Court File and Parties
Ontario Court of Justice
Date: May 7, 2018
Court File No.: Ottawa 17-RF1043
Between:
Adnan Fazeli, Amanuel Mengesha, Patrick Thibault, Mathieu Vaillant
Applicants
— And —
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
Before: Justice Trevor A. Brown
Decision released on: May 7, 2018
Counsel
Ms. Delinda Hayton & Ms. Christa Reccord — Counsel for the Federal Crown
Mr. J. Michael Spratt — for the Defendant, Adnan Fazeli
Ms. Jasna Drnda — for the Defendant, Amanuel Mengesha
Ms. Kim D. Hyslop — for the Defendant, Patrick Thibault
Ms. Anne-Marie McElroy — for the Defendant, Mathieu Vaillant
Decision
BROWN, J.:
Factual Background
[1] On May 7, 2009, Mohammed Ali was shot and killed during an altercation inside Bar 56 located at 56 By Ward Market Square in the city of Ottawa. To date, no one has been charged with his murder. The murder investigation is ongoing.
[2] Seven and a half years after the homicide, the Attorney General of Ontario obtained an authorization to intercept private communications of a number of individuals, including two of the accused persons in this case, Adnan Fazeli and Christian Thibault. The authorization related to the murder investigation of Mr. Ali, and was supported by an Information to Obtain (hereinafter "ITO") sworn by Detective Chris Benson of the Ottawa Police Service on November 30, 2016. The authorization was granted by a Judge of the Superior Court of Justice on December 6, 2016.
[3] The initial wiretap authorization uncovered some information in relation to alleged drug trafficking. A second subsequent authorization was granted on December 29, 2016 in relation to the homicide investigation. A third authorization was granted February 2, 2017. Accused person Mathieu Vaillant was added as a principal known person on the February 2, 2017 authorization.
[4] As a result of information received from the wiretaps obtained as part of the homicide investigation, the Ottawa Police Service began to investigate a drug trafficking organization believed to be operated by Mr. Fazeli, Mr. Thibeault and Mr. Vaillant. Between January and April, 2017, various investigative steps were taken, including several strategic drug seizures from Mr. Thibeault and Mr. Vaillant, and from several alleged underlings in the criminal organization. Accused person Amanuel Mengesha was not a target or principal known person of the homicide wiretaps, but became implicated in the drug investigation that grew out of those wiretaps.
[5] The Applicants are now charged with several offences between December 6, 2016 and April 20, 2017, on an eleven count information. These charges are alleged to have their genesis in the wiretap authorization for the homicide, and the consequent drug trafficking investigation.
Issues
[6] This is an application brought by the Applicant accused persons, seeking disclosure of the complete investigative file relating to the homicide investigation that was the impetus for the three Part VI authorizations that were granted in late 2009. The Applicants have indicated their intention to challenge the initial ITO on the basis that the prerequisites to the authorization – investigative necessity and grounds to believe evidence will be uncovered – have not been satisfied. Dates have been set for the hearing of a Garofoli and Charter application in respect of the Part VI authorizations granted.
[7] In aid of this challenge to the ITO, the Applicants seek disclosure of the full investigative file for the homicide investigation generated by the police and used in drafting the initial ITO. In the initial ITO, sworn on November 30, 2016, Detective Benson swore as follows at para. 6:
[T]he Ottawa Police Service Major Crime Unit pursued the investigation and continued to gather information through the use of undercover operations and various judicial orders to collect phone records as well as continued efforts to obtained [sic] valuable information from confidential informers. These pursuits were not significant to allow police to make any arrests or provide any opportunity to prosecute the person(s) responsible for this public murder in the downtown core of Canada's Capital.
[8] At para. 9 of the same ITO, Detective Benson stated his belief that "traditional investigative avenues have not succeeded in providing sufficient evidence in order to prosecute the individuals responsible for the murder of Mohamed Ali." In other words, this was a case where he was relying on investigative necessity to justify the issuance of a Part VI authorization.
[9] In his ITO, Detective Benson swore that he had "personal knowledge of the facts contained" in his affidavit because he has read the reports of police officers and non-police witnesses, had conversations with police officers and has access to police computer databases. He reported that he did not include every detail in his affidavit and that the reports he read contained significantly more information than was included in his affidavit. He also swore that there were some successful aspects of an earlier undercover agent operation, without detailing anything about the planning, execution, or partial success of this operation.
