WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
This is a case under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act and is subject to one or more of subsections 45(7), 45(8) and 45(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 85(3) of the Child and Family Services Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:
45.— (7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication.
The court may make an order:
(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing,
where the court is of the opinion that publication of the report would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.
(8) Prohibition: identifying child.
No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child's parent or foster parent or a member of the child's family.
(9) Idem: order re adult.
The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.
85.— (3) Idem.
A person who contravenes subsection 45(8) or 76(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 45(7)(c) or subsection 45(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.
Court Information
Ontario Court of Justice
Date: April 25, 2016
Court File No.: Greater Sudbury C-370-14
Between:
The Children's Aid Society of the Districts of Sudbury and Manitoulin, Applicant
— AND —
S.M.L. and M.L. Respondents
Before: Regional Senior Justice P. Boucher
Heard on: February 12, 2016
Reasons for Judgment released on: April 25, 2016
Counsel
Patricia Marcuccio — counsel for the applicant society
George Florentis — counsel for the respondent, S.M.L.
Darren Berlinguette — counsel for the respondent, M.L.
Judgment
Boucher, R.S.J.
Introduction
[1] The Society's motion for summary judgment dated November 09, 2015 proceeded before me on February 12, 2016.
[2] The Society seeks a finding that the child Z.L. (born […], 2014) is in need of protection pursuant to sub-paragraphs 37(2)(b)(i) and 37(2)(b)(ii) of the Child and Family Services Act (the Act). The Society also seeks an order that the child be made a ward of the Crown without access.
[3] S.M.L. opposes this motion. M.L. neither delivered materials in response to the motion nor provided instructions to counsel, Mr. Berlinguette.
The Issues
[4] Are there any genuine issues requiring a trial in this matter, whether at the finding stage or the disposition stage?
The Law – Summary Judgment
[5] As of May 2, 2015, the rules have been amended to broaden the powers of the court on a summary judgment motion. Rule 16 has now been amended to include the same summary judgment powers set out in subrules 20.04 (2.1) and (2.2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The relevant provisions of Rule 16 read as follows:
RULE 16: SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WHEN AVAILABLE
- (1) After the respondent has served an answer or after the time for serving an answer has expired, a party may make a motion for summary judgment for a final order without a trial on all or part of any claim made or any defence presented in the case. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 16 (1).
AVAILABLE IN ANY CASE EXCEPT DIVORCE
(2) A motion for summary judgment under subrule (1) may be made in any case (including a child protection case) that does not include a divorce claim. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 16 (2).
EVIDENCE REQUIRED
(4) The party making the motion shall serve an affidavit or other evidence that sets out specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.
EVIDENCE OF RESPONDING PARTY
(4.1) In response to the affidavit or other evidence served by the party making the motion, the party responding to the motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials but shall set out, in an affidavit or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
EVIDENCE NOT FROM PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
(5) If a party's evidence is not from a person who has personal knowledge of the facts in dispute, the court may draw conclusions unfavourable to the party.
NO GENUINE ISSUE FOR TRIAL
(6) If there is no genuine issue requiring a trial of a claim or defence, the court shall make a final order accordingly.
POWERS
(6.1) In determining whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial, the court shall consider the evidence submitted by the parties, and the court may exercise any of the following powers for the purpose, unless it is in the interest of justice for such powers to be exercised only at a trial:
- Weighing the evidence.
- Evaluating the credibility of a deponent.
- Drawing any reasonable inference from the evidence.
ORAL EVIDENCE (MINI-TRIAL)
(6.2) The court may, for the purposes of exercising any of the powers set out in subrule (6.1), order that oral evidence be presented by one or more parties, with or without time limits on its presentation.
[6] The Supreme Court of Canada, in the case of Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, set out the process to be followed in applying the expanded summary judgment rule in subrules 20.04 (2.1) and (2.2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
[7] The judge should first determine if there is a genuine issue requiring a trial based only on the evidence before the judge, without using the judge's new fact-finding powers. If the judge concludes there is no genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial, he or she must make an order for summary judgment.
