Court File and Parties
Ontario Court of Justice
Date: September 21, 2013
Court File No.: Toronto POA Appeal 13-1787
In the Matter of: Appeals under clause 116(1)(d) of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, as amended
Between:
Real Estate Council of Ontario Respondent
— And —
Hui (Tony) Wang and Xiangling (Lynn) Feng Appellants
Before: Justice David A. Fairgrieve
Heard: September 3, 2013
Reasons for Judgment Released: September 21, 2013
Counsel
Kelvin Kucey — counsel for the prosecution/respondent
Tony Wang and Lynn Feng — defendants/respondents in person on their own behalf
Background
On appeal from sentences imposed by Justice of the Peace J. Cottrell on December 12, 2012.
Reasons for Judgment
FAIRGRIEVE J.:
I. The Offences and Initial Sentences
[1] On December 12, 2012, Tony Wang (as principal) and his wife Lynn Feng (as a party) pleaded guilty to four counts alleging that Mr. Wang traded in real estate without having been registered under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 30, Schedule C, as amended, contrary to s. 4(1)(d) of that statute. A contravention of the Act is made an offence by s. 40(1), for which an offender, if an individual, is liable under s. 40(3) to a fine of up to $50,000 and/or imprisonment for up to two years less a day. After entering convictions on the charges, the justice of the peace imposed fines totalling $20,000, achieved by imposing a fine of $2,500 per count on each of the defendants. Mr. Wang and Ms. Feng now appeal against those sentences, arguing that the fines were harsh and excessive.
II. Standard of Review for Sentence Appeals
[2] As observed in R. v. Fagbemi (2000), 4 M.V.R. (4th) 221 (Ont. C.J.), there appears to be some disagreement in the case law concerning the scope of review by an appellate court hearing a sentence appeal under the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, as amended. Section 122(1) of the P.O.A., which governs sentence appeals in Part III proceedings, states simply that the appeal court "shall consider the fitness of the sentence appealed from." Reference is still made to R. v. Cotton Felts (1982), 2 C.C.C. (3d) 287 (Ont. C.A.), one of the cases cited by Mr. Kucey, albeit for a different purpose. Blair J.A. noted there, at p. 292, that the P.O.A. sentence appeal provisions were in almost identical terms to those in the Criminal Code governing sentence appeals in criminal cases, so that the same principles should govern sentence appeals under both statutes. Blair J.A. went on to state:
It is now well-established that the power of an appellate court to vary sentences under these two sections [s. 614(1) and s. 775(6)] of the Criminal Code is not limited to cases where the sentencing judge has proceeded upon a wrong principle. The appellate court in a sentence appeal has the power and, indeed, the duty to form its own opinion on the fitness of sentence and to vary any sentence if it does not consider it to be fit. The same principle governs an appellate court under [what was then] s. 105 (1) of the Provincial Offences Act.
[3] Following the Court of Appeal's judgment in 1982 in Cotton Felts Ltd., however, the Supreme Court of Canada decided a number of cases that significantly altered the approach taken by provincial courts of appeal to sentence appeals under the Criminal Code. In R. v. Turcotte (2000), 144 C.C.C. (3d) 139 at pp. 144-5 (para. 16) (Ont. C.A.), for example, Catzman J.A. stated:
The limitations on an appellate court in considering an appeal against sentence have been stated and recently restated by the Supreme Court of Canada. The sentencing judge's disposition must be "not fit" or "clearly unreasonable": R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, 102 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at para. 46. It must fall "outside the acceptable range": Shropshire, at para. 50. In the absence of "an error in principle, failure to consider a relevant factor, or an overemphasis of the appropriate factors, a court of appeal should only intervene to vary a sentence imposed at trial if the sentence is demonstrably unfit": R. v. M.(C.A.), [1996] S.C.R. 500, 105 C.C.C. (3d) 327, at para. 90. The sentence must be "in substantial and marked departure from the sentences customarily imposed for similar offenders committing similar crimes": M.(C.A.), at para. 92. The sentence imposed at trial "is entitled to considerable deference from appellate courts": R. v. Proulx (2000), 2000 SCC 5, 140 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at para 123. "Although an appellate court might entertain a different opinion as to what objective should be pursued and the best way to do so," appellate courts should not "second-guess sentencing judges unless the sentence imposed is demonstrably unfit": Proulx, at para. 125.
