The Corporation of the City of Sault Ste. Marie v. Paul William Gough
Ontario Court of Justice
Date: August 7, 2018
Court File No.: City of Sault Ste. Marie 7562258B
Parties
Between:
The Corporation of the City of Sault Ste. Marie
— AND —
Paul William Gough
Court Information
Before: Justice of the Peace J. André Guitard
Heard on: July 25, 2018
Reasons for Judgment released on: August 7, 2018
Counsel:
- Ms. Mia Carella — counsel for the prosecution
- The Defendant Mr. Paul William Gough — on his own behalf
The Trial
[1] On July 25, 2018, a trial was held in the City of Sault Ste. Marie. The question to be determined was not complicated. Was Mr. Paul William Gough (Defendant) guilty or not guilty of speeding?
[2] The Defendant stood charged that on March 2, 2018 at McNabb and Lake streets in the City of Sault Ste. Marie, in the District of Algoma, he did commit the offence of speeding 60 km/h in a 50 km/h zone contrary to Section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 ("HTA"). The prosecution presented evidence that he had allegedly been traveling at a speed of 70 km/h in a 50 km/h zone. However, at the close of the prosecution's case, the Prosecutor did not seek to amend the quantum of the speed indicated on the Certificate of Offence pursuant to section 34 of the HTA. Therefore, the Defendant's ultimate peril was a $30 fine for speeding 10 km/h over the speed limit plus court costs of $5 and a victim fine surcharge in the amount of $10 for a total of $45.
The Court's Decision
[3] At the end of trial and final submissions, the Court reserved its decision. The case was adjourned to August 1, 2018 in order to set a date for a decision. On August 1, 2018, the Defendant was informed that it was the Court's judgment that the Prosecutor had established the offence of speeding beyond a reasonable doubt. He was advised that written reasons would be released on August 7, 2018 and would be available to him at the Court office at his convenience. The Court registered a finding of guilt accordingly and invited submissions on sentence. The Court imposed a $30 fine, court costs, and the victim fine surcharge. The following are the reasons promised to the parties.
Constituent Elements of a Speeding Offence
[4] As indicated already, this was not a complicated trial. Speeding is an absolute liability offence. The constituent elements of the offence are:
i. date;
ii. place/jurisdiction;
iii. posted speed;
iv. identification of vehicle operator;
v. speed of the suspect motor vehicle.
Examination in Chief of Constable A. Campbell
[5] The prosecution's sole witness was Constable A. Campbell ("Investigator") an officer with the Sault Ste. Marie Police Service. He testified that on March 2, 2018 he was working uniform patrol in a fully marked police cruiser. He indicated that at the beginning of his shift he obtained a radar device being a Decatur brand Handheld Directional Genesis II ("Radar Device"). At 7:38 a.m., he tested the Radar Device and found it to be operating correctly as per manufacturer's specifications.
[6] Constable Campbell testified that at 9:31 he was parked facing Northbound on Windsor Street and McNabb Street. He testified that both these streets were highways as defined under the HTA and that both were located within the City of Sault Ste. Marie. His observations were that he had a clear view of both the east and westbound traffic on McNabb Street. To his right he observed a grey pickup truck going through the intersection at McNabb and Lake streets. The truck was westbound and one lane in from the curb lane. He observed it approaching west at a marked higher rate of speed than the traffic that was in the curbside lane beside the vehicle. He used the Radar Device to confirm his observations. The Radar Device registered that the truck was moving at a rate of speed of 70 km/h. He had a direct line of sight between the radar beam and the truck.
[7] The Investigator made a traffic stop of this motor vehicle further west on McNabb Street across from the YMCA. The Investigator informed the driver of the motor vehicle that he had been stopped because he was speeding at the rate of 70 km/h in a 50 km/h zone. He requested the driver's licence, permit and insurance. The driver submitted a two-sided white sheet of paper that was laminated and entitled "statement of birth." It outlined the identification of Mr. Paul Gough including his date of birth (August 5, 1962) and his address (203 Spruce St). The Investigator confirmed the address with the Defendant at that time and confirmed that he was still living on Spruce Street. The Investigator returned to his cruiser to verify Mr. Gough's licence status on the Ministry of Transportation ("MTO") website accessible to him in his cruiser. The search verified that the Defendant was a licenced driver and that the vehicle status was insured. The search also revealed a photo record that allowed him to identify the Defendant.