[10] Disclosure has been provided to the Applicants in relation to the criminal organization and possession for the purpose of trafficking charges. This includes the ITOs stemming from the murder investigation that led directly to the criminal organization and drug trafficking investigation. The Crown has also disclosed or has indicated its intention to disclose the source documents relied upon by Detective Benson. The Crown maintains that all other evidence relating to the investigation into the murder of Mr. Ali is irrelevant.
[11] Counsel for the Applicants submitted a detailed disclosure request including a request for any previous search warrants, production orders, or other judicial authorizations and the information provided to obtain those orders. In addition to material explicitly referred to in the ITO, the Applicants have also requested the entire investigative file as it relates to the alleged murder that is the purported subject of the ITO. More specifically, they seek all police notes and investigative actions, notes taken during investigative meetings, investigative assignments, any information on undercover operations and other investigative measures, complete surveillance videos, and witness interviews. In essence, the Applicants seek all material that would have been disclosed to an accused charged with offences related to the murder investigation.
[12] Crown Counsel has responded to this request indicating that they will not provide disclosure of surveillance conducted in May and June 2009, considering it irrelevant as it was not relied on by Detective Benson in the ITO. Likewise, police officers' notes from the murder investigation are not being disclosed as they were not referred to or relied on by Detective Benson. Finally, the Crown's position is that the full investigatory file into the homicide is not relevant and that it ought not to be required to accede to the request for the entire investigatory file that relates to the Part VI authorization as it is irrelevant to the charges before the court. As indicated earlier, however, the Crown has agreed to provide the bulk of the source documents referenced and relied upon by Detective Benson in his ITO.
[13] The Defence submits that the information sought is producible as first party disclosure under Stinchcombe. The Crown resists production of the requested materials and submits that the information sought to be produced is not part of the "investigative file" leading to the charge before the court. In the Crown's view, the materials on the homicide investigation are otherwise irrelevant, and are therefore not subject to disclosure. The Crown further asserts that the material requested by the Applicants in this case is protected by a public interest privilege.
Analysis
A. Unique Circumstances
[14] This case presents a unique set of circumstances that appears not to have previously been addressed in the case law. Counsel have been unable to identify any case that is on all fours with the circumstances of this case, nor have I been able to locate any similar cases in my own review of the jurisprudence. As counsel acknowledge, this is likely due to the fact that in the vast majority of wiretaps cases, there is no fundamental distinction between the offences under investigation at the time the authorization is sought and the offences charged. In the typical wiretaps case, the alleged activity that is the subject of the ITO and the substantive criminal charges before the court are one and the same, with the result being that the material provided post-charge to the accused person would include the materials available to the affiant on the ITO that led to the Part VI authorization.
[15] A review of first principles relating to the right to disclosure provides a useful roadmap in navigating the issues that arise in this case.
B. First Principles
[16] The right to full and complete disclosure is a foundational principle of the Canadian criminal justice system, integral to an accused person's right to make full answer and defence. This right is enshrined in our Constitution under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter 'Charter'). The Crown has a duty to disclose all information in its possession or control that is not clearly irrelevant or otherwise privileged. A failure to disclose all information generated as part of an investigation impedes the ability of the accused to make full answer and defence and imperils the right to a fair trial: R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 at para. 17.
[17] The right to disclosure, while broad, does have some limits. Material that is clearly irrelevant or engages issues of informer privilege disclosure, may be withheld. The Crown must err on the side of inclusion, and disclosure should not be withheld if there is a reasonable possibility that doing so will impede the right to a fair trial: Stinchcombe, supra at paras. 20, 22, and 29.
[18] The principle of fairness in criminal trials, then, is central to the disclosure principle. In determining whether disclosure of contested materials ought to be made, the Court must act in a way that preserves the continuation of the prosecution while at the same time ensuring due process and fairness. Trial fairness lies at the heart of the disclosure process: Stinchcombe, supra at para. 17; R. v. Knelsen, 2016 ONSC 286 at para. 14.