[8] Second, if the judge determines there appears to be a genuine issue requiring a trial, the judge should determine if the need to have a trial can be avoided by using the new powers. These new powers include: weighing the evidence, evaluating the credibility of a deponent, drawing any reasonable inference from the evidence and possibly hearing oral evidence. These new powers should only be used on a Rule 16 motion where the interests of justice do not require that they be exercised at a trial.
[9] The court in Hryniak also set out the following:
(a) Summary judgment rules must be interpreted broadly, favouring proportionality and fair access to the affordable, timely and just adjudication of claims (paragraph 5).
(b) Undue process and protracted trials, with unnecessary expense and delay, can prevent the fair and just resolution of disputes (paragraph 24).
(c) The summary judgment motion is an important tool for enhancing access to justice because it can provide a cheaper, faster alternative to a full trial (paragraph 34).
(d) The Ontario amendments to rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure changed the test for summary judgment from asking whether the case presents a "genuine issue for trial" to asking whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial. The new rule, with its enhanced fact-finding powers, demonstrates that a trial is not the default procedure (paragraph 43).
(e) Where a summary judgment motion allows the judge to find the necessary facts, to apply the law to the facts and resolve the dispute in a just manner, proceedings at trial would generally not be proportionate, timely or cost-effective (paragraph 50).
(f) A process that does not give the judge confidence in conclusions to be drawn can never be a proportionate way to resolve the dispute (paragraph 50).
(g) On a summary judgment motion, the evidence need not be equivalent to that at trial, but must be such that the judge is confident that the court can fairly resolve the dispute. A documentary record, particularly when supplemented by the new fact-finding tools, including ordering oral testimony, is often sufficient to resolve material issues fairly and justly. The extra powers provided can provide an equally valid, if less extensive, manner of fact finding (paragraph 57).
(h) The inquiry into the interest of justice is, by its nature, comparative. Proportionality is assessed in relation to the full trial. It may require the motion judge to assess the relative efficiencies of proceeding by way of summary judgment, as opposed to trial. This would involve a comparison of, among other things, the cost and speed of both procedures. It may also involve a comparison of the evidence that will be available at trial and on the motion as well as the opportunity to fairly evaluate better evidence that would be available at trial (paragraph 58).
[10] The principles in Hryniak have been applied to summary judgment motions in family law cases since the amendments to rule 16 of the rules became effective on May 2, 2015. See: Children's Aid Society of Ottawa v. K.A. and E.T., 2015 ONSC 3378, and Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. A.G. and A.B., 2015 ONCJ 33.
The Law – The Finding Stage
[11] Subparagraphs 37(2)(b)(i) and 37(2)(b)(ii) of the Act set out the following:
37(2) A child is in need of protection where,
(b) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person's,
(i) failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, or
(ii) pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child;
The Law – The Disposition Stage
[12] Section 57 of the Act provides as follows:
Order where child in need of protection
57. (1) Where the court finds that a child is in need of protection and is satisfied that intervention through a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future, the court shall make one of the following orders or an order under section 57.1, in the child's best interests:
Supervision order
- That the child be placed in the care and custody of a parent or another person, subject to the supervision of the society, for a specified period of at least three months and not more than 12 months.
Society wardship
- That the child be made a ward of the society and be placed in its care and custody for a specified period not exceeding twelve months.
Crown wardship
- That the child be made a ward of the Crown, until the wardship is terminated under section 65.2 or expires under subsection 71 (1), and be placed in the care of the society.
Consecutive orders of society wardship and supervision
- That the child be made a ward of the society under paragraph 2 for a specified period and then be returned to a parent or another person under paragraph 1, for a period or periods not exceeding an aggregate of twelve months. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11, s. 57 (1); 2006, c. 5, s. 13 (1-3).