[8] The Investigator then issued to the Defendant an Offence Notice on which he reduced the speed to 60 km/h in a 50 km/h zone. The speed sign for the zone was at the base of the McNabb hill and would have been visible to any vehicle coming up that hill. The officer explained the ticket process and the Defendant disputed the fact that he was driving and he indicated that it was a human rights issue regarding his ability to transport himself. The Investigator responded by stating that the police enforce the HTA, that McNabb St. is a highway as defined in the HTA and that according to the provisions of the HTA he was driving the vehicle.
[9] The Investigator testified that the traffic stop took place in the City of Sault Ste. Marie in the District of Algoma Northeast Region. The Investigator's evidence was that he was trained to use the Radar Device and that his last qualification had taken place on December 13, 2017. He testified that the Radar Unit was properly functioning both when he tested it at the start of his shift at 7:38 a.m. and then after the traffic stop at 10:24 a.m. His evidence was that the vehicle he had stopped was a grey Dodge pickup truck with the licence plate number as noted on the Certificate of Offence and that the driver of the vehicle was the Defendant. He recognized and identified the Defendant, who was sitting at the counsel table on the day of trial, as being the driver of the grey Dodge pickup truck.
The Cross Examination of the Investigator
[10] The Defendant cross-examined the Investigator. However, the cross examination was not truly related to the constituent elements of the offence of speeding. The Defendant made efforts to elicit evidence to fit an alternate perspective of the case at bar. He questioned the Investigator on the basis that:
i. he had not been properly identified;
ii. he had been improperly identified as a Freeman on the Land;
iii. he was merely traveling;
iv. the Investigator had no authority to stop him because the HTA was of no force and effect because it had not received Royal Assent;
v. the Investigator was guilty of human trafficking;
vi. he was entitled to compensation in the amount of $1,000,000 US.
The Defendant Takes the Stand in his Defence
[11] The Defendant then took the stand to give evidence and affirmed to tell the truth. He identified himself for the record as Paul William Gough. The Defendant proceeded to file fifteen exhibits.
Statement of Birth, Birth Certificate and Driver's Licence
The Defendant referred to a court case in the United Kingdom that he says states that a birth certificate does not identify the person. He then extrapolated that since this did not identify a person then the driver's licence is also inadmissible and that the driver's licence does not identify him. He indicated that the Driver's licence and the Birth Certificate simply represents the "juridical personality that we all possess based on the Quebec Civil Code that every human being possesses juridical personality. And that's what I am saying is my driver's licence and birth certificate."
Excerpt, Quebec Civil Code
With highlighted portions referencing juridical personality as testified to by the Defendant.
USB Drive
Containing full versions of the documents being filed.
Excerpt, European Court of Human Rights Case
Sheffield and Horsham v. The United Kingdom referred to in the above. The Defendant read in from that case the last sentence at par. 28, "A birth certificate accordingly constitutes a document revealing not current identity but historical facts." He then read in part of paragraph 31, "The Government points out that the use of a birth certificate for identification purposes is discouraged by the Registrar General, and for a number of years birth certificates have contained a warning that they are not evidence of the identity of the person presenting it." The Defendant, however, omitted to read in the following sentence that follows the last sentence read into evidence. It states "However, it is a matter for individuals whether to follow this recommendation."
Excerpt, Highway Traffic Act
Hogan et al. v. Newfoundland (Attorney General) et al.
This was submitted as authority for the proposition that if an Act of the legislature does not have an enacting clause and does not have Royal Assent then it is of no force and effect. The Defendant then testified that the HTA does not have an enacting clause and royal assent and that if it did, it no longer has it since the constitution was rewritten in 1982. And, in the Revised Statutes Act of 1985 it was maybe removed even if, at all, it had ever been there in the first place. He testified that an enacting clause and Royal Assent are definitely necessary as laid out in the cases presented by him to the Court. He stated that this was also mandated by the Interpretation Act and the Legislation Act.
Excerpt, Legislation Act
Submitted as an example of legislation with an enacting clause.
Excerpt, Interpretation Act
(Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985 c. I-21)
Submitted as an example of legislation with an enacting clause.