C. Disclosure in the Garofoli Context
[19] The law of disclosure in the context of Garofoli applications has largely evolved out of cases in which the accused seeks evidence relating to police informers, and the right to disclosure has to be balanced against measures required to protect informer privilege. In the vast majority of Garofoli applications, the defence already has the substantive disclosure materials, as the offences the accused is facing are the same as those that were being investigated when the Part VI was sought and granted. As such, the issues for disclosure on the Garofoli application are considerably narrowed by the time they arrive before the Court. As I have indicated, this case is different from the norm. That being said, many of the principles arising out of this case law are helpful in deciding the issue before me.
[20] I have reviewed all of the cases provided by counsel for the Applicants and by counsel for the Respondent Crown. A list of these cases is attached to these Reasons as Appendix "A". Having reviewed the relevant jurisprudence, I have determined that this case is governed by the following additional principles:
i) The accused's right to make full answer and defence applies to pre-trial motions in evidentiary hearings, including the Garofoli application;
ii) An evidentiary hearing, though important, is not a criminal trial on the merits of the case, and context and practicality require that the focus remain on the issues engaged on the evidentiary hearing;
iii) Disclosure to the accused cannot involve information which may compromise the anonymity of a confidential informant;
iv) Materials in the investigative file are presumptively relevant and should be disclosed. In the context of a Garofoli application, "investigative file" means the evidence accumulated by the investigative agency as a result its efforts in the investigation giving rise to the authorizations themselves;
v) Not everything that may once have been seen or heard by an affiant is necessarily "relied on" by that affiant for the purposes of disclosure.
[21] I propose to review each of these principles in turn, applying them to the facts before me where the circumstances require it.
D. The Right to Make Full Answer and Defence Applies to Pre-Trial Motions, Including the Garofoli Application
[22] Justice Campbell of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice conducted a thorough review and analysis of the case law in this area in R. v. McKenzie, 2016 ONSC 242. His reasoning in that case was adopted by Justice Harper in R. v. Knelsen, 2016 ONSC 286. I find that reasoning to be persuasive. As noted by Campbell, J. in McKenzie, "generally speaking, the accused's important right to disclosure from the Crown so as to be able to make full answer and defence … applies not only at trial, but also in connection with evidentiary hearings. That is not to say however that the operation and scope of the right to disclosure is identical in both contexts. When the right to disclosure is being exercised in a hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence, it must be viewed and applied in that context, and must be balanced against other interests": para. 14.
[23] Justice Campbell went on to note in para. 20 of McKenzie that in some cases, such evidentiary hearings may be the single most important aspect of the case, and their outcome can come close to dictating the ultimate result of the trial. The accused is not entitled to the most favourable procedure that could possibly be imagined in relation to such evidentiary hearings, but the rules surrounding disclosure in this context must provide the accused with a meaningful procedural mechanism by which he or she can attack the issuance of a warrant or authorization, both facially and sub-facially. It must be recognized that in the absence of disclosure of any materials beyond that which were placed before the authorizing, justice, it may be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the accused to attempt any type of sub-facial attack on the issues of the warrant or authorization, as the materials in the investigative file that may potentially undermine the accuracy of the ITO are unavailable to the accused.
E. In an Evidentiary Hearing, the Right to Disclosure Must Be Balanced Against Contextual and Practical Interests
[24] An evidentiary hearing, though important, is not a criminal trial on the merits of the case. Context and practicality require the focus of the evidentiary to be on the material issues engaged on the pre-trial application. In a wiretaps case, the focus of the proceedings must at all times remain on whether sufficient grounds were put before the authorizing justice such that the authorization could have validly issued. It must be recalled that the hearing itself is not a criminal trial, and, as Campbell, J. cautioned in McKenzie at para. 21, it "must not be effectively permitted to become one by the adoption of all the procedural trappings of a criminal trial." The courts must guard against the risk of such evidentiary hearings becoming unwieldy and leading to needless complexity and resulting delay.
[25] In the present case, it is important to ensure that the disclosure sought to be made is relevant to the material issues on the Garofoli application, while at the same time ensuring that the hearing itself does not become needlessly complex and inefficient.
F. Disclosure to an Accused Cannot Involve Any Information Which May Compromise the Anonymity of a Confidential Informant
[26] The privilege of secrecy surrounding a confidential informant cannot be compromised. Absent waiver by the informant or an "innocence at stake" determination, informer privilege is absolute. See R. v. Leipert, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281; Re Application to proceed in camera ("Named Person"), [2007] 3 S.C.R. 253.