[13] The options pursuant to section 57 must be read in light of the provisions of section 70 of the Act, which provides that the court shall not make an order for society wardship that results in a child being a society ward for a period exceeding 12 months, if the child is less than six years old on the day the order is made, or a period exceeding 24 months, if the child is six years old or older on the day the order is made, unless the time is extended as provided in subsection 70 (4). This subsection of the Act gives the court discretion to extend the time periods above by six months, if it is in the children's best interests to do so.
[14] In determining the "best interests" test the provisions of section subsection 37(3) as set out below must be considered:
(3) Where a person is directed in this Part to make an order or determination in the best interests of a child, the person shall take into consideration those of the following circumstances of the case that he or she considers relevant:
The child's physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs.
The child's physical, mental and emotional level of development.
The child's cultural background.
The religious faith, if any, in which the child is being raised.
The importance for the child's development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family.
The child's relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the child's extended family or member of the child's community.
The importance of continuity in the child's care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity.
The merits of a plan for the child's care proposed by a society, including a proposal that the child be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of the child remaining with or returning to a parent.
The child's views and wishes, if they can be reasonably ascertained.
The effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case.
The risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent.
The degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection.
Any other relevant circumstance. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11, s. 37 (3); 2006, c. 5, s. 6 (3).
Where child an Indian or native person
(4) Where a person is directed in this Part to make an order or determination in the best interests of a child and the child is an Indian or native person, the person shall take into consideration the importance, in recognition of the uniqueness of Indian and native culture, heritage and traditions, of preserving the child's cultural identity. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11, s. 37 (4).
The Facts
[15] I have read and relied upon S.M.L.'s affidavit sworn February 08, 2016, Ami Madsen's affidavit sworn January 13, 2016, Lee-Anne Martin's affidavit sworn January 08, 2016 and Allison Prusky's affidavit sworn March 31, 2010.
[16] Below I have summarized the facts that were not denied or have been subject only to bald denials.
S.M.L.'s involvement with the Children's Aid Society of Algoma, 2000-2014
[17] Two of S.M.L.'s older children are in the custody of her family. She gave custody of the oldest, born in 2000, to her mother in 2001. Her access to the child was supervised by her mother. The Society closed their file at that time. The Society's concerns included S.M.L.'s diagnosis of schizophrenia and bi-polar disorder (untreated), lifestyle decisions including partying and drinking, as well as transiency.
[18] Despite recommendations she follow-up with her psychiatrist, Dr. Ho-Hay Tang, S.M.L. did not do so until 2007. She was treated by Dr. Tang in 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011. During this time she was hospitalized three times and missed many scheduled appointments. She reported voices telling her to kill herself and other people and suffered from hallucinations. She had difficulties dealing with personal stressors such as breaking up with her then boyfriend (not M.L.), which had a negative impact on her condition.
[19] S.M.L.'s child born in 2010 was also removed from her care. The Society's concerns at that time related to her mental health and lack of medication compliance. She last saw Dr. Tang on January 26, 2011 and missed her next scheduled appointment.
[20] She did not see another psychiatrist until October 16, 2012 when she was assessed by Dr. Hughes Richard. He recommended to her family doctor that she be gradually taken off her lithium because she wanted to become pregnant. He diagnosed her with bi-polar disorder. She saw Dr. Richard again on May 13, 2013 and she reported that arguments with her husband, M.L., triggered her anger but that she could control it. She also reported violent fantasies of throwing hammers in the air but felt she could control her anger.
[21] Dr. Richard saw S.M.L. on seven occasions between July 19, 2013 and June 24, 2014. His reports are generally positive regarding her condition and response to recommendations and treatment.
S.M.L.'s and M.L.'s involvement with the Applicant Society, 2014-2016
[22] Z.L. was born […], 2014. S.M.L. and M.L. took her home from the hospital and had ongoing engagement with the Society, the Public Health Nurse (PHN) as well their family doctor, Dr. Mitchell.
[23] Concerns surfaced regarding the parents' ability to understand formula preparation and feeding as well as understanding and retaining information. The PHN expressed concerns about attachment and bonding between S.M.L. and the baby as well as the parents' intellectual ability to care for the baby. Specifically, she noted S.M.L.'s inability to prepare ahead and plan for possible problems. She used the example of S.M.L. running out of formula despite turning down an offer from someone else to bring her some.