Excerpt, Quarantine Act
(Statutes of Canada 2015, c. 20)
Submitted as an example of legislation with an enacting clause.
Excerpt, Government of Canada News Release
June 20, 2018 Bill C-45, the Cannabis Act in Senate
Submitted as an example of legislation with an enacting clause.
Excerpt, Constitution Act, 1982
Section 52(1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provision of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.
The Defendant testified that this applies to his case because in his view the HTA does not have Royal Assent.
Excerpt, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985 Act
The Defendant testified that in this Act it states that any Acts that were revised resulted in the previous Acts being repealed. He argued that if the HTA did have Royal Assent at one time it does not have it now.
Excerpt, Section 279.01(1) Criminal Code of Canada
Sections related to Trafficking in Persons
The Defendant testified that since the HTA was not enforceable and since to police officer had acknowledged controlling his movements this resulted in one of the prohibited actions in the criminal offence of trafficking in persons.
Excerpt, A Handbook for Criminal Justice Practitioners on Trafficking in Persons
Submitted as further evidence that the Defendant was a victim of Trafficking in Persons.
Excerpt, UNODC Anti-human trafficking manual for criminal justice practitioners
Submitted as further evidence that the Defendant is entitled to compensation as a victim of human trafficking either through the individual or through the state.
[12] This completed the Defendant's testimony. He did not have any further witnesses or evidence to present.
The Cross Examination of the Defendant
[13] In cross-examination, the Defendant denied that he had identified himself by his full name. He indicated that he had provided a laminated copy of a document that stated his name but not in the styling of a driver's licence. He acknowledged in cross-examination that he never disputed the fact that he was Paul Gough at any time.
Final Submissions
The Prosecution
[14] In submissions, the prosecution reviewed the Investigator's evidence regarding the traffic stop involving the Defendant on March 2, 2018. In so doing, she submitted that all of the constituent elements of the offence had been established beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Defendant
[15] The Defendant submitted that the Prosecutor had completely disregarded his evidence. He indicated that the Driver's Licence "sure was used to identify" him but he submitted that it does not identify him because it was created from a birth certificate that does not identify him in the first place according to Sheffield and Horsham v. The United Kingdom. He further indicated that the HTA did not have royal assent and thus was not enforceable. The Defendant then proffered the argument that he had established that he had been a victim of human trafficking on the basis that the Investigator had controlled his movements. He argued that this was one of the prohibited acts committed in order to exploit him for his labour and that his labour in this case was his money. He indicated that he wanted the Court to look into the compensation that he was entitled to as a victim of human trafficking totaling $1,000,000 US.
Analysis
[16] After reviewing the trial evidence and submissions, the only issues that warrant some minimal consideration is whether the Investigator had authority to stop the Defendant and secondly whether the Defendant was properly identified.
[17] The Defendant did not properly bring an application for a remedy based on an alleged legislative invalidity of the HTA. It is true that any legislation that is found to be in violation of any part of the Constitution will be of no force or effect. This Defendant correctly referred to this in his testimony regarding section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. However, there is a presumption of constitutionality regarding all legislation. Where the Defendant, as in this case at bar, challenges the constitutionality or legislative validity of the HTA, notice has to be given pursuant to section 109 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 that includes the Attorney General of the Province of Ontario. The Defendant simply did not do this and therefore his attack on the constitutionality of the HTA could not be adjudged nor could the HTA be declared invalid or inapplicable. The Prosecutor properly objected accordingly. However, since the Defendant was a self-represented litigant leeway was afforded the him to develop all his arguments. This being said, and based on the presumption of constitutionality, the HTA is in full force and effect in the province of Ontario. The Investigator therefore had clear legislative authority and grounds to stop the Defendant for speeding in the circumstance of the case at bar.