[27] Even in cases where disclosure is appropriately provided or ordered absent a waiver of privilege from the confidential informant, the materials disclosed to the accused must be redacted to protect the anonymity of the confidential informant. In the Garofoli context, the court is called on to employ an editing procedure that ensures the accused's right to full answer and defence while protecting informer privilege. Notably, given the significance attached to the right to make full answer and defence in Garofoli proceedings, editing is to be kept to the minimum necessary to protect the informer's identity: R. v. Crevier, 2015 ONCA 619, at para. 51.
[28] In this case, the main thrust of the disclosure application relates to the homicide investigation underpinning the Part VI authorizations. With respect to the confidential informers referred to in Detective Benson's initial ITO, the Applicants seek only the source debriefing notes of Informers # 3 and # 5. The Crown has agreed to provide same pursuant to its Stinchcombe obligations. Crown counsel of course is well aware that no information which could serve to reveal the identity of these confidential informers is to be disclosed.
G. Materials in the "Investigative File" Are Presumptively Relevant and Should Be Disclosed
[29] Mackenzie was a case where the defence was seeking disclosure of certain notes of the affiant with respect to conversations he had with the confidential informant in that case as part of an application to quash a telewarrant. Though the case involved a relatively narrow issue, Campbell, J. was obliged to consider the overarching considerations at play in the context of a request for disclosure in an evidentiary hearing such as the one before him. At para. 15 of his decision, Campbell, J. identified the right to disclosure in the specific context of a Garofoli hearing:
[T]he right to disclosure entitles the accused to virtually automatic access to: (1) all documents that were put before the authorizing or issuing justice; and (2) all other relevant materials in the "investigative file" concerning the accused.
[30] I agree with this articulation of the right to disclosure in the Garofoli context, as well as with Campbell, J's caveat that such disclosure cannot compromise informer privilege. This however begs the question of what is meant by the "investigative file".
[31] As observed by Campbell, J., the state of the law on this issue "may be fairly described as diverse, evolving and unsettled". Justice Campbell sought to settle the state of confusion in the law by articulating a practical, bright-line rule that provides guidance on what is meant to be included in the term "investigative file".
[32] After a thorough, intelligent and considered analysis of the jurisprudence, Campbell, J. concluded that the "investigative file" against an accused encompasses all materials accumulated by the investigating police agency in its investigation and relied upon in the search warrant materials targeting the accused." Justice Campbell added further clarification at para. 31 of this decision: "[F]or the purposes of applications to quash search warrants pursuant to Garofoli, the "investigative file" against an accused is properly defined as including all materials accumulated (ie. gathered or created) by the investigating police agency in its investigation, and relied upon in the search warrant materials targeting the suspect/accused".
[33] In my view, for the term "investigative file" to have any real meaning in the context of a challenge to a wiretaps authorization, it should be taken as comprehending the material that the investigative agency has accumulated as a consequence of its investigative efforts in the investigation giving rise to the authorization itself. Ultimately, what matters on a sub-facial challenge to an authorization is the affiant's reasonable belief at the time the affidavit was sworn; in other words, what the affiant knew, or ought to have, known, in applying for the warrant: R. v. Bennett, 2017 ONCA 780 at para. 33; Crevier, supra at paras. 55, 64; World Bank Group v. Wallace, 2016 SCC 15, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 207 at paras. 119-121.
[34] Too narrow a definition of "investigative file" in the circumstances of a case like the one before me would unduly hamper the accused persons' ability to assess the reasonable belief of the affiant. Realistically, absent disclosure of the investigative file giving rise to the authorizations, the accused in this case would not have the tools to ascertain whether the requirements of investigative necessity have truly been met or whether Detective Benson has made full, fair and frank disclosure of the information in his possession. In such circumstances, the term "investigative file" cannot be limited to the file relating only to the charges ultimately tried.
[35] This common sense understanding aligns closely with that enunciated in R. v. Abdullahi, [2014] O.J. NO 3138 (Ont. S.C.J.), where Justice Clark stated at para. 20 that "a sensible understanding of the term "investigative file" would seem to comprehend all the material that the investigative agency has accumulated as a consequence of its investigative efforts in the investigation giving rise to the authorization(s)" [emphasis added].
