Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and mischief arising from a lengthy relationship with the complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred by requiring corroboration, improperly relying on bad character evidence, and misapprehending evidence regarding his motivation for lying to police.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not require corroboration, did not engage in propensity reasoning, and made no material misapprehension of evidence.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of assault and sexual assault against his former romantic partner and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by admitting a screenshot of a text message exchange without independent authentication and by failing to give adequate limiting instructions to the jury regarding its reliability.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to Gladue and Morris factors relating to his Black and Indigenous ancestry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the complainant's testimony was sufficient to authenticate the screenshot and the jury instructions were adequate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle in weighing the mitigating factors against the gravity of the offences.

The appellant sought leave to appeal an 8.5-year sentence for five counts of driving while disqualified.

The appellant had a lengthy criminal record, including numerous prior driving offences and a previous 10-year sentence for criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

The current offences were committed while the appellant was on parole and subject to multiple driving prohibitions, including a lifetime ban, and involved the use of a fraudulent driver's licence.

The Court of Appeal considered arguments regarding proportionality, parity, the jump principle, and the totality principle.

The court found no errors in principle by the sentencing judge, emphasizing the appellant's incorrigibility and the increased maximum sentence for driving while disqualified.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed, upholding the original sentence.

The appellant appealed her convictions on four offences relating to marijuana grow-operations and one count of breach of recognizance, as well as seeking leave to appeal her sentence.

She argued that her guilty pleas were invalid because she was uninformed of immigration consequences, that the facts did not support her pleas, that her counsel was in a conflict of interest, and that she was deprived of effective assistance of counsel.

She also challenged the sentence as unfit due to failure to consider immigration consequences and claimed the forfeiture orders were grossly disproportionate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and denied leave to appeal sentence, finding the guilty pleas were informed, no conflict of interest existed, the appellant received effective assistance of counsel, and the forfeiture orders were part of the accepted plea offer.

The appellant was convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

He appealed the conviction, arguing his arrest was unlawful, evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

He also appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in concluding there were objective grounds for the arrest based on the totality of circumstances, including a confidential informant tip and police surveillance.

The court also upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis and found no error in the assessment of evidence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the four-year term was fit and within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break, enter, and theft under $5,000, and sought leave to appeal his sentence of six months' imprisonment and 24 months' probation.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by excluding spontaneous exculpatory statements, reversing the onus of proof regarding alibi evidence, and failing to caution himself on eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or assessment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered the mitigating factors and the sentence was not unfit.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him to France for attempted murder.

The applicant argued that the Minister lacked authority to order surrender for attempted murder because the Authority to Proceed was limited to aggravated assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's decision was reasonable and that the Minister is not required to align the surrender offence with the offence listed in the Authority to Proceed.

The appellant was convicted of multiple historical sexual offences and assault causing bodily harm against two of his daughters.

At trial, extensive evidence of the appellant's uncharged violent behaviour and strict discipline was admitted without objection.

The trial judge failed to provide a promised limiting instruction prohibiting propensity reasoning based on this bad character evidence.

Furthermore, the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that they could not use the evidence of one complainant to bolster or confirm the credibility of the other.

The Court of Appeal found these omissions constituted errors in law, allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, a commercial truck driver, was convicted of importing cocaine after 53 kilograms of cocaine were found hidden in his trailer.

At trial, the Crown introduced an expert police report on the use of commercial vehicles for transporting contraband.

The report contained both general opinions and case-specific opinions regarding the appellant's credibility and knowledge of the drugs.

The Court of Appeal held that the case-specific opinions were inadmissible as they usurped the role of the trier of fact.

Finding that the trial judge improperly relied on this inadmissible evidence to conclude the appellant knew about the cocaine, the majority allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, a youth sentenced as an adult, appealed his conviction for first degree murder arising from a stabbing on a city bus.

The appellant, who was the initial aggressor in an attempted robbery, argued the trial judge erred by refusing to leave self-defence under ss. 34(2) and 35 of the Criminal Code to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the self-defence claims.

The court held it was unreasonable for the appellant to believe the victim's resistance was an unlawful assault under s. 34(2), and there was no evidence the appellant attempted to retreat as required by s. 35.

The appellant appealed his convictions for incest and sexual assault, as well as his four-year concurrent sentences.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, shifted the burden of proof, and misapplied the W.D. test for credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons demonstrated a firm grasp of the evidence, properly applied the burden of proof, and accurately reflected the W.D. framework.

The sentence was also upheld as the finding of a pattern of assaults was reasonable.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 12-month sentence for offences including assault and transmitting an STI (Herpes II) to the complainant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant knew he was infected and engaged in unprotected sex, constituting a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable person.

The court also found no error in the assault conviction or the refusal to impose a conditional sentence, noting the appellant was on probation for domestic assault at the time.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who was nearly 18 at the time of the offence, was convicted of second degree murder for the brutal killing of an elderly neighbour during a planned robbery.

The trial judge sentenced the appellant as an adult to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for seven years, finding that a youth sentence would not be of sufficient length to hold him accountable or protect the public.

The appellant appealed the adult sentence, arguing the trial judge overemphasized the seriousness of the offence and failed to recognize the similar lengths of youth and adult sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly balanced all statutory factors and correctly recognized that an adult sentence provides necessary life-long state supervision.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in law by presiding over the trial after having conducted the pre-trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that while judges who conduct pre-trials should generally avoid conducting the trial, it is not a per se reversible error.

Absent clear objection from counsel and any prejudice, the trial judge's decision to seize herself with the trial was not an error in law.

The court also upheld the trial judge's factual findings that the appellant followed the complainant, made threatening gestures, and rammed her vehicle.

The appellant appealed his sentence for an illegal entry offence.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge was entitled to impose the maximum penalty given the pattern of the appellant's crimes and association with illegal entries.

Although the sentencing judge did not clearly enunciate the credit given for pretrial custody, the total sentence imposed was fit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for counselling to commit aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge's reasons were insufficient regarding his intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge implicitly but clearly rejected the appellant's evidence and properly applied the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The reasons were deemed sufficient under the Sheppard standard.

The appellant was charged with possession of marijuana after a small amount was found in her purse during a routine security screening at the entrance of a courthouse.

She argued that the warrantless search violated her rights under s. 8 of the Charter.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge both rejected this argument and convicted her.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the search was authorized by law, the law was reasonable given the vital objective of ensuring courthouse safety, and the search was carried out in a reasonable manner.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction on three grounds, primarily arguing that the trial judge's jury charge on reasonable doubt was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the charge did not strictly comply with Lifchus, the jury would not have misunderstood the standard of proof given the W.(D.) instruction on the alibi defence.

The court also found no merit to the argument that cross-examination was improperly curtailed.

The appellants, a mother and son, were convicted of first-degree murder in the death of the mother's husband.

The son admitted to killing the deceased but claimed self-defence, defence of his mother, or provocation, citing a history of severe domestic abuse by the deceased.

The Crown's theory was that the appellants conspired to kill the deceased for insurance money.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding self-defence, party liability, the use of co-accused statements, the standard of proof for reasonable doubt, and the need for a Vetrovec warning for unsavoury Crown witnesses.

The son also argued the Crown's cross-examination was abusive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and concluding that the cross-examination, while aggressive, did not compromise trial fairness.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction, raising several grounds including errors in the jury charge regarding reasonable doubt, failure to give a Vetrovec warning, improper comments on the evidence, and the admission of crime scene photographs and prior statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.