Court File and Parties

Court File No.: 2811 998 12 13543 00 Date: 2014-07-07

Ontario Court of Justice

Between:

Her Majesty the Queen

— and —

Kris Allan Gowdy

Before: Justice M.S. Block

Heard on: August 8 and 9, 2013; October 30, 2013; February 18, 2014; and April 4, 2014

Reasons for Judgment released: July 7, 2014

Counsel:

• T. D'Eri, for the Crown
• R. Robinson, for the accused K. Gowdy

BLOCK J.:

FACTS

[1] On August 9, 2012 Kris Gowdy placed an advertisement in the personal section of Craigslist with the username "shawnsmithcollegetoy2003". He sought men interested in receiving fellatio. Mr. Gowdy stated his preference in sexual partner as:

under 35, jocks, college guys, skaters young married guy.

[2] The site was being monitored by Detective Kip Wohlert of the Child Sexual Exploitation Section of the Ontario Provincial Police. Detective Wohlert was acting in an undercover capacity. His attention was drawn to the terms "young", "skater" and "under 35" in Mr. Gowdy's advertisement. These expressions caused him concern that the advertisement was potentially directed at persons under the age of consent.

[3] At 10:43 am on August 9, 2012 Detective Wohlert responded to the advertisement with a general statement of awkward interest and some descriptors and the following exchange started, captured in their entirety as Exhibit 2:

Wohlert: . . . .

Gowdy: Where are you located? Stats

Wohlert: I'm north of Bowmanville…im 15 years old blk hair 145 lbs…idk what else do i put here??? Ive nevr done this b4.

Gowdy: sounds cool man. Is 15 legal? Can you host?

Gowdy: How big is your cock? Cut or uncut?

Wohlert: idk…ive nevr really measured it…have u?????

Gowdy: All good. Just wondering. Want me to come over today?

Wohlert: Sure but ive nevr done anything like this b4…is that ok???? I wont want u 2 get made if im abit shy rite now

There followed a series of exchanges in which the "youth" confirmed both his age and his naiveté. Mr Gowdy expressed mature understanding and made clear his appetite to perform fellatio on the "youth" and a 15 year-old friend without obtaining any reciprocal service. In two communications Mr. Gowdy indicated that he was aware of the legal implications of his conduct:

Gowdy: K, cool.

Gowdy: Are you just 15 years old though? Cause I think that might be too young to be legal.

Address?

Gowdy: youre not a cop or any kind of set up are you?

[4] Approximately 5 minutes after the last exchange, Mr Gowdy was arrested at the scene of the intended assignation. His vehicle was searched. Police found personal medical documentation in his vehicle which established that he was HIV positive. No condoms were located on Mr. Gowdy's person or in the vehicle.

[5] Mr Gowdy was charged with inviting sexual touching by means of telecommunication with a person believed to be under sixteen, contrary to Section 172.1(b) of the Criminal Code and attempt aggravated sexual assault, contrary to Section 273(2) of the Criminal Code. The latter charge, withdrawn at the beginning of the trial, was based on the perception that he intended to expose the fictitious 15 year-old to HIV.

ISSUES

[6] The defendant concedes that the offence of luring is proven but argues for a stay of proceedings on the basis that:

1. He was entrapped by the police into committing the offense, or

2. His right to security of the person, guaranteed by section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was violated by the unlawful communication of his HIV positive condition in a Durham Regional Police media release.

ENTRAPMENT

[7] The evidence of the police investigation does not support the conclusion that Mr Gowdy was the victim of entrapment. That ruling requires that the police have engaged in random virtue testing or providing persons with the opportunity to commit an offense without any reasonable suspicion that they are so disposed. The evil that the entrapment doctrine attacks is police behavior that creates an offense where none would have existed otherwise.