[24] After several meetings with the parents and the baby Dr. Mitchell expressed concerns. In her report dated July 23, 2014 she states: "…there is a lack of insight, knowledge and some capacity to understand and problem solve. Because of this, I think that this is a higher risk situation for Z.L. and we at a minimum need to monitor the family closely with involvement from public health, child and family services and my office."
[25] As a result of these concerns, and with the parents' consent, the Society placed Z.L. in a kinship placement with C.B. and M.B on August 08, 2014.
[26] Within two weeks, S.M.L. and M.L. ended their relationship. The Chapleau O.P.P. responded to a domestic disturbance at the couple's home. S.M.L. removed her property from the home with the assistance of the police and moved to Sudbury.
[27] At the same time, the kinship placement broke down and Z.L. was placed in foster care in Sudbury. Despite arrangements being made with the Clinically Managed Access Program in Sudbury, S.M.L. relocated to Sault Ste. Marie, terminating her access.
[28] A second attempt at a kinship placement was made by C.B. and M.B. between January 21, 2015 and April 29, 2015. Once again, they withdrew from the arrangement and Z.L. was apprehended. She has remained in care since that date.
[29] On January 20, 2015 S.M.L. received a crisis intervention/emergency psychiatric assessment at the Sault Area Hospital. She acknowledged she had been out of medication for four months. She reported hearing her daughter's voice but denied any other auditory or visual hallucinations. She was provided her medication and parenting resources.
[30] On April 27, 2015 S.M.L. re-attended at the Sault Area Hospital to speak with a crisis worker. She was not taking her medication and had not found a family doctor. She reported multiple stressors including the break-up with M.L. as well as the sudden death of her mother. Auditory hallucinations were causing her stress. She had turned to alcohol as a coping mechanism, drinking daily until April 24, 2015. She was admitted to hospital for psychiatric assessment and was started again on her medication. She failed to attend her follow-up appointment with a psychiatrist on May 14, 2015.
[31] At the end of October, 2015 S.M.L. moved to Sudbury with her boyfriend and his mother.
[32] From September 02, 2014 to January 12, 2016, S.M.L. had five supervised visits with the child. She states she had weekly supervised access after January 12, 2016.
[33] M.L. had only two supervised visits with Z.L. on October 15, 2014 and October 16, 2014. Efforts by the Society to contact him since May 07, 2015 have not been successful.
Analysis – The Finding Stage
[34] The Society has the burden of establishing there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. The test for granting summary judgment is met when the moving party satisfies the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact that requires a trial for its resolution. Not every disputed fact or question of credibility gives rise to a genuine issue for trial. The fact must be material. (Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. T. (K.), [2000] O.J. No. 4736 (Ont. C.J.)).
[35] The Society has presented compelling evidence. S.M.L.'s struggles with mental health issues have been well documented since 2000. They include diagnoses relating to bipolar disorder, schizophrenia and depression. There is a pattern of attending for psychiatric assessments and then failing to follow through with the required medical regime and/or follow-up consultations and assessments. There is a pattern of hospitalizations related to her mental health struggles. Her most recent hospitalization was just over a year ago.
[36] S.M.L. has also been quite transient, to the detriment of her relationship with Z.L. since these proceedings began. She moved from Chapleau to Sudbury, then to Sault Ste. Marie, then back to Sudbury. She left Sudbury despite Z.L. being placed here and arrangements being made for supervised access. This transiency resulted in very minimal contact with Z.L. from September 02, 2014 until January 12, 2016.
[37] S.M.L. has also displayed instability in her domestic relationships. She and M.L. separated in August 2014 after a domestic incident. She entered into a new relationship in the winter or spring of 2015 in Sault Ste. Marie. She then moved with that partner and his mother to Sudbury.
