COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

DATE: 20260225

DOCKET: C70740

Zarnett, George and Copeland JJ.A.

BETWEEN

His Majesty the King

Respondent

and

Steven Shultz

Appellant

Gabriel Gross-Stein, for the appellant

Brent Kettles, for the respondent

Heard: February 17, 2026

On appeal from the conviction entered by Justice Robbie D. Gordon of the Superior Court of Justice on October 31, 2019.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[ 1 ] The appellant was charged with a number of violent offences allegedly committed between January 2016 and July 2017 against the complainant, his intimate partner. He was tried on a sixteen-count indictment. He was acquitted of seven counts and, on the other nine, was convicted either as charged or of a lesser and included offence.

[ 2 ] One of the convictions was for sexual assault. He appeals from that conviction alone. He raises two grounds of appeal.

[ 3 ] First, the appellant argues that the trial judge erred in relying on the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant on the sexual assault charge. The trial judge’s reasons on the other charges show that he had concerns about the complainant’s credibility and reliability; he noted that the complainant was “prone to significant exaggeration”. According to the appellant, the trial judge’s reasoning in deciding the other charges indicates that he was not prepared to accept the complainant’s evidence except where it was confirmed by other evidence. However, the trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence on the sexual assault, despite it not being meaningfully corroborated by evidence that was independent and compelling. The complainant’s friend, who purportedly confirmed the core allegation of sexual assault, was found by the trial judge to be unreliable in almost every other aspect of her evidence and, at least in some respects, intentionally dishonest. It was thus a legal error to treat the complainant’s evidence as confirmed.

[ 4 ] Second, the appellant submits that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof when he stated that the complainant’s “evidence, that she thought he was trying to put his fingers into her vagina to determine if she had been with someone else, has the ring of truth to it. If it were a fabrication, it would be an odd one indeed”.

[ 5 ] We do not accept the appellant’s arguments.

[ 6 ] There was no legal requirement that the complainant’s evidence on the sexual assault charge be corroborated. Nor can any such requirement be imputed from the manner in which the trial judge disposed of other charges.

[ 7 ] The disposition of the other charges falls into three categories. First, charges where the trial judge convicted on the complainant’s evidence alone, which satisfied him of the appellant’s guilt for those offences beyond a reasonable doubt, without corroboration. Second, charges in respect of which the trial judge had the benefit of the complainant’s evidence and confirmatory evidence that together satisfied him beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, charges where the quality of the complainant’s evidence and the fact that it was unconfirmed left him with a reasonable doubt. All that can be taken from this is that the trial judge assessed the factors in favour of and against the acceptance of the complainant’s evidence on a charge-by-charge basis, as he was entitled to do.

[ 8 ] The trial judge gave a number of reasons for accepting the complainant’s evidence on the sexual assault. Her evidence that the incident began with a confrontation and the appellant accusing her of infidelity fit the nature of their relationship. Her description of the sexual assault itself had a ring of truth to it. Although prone to exaggeration, the trial judge found that the complainant did not exaggerate with respect to this episode, even to the extent of downplaying it. And the complainant’s friend—although an unreliable witness about other matters who gave a description of the encounter that diverged in many respects from that of the complainant—did confirm a key aspect of the complainant’s evidence. The trial judge found this noteworthy, albeit of limited value.

[ 9 ] A trial judge has a wide discretion to make findings of credibility and reliability, and such findings are entitled to significant deference on appeal. In making such findings, a trial judge is entitled to accept all, some, or none of the evidence of a witness. That is what the trial judge did here. He accepted the complainant’s evidence on the key aspects of the sexual assault. He was entitled to take into account the confirmation provided by the friend’s evidence and give it some, if limited, value. He was also entitled to reject the defence submission that the complainant and her friend had colluded about their evidence, given that in other respects their evidence diverged substantially. There is no basis for appellate interference.

[ 10 ] Finally, we reject the submission that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof in making a passing remark that the complainant’s description of what occurred would have been an “odd” allegation to fabricate.

[ 11 ] First, far from losing sight of the burden, the trial judge carefully instructed himself that the Crown had the burden to prove the essential elements of each offence beyond a reasonable doubt and the appellant did not have to prove anything.

[ 12 ] Further, we agree with the Crown’s submission the trial judge’s brief comment that the allegation was an “odd” one to fabricate was in the nature of a common-sense credibility assessment that it was improbable that the complainant was lying about an assault committed in the fashion she described.

[ 13 ] The appeal is therefore dismissed.

“B. Zarnett J.A.” “J. George J.A.” “J. Copeland J.A.”

[1] This appeal is subject to a publication ban pursuant to 486.4 of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.