[8] Detective Wohlert had a concern that Mr Gowdy intended sexual contact with boys under 16 when he read the craigslist advertisement. The language used there legitimately inspired the detective to correspond with Mr Gowdy to determine whether the ambiguous language employed concealed that intention. As long as his initial contact did not offer Mr Gowdy an opportunity to commit the offense it was a mere investigative step.

[9] In the exchanges excerpted above, Detective Wohlert did not start off the correspondence by proposing sex with Mr Gowdy. He expressed curiosity and inexperience, several times gave his age as 15, provided some cursory descriptors as requested and expressed a willingness to continue the communication.

[10] Mr Gowdy responded by asking for more information regarding the location of his home and more intimate physical descriptors. Detective Wohlert sent a photograph and reiterated his lack of experience. In the third message sent by Mr. Gowdy he advanced the first suggestion the two meet at the boy's home, Detective Wohlert didn't directly respond. In his fifth message, the defendant repeated, in more direct language, his suggestion that the two meet. Throughout the exchange Detective Wohlert used the language of tentative, passive inexperience. All suggestions that they meet for sexual activity came from Mr Gowdy. The acceptance of the second suggestion was an offer of an opportunity to commit an offence. That offer was based on reasonable suspicion, if not reasonable and probable grounds that the defendant was prepared to commit the criminal offence of which he was later charged.

[11] The facts in the case before me are on point with Her Majesty the Queen v Bayat, [2011] O.J. No. 5680. In that case Justice Rosenberg wrote for the Court of Appeal that:

the trial judge held that the reasonable suspicion had to exist from the moment the officer contacted the respondent. He failed to consider whether that an initial contact was an offer of an opportunity to commit an offense. In my view, it was not. The initial contact was no more than a step in an investigation, the equivalent of a knock on a door.

paragraph 19

THE DECISION TO ISSUE A MEDIA RELEASE

[12] Following his arrest Mr Gowdy was interviewed at length by Detective Randy Norton of the Durham Regional Police. At an early stage, the focus of the interview appeared to shift from concern with internet luring to Detective Norton's concern that Mr Gowdy may have exposed other individuals to HIV. Mr Gowdy told the detective that he had been diagnosed with the virus in 2009. Detective Norton sought the names of prior contacts for the purpose of advising them of potential HIV transmission and, I expect, charging the defendant with additional offences. Ultimately and reluctantly, Mr Gowdy provided some partial names and contact information to Detective Norton. No prior sexual partners of Mr Gowdy were ever found. Detective Norton did not accept that Mr Gowdy genuinely attempted to assist the police in this respect.

[13] Mr Gowdy was intensely private about his sexual interests. His family, church community and the bulk of his friends were unaware of his sexual orientation. His church regards homosexual practises as sinful. The evidence suggests that this deeply closeted pastor would have had furtive occasional sexual encounters with men he knew little or nothing about. Whether or not Mr Gowdy was evasive, there was no admission in his interview that these prior sexual contacts were unaware of his HIV status, other than contacts he had after his exposure to HIV but before his diagnosis. There was no admission that he engaged in activities that carried the risk of transmission after his exposure. No steps were taken to find out if the medical authorities treating Mr Gowdy had already traced his contacts.

[14] There was no consideration given to whether there was a genuine risk of HIV transmission to the fictitious 15 year old. There was no effort to find out whether HIV can even be transmitted by an HIV positive person performing oral sex on an HIV negative recipient. No consideration was given to the possibility that Mr Gowdy, who had been on medication since his diagnosis, might have a low or negligible viral load at the time of his arrest. The assumption was that Mr Gowdy was a serious transmission risk regardless of his condition or his sexual practises.

[15] The court is in no position to make a determination as to the risks of particular sexual practices or of the effect of a several years of antiviral treatment on potential HIV transmission. There is simply no evidence before me from either the defense or prosecution in respect of these issues. The onus of proof must be on the crown to show evidence of the level of risk in the proposed, and past, sexual activity. I cannot simply assume that Mr Gowdy's sexual history involved risky sexual activity or lack of informed consent by his partners after he knew his HIV status.