A more recent statement to the same effect was made by Pepall J.A. in R. v. Metron Construction Corporation, 2013 ONCA 541 at paras. 69-70.
[4] In my view, the current, more restrictive approach taken by appellate courts to criminal sentence appeals in indictable matters is also applicable to sentence appeals under the P.O.A., although it may be that the issue is somewhat academic in this case, given my conclusion that the fines imposed both reflected errors in principle and were also manifestly unfit, so that appellate intervention is warranted according to any standard applicable to sentence appeals. In those circumstances, I think that the dispositions made by the justice of the peace are not entitled to the usual deference and that it falls to this court to determine the appropriate sentences, having regard to the facts of the offences and the circumstances of the individual appellants.
III. The Guilty Plea Proceedings
[5] The proceedings on December 12, 2012, in the Provincial Offences Court on Markham Road in Toronto, commenced with the prosecutor, Mr. Kucey, informing the Court that instead of the 3-day trial that had been scheduled, the parties had agreed to "a partial plea bargain," whereby both defendants would plead guilty to four of the six charges in the information. Counts 4 and 5 were to be withdrawn.
[6] Despite the fact that the defendants were not represented by counsel or a paralegal, the Court did not conduct any plea comprehension inquiry to ensure that the pleas would be voluntary and informed, and that the facts necessary to establish all of the essential elements of the offences would be admitted. Instead, the justice of the peace simply directed that the defendants be arraigned on the counts indicated by Mr. Kucey.
[7] The four charges on which the prosecutor proceeded were worded in identical terms, alleging that Mr. Wang "did trade in real estate" while he was not registered under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002, and that Ms. Feng was "a party" to each offence. All that distinguished the individual counts were the offence dates and the addresses of the particular properties involved, as follows:
| Count | Period | Property |
|---|---|---|
| Count 1 | 1 Oct. to 31 Dec. 2009 | 1 Lee Centre, #709, Toronto |
| Count 2 | 1 Dec. 2009 to 31 Jan. 2010 | 2550 Lawrence Ave. E., Toronto |
| Count 3 | 1 Jan. to 30 June 2010 | 8 Pagehurst Ct., Richmond Hill |
| Count 6 | 1 Oct. to 31 Dec. 2010 | 38 Forbes Rd., Toronto |
Although not otherwise particularized, each charge concluded with an unnecessary averment that the defendants "thereby knowingly contravened s. 40(1)(c) of the Act" that, as it turned out, was not entirely consistent with the admissions made by the defendants. The appellants repeatedly made it clear in this court, however, that they did not wish to challenge the validity of their guilty pleas or convictions, but that their appeals were limited solely to the amount of the fines.
[8] When Mr. Wang was arraigned on Count 1 and asked whether he pleaded guilty or not guilty, he replied, "Yes, I plead guilty with a detailed explanation, please." His wife, Ms. Feng, stated simply, "Plead guilty."
[9] When the defendants were arraigned on Count 2, and Mr. Wang was again asked whether he pleaded guilty or not guilty, the following exchange occurred:
Mr. Wang: Yes, guilty, but please allow me to explain …
The Court: All I want to hear, sir, is one word at this point and that word would be guilty if you feel you are guilty.
Mr. Wang: Guilty.
Ms. Feng: Guilty.
Following the arraignments on Counts 3 and 6, each defendant replied simply, "Guilty."
[10] The Court then asked the prosecutor to read in the facts. Mr. Kucey stated that at all relevant times Mr. Wang was not a registered real estate sales representative under the Act, continuing as follows:
Now, what took place over the period from approximately October 1st, 2009, to December 31st, 2010, is that Mr. Wang worked with wife, Lynn Feng. Ms. Feng at that time was a registrant under the Act. And so, the two of them worked in common intention [sic] to have him work as an unregistered person with her and they used her registration and her employment with a real estate brokerage in order to legitimize trades in real estate.
The four counts that you heard guilty pleas on have all related to trades in real estate in which Mr. Wang and Ms. Feng worked in tandem with a common intention to carry out the impersonation [by] him [of] a real estate professional registered under the Act. That, of course, allowed her to process transactions through her brokerage and her broker of record, who's here today, was completely unaware of [what] Mr. Wang was doing and what Ms. Feng was carrying out with his assistance.
