Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - ONCA

The appellant, an Ontario lawyer, appealed a summary judgment recognizing and enforcing an Italian court judgment against him for professional misconduct in a failed joint venture.

The Court of Appeal applied the Van Breda test, finding that the tort was committed in Italy, which established a presumptive real and substantial connection.

The court also dismissed the appellant's arguments regarding a denial of natural justice and fraud on the foreign court, noting he had notice of the allegations but chose not to participate in the Italian proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants abandoned their appeal from the order of Justice R. John Harper.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned and noted that the cross-claim had been withdrawn, with no costs awarded.

The moving parties brought a motion to set aside an order requiring them to post security for costs of their appeal.

The underlying appeal was from a summary judgment dismissing their action against the responding parties.

The moving parties argued the summary judgment order was made without jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in their position and dismissed the motion, awarding costs to the responding parties.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their application for pre-certification production of automotive pricing information from a non-party, JATO Dynamics Ltd. The appellants argued the motion judge applied the wrong test under Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and ignored factors from the Ballard Estate decision.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge conducted an appropriate Rule 30.10 analysis and properly exercised his discretion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Class counsel appealed a motion judge's order fixing their fees at $14.5 million instead of the requested $27.5 million following the settlement of a class action regarding payday loans.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge did not err in applying section 32(4) rather than the base fee/multiplier approach in section 33(7) of the Class Proceedings Act, as the fee agreement was not approved by the court.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's decision to treat the fees of consultants and other lawyers retained on a contingency basis as disbursements.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, ruling that the representative plaintiff's $3,000 compensation should be paid out of the settlement fund rather than out of class counsel fees.

The appellants' farm property was destroyed by fire.

They sued the respondent volunteer firefighters and township for negligence.

The trial judge found the respondents breached a professional standard by failing to conduct an adequate size-up of the fire scene, but dismissed the action, concluding their fire attack plan was reasonable and the destruction was inevitable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge's conclusions on breach and reasonableness were contradictory, and his causation analysis was materially incomplete because it relied on a theory of inevitability whose factual foundation was disproven at trial.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision enforcing a settlement agreement.

The appellant argued that the timing of an $80,000 payment and a letter of reference were essential terms not agreed upon.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the timing of payment was peripheral to the contract's formation, and refusing to hear the letter of reference issue as it was not raised below.

An Ontario car dealer purchased a vehicle originally from Québec and sold it to an Ontario wholesaler.

At the time, a finance company had an unregistered security interest in the vehicle under Québec law, which it registered 12 days later.

Under the Civil Code of Québec, this registration was retroactive.

The finance company sued the Ontario purchasers to enforce its security interest.

The trial judge found for the finance company, holding that the purchasers' presumed good faith was rebutted by their failure to act with due diligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the purchasers' appeal, determining that the standard of review for foreign law is correctness, and agreeing that the purchasers' failure to take prudent steps to verify title rebutted the presumption of good faith under Québec law.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its motion to stay or dismiss the action on jurisdictional grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the dispute did not arise 'in connection with' the Confidentiality Agreement, and therefore the arbitration clause did not apply.

The Court also agreed that there was a real and substantial connection between Ontario and the subject matter of the action, and found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's determination that Ontario was the forum conveniens.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000.

The appellant received a retroactive lump sum payment for a Canada Pension Plan disability pension and brought a proposed class action claiming interest on the payment.

The Attorney General moved to strike the statement of claim.

The motion judge struck the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment but allowed the claims based on constructive trust and the inherent power of the court to award interest to proceed.

On appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal held that it was plain and obvious that none of the claims could succeed, as the comprehensive statutory scheme of the Canada Pension Plan does not provide for the payment of interest on benefits.

The appeal was dismissed, the cross-appeal was allowed, and the action was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action against the respondents.

The motion judge had struck the claim on the basis that deputy judges are immune from civil liability, the action constituted a collateral attack and abuse of process, and the claim disclosed no cause of action.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellants opened a hydro account personally in 1967.

In 1975, they incorporated a business which thereafter paid the account.

The trial judge found the appellants remained personally liable for the account because there was no evidence of assignment or novation to the corporation.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim for adverse possession of a parking space between 1984 and 1995.

The Court of Appeal noted disagreement with the trial judge's definition of adverse possession but upheld the result, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's rejection of the appellants' evidence regarding the extent of their use of the space.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $7,500.

The Court of Appeal ordered a lawyer to personally pay $5,000 in costs thrown away due to the adjournment of an appeal.

The order was made pursuant to Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, based solely on the lawyer's failure to take appropriate action to enable the court to hear the appeal in a timely manner, despite several orders and directions establishing timelines.

The appellants appealed a judgment of Justice Snowie.

The Court of Appeal reluctantly adjourned the appeal due to allegations in a fresh evidence motion and a recent change of solicitors by the respondents.

The new hearing date was made peremptory on the respondents.

The court set a timetable for responding materials, cross-examinations, and factums.

Costs of the day were reserved to allow the respondents' former counsel an opportunity to respond to submissions that he should pay the costs personally.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, had a pending civil action against the respondent law firm.

The trustee in bankruptcy took no steps regarding the action and was subsequently discharged.

Years later, the bankrupt's status to pursue the action was challenged, prompting the trustee to solicit offers for its interest in the action.

The bankrupt moved for an order that the trustee assign the action to him, which was granted by the Deputy Registrar but reversed on appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the bankrupt's appeal, holding that under section 40(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the trustee's prolonged inaction indicated the property was incapable of realization, and it was too late for the trustee to assert an interest.

The Court of Appeal reviewed written submissions regarding the costs of an appeal.

The court declined to award costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

Costs of the appeal were fixed in favour of the respondent at $12,500 inclusive of GST and disbursements.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action on summary judgment.

The motions judge found the action was statute-barred because the cause of action accrued more than six years before the Statement of Claim was issued.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, applying the principle that a cause of action accrues once the plaintiff knows some damage has occurred and has identified the tortfeasor.

The court found the appellant's letter sent prior to the limitation period demonstrated his awareness of the respondents' conduct and the resulting damages.

In an addendum on costs following an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded the respondents their costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $13,099.75 inclusive of disbursements and GST, having regard to their success on appeal, the complexity of the issues, and their Bill of Costs.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against an obstetrician following a birth resulting in severe brain damage.

The trial judge had dismissed the action by finding no negligence, without first resolving the conflicting evidence on causation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, applying the principle from Meringolo that a trial judge must determine the cause of the injury before addressing whether the defendant breached the standard of care.