[16] Both Detective Norton in his evidence and the crown in her submissions speculated that the defendant may have gone on to engage in sexual activity of a different kind than the oral service promised on August 9, 2012. The only evidence before the court of Mr Gowdy's intention are the exchanges with Detective Wohlert and the explicit craigslist advertisement. The only evidence-based conclusion is that Mr Gowdy intended to perform oral sex on the fictitious 15 year old boy.

[17] Following the interview Detective Norton asked the Durham Regional Police media relations unit to issue a news release regarding Mr Gowdy. The media release of August 10, 2012 advised the public of Mr Gowdy's charges, his professional work history, and his HIV status. There is no evidence that anyone considered whether this was a lawful action.

[18] In his evidence, Detective Norton laid out the dual purpose of the public disclosure of the defendant's HIV status:

"I made a decision to put out a press release to advance the investigation. That was all it was. And to make –ensure that the community was safe and if there was people that had been - had contact with Mr Gowdy that they could at least go seek treatment or go seek testing, and that was all that was on my mind"

Transcript of August 8, 2013, page 33

[19] In his testimony Detective Norton indicated that he was completely indifferent to any right that Mr Gowdy might possess to keep his medical status private. He was also apparently indifferent to the two other questions at the heart of his contact with the defendant: Was there a serious risk of HIV transmission? Was there a statutory regime that set out the conditions under which the defendant's HIV status could be made public?

PROVINCIAL PRIVACY LEGISLATION

[20] The right to privacy in medical information is protected in provincial legislation which governs the release of information of the identity of persons with communicable disease.

[21] The Municipal Freedom of information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990 (MFIPPA) is the general governing provincial statute for the release of personal medical information held by municipal authorities. The Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, Disclosure of Personal Information O. Regulation 265/98, speaks directly to the disclosure of personal information by a police service. The relevant sections of the legislation form the appendix to this judgment.

[22] The Police Services Act and its regulations form a complete regime for the public disclosure of the identity of persons with a communicable disease by a police service. Section 41 of the Act authorizes the chief of police to disclose personal information about an individual for the protection of the public pursuant to regulation. The relevant regulations to the Act clearly do not contemplate the release of information that a particular accused individual has a communicable disease. The regulations do contemplate the release of such information if an individual has been convicted of a criminal offense and the chief, or his or her designate, reasonably believes that the individual poses a significant risk of harm to other persons.

[23] A statute which directly addresses the powers of a police service to release personal medical information regarding persons charged with an offence clearly supersedes a general statute governing the release of information by all municipal bodies.

[24] The MFIPPA clearly requires that the institution in question have a structure in place to determine whether personal information should be released. The information at the heart of this case is clearly personal information within the meaning of the Act. Disclosure of such information is presumptively an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.

[25] Section 32 of the Act provides the specific exceptions to the general rule that personal information shall not be disclosed. The only reference to disclosure by a law enforcement disclosure is the requirement in section 32(f) of the MFIPPA that it be to a Canadian or authorized foreign counterpart.

[26] The crown cites section 32 (c), (h) and (i) of the MFIPPA as authority for the release of personal information by the police. Section 32 (c) allows release of personal information "for the purpose for which it was obtained or compiled or for a consistent purpose". This cannot refer to the disclosure of personal information that comes into the knowledge of the police through search incident to arrest. The applicant's HIV status was obtained or compiled as a health matter. The disclosure of this information by the police was obviously not for that or any consistent purpose. Section 32 (h) of the Act requires that "compelling circumstances affecting the health or safety of an individual" exist before personal information can be disclosed to that individual. Section 32(i) allows the release, in compassionate circumstances, of personal information concerning an injured, ill or deceased person to family, spouses or friends. None of these sections contemplate a media release of personal health information.

