timely opportunity to interpret the recast section”. The provincial court judge did not provide any reason for his conclusion that s.252 created a continuing offence, but rather stated it, the defendant Griffith did not argue the point in the Court of Appeal, and Justice Fitch declined to deal with the point other than to suggest the possibility that the provincial court judge was not necessarily correct.
[60] In Griffith, the trial judge concluded that the obligation to stop continued, despite an initial reasonable excuse without reference to authority. In the Court of Appeal, Justice Fitch only noted that the appellant, before making the concession, had not cited any authority that it was not a continuing offence. Crown counsel in the Court of Appeal of British Columbia relied on the decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench in R. v. Maxie, 2013 SQKB 451 aff’d on other grounds 2014 SKCA 103.
[61] In Maxie, the trial judge concluded that the offence of fail to stop under s. 252 of the Criminal Code was a continuing offence in the context of assessing Maxie’s defence of necessity for driving away. The judge concluded that there was a continuing obligation to stop that deprived the accused of the common law defence of necessity but provided no authority.
[62] What authority there is, provides little assistance in interpreting the new section, because the judgments are inextricably bound up with and dependent on the now repealed essential element of the offence that required an intent to escape civil or criminal liability. But to the extent that they assist, I conclude that they are authority for the conclusion that I have reached, that the recast new offence is not a continuing offence, and that the reasonable excuse applies only to the point in time where the failure to stop occurs.
[63] In R. v. Wood, supra, Justice Hill discussed the obligations imposed by s. 252 in positive terms as opposed to the element of failing and stated that the obligations created will usually occur at the time of the collision. He did go on to say that in certain circumstances the obligations will arise at a later point in time and cited R. v. Wintonyk (Sask C.A.), [1993] S.J. No. 156.
[64] Wintonyk is a short judgment. The trial judge had found that the accused might not have known he was involved in an accident, but did realize it after driving 6 ½ miles. The trial judge thus found that the knowledge of the accident later gave rise to the duty to provide his name and address. Justice Lane found the conviction to be sustainable:
Because the accused knew, and because he failed to give his name and address, the trial judge found the offence to be complete. The verdict is sustainable as each of the duties in s. 252(1) is a separate duty (see R. v. Adler, 1981 CanLII 2064 (SK CA), [1981] 4 W.W.R. 379) and at that point the accused failed to give his name and address with intent to escape civil and criminal liability.
[65] Neither Justice Lane, nor Justice Hill in citing him, were directing their minds toward or saying anything about the reasonable excuse in the current section. Obviously because the section did not exist, but also because they were both addressing their minds to when the obligation to fulfill arose, that is at the time that the accused knew there had been accident. That is also true in the new section. But their conclusion as to when the obligation arises does not assist in determining whether the reasonable excuse that excuses the failure can somehow expire so as to criminalize the failure to provide information to someone at a later point. The more pertinent portion of Wood is earlier in the judgment when Justice Hill cites himself, citing Justice Martin:
44 The duties, as a general rule, are to be discharged at the scene of the accident at the time of the accident. In this regard, I observed in Regina v. Romanowicz (1998), 1998 CanLII 14957 (ON SC), 14 C.R. (5th) 100 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) (appeal under reserve by Ont. C.A.) at 106:
The only reasonable interpretation of the statutory scheme is that the duties are to be discharged at the scene of the accident including the provision of name and address. In this regard, I note the observation of Martin J.A. in Regina v. Gummer (1984), 1983 CanLII 5286 (ON CA), 1 O.A.C. 141 (C.A.) at 144:
In our view, the court has a duty to bring home to persons having the charge of a motor vehicle which has been involved in an accident that the courts of this country will not countenance the failure to remain at the scene and discharge the duties required by the Criminal Code. Any relevant witness to the accident, or investigating police officer as the case may be, can then link visual identity of the driver to the required statement of identity. In turn, relevant driver documentation can be matched against the represented identity of the driver. (emphasis of original)
[66] No authority under the previous section answers the question before me, not Griffith, not Maxie and not Wood citing Wintonyk.
[67] I do not find that Parliament’s intention was to allow for a reasonable excuse and then criminalize the failure to comply with the section if the accused cannot establish that the reasonable excuse that led to his failure was ongoing. But if it were, determining Parliament’s intention is one thing and determining if Parliament achieved that intention with the words it used is another. This section neither talks about nor penalizes the driver’s behaviour after a failure to stop, provide information or assistance but with a reasonable excuse for doing so.
[68] Having found that Mr. Wells had a reasonable excuse for failing to perform the three statutory requirements, I will not assess the reasonableness of his behaviour after he was punched and drove away. He spoke to Officer Ali within 90 minutes of the accident and confirmed his name and address that the police already had from a witness who obtained Wells’s plate number. He testified that he intended to go the police station nearest his house after his wife attended to his very real injuries. Whether he would or would not have, Officer Ali reached him first. There is no reason to disbelieve his intention that he testified to. If I disbelieved that, I would disbelieve his reason for driving away and there would be no reasonable excuse.
[69] But the offence was committed, and the reasonable excuse excused it at the time that he failed to stop and comply with the other two requirements. He is not guilty.
Released: June 12, 2020
Brent Knazan Ontario Court of Justice
[^1]: Section 252 (1) Every person commits an offence who has the care, charge or control of a vehicle, vessel or aircraft that is involved in an accident with (a) another person, (b) a vehicle, vessel or aircraft, or (c) in the case of a vehicle, cattle in the charge of another person, and with intent to escape civil or criminal liability fails to stop the vehicle, vessel or, if possible, the aircraft, give his or her name and address and, where any person has been injured or appears to require assistance, offer assistance.