[36] It is also consistent with Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence. In R. v. Pires & Lising, 2005 SCC 66, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 343, the Court considered the argument on behalf of the accused that the requirement of obtaining leave to cross-examine the affiant on a Garofoli application was an unconstitutional limitation on the right to make full answer and defence. At paras. 25 to 27, the Court pointed to the right to full disclosure as providing an answer to that argument:
25 The first contextual factor that is ignored by the appellants' argument has already been mentioned -- the right to full disclosure. Under s. 187(1.4) of the Criminal Code, the defence has access to all the documents relating to the authorization. Access is granted on the simple assertion that the admissibility of the evidence is challenged and that access to the material is required in preparation for trial: Dersch v. Canada (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1505 [page360], at p. 1517. The material includes the affidavit filed in support of the application for an authorization. Subject to any necessary editing for the protection of informants, the affidavit will usually provide a comprehensive account of the investigation leading up to the wiretap application, an articulation of the grounds relied upon in support of the application, and information relevant to the reasonable believability of material gathered from informants. The affidavit filed in this case will be reviewed in detail later in these reasons.
26 In addition, under the principles established in Stinchcombe, the defence is entitled to all material in the possession or control of the Crown that is potentially relevant to the case, whether favourable to the accused or not. The defence can therefore compare the contents of the investigative file received from the Crown to the authorization's supporting material to ascertain whether anything throws doubt on the reasonable believability of the latter. Further, the disclosure material may also provide the defence with possible third-party avenues of inquiry.
27 Hence, the defence does not arrive empty-handed at the evidentiary hearing.
[Emphasis added]
[37] The Supreme Court of Canada considered the ability of an accused person to compare the investigative file leading to the granting of the authorization, to the affidavit filed in support of the ITO, as a critical means of allowing that person to challenge the sufficiency of the grounds for its issuance. Without disclosure of the evidence that was in the hands of the police prior to the authorization being sought, of course, the accused would lack the means to ascertain whether anything cast doubt on the reasonable believability of the supporting affidavit. The ability of the accused to conduct this comparison was a key element in the court's finding that it was not unconstitutional to require an accused person seeking to cross-examine the affiant to establishing a basis for so doing.
[38] In the present case, the affiant, Detective Benson, relied on his knowledge of the investigation gleaned from his review of the reports of police officers and non-police witnesses, conversations with police officers and his access to police computer databases. He deposed to having had knowledge of an earlier undercover agent operation, ongoing efforts to obtain information from confidential informers, and various judicial orders to collect phone records. He swore that traditional investigative methods had not succeeded in providing sufficient evidence in order to prosecute those responsible for the murder of Mohamed Ali. The Applicants can only meaningfully test the legitimacy of these assertions if they have access to the investigative file for the homicide.
H. Not Everything Seen or Heard by the Affiant Is Subject to Disclosure
[39] Although I have determined that the "investigative file" against an accused encompasses all materials accumulated by the investigating police agency in its investigation and relied upon in the search warrant materials targeting the suspect/accused, this does not mean that the entirety of the investigative file is subject to disclosure without limitation. The element of "reliance", in the context of materials "relied on" by the affiant, must be understood in a practical way. Not everything that may once have been seen or heard by the affiant before completing the ITO is necessarily relied upon by the affiant and therefore part of the investigative file in relation to the accused: McKenzie, supra at para. 32.
[40] There are legitimate contextual and practical concerns that may limit the materials to be disclosed in a challenge to a Part VI authorization. My task is to ensure that those materials which would reasonably be expected to advance the inquiry at play in the Applicants' Garofoli application be disclosed, while at the same time ensuring that these proceedings do not become overwhelmed in the process.
[41] The Applicants in this case seek not only the investigative file in the homicide investigation up to the point where the first information to obtain was sworn, but also everything that has been generated as part of the file since the time of the first authorization. I have carefully considered whether the whole of the investigative file regarding the homicide investigation to date, as urged by the Applicants, ought to be disclosed. I have concluded it ought not to be disclosed in its entirety. Some limitations must be placed on the contents of the investigative file to be disclosed in the present case in order to guard against needless complexity and inefficiency. I am mindful that absent such limitations, the volume of disclosure can reasonably be anticipated to overwhelm the proceedings. This is, after all, a homicide investigation that has now spanned some nine years.