And, of course, they participated in sales and trades of real estate and were paid commissions for all of those transactions.
Now, interestingly, there's been a bit of a flip [which] now is that Mr. Wang on February 28, 2011, has become a registrant with the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act and the Real Estate [Council] of Ontario, and his wife has surrendered her registration. So we've had a complete inverse of those circumstances.
Currently, Mr. Wang remains a registrant and Ms. Feng is no longer a registrant, and I think that for purposes of this profile [sic], I think that's all we really need to speak about.
[11] Without asking each defendant if he or she agreed with the facts read in by Mr. Kucey, when prompted by the prosecutor, the Court simply confirmed that findings of guilt had been entered on the four charges.
[12] It was only then that the justice of the peace asked Mr. Wang about the "explanation" he had wanted to offer when he was arraigned. Mr. Wang stated, "I just want to help my family. I really didn't know this is a serious offence. If I knew it, definitely I wouldn't do that."
[13] Mr. Wang proceeded to file a letter he had prepared, which the justice of the peace read into the record. It read as follows:
I just want to help my wife. We really had no intention to do any bad things to anybody. We really didn't know this is a serious offence. If I knew it, I definitely won't do that. I just help my wife as an assistant. We didn't hurt any public interest … There is not any victim or any damage to anybody. In my life, I always try to be a good, decent person, be nice with everyone and I have never had problems with anybody or any authorities in my whole life, except this nightmare.
Since I was registered, I have always trying to do everything properly and correctly. As you can check, I have never had any complaints and any problems with anybody and I should have good record since I registered with R.E.C.O. My wife is the same. As you can check, she has never had any other problems during her registration period except this case.
The only reason why Jingmei Li initiated this case is she asked us to give her our hard-earned commission back to her after she bought the house and we refused her unreasonable request. We have four kids and we just want to be ordinary family, get normal and peaceful life feeding the family, making living in this beautiful country. We never experienced this kind of trouble.
Because of this big hit, my wife became tired to be real estate agent and she quit it by herself already last year of 2011 and stays at home to take care of the kids. So, I am the only source of income to feed our family and I still want to be stayed in this business and have a chance to work. We really have big financial difficulty, that is why we even cannot afford a lawyer to help us today.
The justice of the peace replied that he appreciated the defendant's contrition and his concerns about his family, but that registration under the Act was mandatory.
IV. Inadequacy of Factual Findings
[14] Although the prosecutor later called one witness on the sentencing hearing, Jingmei Li, the purchaser of the property referred to in Count 6, no further questions were asked by the Court concerning precisely what the defendants' respective conduct consisted of in relation to each of the four transactions, nor did the prosecutor offer any more factual details. Particularly since Mr. Wang's "explanation" included the assertion that he "just helped [his] wife as an assistant," I think that it was incumbent on the trial Court to ascertain the additional facts that would have allowed a proper assessment of the gravity of the specific offences.
[15] Since there is evidently no statutory prohibition against a registered sales representative being assisted by an unregistered employee as long as the assistance does not amount to a "trade" within the meaning of s. 1(1) of the Act, it was important, I think, to know in what ways Mr. Wang's conduct crossed the line between what was permissible assistance and what constituted trading activities requiring prior registration as a real estate agent. I accept Mr. Kucey's submission that Mr. Wang's business card identifying himself as a "Sales Rep." with HomeLife Landmark Realty Inc., Ms. Feng's real estate brokerage, as well as an advertisement on a Chinese-language web site that included telephone numbers for both Ms. Feng and Mr. Wang and a statement that they were "working together", clearly supports the allegation that he was "impersonating" (to use Mr. Kucey's word) a real estate agent, but the facts read in did not identify precisely what conduct Mr. Wang engaged in that was prohibited by statute. For example, the sentencing court was left uninformed as to whether Mr. Wang assisted only purchasers like Ms. Li or had vendors' listings as well, whether anyone alleged any financial loss as a result of his involvement in the "trades" identified in the charges, and whether the degree of Ms. Feng's participation in the transactions meant that she was entitled to a commission as well, even if her supervision of Mr. Wang was inadequate by permitting him not merely to assist her, but to "trade" as well. While there was no issue as to Mr. Wang's unregistered status, that was only one of the elements of the offences charged. The nature and extent of his prohibited "trading," which they admitted his wife had aided or abetted in some way, were left unexamined by the justice of the peace.