[18] The evidence in this case established identity beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence revealed that the Defendant had been driving the speeding motor vehicle on March 2, 2018 at 9:31 am. He identified himself as Paul Gough to the Investigator at the roadside. He presented a self-made document in the form of a piece of identification. It contained his name, date of birth and address. The Investigator followed up on this identification using the database for MTO. The MTO records revealed a photo bearing the image of the Defendant, that he possessed a valid licenced driver's licence and insurance. In cross-examination, the Defendant admitted that he never disputed the fact that he was Paul Gough at any time. This alone is sufficient proof of identity. There was also attornment to the jurisdiction of the Court as Paul William Gough and indeed, he defended the case in that name. The Investigator identified him in court as being the person that he had stopped roadside and who identified himself as Paul Gough on March 2, 2018. The investigator at roadside did not see the actual driver's licence issued to the Defendant by the province of Ontario. However, the Defendant did better at trial and filed a composite Exhibit A being not only his actual driver's licence with and expiration date of 2020/08/05 but also his Birth Certificate and his actual Statement of Birth issued by the province of Ontario pursuant to The Vital Statistics Act. The Defendant's legal argument that his birth certificate did not identify him and thus his driver's licence cannot identify him must fail. He did not in fact identify himself by use of his driver's licence. He used a self-laminated piece of identification that in the end allowed the investigator to identify him as the driver of the speeding motor vehicle both at roadside and in court on the day of trial. This at roadside had permitted the Investigator to further conduct an investigation concerning his identity.
[19] The Defendant is entitled to have his personal legal beliefs but he was clearly identified to be Paul William Gough the driver of the impugned speeding vehicle. The fact that the Defendant himself possesses a validly issued driver's licence in Ontario is counter indicative to his own argument that this document does not identify him and that the HTA is not a valid piece of legislation. Why does he comply with the HTA as a holder of a valid driver's licence if he feels the legislation is not valid? Why does he not abandon possession of government issued documents that identify him? He is indeed consensually, fully and freely complying with the requirements of the HTA although his consent to this regulated activity is simply not required at law. (See paragraphs 55 to 58 R. v. Bydeley, 2010 CarswellOnt 10824, 2010 ONCJ 740, [2010] O.J. No. 6063, 95 W.C.B. (2d) 49; affirmed R. v. Bydeley, 2011 ONCJ 842, 2011 CarswellOnt 15651 (Ont. C.J.); leave to appeal refused R. v. Bydeley, 2011 CarswellOnt 15652 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]).
[20] The defendant's trial evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt on the constituent elements of the offence of speeding. The court is satisfied that the there was sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the Defendant of speeding. The Investigator testified that on March 2, 2018 at or about 9:31 am in the City of Sault Ste. Marie, in the District of Algoma and in the Province of Ontario he stopped a suspect vehicle for speeding at McNabb and Lake streets. The vehicle had been operated on a highway as defined under the HTA in an area with a posted speed of 50 km/h. The Investigator used a Radar Device to establish the speed of the vehicle. The registered speed of the vehicle was 70 km/h in a 50 km/h zone. The Radar Device was in proper working order and had been tested according to its manufacturer's instructions. This was done both at the start of the Investigator's shift and following the traffic stop in question. Through various investigative techniques, the Investigator determined that the driver of the vehicle was Paul William Gough because the driver identified himself verbally and voluntarily in addition to a self-made laminated document piece of identification. Indeed, at trial the Defendant admitted that he never disputed the fact that he was Paul Gough at any time. In addition, at roadside the Investigator used other investigative measures to establish that Paul William Gough was the driver of the motor vehicle that he had observed operating on a highway. The evidence established that the defendant committed the offence of speeding. While the evidence at trial established a rate of speed beyond which was noted on the Certificate of Offence, no amendment was requested by the Prosecutor to increase the quantum of speed at trial. Section 128 of the HTA is an absolute liability offence. As I have already indicated, a finding of guilt was registered on August 1, 2018. Pursuant to the requirements of subsection 128(14) of the HTA, the court imposed a fine of $30 plus costs of $5 and a victim surcharge of $10 for a total owing of $45.
[21] The Defendant argued an alternate perspective as to whether he had been properly identified as the driver of a motor vehicle. The evidence, however, was clear on identity.
[22] The defendant alleged that the HTA was invalid based on his view that it never received Royal Assent. That question was not properly before the Court for adjudication. Still, the legal argument put forward by the Defendant in this regard was the result of a misunderstanding of the legislative process. It ignored the simple fact that the Highway Traffic Act of Ontario was revised and preserved under the Revised Statutes of Ontario (R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8). It remains in full force and effect today as amended over time.