[42] In my view, what ought to be disclosed in this case are those materials in the investigative file that can reasonably be anticipated to be of assistance to the defence in testing whether the statutory prerequisites for issuance of the authorization were met, in particular whether reasonable grounds existed, and whether investigative necessity is established. Evidence of steps taken by the Ottawa Police that post-dated the issuance of the initial authorization is unlikely to have a material impact on the assessment of the sufficiency of the ITO that was sworn on November 30, 2016.
[43] I have carefully reviewed the affidavits of Detective Benson, reproduced at Tabs 3 and 4 in the Applicants' Application Record, which outline the investigation of the Mohamed Ali homicide and the principal avenues of investigation employed in the case. I have also reviewed in the Application Records of counsel for the Applicants and the Respondent, the specific disclosure materials sought by counsel for the Applicants. I am familiar with the investigation structure employed in major crimes like the homicide in question, and am well acquainted with the standardized Major Case Management System that is typically employed in cataloguing disclosure materials in such cases.
[44] Having canvassed these sources, I am able to determine that disclosure of the following materials from the investigative file for the homicide will allow the accused to assess and challenge the facial and sub-facial validity of the authorizations, without the disclosure process overwhelming the entire proceedings:
Notes and summaries of all investigative team meetings and briefings;
All logs and reports documenting the assignment and completion of investigative tasks up to and including the date of the first authorization;
All notes and investigative action reports of Detective Benson and any other lead investigators part of the investigative team in the homicide investigation, up to and including the date the first authorization;
The investigative action reports of all police officers involved in the homicide investigation up to and including the date of the first authorization; I am not ordering the duty book notes of said officers as, in contradistinction to the investigative actions reports, they were not used or relied upon by Detective Benson;
The reports of all Identification officers involved in this case, up to and including the date of the first authorization;
The statements and recorded interviews of all civilian witnesses interviewed by the police in advance of the initial authorization, estimated to be forty-five such witnesses in the ITO itself;
The surveillance reports from May 8 to June 11, 2009;
The notes, reports and briefing notes of those officers involved in the undercover operation initiated in respect of Saeed Sheikhdoon, with the appropriate redactions to preserve the identity of the undercover officer if deemed necessary by the Crown;
The production orders, search warrants and supporting affidavits for same that were granted in relation to the homicide investigation prior to the Part VI authorization being granted;
The phone data analysis conducted in the homicide investigation and any reports generated as a result;
The Bar 56 and Barefax security camera footage and photos referenced in the information to obtain;
The source debriefing notes of Detective Pilon in relation to Informant #3 from May 8, 2009, and the source debriefing notes of detective Matthew Cox in relation to Informant #5 from September 13 and November 17, 2016; no information which could reveal the identity of the confidential informant however is to be disclosed;
The remaining materials from the "Additional Disclosure Sought" document that Crown counsel advised in oral submissions they were prepared to provide to the Applicants.
I. Public Interest Privilege
[45] The Crown suggested in its factum and in oral argument before the Court that public interest privilege permits the Crown to delay disclosure relating to investigations that have not yet been completed. The public interest in completing an investigation may, in some circumstances, outweigh the accused's interest in disclosure.
[46] In response to this argument from the Crown, I can only note that the Crown called no evidence in support of a public interest claim in respect of any of the evidence sought to be disclosed in this particular case, nor could it point to any evidence anywhere in the materials before the Court that supported the applicability of such a privilege in the circumstances before the Court. Public interest privilege is not a blanket privilege to be claimed over the entirety of an investigative file.
[47] Absent some evidence that the disclosure of a particular piece of evidence would impact the integrity of an ongoing investigation, or some indication from that Crown that a particular piece of evidence risks jeopardizing that investigation, I am unable to resolve this issue in the Crown's favour. As such, the materials outlined in paragraph 44, above, are to be disclosed to the Applicants.
Conclusion
Released: May 7, 2018
Signed: Justice Trevor A. Brown
Appendix "A": Relevant Legal Authorities
R. v. McKay, 2016 BCCA 391, leave to appeal refused