[16] At the hearing of this appeal, Mr. Kucey submitted that even in the absence of additional admitted facts, a reasonable inference could be drawn that the other transactions must have been similar to the one described by Ms. Li in relation to Count 6. Without necessarily agreeing with that assertion, it was apparent from Ms. Li's testimony that her main complaint about the defendants' participation in the purchase of her house turned on a disagreement between the parties as to whether a reference, evidently made in Mandarin, to a 50% reduction in the commission she was to pay them was reflected in the reduced price she offered the vendor or whether she was to receive a "rebate" after the closing of her purchase. This dispute evidently led to litigation in the Small Claims Court, followed by an appeal to the Superior Court which was still outstanding at the time of the guilty pleas. The justice of the peace, wrongly in my view, prevented Mr. Wang's cross-examination of Ms. Li on the facts of her transaction and her dealings with the defendants because, the Court stated, he did not want to "step on the [the Superior Court's] feet." The civil proceedings that were then outstanding should not, I am certain, have prevented Mr. Wang from cross-examining the witness about the facts pertaining to one of the counts on which he and his wife were about to be sentenced.
[17] After Mr. Wang initially obtained Ms. Li's agreement that she was happy with the purchase of her house, Mr. Wang's next question started with "We [emphasis added] worked very hard to find this lady [her house]…," leading the justice of the peace to cut him off and admonish him for giving evidence rather than asking questions. It would have been more appropriate, I think, if the Court had assisted the unrepresented defendant to frame a proper question to elicit the evidence he was seeking. With respect to those facts, Mr. Kucey on the appeal took the position that the rules governing the reception of fresh evidence on criminal conviction appeals should also apply to P.O.A. sentence appeals. I am satisfied, however, that given the more informal, less technical nature of P.O.A. appeals, particularly when they concern the fitness of the sentences imposed after guilty pleas and the fairness to the defendants in allowing them to present their version of the facts, it was appropriate to correct earlier omissions and allow further information to be presented. Ms. Feng stated here that she had been present for the negotiations and presentation of Ms. Li's offer to purchase, with the implication that the document signed by her for her broker was intended to convey her personal participation in the transaction as the registered agent and her entitlement to a commission, rather than simply concealing the excessive involvement of Mr. Wang that they admitted by their guilty pleas.
V. Sentencing Submissions and Errors
[18] Before calling Ms. Li as a witness on the sentencing hearing, Mr. Kucey referred to four cases that, in his submission, provided precedents that would be helpful to the Court. In those cases, the sentences ranged from a $4,000 fine to 15 months in jail, the last of which, he fairly conceded, involved 13 counts where the defendant had been involved in "a number of nefarious things" apart from being an unregistered real estate agent. It seems to me that citing four cases with widely disparate sentences hardly establishes an accepted range of sentence, but rather demonstrates that the appropriate penalty for the offence will be determined by a consideration of the mitigating and aggravating factors that arise based on the facts of the particular case and the personal circumstances of an individual offender.
[19] After stating that he was not seeking a jail term, the prosecutor gave his opinion that "the reasonable floor" would be a fine of $5,000 per count, for a total of $20,000, without indicating whether those fines should be imposed on each defendant individually or on both collectively, presumably because they were a married couple. Oddly, perhaps, the justice of the peace made the same error when he simply announced, during the defendants' submissions and without any reasons justifying his conclusion, that there would be a fine of $5,000 per count for a total of $20,000. It was only after the court clerk reminded him that there were two separate defendants that he altered the fines to $2,500 for each defendant on each charge, again without giving any reasons for finding that each person shared equal culpability and should be penalized in the same way.
[20] The Court's interruption came after the defendants were asked if they had anything to say, and Mr. Wang was speaking on behalf of his wife. The exchange was as follows:
Mr. Wang: My wife says another baby's coming and we have 4 kids totally – really hard to pay huge money – 20,000 is a huge money for my family.
The Court: I can appreciate it's a huge amount for your family, sir, but you've broken the law. It's very clear to me today.
