Court of Appeal

The appellant challenged his jury conviction for sexual assault offences and a five-year penitentiary sentence, arguing the jury charge on motive was unbalanced and the sentencing judge improperly treated lack of insight or remorse as aggravating.

The court held the charge, read functionally and as a whole, accurately and sufficiently instructed the jury, including on motive to fabricate and motive to offend, and any imperfections did not create legal error.

On sentence, the court found no error in principle affecting fitness and no improper reliance on lack of remorse.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

On a motion panel review, the moving party sought to overturn a single-judge order dismissing his stay and ancillary requests.

The court held the moving party failed to show any error in the finding that the appeal lacked merit and therefore failed to establish entitlement to a stay.

The court also rejected additional relief requested before the panel for lack of legal entitlement and admissible supporting evidence.

Costs were awarded to the responding party on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $1,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appeal arose from a dispute over whether a substantial contribution to a home purchase created a beneficial ownership interest under resulting trust principles.

The majority held the trial judge made a legal error by disregarding key third-party evidence probative of the transferor’s objective intention and allowed the appeal.

The court declared the appellants entitled to a 50% beneficial interest in the property, set aside the judgment and costs below, and remitted related sale and accounting remedies for case management.

A dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible legal or factual error and concluding the transfer was supported by consideration.

In an estate appeal, the court held that the judgment under appeal was, on its face, made under the Succession Law Reform Act.

Because s. 76 grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Divisional Court for appeals under that Act, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The appeal was dismissed on that basis.

The court also ordered costs payable to the respondent by the estate in an agreed all-inclusive amount.

The appellant challenged a bankruptcy order and a related post-judgment Mareva order granted at the request of a court-appointed monitor holding a substantial judgment debt.

The court held the bankruptcy order was appealable as of right under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and treated the Mareva order as a final order appealable under s. 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act in the circumstances.

On the merits, the court found no reversible legal or discretionary error in rejecting objections to the monitor’s authority, rejecting allegations of collateral purpose, and refusing dismissal or adjournment under ss. 43(7) and 43(10) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court also upheld continuation of the Mareva relief as complementary to bankruptcy administration and dismissed the appeal with agreed costs.

The appellant challenged a sexual assault conviction arising from an indictment that included multiple violent offences against an intimate partner.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on uncorroborated complainant evidence and by reversing the burden of proof through an odd-to-fabricate remark.

The court held corroboration was not legally required and found the trial judge properly conducted a charge-by-charge credibility and reliability assessment, accepting only portions of witness evidence.

The court further held the burden of proof was correctly articulated and applied, and that the impugned remark was a permissible common-sense credibility observation.

Appellate intervention was not warranted.

The appellant challenged an annual Review Board disposition that maintained a conditional discharge based on a finding of significant threat to public safety.

On appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code, the court admitted post-hearing psychiatric evidence showing medication discontinuation without decompensation, a revised diagnosis, and a materially lower structured risk assessment.

Applying the interests of justice framework for fresh evidence in NCRMD appeals, the court held the new record required allowing the appeal.

The court found remittal unnecessary because an absolute discharge was the only reasonable disposition on the updated evidence.

The respondents sought dismissal of the appellant's appeal under r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court held that an appeal from a default judgment was outside its jurisdiction because the order was interlocutory and the proper route was a motion to set aside default under r. 19.08.

The panel also noted that a party noted in default is restricted from taking further steps absent leave or consent under r. 19.02(1)(b).

Concluding the appeal was jurisdictionally barred and abusive, the court dismissed the appeal without costs.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal in a sexual assault case, finding no reversible misapprehension of evidence, no misuse of the complainant's voice note despite the absence of a voir dire, and no uneven scrutiny.

It granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal as the sentence was fit and within range.

The appellant sought to appeal a superior court bail review decision under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after release relief was denied.

The respondent moved to quash for lack of jurisdiction.

The court held that no criminal appeal right exists to the court from decisions under ss. 520 or 521, and provincial legislation cannot create an appeal route in criminal matters absent federal statutory authority.

The court also held that asserting Charter issues did not establish jurisdiction where no statutory right of appeal exists.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction, and the fresh-evidence request was left unaddressed.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed for loaded prohibited firearm possession and related offences after a collision, firearm discharge, flight, and disposal of the weapon in a residential area.

The court held the conditional sentence was demonstrably unfit and found a three-year penitentiary sentence would have been fit on the sentencing record, given denunciation and deterrence principles for serious public-safety firearm offending.