[23] The Defendant sought relief in the form of damages based on his belief that he had been a victim of human trafficking. The Court simply had no jurisdiction to the grant the relief the Defendant was seeking.
[24] For greater certainty, the Court considered all the Defendant's arguments including the argument that he was merely "traveling." This is a well-known argument held by certain persons who believe that a driver's licence is not required to travel on highways. The Court found the Defendant's arguments fell in the area now commonly referred to as Organized Pseudo Legal Commercial Arguments (OPCA) as described and thoroughly discussed by J.D. Rooke in the case of Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 57. The Court agrees with the reasons provided in that case. In arriving at this decision, the Court also took into consideration the following cases: R. v. Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767, [2008] O.J. No. 4522; R. v. Duncan, [2012] O.J. No. 6405; R. v. Cassista, 2013 ONCJ 305, [2013] O.J. No. 2560; Ali v. Ford, 2014 ONSC 6665; R. v. Ainsworth, [2015] O.J. No. 934; and Dove v. Canada, [2015] F.C.J. No. 1187.
[25] I agree with Adamson J. in Ainsworth (2015) where he stated at para. 6: "Justice Rooke dealt with these matters exhaustively in Meads (supra) in part so judges in future would be spared that burden and so that these litigants would not succeed in their apparent aim of bogging down the justice system with nonsensical arguments which would have to be dealt with piecemeal by each and every judge they appear before." He then went on to summarily dismiss all of those arguments made in that case. The Court chose not to do so, in this case, because the issue of identity and the issue of the validity of the HTA required a minimum comment from this Court.
[26] The Court also agrees with F.L. Myers J. at para. 9 in Ali v. Ford where he stated:
But no one has the right to create his or her own legal order whether in good faith or as a tactic to try to tie up the courts and government officials. While I want very much to be respectful to the plaintiff and accord him the dignity before the courts that he deserves (as all who appear before our courts deserve) I cannot dignify his assertions by treating them as legal arguments deserving of respectful counter-argument. The reasons underlying the court's clear rejection of these types of arguments are made most definitively in Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 (Alta. Q.B.). If the plaintiff wishes to assert his legal rights in a manner which will be heard and responded to on the merits, he must stop his reliance on abusive theories and seek legal advice as to his true rights and obligations as a member of Canadian society.
[27] The Court found the words of S.R. Shamai J. in the case of Bydeley to be very persuasive (R. v. Bydeley, 2012 CarswellOnt 17276, 2012 ONCJ 837, [2012] O.J. No. 6407, 105 W.C.B. (2d) 596) at para. 18:
In some ways the litigation undertaken by Mr. Bydelely on his own behalf and previously on behalf of his wife raise issues of access to justice. They show a citizen, not trained in law, attempting to argue principles of law as they apply to a set of facts, as he sees them. They show the disconnect, in so many ways between the way this citizen interprets the law, and the manner in which the law has been interpreted by those trained in law and those with authority to interpret and apply the law. In his refusal to be bound by the common law, that is the authoritative interpretation of laws by judicial precedent, Mr. Bydeley presents argument which eerily resembles the language as deployed by Lewis Carroll in his famous poem, "Jabberwocky": It sounds like English, in the case of the famous poem, but it is largely comprised of invented words evincing meaning primarily to the speaker of them. The result is, that essentially Mr. Bydeley says, the law means what I say it means. In the presentation of argument thus constituted in Mr. Bydeley's case, it cannot form part of the social convention of legal argument in an institution as fundamental to constitutional democracy as a Court of Law.
[28] There is an evolving trend since Meads v. Meads was released in 2012. The weight of the authorities suggests a growing view that courts should summarily dismiss OPCA arguments. This is a persuasive and well-grounded view that will no doubt be the subject of further legal comment. However, in this case, the Court found that the Defendant, who had properly conducted himself before the Court, merited more complete reasons. Further, the Court is of the view that the Defendant holds an honest belief in the arguments that he was making even if the court could not accept his attempted defences. It was a simple trial even if it lasted a little longer than it should have. Still, the Defendant did not appear to have an ulterior motive in his litigation. He simply wanted his day in court. He did not protract the litigation and he obtained his day in court.
[29] This now completes the Court's reasons. The Defendant stands convicted of speeding.
Released: August 7, 2018
Signed: Justice of the Peace J. André Guitard