Apparently recognizing that the Court's observation that they had broken the law, as they had admitted by their guilty pleas, did not provide any reason for fixing on a particular quantum of fine, Mr. Wang brought to the Court's attention another case of trading in real estate while not registered that he had found on the Real Estate Council of Ontario website. In that case, R. v. Goldmintz, a fine of $1,000 had been imposed on each of two counts after a trial. Without knowing anything about the facts of the case, it is hard to say whether it is distinguishable or not, but it at least demonstrated that the "low-water mark" of $4,000 per count cited by the prosecutor, which apparently had influenced his submission that $5,000 per count was appropriate here, was not entirely accurate. (It might be noted that in its endorsement, R. v. Goldmintz, 2012 ONCA 775 (November 14, 2012), the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial based on the inadequacy of reasons given by both the justice of the peace at trial and the Provincial Judge on appeal, without addressing either the sentence that had been imposed or the question of law on which special leave to appeal under the P.O.A. had presumably been granted.)
[21] In his submissions, Mr. Wang went on to state that he now realizes that he did something wrong, but pointed out that there was no damage done to anyone or any financial gain to him or his wife, since she would have been entitled to her commission on the transactions in any event, even if she had done all of the work by herself. It was at this point that the justice of the peace cut off Mr. Wang's submissions, stating simply "A fine of $5,000 on each of the four counts, sir."
VI. Principles Governing Fines
[22] There is no confusion about the principles that apply in a criminal case to the imposition of fines. In R. v. Ward (1980), 56 C.C.C. (2d) 15 at p. 18 (Ont. C.A.), Martin J.A. stated that "where a fine is an appropriate penalty, a fine of such magnitude should not be imposed, that having regard to the means of the offender, it cannot be paid within a reasonable time." Similarly, in R. v. Snider (1977), 37 C.C.C. (2d) 189 at p. 190 (Ont. C.A.), Martin J.A. also stated that having decided that a fine is an appropriate disposition, "the trial judge should only impose a fine that is within the offender's ability to pay, bearing in mind, of course, the possibility that he may extend the time for payment." I see no reason why sentences for regulatory offences should involve a different principle. I am satisfied that in the circumstances here, the justice of the peace erred in principle both by failing to inquire into the defendants' financial circumstances, as contemplated by s. 57(3) of the P.O.A., and also by going on to impose fines that were clearly excessive and well beyond their ability to pay. The fines, in my view, were totally disproportionate to the gravity of the offences they had committed and would cause undue financial hardship to both the defendants and their numerous dependents.
[23] The material filed by the appellants here included their income tax assessments for 2011, admittedly not the time frame within which the four impugned real estate transactions occurred, but still a demonstration of their economic circumstances relevant to the sentencing. The tax assessments indicated that Mr. Wang's total income for the year was $8,479 and Ms. Feng's $19,979. Also filed was Mr. Wang's CIBC personal line of credit statement dated December 10, 2012, indicating that it was being used for ordinary household expenses, leading to a balance of over $36,000 at the time. It was not disputed that Mr. Wang is now the sole breadwinner for the family, that Ms. Feng stays home to look after their four children, and that they also support two elderly parents.
VII. Sentencing Considerations
[24] Mr. Kucey referred in his submissions to the importance of denunciation and deterrence when dealing with such public welfare regulatory offences. I accept his argument that deterrence should be the paramount consideration and that a fine should not be perceived simply as a licensing fee for illegal conduct. In Cotton Felts, supra, the case cited by the prosecutor, the Court of Appeal in 1982 found no error in the $12,000 fine imposed on a corporate defendant following an offence under the Occupational Health and Safety Act that had led to the amputation of one worker's arm and an injury to another worker's hand. I also agree with his submission that the same principles should apply to other public welfare statutes as well, including those that have consumer protection as their primary objective. At the same time, it does not follow that every strict liability provincial offence is of the same seriousness or that every example of a specific offence all pose the same threat to the welfare of the public. Every case will have aggravating and mitigating factors, and it is axiomatic that a fit sentence should be tailored to reflect the circumstances surrounding the unlawful conduct and the offender's personal circumstances.
[25] In my view, the sentencing in this case suffered from both procedural and substantive errors, not the least of which was the failure of the justice of the peace to give any reasons explaining the quantum of the fines he imposed. There is clearly nothing wrong with a justice of the peace in a trial court accepting a prosecutor's submissions, at least if the prosecutor justifies his position and the justice explains why he agrees, but neither occurred in this case.
