COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

DATE: 2026-02-17 DOCKET: COA-25-CV-0207

Sossin, Copeland and Madsen JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Aqib Rahman Plaintiff (Appellant)

and

Peel Standard Condominium Corporation No. 779 Defendant (Respondent)

Aqib Rahman, acting in person

Rory Love, for the respondent

Heard: February 5, 2026

On appeal from the order of Justice Irving W. Andre of the Superior Court of Justice dated January 30, 2025.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1] The appellant, Aqib Rahman ("Mr. Rahman"), appeals from an order dismissing his claim as an abuse of process and requiring him to seek leave from the court before bringing future proceedings against the respondent, Peel Standard Condominium Corporation No. 779 ("Peel"), or its counsel.

[2] By way of brief background, Mr. Rahman brought an action against Peel in which he sought a range of relief including damages for breach of fiduciary duty, defamation, discrimination, and fraud. Peel denied all allegations, pleaded that the action was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and asserted that Mr. Rahman was attempting to relitigate issues that had already been raised in other actions. It sought the dismissal of Mr. Rahman's action.

[3] Both parties brought motions. Mr. Rahman brought a motion for summary judgment in which he set out twelve grounds purporting to justify his claim, largely distilling assertions in his statement of claim. Peel responded with a motion pursuant to r. 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 (the "Rules") in which it sought to strike out Mr. Rahman's claims for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action or on the grounds that the action was frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process. Peel asserted, in part, that Mr. Rahman's claims were barred under the doctrines of res judicata, cause of action estoppel, issue estoppel, and collateral attack.

[4] The motion judge heard both motions at the same time. He considered the history between the parties, noting that the origin of the dispute was the use of a designated accessible parking spot at the condominium location -- a dispute in which Mr. Rahman prevailed. The condominium authority tribunal and subsequently the Divisional Court confirmed Mr. Rahman's right to use that spot: see Peel Standard Condominium Corp. No. 779 v. Rahman, 2023 ONSC 3758. However, the dispute has morphed into a multitude of proceedings. The motion judge noted the existence of several ongoing civil matters, Mr. Rahman's efforts to have former counsel for Peel criminally charged, and his complaints to the Judicial Council about various justices involved in the matter. The motion judge also noted the decision of the Superior Court between the same parties, in which the court stated: "Mr. Rahman runs a significant risk that on a motion by an opposing party for such a declaration, the court will declare him a vexatious litigant": Rahman v. PSCC No. 779, 2023 ONSC 3834.

[5] The motion judge concluded that Mr. Rahman's action should be dismissed pursuant to the doctrines of res judicata and abuse of process. In line with the applicable legal principles, he determined that Mr. Rahman's allegations appeared no different than those raised in prior proceedings: see Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460. Indeed, a review of statements of claim before the court confirm this characterization. We see no basis to intervene in this conclusion.

[6] Having said that, the motion judge also ordered that Mr. Rahman "should seek leave from the court before he can bring any future court proceeding against the defendant or its counsel." This relief was not sought in Peel's notice of motion and appears to have been addressed for the first time in oral argument.

[7] While the self-represented appellant did not raise this issue on appeal it was put to the parties in oral argument during the hearing.

[8] This portion of the order must be set aside. While the vexatious litigant order is permitted under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (the "CJA"), given the gravity of the relief and the impact on any litigant so designated, there are procedural requirements under r. 2.2 of the Rules that must be followed: McLean v. Connell, 2025 ONCA 495, at paras. 18, 22-23. These requirements include but are not limited to: a) notice (r. 2.2.03(4) if sought by party or r. 2.2.04(1) if on judge's own initiative); and b) an opportunity to respond (r. 2.2.05). Any order to this effect must also include reference to the right of appeal or review under s. 140(2.3) of the CJA (r. 2.2.07(5)). None of these requirements were met in this case.

[9] Even if a vexatious litigant order would appear warranted on the record before the court, it cannot stand when the appropriate procedure was not followed and a party's right to a fair hearing on the issue was compromised: Kalaba v. Bylykbashi, 265 D.L.R. (4th) 320, at paras. 50-51.

Disposition

[10] Clause 2 of the order under appeal is deleted. The remainder of the order continues with full force and effect. The appeal is otherwise dismissed.

[11] Costs are payable by Mr. Rahman to Peel in the amount of $5,000.

"L. Sossin J.A." "J. Copeland J.A." "L. Madsen J.A."