APPLICATION OF THE LEGISLATION

[27] I arrive at the following conclusions:

1. A media release naming a HIV-positive person must be the result of the decision by a chief of police or his or her designate;

2. The decision must be made after a determination that there is a reasonable belief that the individual to the information relates poses a significant risk of harm to others.

3. That individual must be convicted or found guilty of a crime.

[28] None of these conditions were present in relation to this matter at the relevant time. It is clear that Detective Norton made the decision to issue a media release. There was not a shred of evidence that anyone connected with the arrest or investigation was designated by the chief of police with the authority to release this information. There was no evidence of the existence of any relevant management structure within the Durham Regional Police. The obviously sincere belief that Mr Gowdy posed a serious risk to his prior sexual contacts or to the fictitious 15-year-old was based, at best, on uninformed speculation. Needless to say Mr. Gowdy had not yet been convicted of anything at the time of the media release. The publication of Mr Gowdy's HIV status in the media release was unlawful.

WERE MR GOWDY'S S.7 RIGHTS BREACHED?

[29] On an earlier date I indicated that I found that Mr Gowdy's S. 7 rights had been breached by the police conduct but that I would not grant a stay of proceedings.

[30] The right to keep personal medical data private is protected by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, which reads:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

[31] In Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission) 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307, the Supreme Court of Canada reiterated the principle that the right to security of the person encompasses freedom from serious state-imposed psychological stress. In order to engage s. 7 of the Charter, the psychological harm must be state-imposed and the psychological stress must be serious.

[32] In Her Majesty the Queen v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, the Supreme Court held that the Charter was a purposive document to be interpreted generously and that a purpose of Section 8 is protection of the privacy of the individual. La Forest J. recognized that section 8 of the Charter protects privacy in relation to information:

Finally, there is privacy in relation to information. This too is based on the notion of the dignity and integrity of the individual. As the Task Force put it (p. 13): "This notion of privacy derives from the assumption that all information about a person is in a fundamental way his own, for him to communicate or retain for himself as he sees fit," In modern society, especially, retention of information about oneself is extremely important. We may, for one reason or another, wish or be compelled to reveal such information, but situations abound where the reasonable expectations of the individual that the information shall remain confidential to the persons to whom, and restricted to the purposes for which it is divulged, must be protected. Governments at all levels have in recent years recognized this and have devised rules and regulations to restrict the uses of information collected by them to those for which it was obtained; see, for example, the Privacy Act, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 111.

at paragraph 22

[33] The Court considered the particular sensitivity of personal medical information.

This is obviously necessary if one considers the vulnerability of the individual in such circumstances. He is forced to reveal information of a most intimate character and to permit invasions of his body if he is to protect his life or health. The Court emphasized the strict requirement that information obtained in a therapeutic relationship be kept from casual disclosure to police and use in a criminal justice setting.

at paragraph 29

[34] Authority for the principle that a very high expectation of privacy in personal medical information can be found in Her Majesty the Queen v. Pohoretsky, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 945; Her Majesty the Queen v Colarusso, [1994] S.C.J. No. 2 and Her Majesty the Queen v. Dersch, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 768. See also, Wayne Renke, The Confidentiality of Health Information in the Criminal Law, 6 Health Law Review No.3 and John Dawson, Compelled Production of Medical Reports, (1998) 43 McGill L.J. 25.

[35] The inherent reasonable expectation of privacy in medical information is taken for granted in the vast volume of authorities that consider the rights of complainants in sexual assault matters. It is also commonly accepted that the seizure of medical data as evidence in a criminal prosecution requires prior judicial authorization. In the case before me the information was not seized in a manner impugned by the defence. But where personal medical information falls into the hands of the police without any unlawful conduct on their part, the suspect still retains a right that any subsequent use by the police conform to Charter principles. Privacy of personal medical information cannot be restricted to cases where Section 8 infringements are pled. The concept of "security of the person" is engaged anytime police violate a reasonable expectation of privacy by unlawfully circulating private medical data.