The court accepted significant mitigation, including youth, no prior record, rehabilitation, and a serious neurological condition that increased custodial hardship and treatment risk.

Fresh evidence established ongoing rehabilitation and unresolved worsening neurological concerns requiring continued monitoring.

The court granted leave to appeal sentence but declined reincarceration and directed continuation of the conditional sentence.

The appellant challenged convictions on three sexual assault counts and the custodial and ancillary sentencing orders.

The court held that the trial reasons adequately applied the reasonable doubt framework, addressed credibility and reliability concerns arising from complainant incapacity, and permitted meaningful appellate review.

It further held that the custodial term was fit, declined to admit fresh evidence concerning family caregiving circumstances, and upheld the 20-year SOIRA order as properly imposed under the governing statutory regime at sentencing.

A constitutional remedy request regarding registration obligations was left to a court of first instance due to an insufficient record.

Both conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence about cannabis-related perception issues, applied an improper reliability analysis, and failed to address inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence.

The court held that any alleged misapprehension was not material to the conviction reasoning and that the trial judge identified and decided the live reliability issue correctly.

It further held that trial reasons are assessed functionally and need not expressly resolve every inconsistency, particularly those not emphasized in closing submissions.

Appellate deference applied to the trial judge’s factual reliability findings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant landlord appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that a long-term commercial lease had expired and for ancillary relief on the basis that the tenant was overholding.

The appellant argued that the tenant's failure to obtain timely Planning Act approval brought the lease to an end and precluded further renewals.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's analysis, holding that the tenant had continued to take appropriate steps to obtain the necessary approval and that the renewals were permitted subject to such approval.

Fresh evidence motions were dismissed as irrelevant to the appeal outcome, and leave to appeal the $225,000 costs award was denied.

The appellant appealed her conviction for second degree murder arising from a home invasion during which her uncle was fatally stabbed.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant organized the break-in intending for the deceased to be killed by her co-accused.

The Court of Appeal found two errors in the jury charge: first, the jury was not adequately instructed about the limited probative value of the appellant's after-the-fact conduct if they rejected the Crown's theory that the killing was planned; second, the jury was not properly instructed that the appellant's partially exculpatory police statements could contribute to a reasonable doubt even if not affirmatively believed.

The curative proviso was not applied, as the Crown's case on murder was not overwhelming.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial on second degree murder was ordered.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict dismissing her negligence action against the respondent homeowners after she slipped and fell on their staircase.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in excluding the first set of expert slip resistance testing, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's gatekeeping decision under the White Burgess framework, as the excluded testing differed materially from the actual conditions.

Even if the exclusion were erroneous, no miscarriage of justice resulted because the tampering theory was still advanced at trial through other evidence and the jury's verdict turned on the credibility of the parties.

The appellants sued the City of Toronto after one of them fractured her ankle stepping into a hole in a ditch within the municipal road allowance on a road with no sidewalks.

The City obtained partial summary judgment on the basis of the statutory bar in s. 42(4)(b) of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, pertaining to untraveled portions of a highway.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by proceeding to decide the partial summary judgment motion despite his own conclusion, applying the Malik v. Attia factors, that the case was not appropriate for partial summary judgment.

The court held that once the motion judge found the Malik factors weighed against partial summary judgment, he ought to have dismissed the motion.

The cross-appeal was dismissed as moot.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and assault with a weapon against his stepdaughter and sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by treating the appellant's silence during a police interview as a "tacit admission" of guilt on the charges he did not explicitly deny.

This error was foundational, materially affecting the trial judge's assessment of both the appellant's and the complainant's credibility.

The court held that the right to silence, protected under s. 7 of the Charter, prohibits drawing an inference of guilt from an accused's choice to remain silent on some allegations while denying others.

The convictions were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring the respondent the beneficial owner of 15% of a corporation's shares and finding their conduct oppressive under the OBCA.

The appellants narrowed their appeal to challenge only the order requiring production of financial statements dating back to 2014.

The Court of Appeal held that the production order was ancillary to the respondent's damages claim, not a standalone shareholder rights claim subject to a limitation period, and that compliance required only producing existing documents.

The appeal was dismissed with costs of $30,000.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of oxycodone, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He appealed on the sole ground that the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) application.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's characterization of 216 days as defence delay, attributable to the appellant's failure to raise the delay issue despite knowing trial dates were set beyond the Jordan ceiling.

Net delay fell well below the 18-month ceiling, and the appeal was dismissed.