[38] The evidence submitted regarding the parents' inability to parent Z.L. prior to apprehension is also compelling. Despite the very close intervention of various professionals, including the Society, the PHN and their family doctor, the evidence demonstrates the parents lacked knowledge, insight and problem solving techniques. These problems were noted by all of the service providers over the three month period from her birth to placement with C.B. and M.B. The inability of the parents to acquire the necessary skills during this period of intensive intervention required placement with family.
[39] The responding party, faced with a prima facie case for summary judgment, must provide evidence of specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue requiring a trial. Mere allegations or blanket denials, or self-serving affidavits not supported by specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue requiring a trial must be insufficient to defeat a claim for summary judgment. (Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. A. (M.), [2002] O.J. No. 2371 (Ont. C.J.)). This principle has been codified in subrule 16(4.1) of the Rules.
[40] M.L. neither delivered an affidavit for this motion nor provided instructions to counsel. He has not been in communication with the Society for almost a year, despite their best efforts.
[41] S.M.L. delivered an affidavit sworn February 08, 2016 in response to this motion. It is two pages in length and consists of blanket denials and assertions. Neither the denials nor the assertions have specific facts alleged to support them. In fact, some of the comments run completely counter to facts established by multiple independent service providers. For example, S.M.L suggests her "mental health has been well controlled for the last seven years" and she has been "monitored by psychiatrists regularly". She further asserts she takes "all medications as required" and has not "had any mental health incidents or breakdowns during the last seven years."
[42] This evidence fails to meet the standard required by the jurisprudence on these motions as well as subrule 16(4.1).
[43] I find the Society has discharged its burden in demonstrating there is no genuine issue requiring a trial at the finding stage of these proceedings. I do so without having to resort to the enhanced powers contained in subrule 16(6.1). Had the respondents provided evidence sufficient to satisfy subrule 16(4.1), then perhaps these powers would have been required to weigh evidence, evaluate credibility or draw reasonable inferences. This is not the case, however, and I am left with the compelling evidence of the Society, composed of the observations of multiple independent professional service providers.
[44] That evidence, as summarized above, meets the tests established by subparagraphs 37(2)(b)(i) and 37(2)(b)(ii) of the Act, and accordingly, there is a finding that Z.L. is in need of protection.
Analysis – The Disposition Stage
[45] I similarly find the Society has discharged its burden in demonstrating there is no genuine issue requiring a trial at the disposition stage of these proceedings.
[46] At the date of argument of this motion Z.L. had been in care 452 days, which exceeds the time limit established in section 70 of the Act.
[47] Since the date of apprehension M.L. has not demonstrated any commitment to Z.L. Other than two supervised visits 18 months ago, M.L. has effectively disappeared from Z.L.'s life. There is simply no evidence to suggest that placement with him pursuant to a supervision order would be in her best interests. The evidence of his parenting prior to the apprehension in fact suggests the opposite. I am not satisfied it is in her best interests that I extend the time she may remain in care in order for him to perhaps decide to become a part of her life.
[48] It was only a few months prior to argument of this motion that S.M.L. committed to access with her child.
[49] S.M.L. moved to Sault Ste. Marie when Z.L. was initially placed in care in Sudbury on September 02, 2014. This made it more challenging to have meaningful access. Her first visit took place October 15, 2014 after court. She missed without explanation a visit scheduled for October 29, 2014. The second visit took place December 09, 2014.
[50] Over the next 10 months several planned visits were missed. The Society continued to work with S.M.L. over this time to encourage access. The next visit occurred on October 21, 2015, with the fourth on December 15, 2015. By that time S.M.L. had moved to Sudbury. For unknown reasons she declined an offer to extend the length of the fourth visit. A few more visits took place prior to argument of this motion.
[51] It is clear from the evidence in this matter that it is not in Z.L.'s best interests that she be returned to S.M.L.'s care under a supervision order. The Act requires a child-centered approach be taken. The risk concerns that existed at the time of apprehension continue to exist today. They have been outstanding for an extensive period of time. The last-minute expression of interest, though well intentioned, is simply not enough. Z.L.'s best interests require much more.