[36] I rule that the unlawful and unreasonable public disclosure of Mr Gowdy's personal medical information violated Section 7 of the Charter.

THE EFFECT OF THE BREACH ON MR GOWDY

[37] Mr Gowdy testified in the voir dire on this application. He had been a pastor of the Free Methodist Church since 2003. This post had been obtained after many years of prior study and work in subordinate positions. He stated that has struggled with same-sex attraction in isolation for many years.

[38] Mr Gowdy was diagnosed with HIV in November 2009. He told the court that disclosure of his HIV status, and thus his attraction to men, would likely have required him to step down from his position in the church and face disciplinary process. As a consequence, his career and livelihood would have been ruined and his family and friendships deeply affected. He did not share his diagnosis with anyone other than health-care professionals. He testified that his privacy in this matter was very important to him.

[39] Mr Gowdy agreed with Ms D'Eri in cross-examination that the charge of child luring itself would have been extremely detrimental to his professional position. At the time of his arrest he told Detective Norton that he believed that the arrest would force disclosure of his attraction to men and would finish his professional career. The obvious implication of this evidence, together with evidence of his personal struggle with same-sex attraction, was that his denomination has a conservative doctrine with respect to matters of sexual orientation. The conservative character of his church in this respect was attested to in his affidavit filed in support of the stay application.

[40] In his testimony during the Charter application, Mr Gowdy insisted that knowledge of his H.I.V. status within his church would itself endanger his occupation independent of any other consideration. He told the court that, at the time of his statement to Detective Norton, he feared the consequences of disclosure of his medical status. I reject this contention. There is nothing in the statement to corroborate that assertion. His protestation to the contrary, it makes no sense that he anticipated the public disclosure of his HIV status at the time of that statement. Potential disclosure by the police never came up during the interview with Detective Norton.

[41] In his evidence, the defendant was unable to distinguish any effect that disclosure of his HIV status would have on his career independent from the effect of the charge of child luring and the resulting revelation of his sexual orientation. No evidence was called to support the proposition that disclosure would aggravate the effect of a charge of same-sex underage internet luring against a clergyman in a conservative religious organisation. The complaint filed with the Office of the Independent Police Review Director on August 13, 2912, Exhibit 6 at trial, did not mention the disclosure of Mr Gowdy's HIV status.

THE TEST FOR STAY

[42] Mr Gowdy has applied for a stay pursuant to Section 24(1) of the Charter.

[43] In the recent case of Her Majesty the Queen v Babos, 2014 SCC 16, [2014] S.C.J. No. 16, The Supreme Court of Canada reiterated the high onus that the applicant must meet to demonstrate that the administration of justice can only preserve its integrity through a stay of proceedings. The Court reiterated the three part test for a stay of proceedings:

1. There must be prejudice to the accused right to a fair trial or to the integrity of the justice system that 'will be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial or its outcome'

2. There must be no alternative remedy capable of redressing the prejudice; and

3. Where there is still uncertainty over whether a stay is warranted after steps 1 and 2, the court is required to balance the interests in favour of granting a stay, such as denouncing misconduct and preserving the integrity of the justice system, against the interest that society has in having a final decision on the merits.

[44] As in this case, Babos dealt with the residual category in which the state conduct created no threat to the accused' right to a fair trial. In such cases the first test is whether the impugned behaviour is so offensive to society's sense of fair play and decency that to allow even a fair trial to continue risks tainting the justice system with the misconduct. Ordinarily, the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled, society will not be offended unless the misconduct is apt to continue.

[45] The second test requires that the court address the prejudice to the integrity of the justice system. The question that must be answered is whether an alternate remedy short of a stay of proceedings will disassociate the system from the impugned state conduct going forward.