VIII. Mitigating and Aggravating Factors
[26] I think that the appropriate penalties here should reflect the following considerations, most of which can obviously be regarded as mitigating in nature:
(i) The guilty pleas by both defendants, avoiding the necessity of a multi-day trial where there appeared to be a number of triable issues that would arise;
(ii) The technical rather than flagrant nature of the offences, given the apparently blurred line between what would have been regarded as permissible assistance to a registered sales representative and what constituted prohibited "trading," particularly given the failure of the prosecutor to identify the precise conduct on the part of each defendant in each of the four transactions attracting a finding of culpability;
(iii) The apparently undisputed absence of any need for a specific deterrent, given Mr. Wang's current registration after satisfying R.E.C.O. of his good character and Ms. Feng's retirement from real estate to care for their four young children;
(iv) The uncontradicted assertion by Mr. Wang that he acted in good faith, to the extent that his ignorance of the law caused him to misperceive the restrictions on presenting himself as a sales representative or as his wife's business partner prior to his own registration;
(v) The absence of any evidence or admission that actual harm or economic loss was suffered by anyone, particularly given the defendants' unchallenged position that Ms. Feng's participation in the transactions was sufficient to entitle her to the registrant's commission actually received by them;
(vi) The absence of any prior record or disciplinary difficulties on the part of either defendant;
(vii) The sincerity of their remorse or contrition expressly accepted by the justice of the peace;
(viii) The compelling evidence that the defendants' economic situation was, and remains, relatively dire, particularly given their family responsibilities, such that large fines would accurately be described as crushing in nature;
(ix) The fact that at least one other case, of a very small number of cases resulting in widely disparate sentences, resulted in a comparatively small fine.
On the other side of the ledger, the sentence must, of course, recognize the importance of general deterrence and the enforcement of the registration scheme directed by the Legislature to protect the public from dishonest, unethical or unprofessional conduct in the trading of real estate. That the appellants' conduct could not be described in that way, or at least that the admitted facts and evidence did not establish it, remains, I think, sufficient justification for viewing this case as significantly less serious than many other situations one might envision.
IX. Revised Sentences
[26] In my opinion, consideration of all of the circumstances that must be taken into account leads to the conclusion that a very lenient, perhaps exceptionally lenient, sentence is warranted in this case. The present objective is not to establish a precedent for what might be appropriate in another, more typical case of this nature. In place of the fines imposed by the justice of the peace, and given both the absence of any basis for distinguishing the different offences and the principle of totality, I would impose on Mr. Wang fines of $250 on each of the four counts, for a total of $1,000. That, I appreciate, is less than he, as an inexperienced, unrepresented appellant, was seeking. In my view, however, such a fine is not a trivial or token slap on the wrist, especially given the appellant's financial circumstances. It might be observed, without wishing to compare apples with oranges, that a $1,000 fine is not only the mandatory minimum fine imposed by the respective legislatures for impaired driving offences and driving while disqualified, but also the customary sentence imposed on a first offender. Those offences clearly involve denunciation and deterrence as the paramount factors on sentence and the importance of enforcing a regulatory licensing scheme, considerations also applicable to this case. In my view, particularly given the absence of evidence of financial gain by the appellants that Ms. Feng would not otherwise have received, I see no reason to regard $1,000 as other than a substantial penalty that adequately achieves the sentencing objectives.
[27] With respect to Ms. Feng, I do not understand what public interest would be served by imposing any additional financial penalty for her apparently secondary role in effecting what the prosecutor described as their "common intention." The fines imposed on Mr. Wang will, I think, be a common burden shared by their family as a whole. In those circumstances, I think a suspended sentence on each count is all that is required.
X. Disposition
[27] In the result, then, the appeals are allowed. The fines imposed by the justice of the peace are set aside. In Mr. Wang's case, the fine on each of the four counts will be $250, for a total of $1,000, before the statutory surcharge is applied. He may have 12 months from today's date to pay. In Ms. Feng's case, sentence will be suspended on each of the four counts to which she pleaded guilty.
September 21, 2013
Signed: "Justice David A. Fairgrieve"