[52] Her best interests also require that I decline to exercise my discretion to extend the time limit she may remain in care. There is no evidence before me to suggest sufficient change will occur during the brief period that remains within the six-month extension period.
[53] I have also considered there have been two failed placements with family since August 08, 2014. These placements were in addition to the time in care. Stability in planning for Z.L. is therefore at a premium at this point. See Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. S.S. [2011] O.J. No. 606 (OCJ) at paragraph 134.
[54] Crown Wardship orders are only made after careful deliberation. These orders must only be made in the best interests of the child. They must be made when there are no other less-intrusive orders available that are in the child's best interests.
[55] The Society in this case provided the parents with many opportunities to parent. They worked closely with other service providers after Z.L.'s birth. They encouraged, assisted and monitored the family after her birth. After approximately 7 weeks they placed her with family. This was after consultation with and reports from the other services providers, including Z.L.'s family doctor. The Society continued to be available to the parents after that time. Despite this, the parents did not take advantage of this assistance.
[56] For these reasons, and after careful consideration of the jurisprudence and statutory requirements of the Act, I am required to make an order that Z.L. be made a Ward of the Crown.
Access
[57] Subsection 59(2.1) of the Act provides as follows:
(2.1) A court shall not make or vary an access order made under section 58 with respect to a Crown ward unless the court is satisfied that,
(a) the relationship between the person and the child is beneficial and meaningful to the child; and
(b) the ordered access will not impair the child's future opportunities for adoption. 2006, c. 5, s. 17 (2).
[58] The Act creates a presumption against access when a child is a Crown Ward. The parent seeking access has the difficult burden of rebutting this presumption. The meaning of the phrase "beneficial and meaningful to the child" was examined in the case Children's Aid Society of the Niagara Region v. M.J., 4 R.F.L. (6th) 245 (Ont. Fam. Ct.):
[45] What is a "beneficial and meaningful" relationship in s. 59(2)(a)? Using standard dictionary sources, a "beneficial" relationship is one that is "advantageous." A "meaningful" relationship is one that is "significant." Consequently, even if there are some positive aspects to the relationship between parent and child, that is not enough – it must be significantly advantageous to the child.
[46] I read s. 59(2)(a) as speaking of an existing relationship between the person seeking access and the child, and not a future relationship. This is important, for it precludes the court from considering whether a parent might cure his or her parental shortcomings so as to create, in time, a relationship that is beneficial and meaningful to the child. This accords with common sense, for the child is not expected to wait and suffer while his or her mother or father learns how to be a responsible parent.
[47] Even if the relationship is beneficial and meaningful, as a final precaution I think that there still must be some qualitative weighing of the benefits to the child of access versus no access, before an order is made.
[59] In applying this test to the case of M.L., for reasons I have already detailed, I can only conclude the burden has not been met to rebut the presumption against access.
[60] In applying this test to the case of S.M.L., despite a last-minute interest in access, I come to the same conclusion. She failed to show a level of consistency in her visits that would make them beneficial and meaningful. She missed many visits, creating a gap of 10 months. She did not take advantage of an extension to one of her more recent visits. Z.L. needed much more than this for her mother's access to be beneficial and meaningful to her.
[61] Having come to the conclusion that access with her parents would neither be beneficial nor meaningful, I need not address the second part of the conjunctive test in paragraph 59(2.1)(b) of the Act. See CAS of Toronto v. T.L. 2010 ONSC 1376, [2010] O.J. No. 942 (Ont. S.C.).
Conclusion
[62] An order will go that Z.L., born […], 2014, be made a Crown Ward, with no access, for the purposes of adoption.
[63] I understand the decisions I have made in this case will be difficult for Z.L.'s mother to accept. I know she planned her pregnancy and took steps to ensure her medication at the time would not interfere with her unborn child's development. It appears that was the only time in the last 16 years that she consistently sought the assistance of her psychiatrist. I hope she can return to that kind of consistency in her treatment and I wish her the best in that endeavour.
Released: April 25, 2016
Signed: "Regional Senior Justice P. Boucher"