[46] The Supreme Court held that the third test, the balancing of interests, has added significance for the determination of cases under the residual category. In such cases the court must whether the integrity of the justice system is best protected by a stay or by the continuation of the trial. In determining the issue the court must consider:

1. The nature and seriousness of the impugned conduct,

2. Whether the conduct is isolated or reflects a systemic and ongoing problem,

3. The circumstances of the accused,

4. The charges,

5. The interests of society in having the charges disposed of on the merits.

[47] The Supreme Court, at paragraph 41 in Babos, put the balancing process in the following context:

Clearly, the more egregious the state conduct, the greater the need for the court to dissociate itself from it. When the conduct in question shocks the community's conscience and/or offends its sense its sense of fair play and decency, it becomes less likely that society's interest in a full trial on the merits will prevail in the balancing process. But in residual category cases, balance must always be considered.

[48] Finally, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that, in the residual category, cases warranting a stay of proceedings will be "exceptional" and "very rare".

APPLICATION OF THE BABOS TEST

[49] I have concluded that the applicant has not met the high onus required for a stay of proceedings.

[50] The police conduct demonstrated profound ignorance of the legal requirements for public disclosure of the applicants HIV status and simply assumed the danger of contagion. There was also a demonstrated indifference to Mr Gowdy's privacy interests. However, the police were neither brutal nor dishonest. The evidence of police witnesses was candid. The integrity of the judicial system will not be compromised by the continuation of the trial so long as there is a meaningful judicial response to the police conduct.

[51] A response short of a stay can answer the challenge to the integrity of the criminal justice that the unlawful disclosure of the applicant's medical status represents. The stern judicial rebuke reflected in this judgment and a reduction of sentence will have the effect of meaningfully disassociating the administration of justice from the misbehaviour and addressing the prejudice suffered by Mr Gowdy.

[52] The balancing of interests component of the Babos test favours the continuation of the trial to a determination on the merits. The police conduct was well-intentioned, if deeply flawed. There was none of the cynical moral corruption that so distresses the well-informed citizen. There is no evidence that the conduct is an ongoing issue. Mr Gowdy faces real difficulties as a result of his legal predicament. He has lost his profession and will have to find a new career with the impediment of a serious criminal conviction. He has lost his standing within his church community. The disclosure of his sexual orientation to his family and friends was taken out of his hands. Mr Gowdy no doubt suffered additional embarrassment because of the disclosure of this medical status. However, the more serious personal challenges he faces going forward are the product is his own voluntary misconduct and not problems caused by the police. Lastly, the lowering of the age of consent several years ago and the parliamentary attention to internet-related sexual offences reflected in s. 172.1 (b) reflect an apparent public consensus that sexual misconduct with children is a matter of great concern. I convict Mr Gowdy on the sole remaining count on the information.

APPENDIX

Municipal Freedom of Information and Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990

Purposes

1. The purposes of this Act are,

(a) to provide a right of access to information under the control of institutions in accordance with the principles that,

(i) Information should be available to the public,

(ii) necessary exemptions from the right of access should be limited and specific, and

(iii) decisions on the disclosure of information should be reviewed independently of the institution controlling the information; and

(b) to protect the privacy of individuals with respect to personal information about themselves held by institutions . . .

Interpretation

2. (1) In this Act,

"head", in respect of an institution, means the individual or body determined to be head under section 3; (personne responsable")

"institution" means ,

(b) . . . police services board . . .

"personal information" means,

(b) information relating to the . . . medical . . . history of the individual

Designation of head

3. (1) The members of the council of a municipality may by by-law designate from among themselves an individual or a committee of the council to act as head of the municipality the purposes of this Act.

(2) The members elected or appointed to the board . . . may designate in writing from among themselves an individual or a committee of the body act as head of the institution for the purposes of this Act.

Obligation to disclose

5. (1) Despite any other provision of this Act, a head shall, as soon as practicable, disclose any record to the public or persons affected if the head has reasonable and probable grounds to believe that it is in the public interest to do so and that the record reveals a grave environmental, health or safety hazard to the public.

Notice

(2) Before disclosing a record under subsection (1), the head shall cause notice to be given to any person to whom the information in the record relates, if it is practicable to do so.

Representations

(4) A person who is given notice under subsection (2) may make representations forthwith to the head as to why the record or part should not be disclosed; those representations will be considered by the head.

Personal privacy

14(1) A head shall refuse to disclose personal information to any person other than the individual to whom the information relates except,

(d) under an act of Ontario or Canada that expressly authorizes the disclosure;

(f) if the disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.

Criteria re invasion of privacy

14 (2) A head, in determining whether a disclosure of personal information constitutes an unjustified invasion of personal privacy, shall consider all the relevant circumstances, including whether,

(b) access to the personal information may promote public health and safety;

(e) the individual to whom the information relates will be exposed unfairly to pecuniary or other harm;

(f) the personal information his highly sensitive;

(g) the personal information is unlikely to be accurate or reliable;

Presumed invasion of privacy

14(3) A disclosure of personal information is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy if the personal information,

(a) relates to a medical, psychiatric or psychological history, diagnosis, condition, treatment or evaluation;

(b) was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of the law, except to the extent that disclosure is necessary to prosecute the violation or to continue the investigation;

Exemptions not to apply

16. An exemption from disclosure of a record under sections 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14 does not apply if a compelling public interest in the disclosure of the record clearly outweighs the purpose of the exemption.

17. An institution shall not disclose personal information in its custody or under its control except,

(a) in accordance with part one;

(c) for the purpose for which it was obtained or compiled or for a consistent purpose;

(f) if disclosure is by law enforcement institution,

(i) to a law enforcement agency in a foreign country under an arrangement, a written agreement or treaty or legislative authority, or

(ii) to another law enforcement agency in Canada;

(g) if disclosure is to an institution or law enforcement agency in Canada to aid an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement proceeding or from which a law enforcement proceeding is likely to result;

(h) in compelling circumstances affecting the health or safety of an individual if upon disclosure notification is mailed to the last known address of the individual to whom the information relates;

Police Services Act R.S.O. 1990

41.(1.1) despite any other act, a chief of police, or a person designated by him or her for the purpose of this subsection, may disclose personal information about an individual in accordance with the regulations.

Police Services Act, Disclosure of Personal Information O. Reg 265/98

2. (1) a chief of police or his or her designate may disclose personal information about an individual to any person if,

(a) the individual has been convicted or found guilty of an offense under the Criminal Code . . .

(b) the chief of police or his or her designate who would disclose the personal information reasonably believes that the individual poses a significant risk of harm to other persons or property;

(c) the chief of police or his or her designate who would disclose the personal information reasonably believes that the disclosure will reduce that risk.

(2) if subsection (1) applies, the chief of police or his or her designate may disclose any personal information about the individual that the chief of police or his or her designate reasonably believes will reduce the risk posed by the individual.

3. (1) a chief of police or his or her designate may disclose personal information, as described in subsection (2), about an individual to any person if the individual has been charged with convicted were found guilty of an offense under the Criminal Code . . .

(2) if subsection (1) applies, the following information may be disclosed:

1. The individual's name, date of birth and address.

2. The offense described in subsection (1) with which he or she has been charged or of which he or she has been convicted or found guilty and the sentence, if any, imposed for that offense.

3. The outcome of all significant judicial proceedings relevant to the events described in subsection (1).

4. The procedural stage of the criminal justice process to which the prosecution of the events described in subsection (1) has progressed and the physical status of the individual in that process (for example, whether the individual is in custody, or the terms, if any, upon which he or she has been released from custody).

5. The date of the release or impending release of the individual from custody for the offense described in subsection (1), including any release on parole or temporary absence.

Released: July 7, 2014

Signed: "Justice Block"